measure with great efficiency and dispatch even in the face of some question concerning certain features of the proposal. Senator EAGLETON deserves our highest commendation.

APPOINTMENTS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Allen in the chair). On behalf of the Vice President, the Chair, under the provisions of Public Law 84–689, appoints the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) to attend the North Atlantic Assembly, to be held at Brussels, Belgium, on October 16–21, 1969.

The Chair also appoints the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. YOUNG), vice the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD) and the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), to the North Atlantic Assembly.

ADJOURNMENT TO MONDAY

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon on Monday next.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 5 o'clock and 7 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until Monday, October 6, 1969, at 12 o'clock noon.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate October 3, 1969:

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Casper W. Weinberger, of California, to be a Federal Trade Commissioner for the term of 7 years from September 26, 1969, vice James M. Nicholson, term expired.

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate October 3, 1969:

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Harry D. Steward, of California, to be U.S. attorney for the southern district of California for the term of 4 years.

Jack V. Richardson, of Kansas, to be U.S. marshal for the district of Kansas for the term of 4 years.

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

Helen D. Bentley, of Maryland, to be a Federal Maritime Commissioner for the remainder of the term expiring June 30, 1970.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

Secor D. Browne, of Massachusetts, to be a member of the Civil Aeronautics Board for the term expiring December 31, 1974.

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Isabel A. Burgess, of Arizona, to be a member of the National Transportation Safety Board for the term expiring December 31, 1974.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—*Friday, October 4, 1969*

The House met at 11 o'clock a.m.

The Chaplain, Rev. Edward G. Latch, D.D., offered the following prayer:

God is love and he who abides in love abides in God, and God abides in him.—I John 4: 16.

O God, our Father, we, the Representatives of the people of this Nation, bow before Thee seeking strength for this day and guidance for these hours. Make this moment of prayer a moment when we are aware of Thy presence, a moment when we hear Thy voice calling us to lead our people in the ways of justice, peace, and good will.

Give to us a higher faith and a greater courage to seek to lift the lowly, to strengthen the weak, to encourage the discouraged, and to make this Nation a nation in which men are concerned about their fellow men.

God bless this America of ours and help us to live together with respect for each other and with love in our hearts: through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

LIMITATION OF DEBATE

(Mr. ECKHARDT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ECKHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I rise here at this time to express a reaction to the debate on yesterday and to express a hope that in the debate today it will be possible for an individual to be permitted at least a 1-minute extension in order to answer questions. In this connection I wish to praise the gentleman from Michigan in withdrawing an objection that he made yesterday that I suppose was directed as a rebuke to the efforts to stop such debate. If debate on this floor is to be effective, it is going to be necessary to permit a dialog as well as an intermittent monolog. It seems to me as though the rules of the House do permit a man in the position of the gentleman from Michigan to make the objection he made, just as clearly as they permitted the other gentleman to frustrate debate and dialog by objecting to all extensions of time to permit questions and answers. Unless there is some restraint by the Member in exercising his power to object to the fullest extent, effective debate on this floor is frustrated, and this may be done at the will of a single Member of this House.

INCREASE IN AIR FARES

(Mr. VANIK asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. VANIK. Mr. Speaker, after a 3-percent increase in air fares earlier this year and a 6½-percent increase in air fares effective several days ago, I was appalled to learn that Secor D. Browne, President Nixon's nominee for the Civil Aeronautics Board Chairman, thinks that higher passenger fare boosts may be in order.

Mr. Browne said the Civil Aeronautics Board needs to help the airlines industry portray a "healthy picture" to the investment community to attract funds to pay for major equipment purchases.

This statement of Mr. Browne puts him squarely on the side of the investors rather than the air passengers he is supposed to represent.

The 3-percent increase earlier this year, the 6½-percent rate increase effective October 1, and the proposed 3-percent increase in the commercial air travel tax, coupled with the additional air travel increases suggested by Mr. Browne, will soon reverse the trend toward increased air travel.

Mr. Browne may achieve the distinction of being the first Civil Aeronautics Board Chairman to encourage the return to surface transportation. The appointment of Mr. Browne certainly does not appear to be in the best public interest. He has compromised his position as an impartial Chairman by clearly indicating his support of rate increases even before having assumed office.

I plan to protest Mr. Browne's nomination before the Senate Commerce Committee.

SWEDISH SUPPORT OF HANOI

(Mr. SCHERLE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, the many fine American military personnel of Swedish descent serving valiantly in Vietnam must be tragically disappointed by the ungrateful and morale-defeating attitude of the mother country to which they bear close ethnic and emotional ties in her harsh snub to the United States. Sweden, the European haven for American deserters and draft dodgers, has just announced plans to support Hanoi to the tune of $40 million in loans and grants over a 3-year period. State Department information indicates that these are scheduled to begin next July 1. In other words "Sweden will roll the spit balls while Hanoi throws them."

Before Sweden can give these millions to an avowed enemy of the United States we should insist this "professionally neutral" country repay the balance of the $79.1 million borrowed from the Export-Import Bank which is wholly American supported. Even though amendments to the Export-Import Bank legislation demand a complete credit cutoff to any country aiding North Vietnam, those provisions do not go into effect before the fact, and Sweden could continue to borrow hard-earned American dollars until next July. Furthermore, Swedish Foreign Minister Torsten Nilson said that after North Vietnam Sweden would greatly increase its aid to Cuba.

The United States has always considered Sweden a friend worth aiding both financially and with favorable trade agreements, but it is the height of folly for this country to support those who give aid and cash comfort to our enemies.

Apparently this friendship is a one-way street.

A FREE-TALKING NONVOTING SENATOR FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

(Mr. ABERNETHY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ABERNETHY. Mr. Speaker, while en route home last night I had the radio of my car on. I heard from a newscaster that the other body had on the day before taken the very unusual and presumptious step of passing a bill to enlarge the House of Representatives. If any Member of the other body consulted with Members of this body about the enlargement of the House then I know nothing about it. On inquiry made of several this morning I found that they knew nothing about such a move.

In any event, on reaching the office this morning I checked the RECORD and found that, just as the radio man said, a bill had passed the other body to place a free-talking, nonvoting delegate in the House of Representatives for and on behalf of the District of Columbia.

I also noticed that Members of the other body were so impressed with this measure that they passed it without any debate or any discussion whatsoever. It was merely called up, read a third time, and passed; and that was that.

A delegate for the District might be a good thing. On the contrary such might be a nuisance, as many over this way feel. If, however, the District is to have a delegate in the Congress, I am sure our friends in the other body would want the District to have the very best. This gentleman would represent approximately 850,000 people, a number equal to more than the population of several States of the Union which have two Senators.

The other end of the Capitol has so much more to offer a free-talking, nonvoting delegate. Office space over there is considerably more commodious. Their office staffs are much larger. I went over and took a fresh look at their Chamber this morning. They have a considerable amount of space that is not being utilized. They have excellent floor desks, while we have only simple seats in this Chamber. A free-talking, nonvoting delegate would fit so nicely into that vacant space and one of those fine desks. Furthermore the opportunity to talk over there is greater than the opportunity for such in the House. Debate is not limited and once the delegate gets the floor he can talk, and talk, and talk. It is also to be noted that the acoustics over there are much better than in the House. Thus, in that body the delegate would have a much better opportunity of being heard. It is also worthy of note that committee meetings are frequently televised. This would offer the delegate a greater opportunity for publicity.

If a District delegate were authorized for the other body he would have a 6-year term, whereas in the House he would have to run every other year, which I think would be a bit degrading for one who represents such a large and enlightened constituency as the District of Columbia.

So in order that the District of Columbia may have the best, I am introducing a bill this morning to place a free-talking, nonvoting delegate in the other body, who shall take his seat over there for a 6-year term on being so elected by the citizens of the District of Columbia.

But before this measure is considered by the Members of the House of Representatives, I would recommend that Members of the other body be accorded an opportunity to express their views thereon in appropriate hearings before the House District Committee. And I would certainly recommend that the bill not be called up and considered in the House until the other body had first passed such a measure.

AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 1970, AND RESERVE STRENGTH

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 14000) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from South Carolina.

The motion was agreed to.

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill H.R. 14000, with Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee rose on yesterday, it had agreed that title II of the bill would be considered as read and open to amendment at any point.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. Evidently a quorum is not present. The Clerk will call the roll.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 197]

Alexander	Clay	Fuqua
Annunzio	Colmer	Gallagher
Ashbrook	Cowger	Gibbons
Aspinall	Cramer	Gray
Barrett	Daddario	Green, Oreg.
Belcher	Davis, Ga.	Hagan
Bell, Calif.	Davis, Wis.	Harvey
Berry	Dawson	Hathaway
Bolling	Delaney	Hays
Brock	Dent	Henderson
Brooks	Dingell	Holifield
Brown, Calif.	Dulski	Hull
Bush	Edwards, La.	Jacobs
Cahill	Erlenborn	Kirwan
Casey	Fallon	Kyros
Celler	Flowers	Lipscomb
Clark	Ford,	McClure
Clawson, Del	William D.	Marsh
Martin	Pelly	Snyder
Mathias	Pepper	Staggers
Mills	Pickle	Sullivan
Mink	Pollock	Talcott
Minshall	Powell	Teague, Tex.
Morse	Quillen	Tunney
Morton	Reid, N.Y.	Whitten
Mosher	Rhodes	Winn
Murphy, N.Y.	St. Onge	Young
Obey	Saylor	

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill H.R. 14000, and finding itself without a quorum, he had directed the roll to be called, when 348 Members responded to their names, a quorum, and he submitted herewith the names of the absentees to be spread upon the Journal.

The Committee resumed its sitting.

Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to pay tribute to the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Honorable L. MENDEL RIVERS, of South Carolina.

During my service on this committee, I have spent literally hundreds of hours in committee sessions, thus giving me an opportunity to closely examine his stewardship. Fairness has always prevailed. Every member, without exception, has been allocated time not only to question witnesses but to express his basic personal philosophy in regard to the various elements of national defense. As one who sits on the minority side, I am pleased to say that in the committee there is never an element of partisanship. He works under the assumption that national defense transcends politics. It has been my pleasure to serve on the committee during both Republican and Democratic administrations, and to watch the response of the chairman to the requests from both administrations. Under his leadership, the committee has challenged basic premises forwarded to us by both administrations. Contrary to the expressed statements of some, this committee is not and has never been a rubberstamp for the Pentagon. The only thing that we try to insure is the best security posture available for our national defense.

To achieve this nonpartisan spirit is due in large part to the leadership of our chairman, whom I consider one of the hardest working and most dedicated men in Congress.

During these last few days, we have seen his immense knowledge of national defense matters. This is based upon his many years of specialization while a member and, later, chairman of the Armed Services Committee. Not only does he understand the past and the current situations but he also has an insight into the national defense required for the future.

This bill that we are considering reflects his view as well as the view of the majority of our committee as to the defense needs in the middle and late 1970's.

I, for one, commend his leadership and publicly acclaim that I am happy to be a part of a committee of which he is the chairman.

Mr. LANDRUM. Mr. Chairman, I

move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, it is a great pleasure to join the distinguished Member from New York, a member of the Armed Services Committee, in paying tribute to the fine leadership MENDEL RIVERS provides for the Armed Services Committee of this House.

Down through the years of its life the Armed Services Committee has enjoyed distinguished, effective and forceful leadership. The illustrious predecessor of the present occupant of the chairmanship of the Committee on Armed Services was a Georgian who served in this House longer than any other man, 50 years.

Carl Vinson, still alive, active, keenly alert to all of the problems of the day, and everyday thinking in terms of what his beloved Armed Services Committee is doing, is basking in the sunlight of the success of its distinguished chairman, for MENDEL RIVERS was one of Carl Vinson's most beloved associates and one of his really effective Members.

I am glad to see this committee, at this critical time in our history, continue to have the constructive leadership it has had over the years of its history. I am glad to join the gentleman from New York in publicly acclaiming my respect for his achievements as chairman, for the candor with which he presents the facts to this House, and for the effectiveness which he continues to bring to this important committee.

If I might add, in a facetious way, perhaps, the one thing I see lacking in the present chairman's leadership of the committee is his not taking advantage of the lesson he should have learned from his predecessor, Mr. Vinson. It was said that Mr. Vinson often had trouble with some of his Members, and that when he did he just issued a travel authorization and put them in orbit around to various points over the globe. The story is told that one day, up in the Rules Committee, when the distinguished former Member, Howard Smith, its chairman, said, "Now, Mr. Vinson, I understand you rule your committee with an iron hand," he replied, "No. No. I do not do any such thing." "But," said Judge Smith, "Mr. Vinson, I understand that when one of your committee members gets a little out of line, a little obstreperous, you just send him around the world some place and get him out of the way." And Vinson replied, "That is right. That is right. I have got three in the air right now."

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, at times in debate it is only natural that we should become irritated and say things that we should not. There have been things said on this floor in this debate that should never have been said. There have been Members who in debate have made remarks alleging that they were unfairly treated in the Armed Services Committee. Their statements should never have been made for these statements are not factual. I want to say that I have been on that committee for about 17 years, and I have served under three chairmen, each of whom were great and dedicated Americans. I further want to say also I have never seen a member treated unfairly on that committee. As for this legislation, if anyone wants to look over the hearings, they will see that the members who are alleging unfair treatment, as to the lack of time they were given, the record will describe that these members actually took up more of the committee time than anyone else did on that committee. I do not want to be critical of them. They are fine gentlemen and friends of mine. But I believe in all fairness to themselves, to the Armed Services Committee and to this body, that they should admit the error before this debate finishes. I have not always agreed with the chairman of this committee, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS), but I want to say that at times I have disagreed with him but I have always been treated fairly. I am proud to be a member of that committee and I am deeply proud to serve under his leadership. He is a great American and a capable, fair dedicated leader. Further than that I want to say—and perhaps all of you are not aware of this—that there is no such thing as minority and majority counsel on the Armed Services Committee and there never has been. When we go into that committee we try to set aside partisan politics. We may have made mistakes, but I assure you it has not been mistakes from the heart. I thought maybe it would be a good idea to pour a little oil on the troubled waters before any unfair remarks are made in this body about a committee which I am deeply proud to serve on and I am deeply proud to serve under those three chairmen.

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, near the close of business yesterday there was an interesting colloquy between the gentleman from Washington and the gentleman from New York. Since it raised a question as to the justification for the F–14 it indirectly raised a question as to the need for our naval attack carrier forces.

I have listened to this debate and I have read during the past several months the arguments of those who seek to prevent or to delay the construction of two nuclear aircraft carriers of the *Nimitz* class.

It seems to me that these arguments, by and large, reflect a failure to comprehend or to appreciate the task and the effectiveness of our attack carrier forces. Moreover, they seem to reflect a natural reaction of those who are land oriented with the result there is a fatal failure to properly consider the strategy required to protect our national interest in our world, the area of which is 75 percent water. These arguments seem to ignore the fact that our Nation is in essence an island in these seas. They seem to ignore the fact that unlike the Soviet Union, mainland China, or Germany in World Wars I and II, we have no contiguous land mass over which we can move to protect our national interest and over which we can transport our supplies.

The incontrovertible fact is that the United States is forced to rely upon a free use of the seas for the importation of vital resources and the implementation of its international policies. Our current experience in Vietnam offers a sterling example of this latter fact where, despite our tremendous technological developments in airlift capabilities, 98 percent of all of the men and material delivered to that area have been transported there by sea.

This Nation, if it is to be strong, has no choice but to keep world sea lanes free and open to its use. I fail to see where there is any realistic argument to the fact that the primary means of providing the offensive and defensive power essential to achieving and maintaining that use is the naval attack carrier force.

I am frankly amazed at some of the arguments we have heard during this debate which reflect a complete lack of understanding of the operations of an attack carrier force and its flexibility. One example of this occurred yesterday during discussion of the F–14 aircraft for the fleet. At one point a serious inquiry was made, obviously questioning the need for an up-to-date fighter plane for the fleet, as to what potential carrier threats do we face and what potential enemy fleet is there against which we would use a new fighter aircraft. Obviously this question deals with but a small part of the issue. It ignores completely the multiuses to which a carrier based fighter aircraft can be put. They are fighter planes, yes, because they possess the capability to engage enemy aircraft in aerial combat, but they are also available for air and sea search and reconnaissance, for defense of the fleet whether attacked by sea or air, as delivery vehicles for bomb, rocket, and strafing attacks as well as a vehicle for the close air support of ground forces.

Furthermore, it should be clearly understood that preparation for engagement with an enemy fleet is only part of the task of our attack carrier forces. They must be able to successfully engage and dominate land based aircraft of a potential enemy not only to properly defend itself but to establish air superiority in hostile areas when needed so as to permit amphibious operations, debarkation of troops and material on foreign soil and to permit the development of land based airfields for use by the Air Force.

I do not intend to depreciate the need for or the effectiveness of submarines, the Air Force, the Army or the Marines or our amphibious forces. If we are to remain strong we need them all. What I do say, however, is that unless we insure the use of the seas and unless we maintain an effective attack carrier force necessary to that objective, the full effectiveness and deployment of all the rest of our Armed Forces will be dangerously crippled.

Isolated as we are by oceans and seas, we have no realistic alternative to the attack carrier forces in terms of mobility and flexibility. It is a fact that aircraft based aboard an attack carrier force can reach those areas on our globe which are inhabitated by 95 percent of the earth's population and which include 85 percent of the areas included in our contingency plans. There is no alternative force which can perform a similar task.

Our attack carrier forces afford this Nation with a full range of options running from the mere establishment of

presence or show of force to engagement in conventional warfare and to participation in nuclear holocaust. There is no alternative force or system which will afford a similar range of options.

The attack carrier force is free to move without the necessity of international agreement or contention with local political threats. No other force or system has this capability.

The nuclear attack carrier force has the ability to move to any area of the world to carry out national policy while maintaining the capability to defend itself by its mobility, its weapons systems and its aircraft. No other force or system possesses the same capability.

Construction of CVAN–69 and CVAN–70 is vital to our future ability to utilize the sea because each of them is scheduled to replace smaller aircraft carriers which primarily due to their advanced age are less effective than their replacements will be. Indeed the deficiencies that flow from the aging of our current attack carrier force is more than evident in the fact that of the 15 carriers now assigned to that service, seven are of World War II vintage and five will be unable to utilize the aircraft needed in the 1970's to assure us superiority of our potential enemies.

We cannot afford to permit our attack carrier force to continue to age without replacement nor should we refuse to employ new technology which will modernize that force commensurate with modern military requirements.

The best assurance we have against war, particularly general war, lies in maintaining that high degree of strength which will deter our potential enemies from attacking us. If we fail to maintain, as an integral part of that strength, an effective modern attack carrier force then all of our other efforts in this direction will no longer be credible.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. LEGGETT

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. LEGGETT: On page 4, line 5, after the words "Air Force," strike "$3,241,200,000" and insert "$3,218,200,000".

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I do not think I am going to take 5 minutes to explain this amendment. I think this debate is almost all over but the shouting. In this last research and development title we have only amendments amounting to less than $100 million left in the $21.5 billion bill. My effort in this amendment is to strike $23 million for the AMSA research and development aircraft. I am not against an advanced manned supersonic attack aircraft. I think we should have a bomber capability and a good bomber capability into the indefinite future. I support a manned capability to complement our ICBM system and similar other capabilities. However, the $23 million for this program was added as an afterthought by the DOD. The original budget item in the beginning of the year was $77 million. I think that the House should understand that we are sowing the seeds in this amendment here and in this particular provision for a rather phenomenal expenditure in the foreseeable future.

The advanced manned supersonic bomber really is urged, I guess, or the acceleration is urged by a lot of people who are disappointed that we abandoned the B–70 bomber some years ago. It seems very sensible to me. The fact is that on the B–70, unfortunately, we missed the true concept, and we spent $3 billion on the airplane. We built three of them, one crashed, and one is in a museum. But this was a big airplane. It was valueless because it could not go supersonic at a very low altitude, and we felt it would be a sitting duck in the middle 1970's or 1980's when we needed this kind of capability.

So now we are moving ahead again, trying to rectify that error, and I think we should. But when we move too fast, as we did, I believe, with the C–5A aircraft—and you look at the majority report and at their explanation on why we spent $1.5 billion overrun on the C–5A development, and they say it is because of the fact that we moved too fast; we moved too fast in the development program, and we did not wait for all of the tests.

I would say that if you accept my amendment we are still left with $77 million to develop the AMSA aircraft.

I am not making the same amendments that have been made in the Senate against any manned bombers in the seventies. But I think we to go slow, because when you build a 400,000-pound aircraft and you try to make it go supersonic on the deck—I would anticipate that the total cost for this airplane, which is going to be at least five times the size of the $15 million F–111 bomber, that we now have coming into inventory, we are going to run up a cost of between $50 to $80 million a unit. We need 250 of these, if we need any, so we are talking about an expenditure in the next 5 or 6 years around the order of $15 to $20 billion. I do not believe we should rush headlong into this expenditure, because it is going to hypothecate the taxes of our children for a very long period in the future.

I believe also if anybody on this floor is interested in economy, this is the place to economize.

I know it has been said that the Soviets have miscellaneous types of bombers, and the doctor—Dr. HALL— is quite right in talking about the things that they have, but they are all one-way bombers, if they want to bomb the United States, and I do not think they are going to do that, they do not have the 6,000-mile-range bombers we have at the present time.

I think we need it, but I do not think we need it quite as fast as some think we do.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, can the gentleman advise the Members if the Russians are going ahead with any modern strategic bombers? Does the gentleman have any information on that?

Mr. LEGGETT. I understand the Soviets do not have long-range strategic bombers at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, we oppose the amendment. I said before the Committee on Rules that the Russians do have a bomber.

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. RIVERS

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move that all debate on this amendment close at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from South Carolina.

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend our chairman for the inclusion of authorization for development of a modern, inexpensive free world fighter. For many years we have supplied fighter aircraft to a number of free world countries under the military assistance program. Many of these aircraft were older U.S. types which are not obsolete and which would be no match for the Russian Mig in an air-to-air encounter.

It is estimated that there are now over 3,000 Mig fighters of various models in the hands of Communist countries, including Southeast Asia. Any Mig over its home grounds, under ground intercept control, is a formidable defensive fighter. It has given a good account of itself against our first-line fighters in Southeast Asia. On the other hand we do not consider the Mig's to be offensive aircraft since they don't carry much of a bomb load very far.

It is now necessary to modernize the free world forces so they may execute their defense responsibilities in the interest of their own national security.

It is also in our national interest and in support of our national policy, as part of the modernization of the free world forces, that a tactical fighter aircraft be provided to them that is capable of doing the job against the Mig. It must also be easy to maintain and be within the overall means of all of our allies to own and to operate. It must be an aircraft whose very presence is a deterrent and should this deterrent fail posses capabilities sufficient to handle any intruder. It must be a competitor to foreign-developed aircraft which are now being sold to those allied countries who can pay for their own defense requirements. But many free world nations, now equipped with old and operationally deficient tactical fighter aircraft are facing Communist bloc air forces equipped with significantly greater numbers of modern Soviet aircraft.

While there has been some modernization of friendly air forces, the Soviet bloc is already far ahead in this area. Over 500 MIG's were in North Korea at the time of the *Pueblo* incident. Moreover, the Russians have followed a continuing policy of increasing the quality and quantity of the tactical aircraft provided to the nations they support. They have done this because they recognize that it is far more effective and cheaper than deploying their regular air force units to their satellite countries. This is clear evidence of a worldwide plan to use

fighter aircraft to support their political objectives.

In 1952 the Congress voted $6 billion for military assistance. The fiscal year 1970 budget request is for $375 million, for which only $98 million is for air force. Many of us are gravely concerned by this drastic curtailment in our military assistance funding. For us to diminish our presence in Asia without concern for the ability of the free nations of Asia to defend themselves is unthinkable. This is especially true now at this important point in history when a relatively small investment by us in assistance to them to strengthen themselves can yield so much.

A fighter intended for home air defense can be fairly small and simple. It does not need complex radar aboard, for it can depend on instructions from ground-based radar—GCI—to direct it toward the intruding aircraft. An offensive fighter, on the other hand, must be capable of operating deep into enemy territory outside the range of its ground radar control; to do this at night or in foul weather, requiring it to have complex avionics on board. It must also have a large fuel capacity for long range, thus making it a heavy and more expensive aircraft. I do not propose this type of fighter for South Vietnam.

The Department of Defense has informed me of the need to procure a new fighter suitable for the tasks I have described. It is the Department of Defense estimate that such a fighter could be available for service operations within 2½ to 3 years given early authorization to proceed.

To expedite this program the committee proposes in the bill before you $48 million for R.D.T. & E. and $4 million long lead procurement for a new free world fighter. This will lead to availability of a fighter that will have excellent performance and economy of operation and maintenance. If we do not produce an inexpensive fighter for the tasks mentioned above, we will find it necessary to furnish very expensive, sophisticated aircraft such as F–4 or F–15 types to the free world countries needing assistance.

The ultimate quantity to be needed is considered sufficient to assure relatively low unit cost, on the order of half of what the United States is now paying for its sophisticated air-to-air fighters. If we do not have a modern but relatively inexpensive fighter available for sale to our allies who can afford to upgrade their own air defense capabilities they will turn to aircraft designed in other countries.

I strongly urge the approval of this authorization for a new free world fighter. Our allies have some modern aircraft but it must be recognized that the bulk of their tactical aircraft inventory is made up of aircraft which cannot operate in an active Mig environment. There is a need now to provide our allies with a tactical aircraft inventory capable of neutralizing the Mig–21. Our aim and theirs should be to increase their capability, individually and collectively, to contain their own local threats and to make permanent deployment and involvement of U.S. Air Force unnecessary. If we in the future are able to reduce the expensive deployment of our own air forces around the world, it will only be because we equip those nations showing a will to defend themselves with tactical equipment having performance adequate to the need and within the resources available them.

If we are to achieve this objective of reducing deployment of U.S. military forces in Asia it is essential that the provisions of this bill be passed. And that the proposed amendment be defeated.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a division.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry. Is the Chair counting Members now who are opposed to or in favor of the amendment?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is counting Members who are in favor of the motion of the gentleman from South Carolina that debate now close on the amendment.

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. FRASER), there were—ayes 53, noes 21.

So the motion was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT).

The amendment was rejected.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. LEGGETT

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. LEGGETT: On page 4, line 5, after the words "Air Force," strike "$3,241,200,000" and insert "$3,189,000,000".

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, this is the Freedom Fighter amendment which would cut out $52,000,000 apportioned for the alleged world Freedom Fighter.

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. The addition of $52 million by the Armed Services Committee is for the development of an inexpensive aircraft that we can furnish our allies around the world through sales and the military assistance program. This is, in my judgment, a wise move, and one which should be applauded—not criticized.

The committee can see the handwriting on the wall just as we all should see it. If we do not develop a free world fighter that can be economically produced, economically maintained, and yet will give the defense necessary to our allies, we will have to furnish them with the very expensive, very sophisticated types such as the F–4, or the new F–15. This would not be sound economy even if we and our allies could afford it.

Recently, the United States has lost foreign sales to competition from France, Sweden, and Russia. The development program supported by the committee's add-on will improve our ability to compete favorably with aircraft produced abroad. For example, the French Mirage has been sold to several countries in South America. Russian Migs have been made available to nations which once looked to us for weapons.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense wrote Chairman RIVERS on September 24 setting forth the need for the development of this type of aircraft. Secretary Packard said:

We believe this is an important program and we hope your Committee will approve this program in connection with its action on the bill.

The Air Force has been assigned the responsibility for the development of this free world fighter. It is necessary that this committee add-on be approved so that they—Air Force—can proceed expeditiously with the program. They cannot be expected to take the development money "out of their hide." It just is not to be found in today's tight budget.

By the development of a modern, high-performance aircraft with a reasonable price tag, the United States will have the opportunity of reclaiming, or at least competing for, a substantial portion of the foreign military sales market which recently has decreased considerably. Not only will this have a favorable impact on the balance-of-payments problem, it would hasten the modernization of the free world air forces, particularly those countries to which we have a heavy commitment such as Korea, Taiwan, and South Vietnam. We will help to keep nations on our side. The authorization proposed by the Armed Services Committee does not call for any particular aircraft or aircraft manufacturer to be considered. It does not give prior approval to any aircraft design, but would leave the Air Force completely free to develop competition for this badly needed fighter.

Modernization of U.S. and allied forces is the great need of the hour. This is a step toward that modernization.

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, the amendment offered by the able gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) to delete funds for the so-called Freedom Fighter deserves the support of every Member of this body who is concerned about the overreaching power of the military-industrial complex. The $52 million included by the committee at the last minute for a plane, which the Air Force does not plan to use, is a blatant example of that power. It is an outright subsidy to a defense contractor—Northrup Aviation—to build a modified F–5 fighter plane for sale abroad.

The Defense Department did not request any funds for this plane in its budget. However, when DOD decided not to seek a fifth squadron of C–5A's, $52 million became available. After a telephone conversation between Secretary Packard and the chairman, the Armed Services Committee transferred the C–5A moneys to the F–5 Freedom Fighter. Although Secretary of Defense Packard backed this conversation up with a letter to the chairman in which he said in order to develop this plane between $40 and $60 million would be needed "depending upon when appropriations are available to us," but only "$4 million for long-leadtime items for fiscal year 1970."

Thus, $52 million have been added to the bill for the F–5–21. However, the commitee has been given no written explanation of costs for the plane.

In March the committee supported a similar subsidy to Northrop Aviation. At

that time, the committee added $14 million in the supplemental military procurement authorization bill for fiscal year 1969. The Department of Defense has neither requested the funds in the budget nor asked the committee for them. Since the Senate did not act on that proposal, it is before us again in a larger sum.

In the hearings on the fiscal year 1969 supplemental procurement authorization at page 535, Gen. Durward Crow, the director of the budget for the Air Force, said concerning this plane:

We are not asking for authorization, sir.

At that time the impetus for the request for the additional $14 million authorization apparently came primarily from the chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

The money in that supplemental was to be used, in Chief Counsel Blandford's words, as an "initial increment for the retooling of the Northrup Aviation plant to go from the production of F–5's to the production of F–5–21" which entails, among other things, a new engine, better radar coverage, and the installation of two machineguns.

The Department of the Air Force, according to the testimony of General Crow, has no plans for utilizing this plane in our own aircraft inventories. In response to a question from our colleague, Congressman PIKE, as to whether the Air Force intended to acquire this plane itself, General Crow replied:

We do not have an approved program for this aircraft in our inventory.

The gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE) went on:

So the purpose of this expenditure is to build a plane which we can sell to other countries, under our military-assistance program.

General Crow affirmed that "that is the primary purpose"—hearings, page 535.

Mr. Chairman, the Air Force will never use this plane. Why should it subsidize a plane which it is not going to use?

I raised some questions on March 27 about the F–5–21 which are still pertinent today:

Has the Armed Services Committee taken over the authority for the military assistance program from the Foreign Affairs Committee?

Is this authorization in conflct with the provisions of the Conte-Long amendment designed to discourage the sale of sophisticated weaponry to underdeveloped countries?

And, most important, is this not another example of our tragic imbalance in spending priorities?

Our cities are rotting, our air is polluted, children are starving, millions suffer from inadequate educational and economic opportunities, and others live in inadequate housing. But do we allocate sufficient resources to alleviate these problems? No. Instead, we use our money to subsidize an already successful aircraft corporation. It is inexcusable to ask the American taxpayers to finance foreign military sales by defense contractors.

This $52 million should be turned to the desperate domestic needs of this country.

I include at this point in the RECORD the very-well-reasoned and pertinent supplemental views on the Freedom Fighter submitted by our colleague the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) who is to be commended for the leadership he has shown throughout this debate:

SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT L. LEGGETT, DEMOCRAT OF CALIFORNIA ON THE FREEDOM FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

In committee I moved to strike $36 million from a $52 million item not in the committee print, the budget or in any formal Air Force communication for an alleged World Freedom Fighter Aircraft. The $52 million surplus arose the day of our committee mark-up as a result of DOD determination not to go ahead with a 5th C–5A squadron. The funds were for long leadtime procurement.

It was stated at the time this item was voted on that the World Freedom Fighter plane was not necessarily the F–5–21 Freedom Fighter Aircraft of Northrop Aviation, but could be any airplane of any company. This has got to be the most bizarre $52 million authorization to ever come out of a congressional committee.

If the United States needs a cheap jet airplane to sell only to foreign governments, let's ask the foreign governments to foot the bill. We've never paid Air Force money in the past to develop a new airplane the Air Force could not use!

Moreover, the project has escalated fourfold since it was last presented to this House.

If you will refer to the Record of March 27, last, at page 7896, you will see that the cost of the more definitive F–5–21 Freedom Fighter only cost $14 million at that time to modify the F–5A's and F–5B's now selling like hotcakes worldwide. *Neither the Air Force nor the Department of Defense has ever asked for these development funds.* My chairman stated last March as follows:

"You will notice in the report that the committee added $14 million to the authorization bill for modifying the F–5 Freedom Fighters—aircraft into an improved version which will be called the F–5–21. By taking advantage of the several improvements that have been funded by Canada, Norway, and the Netherlands, at a cost of more than $50 million, and by installing the increased thrust J85–21 engines, a significant increase in military effectiveness will be attained while retaining the desirable low-cost, high-utilization rates and excellent maneuverable qualities of the F–5 aircraft."

As Representative Arends stated on page 7897:

"First. Why should the United States invest $14 million at this time in an aircraft not in the U.S. inventory? * * * *By minor United States investment* we can take advantage of these and other advances now available to modify the F–5 into an improved production version."

The September *Air Force Space Digest* describes the F–5 as follows:

"F–5A, B FREEDOM FIGHTER

"Lightweight supersonic all-purpose fighter, being furnished U.S. allies under military assistance program, including South Vietnamese AF, and more than a dozen others. Canadair is producing improved versions, 115 for RCAF and 105 for Royal Netherlands Air Force. None is operational in U.S. Air Force, except in training foreign pilots at Williams AFB, Ariz. F–5A is single-seater; F–5B accommodates 2-man crew for training or combat missions. It carries up to 6,200 pounds external stores—armament or fuel—and can take off or land from sod field. Freedom Fighter evolved from USAF T–38 Talon jet trainer. Contractor: Northrop Corp., Norair Div. Powerplant: 2 General Electric J85–13 turbojets, 4,080-pound thrust with afterburner. Later version, including Canada's CF–5, employs J85–15 engine with 4,300 pound thrust. Dimensions: span 26 feet, 5 inches, length 45 feet, 11 inches, height 13 feet. Speed: 1,000 miles per hour. Ceiling: over 50,000 feet. Range: combat, 400 miles; ferry, 2,100 miles with external tanks. Armaments, 2 M39 20-millimeter cannons in nose. Can carry Sidewinder missiles or 2,000-pound bomb, or rockets in combination. Crew: F–5A, one; F–5B, two. Maximum gross takeoff weight: over 20,000 pounds. Primary using commands: U.S. allies.

I say there's no need for the United States to spend this $52 million at all.

The Air Force is strangely silent on the airplane. Under date of June 6, I sent the following letter to Air Force Secretary Robert C. Seamans, Jr.:

JUNE 6, 1969.

Hon. ROBERT C. SEAMANS, Jr.,
Secretary of the Air Force,
Department of the Air Force,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There was presented before my House Armed Services Committee an amendment to the supplemental authorization bill to provide funds for the construction of F521 arcraft.

At your earliest convenience, I would appreciate having a complete analysis of this subject—past costs of F5 aircraft for foreign nations sales that have been made; original funding which was used; history of the proposed new funding; location where the aircraft will be constructed; proposed customers for the new aircraft; and position of the Department of the Air Force on this proposed contract and justification therefor.

Your many courtesies are appreciated.

Very sincerely,

ROBERT L. LEGGETT,
Member of Congress.

To date, I am still waiting for a reply.

As I understand the current state of the record, the Air Force has orally requested $52 million for development of a World Freedom Fighter aircraft, which may or may not be the Northrop Freedom Fighter and moreover, the Air Force to this date has presented no written justification or the method whereby they will spend $52 million of our American tax dollars.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of my distinguished colleague from California in support of this amendment.

The F–5 procurement authorization is truly an amazing item.

It is for a program that was never requested. It is for a plane that is not for our Armed Forces. Not a penny will go for our defense.

This is a foreign aid plane for us to sell to other countries—or to give away.

It is bad enough when we willy-nilly sell and give away our obsolete weaponry. Now we are going to make a special weapon to sell or give away.

It is indicated that we need 325 of these planes for Korea, Taiwan, South Vietnam, and other nations.

May I point out that South Vietnam already has 15 freedom fighters, South Korea has 54, and Taiwan has 70.

May I suggest that the most likely candidates for the other planes are Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela.

Let me tell you about the last time we sold F–5 Freedom Fighters abroad.

In 1966, Libya suddenly became rich with the discovery of oil. Between 1966

and 1969, the United States and Britain pumped $500 million worth of weaponry into the country—nearly 36 times its entire defense budget for 1966. This included F–5's.

Only a few weeks ago, these very weapons were used against our own interests. A puffed-up military junta which is becoming increasingly unfriendly toward the West overthrew with our weapons a progressive regime that was friendly to the West.

We need less, not more, international trade in arms and certainly do not need a special plane for sale to foreign powers. We are developing plenty of obsolete equipment.

Those who made the sale of F–5's to Libya never asked: Where is the war? Where is Libya's enemy? Where is the threat? Just sell them all the arms you can, take the money, and then show surprise when a group of radical Libyan Air Force officers, puffed up by the very weapons we sold them, overthrows a pro-West government.

If the situation were not so serious, it would be ludicrous. Was there ever any question that this was inevitable, and that it will happen again and again unless we put a stop to this kind of thing?

Secretary Packard notes on page 58 of the report of H.R. 14000 that "other countries" will need these planes. The most likely candidates for these planes are Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela.

In October 1967 our Government promised to supply these and other nations in Latin America with F–5's if they were prepared to wait 20 months for delivery. Coincidentally, the 20 months were up last spring. It also occurs to me that the first three of these countries—Peru, Brazil, and Argentina—are run by military dictatorships, and the last two—Chile and Venezuela—are democracies currently going through difficult times, one trying to stave off a Communist bid for power and the other seeking to appease its restless military. Is it in our interests to encourage these nations to seek such advanced and expensive equipment as the F–5 Freedom Fighter, or any other plane of this caliber?

Because we have no agreement with our allies or the Communist bloc countries to limit the sale of advanced weaponry in Latin America—or, for that fact, anywhere else in the world—we are pushing the sale of the F–5 in order to beat the competition to the punch. Our rationale, never expressed in writing but still just as real, has been to get in there first with an arms sale before the business goes to Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Italy, Sweden or any of two dozen other arms producing countries that sell arms abroad.

Yet, as in Libya, these arms may well end up being used against our best interests.

The continued promotion of a policy that encourages the sale abroad of equipment like the F–5 is sheer madness, particularly in the absence of any arms control agreements at all. This is why I oppose the spending of $52 million on the F–5 program, and why I support this amendment.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I move that all debate on this amendment do now close.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT).

The motion was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT).

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I take this time to again express my concern that the chairman of the Armed Services Committee apparently did not want any debate to take place on the advanced manned strategic bomber. I am sorry we only had one Member who was permitted to discuss that important question.

I am sure the chairman of the committee is a very learned man whose guidance we all seek. But I assume perhaps that like some of the rest of us he does not consider his judgment infallible. I know that within the defense community itself, among those who have professionally had responsibility for defense planning in the United States, there are serious questions about whether the United States ought to go ahead with this kind of bomber.

Now is it that we do not want to hear what kind of questions have been raised on this issue? For example, the chairman tells us that there is some kind of threat of the Soviet Union, I gather by some new strategic bomber force. To my knowledge this was not developed before his committee. But I may be wrong. But this is a matter of grave importance. Is it true that the Soviets today have a very limited bomber force and that the number of their planes is one-fourth our number, and that none of them has any real capability to mount a sustained attack on the United States? Is that the case, and do we have any knowledge that they are planning to build a new strategic bomber force? To the best of my knowledge, they are not.

Why is it, then, that the United States believes it ought to spend billions and billions and billions of dollars for a new, more sophisticated supersonic bomber when the Soviet Union is not making any move in that direction itself? The fact of the matter is that if the SALT talks should make any progress—and I pray that they will—we will have adequate deterrent force that would render the AMSA bomber totally unnecessary.

But my point in getting up is not so much to argue the merits of AMSA. It is to argue the desirability of having some floor discussion on a matter of this importance.

If it is the case that the House will say, "We do not care, the Armed Services Committee has come out with a report and we are tired of talking about these issues," then I think the voters will truly be justified in responding appropriately at the polls in 1970.

But I happen to think that these matters are too important, too important to the people in our cities, too important to the world, and too important for our future to be run roughshod over in the manner we just saw when the chairman moved to cut off debate after just one speaker, and when we had a commitment from the chairman that he was not going to do that. But I guess that commitment did not last very long.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRASER. I yield to the chairman.

Mr. RIVERS. We did not have any such commitment.

Mr. FRASER. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I misunderstood you.

Mr. RIVERS. You should apologize, because the Chairman said he had a commitment on the ABM. That is as far as he committed himself. I will not discuss the AMSA. I will not discuss with you what the Russians have. On my own responsibility I tell you the Russians are building a bomber. You can take it or leave it. I defy anybody in the United States, including the gentleman from Minnesota, to prove that statement false. And this goes for anyone in the United States.

Our responsibility is clear. For 5 years we have been trying to build an AMSA. McNamara tried to build an AMSA. We need an AMSA whether the Russians have it or not. It just so happens that they are well on the way, and I shall not discuss it further.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Minnesota has expired.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise to move to strike the last word.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. FRASER. I just want to say to the chairman, since he would not let me finish my statement, that I misunderstood his remarks about the debate on amendments to this bill. I am sorry. If he reserved the right to cut off debate without any discussion, I am sorry I misunderstood him. It is apparent that I did misunderstand him, because he did move to cut off debate. So I apologize for my misstatement or misunderstanding of what the gentleman said.

If I may say just one more thing, I am surprised that nobody else on your committee seems to be aware of the knowledge that you have about the bomber threat of the Soviets. Maybe they do. I have asked one or two members and they do not seem to have heard about it.

Mr. Chairman, I think we can all agree that manned bombers are considerably less important to our deterrent posture than are land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles. But it is startling to realize just how marginal the utility of the manned bomber has become. Consider that every one of the following conditions would have to be satisfied before the manned bomber would become essential to our deterrent.

First, the coming strategic arms limitation talks must fail to limit MIRV, for if there is no MIRV our ICBM's will not be in jeopardy.

Second, the Safeguard ABM must fail to safeguard our ICBM's. It is striking to note that many of those who a few hours ago were expressing great confidence in Safeguard are now expressing no confidence in it by supporting AMSA.

Third, the Soviet Union must find some means of detecting, tracking, and destroying our missile submarines. While anything is possible, at this time no one has the remotest idea of how this could be done. We have every expectation that a large majority of our SSBN fleet will remain undetectible for many decades to come.

Fourth, this attack on our missile submarines would have to occur at exactly the same time as the attack on our ICBM's.

Fifth, our ICBM's would not be launched on warning of attack.

Sixth, the Soviet planners must have absolute confidence in their ability to destroy our SSBN's and ICBM's. They would know that any miscalculation on their part, any significant mechanical or electronic failure, would result in the total destruction of their society. And they would have to have this absolute confidence that their offense would work the first time it was used.

Seventh, it must be assumed that, even though they will have been able to solve these fantastic technical problems, the Soviets will not have been able to build an effective air defense.

And in order to rationalize the construction of AMSA, an eighth condition would have to be met: While the Soviets would have to be unable to build an air defense that could stop AMSA, they would have to be able to build one that could stop the B–52 and the FB–111.

It does not seem to me that we have $12 billion worth of probability that these conditions will be met.

There are other arguments that can be made in favor of AMSA regarding its secondary missions—reconnaissance, utility in conventional warfare, and so forth. Here, as with the primary mission, the question is not whether AMSA would work better than existing equipment. I do not doubt that it would, assuming it turns out to be reliable. The question is whether the improvement is worth $12 billion and up. To my mind, it is not.

I do not think the program should be continued, and I am certain it should not be accelerated. No one has yet explained why we must have this plane by 1977 rather than 1978.

For these reasons, I shall vote to support the Leggett amendment.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I join in the observations about procedure made by our colleague in the well. I do not pretend to be an expert in this matter under discussion. The information, as one Member of this body, that has come to me about the advanced manned strategic aircraft was that, to our knowledge, there was no informed opinion about Soviet development in this area.

As the gentleman from Minnesota indicated, we might be wrong. But I do not think that all 434 Members should have to proceed in this debate on the good faith or opinion of the chairman of any one committee. I thought that we were going to develop the arguments before the Nation so that everyone could appreciate why we are or are not supporting these amendments.

ADVANCED MANNED STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT

It is universally acknowledged that land-based and undersea-based ballistic missiles constitute a far more effective nuclear deterrent than do manned bombers.

All the argument for ABM notwithstanding, it is impossible to defend against a heavy missile attack, but there is considerable possibility of defense against a manned bomber, no matter how sophisticated.

A bomber requires perhaps 5 hours to reach a target deep in the Soviet Union. A missile requires at most 30 minutes.

A bomber is fragile, and easy to destroy on the ground in a sneak attack from the sea or from orbit. A land-based ICBM in a hardened silo cannot be destroyed by anything less than a direct hit or very near miss by a thermonuclear warhead. A submarine-based missile is even more invulnerable because it is virtually undetectable. Moreover, submarine-based missiles have achieved a degree of reliability far above that of any other strategic system.

Yet we are asked to authorize funds for a new manned bomber. We are asked to authorize $100 million for the coming fiscal year; ultimately the AMSA will cost billions. This is something we need to examine very carefully.

As I understand it, the basic theory upon which we have based our retention of manned bombers holds that the United States is best protected when we are able to destroy a potential enemy in three different ways: With bombers, with ICBM's, and the SLBM's. It is argued that each system complements the others by assuring that it will be available as a full deterrent or strike force if the other systems fail or are degraded by defensive developments on the other side.

But if SLBM's and ICBM's are preferred, it seems to me that we must have at least some indication that they will be inadequate before we invest billions in a third force. Obviously, deterrence will work with just one force—large, visible, and effective enough to convince the Soviet Union that we could retaliate with a society-destroying blow if they should attack. Surely they will not be the less deterred if we cannot destroy them three ways or even two. If we have a system that will work, why is it necessary to convince a potential aggressor that we can kill him three different times with three different weapons systems?

Why have the Russians not built a modern strategic bomber? Why is their only heavy bomber an obsolete propeller-driven type? And why did they build only 150 of those?

Mr. Chairman, I for one feel that we do not need a new manned bomber when we have the enormous destructive power of 1,050 ICBM's and 656 SLBM's, any one of which is capable of destroying a major city. I feel that three deterrents are more than enough, that we probably do not need a manned bomber at all, and that we certainly do not need a new bomber at upward of $30 million per copy. We need this money for our people.

A very unusual thing happened yesterday to me. I was called off the floor.

It so happened that there were approximately 300 students from Eastern High School in the District of Columbia who were petitioning to talk to any Member of Congress. They were on the steps of the Capitol, and they were asking if any Member would come out to speak to them, come and visit their schools and see that they do not have the textbooks, and see that the schools are in a very serious state of disrepair.

The question I bring to this body at this time is this: Is there any relationship between the crying needs of the poor and the left out in this country and in this Capital and our reluctance to vote out the kinds of moneys we need at this time for the domestic programs in the areas of neglect; is there any connection between that and the way we proceed to disburse approximately $21 billion for our military necessities?

I am not saying we should eliminate this authorization, but I do say that there is some connection, in my judgment, between the way we cannot even inquire or deliberate and consider democratically this measure before us and the fact that there are black youngsters begging the Congress of the United States for some schoolbooks.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. Mr. Chairman, when one makes a motion to cut off debate, it has to be voted on by the House. Any time the House wants to debate, the House can.

I just do not think we should get out here at this time and discuss AMSA. For years we have been trying to get it. For years Mr. McNamara denied it. As the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT) who was for years the head of a special subcommittee. Now we wake up and see that we have not even started it. We have not even started.

If we are going to fashion our defense on what Russia has or does not have may God save America. We need this and we need a great many other things.

We had better get on with the business of approving this bill. Are we going to discuss the dotting of every "i" and the crossing of every "t"?

Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I want to call attention to something we should remember in this House; namely, that on many occasions we have expressed our conviction that progress in providing this advanced manned strategic bomber was required in the interests of this country. The amount of money we have authorized for this development has been predicated on the state of the art. The addition to which reference has been made by this amendment was brought about by the reexamination of the current Secretary of Defense when he came into office. This recommendation is for the purpose of doing the requisite engineering in order to advance this study, so that we can reach a decision in a timely manner on production of this advanced bomber.

I am sure if the examination is made into the detail of this request, it will be determined that it is not a waste of money, that it is an effort to provide this bomber by the time we will need it.

Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PIRNIE. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN. Mr. Chairman, I want to add briefly to what the gentleman from New York has said. I believe

everyone in this Chamber has at one time flown in commercial aircraft, no doubt across the country.

They must surely realize that the enjoyable flights you all make across this country are due to the advanced state of the art and the technological capacity of the aircraft manufacturers and the aeronautical engineers in this Nation. So I believe what the gentleman from New York has said relates to this particular amendment. Certainly it is cogent.

I believe the same remark is going to be made and should be considered as we move toward ultimate development of the SST.

One of these days people are going to have to realize the technological capability and development for the military and defense units of this country certainly serve, ultimately the civilian purpose in the aviation field, and it is true not only in this field of transportation but also in the field of satellite communication.

The bulk of our progress, in the aerospace and aviation fields of this Nation, has come as a result of technological data developed through defense research, development, and deployment.

Many of the utensils and household appliances that are serving to lighten the load of housewives in the kitchens of America, are the direct result of technological data developed in the aerospace industry.

For a number of years, particularly during the Kennedy, Johnson, Secretary of Defense McNamara administration era, I believe the United States placed far too much emphasis on the type of defense strategy, that put intercontinental ballistic missiles and overkill through nuclear weapons as our major defense.

As a result we have lost a great deal of time and flexibility in developing the kind of deterrent system that I personally feel would be more effective than total dependence on a nuclear land-based missile system.

This is not to say that we should defer safeguarding this nuclear deterrent system.

However, I believe strongly that a more flexible response system, coordinating the naval Polaris and/or Poseidon system with strategic aircraft will serve our defense purposes much more effectively.

The mobility and flexibility factors involved certainly lend themselves toward a more effective defense strategy as we move toward strengthening our alliances with free world nations.

Certainly the aeronautical expertise we develop will serve both our defense and civil aviation objectives. The competency in the U.S. aeronautical engineering field is being challenged more and more with each passing day. The Soviet Union, France, and England are highly competitive in advanced aeronautical engineering. In addition to defense requirements, our future security will, in my judgment, require economic, diplomatic, psychological, and technological offensives as we move toward economic and political integration with our free world friends.

The knowledge, competence, and expertise we develop in the aerospace-aviation technological field will ultimately determine our strength as a nation. We cannot relinquish our lead in the aviation field. If we are to avoid getting bogged down in future Vietnams, I admonish America and this Congress to stay first in both civil and military aviation. They are totally interdependent and will serve to benefit future American generations and the peoples of developing free nations looking to us for hope and leadership.

Mr. PIRNIE. I thank the gentleman from California. He is one of the most knowledgeable Members of the House in this field of aviation. I know his interest in this subject is deep and sincere.

Mr. EVANS of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PIRNIE. I yield to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. EVANS), a former member of the committee.

Mr. EVANS of Colorado. I appreciate the gentleman's yielding.

I should like to say, along with the comments of my colleague, the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER), that it was also my understanding that this bill would be discussed without time limitations.

I am not going to blame our chairman entirely, although I would certainly place a good deal of the blame on his shoulders. We are in the process of discussing the expenditure of $21 billion, and if we can discuss the C–5A and all the intricacies of these other programs, and if we can read in the newspapers and periodicals and military magazines more about the AMSA than has been allowed to be discussed on this floor now, then in addition to blaming the chairman, and I do, for closing off debate, we must blame those who vote to close off debate.

Mr. HICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, first I want to go on record as saying that I get a number of letters from my constituents stirred up by certain columnists, or who were stirred up by certain columnists. These letters complain about the seniority system and complain about the chairman of the Armed Services Committee in particular.

If we did not have the seniority system, knowing what I know after having served on this committee for four and a half years. If I were asked to cast my vote I would vote for the present chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

That does not mean I do not disagree with him from time to time. I disagree with him on this matter of cutting off debate.

Certainly the House rules. Certainly the House does act. If it wants to continue the debate it can. But it follows the gentleman from South Carolina's leadership in this particular instance, and I do believe the gentleman should let the debate continue a little further.

So far as this whole procurement program is concerned, many of my liberal friends have been talking about cut, cut, cut. Well, if we are going to cut our military expenditures, the best way to cut them is to reduce personnel. The finest way I know of to safely cut personnel is to give our military the best weapons possible. We do not have to replace the weapons we have now with the new systems we are talking about on a 1-to-1 basis. If we bring new systems into the inventory we are going to be able in the future to reduce the amount of manpower needed to operate those systems.

It takes a lot of years to develop a weapons system. We do not do it overnight, and we do not do it in 1 or 2 years. All Members know that. Consequently, when there is an attack on research and development when Members successfully reduce these needed funds, all that results is delay, and it is going to put the acquisition of new weapons systems a long way down the road.

We can train men in a year or two. We know that. We have done it time and again. We can save from $8,500 to $15,000 a year per man, depending upon whose figure we want to take, when we reduce personnel.

We do have a cut in personnel in this bill. We could cut it further. So far as I am concerned, if any Member wants to offer such an amendment I will support it.

But I do not believe we should be cutting back on new weapons systems which the men we do have left will operate in the years ahead. We have not cut this bill as we have gone along. I believe this House has been very wise in its action taken in this regard.

At the same time, I want to commend the people who have brought forth amendments, because I believe it is healthy for this country to continue to discuss these programs. If a program is a good one, it is a good one after we talk about it 2 or 3 days in this body. We do not have to depend on all the discussion coming from the other body.

Mr. PATTEN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I want to direct my remarks to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. CONYERS).

I am on the District of Columbia Appropriations Committee, and the schoolchildren of the District never had a better friend than ED PATTEN. I have attended every meeting. We started in January and continued through February and March. The school budget should have been passed by April or May, but it was not even brought to the floor. We held special hearings in the caucus room of the Cannon Building and have invited all of the organizations and people of the District of Columbia to attend. I have been in contact with them ever since then. I have had many appointments with the chairmen of these various local committees. However, I am sick and tired of reading in the papers that the Congress is doing nothing. I am going to ask the chairman of the full committee to take me off the District of Columbia Committee on Appropriations because I do not like the publicity that the Congress receives.

I want to be specific about textbooks. As a general statement, I will tell you that the per capita cost of high school students in the District of Columbia schools is the highest in the United States.

Now, Mr. Chairman, what administration problems they have about text-

books, I do not know, but speaking for one Member, I have given the District of Columbia schools every dime that I could give them under the law and I would like to give them more. I would not want word to go out that our District of Columbia Appropriations Committee was not a friend of the local schools. We want them to be the best schools in the country. We are with the students. And I tell you that I for one do not think that the little remarks here about no textbooks is a very correct impression. Our District of Columbia schools are wonderful and they are going to become better with my help as long as I am on the committee.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PATTEN. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. CONYERS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I reported the incident because to me I am beginning to wonder, after being in this body for 5 years, whether or not we are really attuned to the problems that are really affecting the District of Columbia. I hope that the gentleman, if he proclaims himself to be a friend of the citizens and the students of the District of Columbia, does not get off that committee. I hope he will join me in one request that these students made to me—and I am merely relaying it to you and to the body—let us take a visit to Eastern High School. That was the challenge put to me. They said not one Member of Congress had ever been out there really to see about the shortages that exist there.

What I want to say to the gentleman is, maybe he is right. I would sure like to take those arguments back to those gentlemen. But join me, if you will, in paying a much overdue visit to that high school.

Mr. PATTEN. We would have been glad to talk to the 300 students. We would have enjoyed it.

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. But what about the trip?

Mr. PATTEN. For the 4 years I have been on the committee I want to tell you I have been in Eastern, and looked at other school buildings. I think other members of the committee have done the same thing.

Mr. CONYERS. Then I will make a trip there and report back to you.

Mr. PATTEN. DON FRASER is on the authorization committee, and he can give a good account of himself, and so can others. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. RIEGLE) is on the committee and is very close to the matter. BOB GIAIMO, the gentleman from Connecticut, is on it, also. They have been in many schools and talked with the principals and the teachers.

We have a good system in the District of Columbia, and we will make it better. They are not so poor that they cannot have adequate textbooks.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I had not intended to take the well on this subject. The question of the AMSA, as usual, has wound up in a mass of distortion, ignorance, misrepresentation, and lack of knowledge. I think I know as much about the AMSA situation as anybody in this Congress. This is not an immodest statement. Under the direction of our chairman, the gentleman from South Carolina, I headed a committee which had as its charter the investigation of the advanced manned bomber.

Now, this did not start today. This started years ago. We held extensive hearings on the subject matter, and I am just wondering if those gentlemen who want to know all about the AMSA have looked at one page of those hearings and read them, and examined the full discussion? If they have, I would be delighted to see them raise their hands so I know I could discuss this with somebody who knows at least what they have read.

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I am not yielding. I am merely asking them to raise their hands—anybody who has read that.

Has the gentleman read all the hearings on the AMSA? The gentleman nods assent. And the gentleman wants more discussion after reading all those pages, and everything was brought out?

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, will my colleague yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I refuse to yield.

Let me get down to what we are talking about: to the nuts and bolts.

If we do not have an AMSA this country does not have a follow-on bomber to the B–52. I care not what Russia has. I care what America should have.

What we are talking about here is a definition contract.

From the time that Curtis LeMay was Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the military and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—General McConnell, who was Chief of Staff of the Air Force after LeMay—all have strongly recommended the development of a follow-on bomber.

On the day that this bomber is put on the production line, it will take from 5 to 6 years before it is put in the inventory. That is what we are talking about. We are talking about that the B–52's will be repaired and re-repaired and re-re-repaired after 1973 and 1974, and that is the most optimistic date that we could replace the B–52 bombers, and that would be when the last B–52 bomber off the production line is 14 years old.

An attempt was made by the former Secretary of Defense to block this despite the advice of the military. And, I may parenthetically state, blame the military. Yes, blame them. When the civilian leadership makes the decision a good military man, the soldier, follows that civilian leadership.

Mr. McNamara defied the Congress He resorted to every trick in the book to circumvent our intentions.

And let me say this, let me just pause here to say to this Congress that when the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services tells you that the Russians have a bomber, he is telling you the truth, and he knows what he is talking about, and I share his remarks.

You would not want us to come here and discuss all of our military strategy and give away all our secrets and sensitive knowledge that we have—what a day that would be in this country. We do not intend to do it, and never have intended to do it. We have executive meetings, and we receive knowledge that we cannot possibly discuss publicly.

At a matter of fact, in recent years, too much has leaked out of the Committee on Armed Services which never prevailed heretofore. It has almost become a fact to see and to read it in the news columns, things that we treated in confidence, and never intended to be public.

If you tell me that we do not need the follow-on bombers to keep our inventory up, then I will say that we have lost our sense of priority, and our sense of judgment.

This is vital to America's future. This is the successor to the B–52. The F–111, the ill-fated TFX was never even advanced by Mr. McNamara as being a bomber to replace the B–52. So please do not let us get confused with a lot of semantics and irrelevant talk.

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. STRATTON

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, we are now on title II of the bill. We have three remaining titles of the bill after title II.

We have had an interesting discussion on the school problem in the District of Columbia.

Mr. Chairman, I move that all debate on title II and, all amendments thereto, close at 1:15 p.m. with the last 5 minutes to be reserved for the chairman of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON) that all debate on title II and all amendments thereto close at 1:15 p.m.

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. REUSS); there were—ayes 65, noes 47.

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers.

Tellers were ordered, and the Chairman appointed as tellers Mr. STRATTON and Mr. REUSS.

The Committee again divided, and the tellers reported that there were—ayes 84, noes 57.

So the motion was agreed to.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRIES

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. REUSS. How many amendments to title II are pending, and what will be the division of time?

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk has two amendments at the desk.

Mr. REUSS. What will be the division of time between them under the motion?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state that each Member will be allocated 45 seconds.

Mr. VANIK. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the time allotted to me.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. GUBSER. Will all amendments to title II pending at the desk be read and considered at the same time?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair does not know whether either amendment will be offered.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. REUSS).

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. REUSS

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. REUSS: On page 4, line 5, strike out "$3,241,200,000" and insert "$3,200,200,000"; on line 9, strike out "$18,500,000" and insert "not more than $2,500,000"; and on lines 13 and 14, strike out "$40,000,000" and insert "not more than $15,000,000".

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. RIVERS. Do I have 5 minutes?

The CHAIRMAN. No, the gentleman will have 45 seconds.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my time be allocated to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

Mr. HALL. I object.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the 45 seconds deliberation hitherto allotted to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. ECKHARDT), the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT), the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. NEDZI), and the gentleman from New York (Mr. OTTINGER), by agreement with those gentlemen, be made available to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. REUSS?

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I object.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

The gentleman from Wisconsin is recognized for 45 seconds.

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, doing the best I can with an amendment that affects many billions of dollars, this amendment would cut back to the level authorized by the Senate the programs for the AWACS and the CONUS air defense interceptor. The provisions in question are designed against a Soviet bomber threat in the late 1970's.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. OTTINGER).

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word, and I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. REUSS).

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, Senator STENNIS, has said.

It looks to me as if the Soviet bomber threat is getting thinner and thinner every year.

A high level Pentagon briefing I have just received entirely bears out the judgment of Senator STENNIS.

I know the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS), has said that the Soviets have under way an Advanced Strategic Bomber. If that is so, I think the Pentagon is entitled to know it, and the Members of this House are entitled to know it.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. ECKHARDT).

Mr. ECKHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. REUSS).

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. Chairman, as a sort of afterthought, the argument is made that AWACS would be useful in a tactical way in a major war in Europe or in brushfire wars around the world. This collides with the decision of the Defense Department to make a 1-year review of the Soviet bomber threat. If that review is made and it is decided that the Soviet bomber threat which is now based on the 1955 Bear bombers is not an immediate threat, then this money is much better spent in more fruitful ways.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT).

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word, and I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, a point of order. A Member cannot strike the last word under the limitation of time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California was recognized. The gentleman from California yields to the gentleman from Wisconsin?

Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. REUSS).

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California for yielding.

I would say the pitiful little 45-second driblets being allotted to this vital question are simply not orderly debate. The members of this Committee deserve better than that. I have information which I think Members would have liked to have heard on the exact nature of the Soviet bomber threat against which it is proposed to divert billions and billions of dollars that might have been better elsewhere, including in the defense program. It is vitally important that this body act responsibly.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. NEDZI).

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. REUSS).

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. Chairman, the first of my two amendments would reduce the CONUS interceptor program from $18.2 to $2.5 million.

The trouble with the CONUS interceptor program is that the Air Force has not yet selected an interceptor plane for this radar and missile system. Until the Air Force does make its selection, going ahead full steam means that we will be developing the radar and missile system, but lacking a plane to carry it, and there will be very costly overruns while we redevelop the radar and missile system to fit the plane the Air Force has finally selected.

The amendment which was approved by the Senate should be passed.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. CONYERS).

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. REUSS. I thank the gentleman from Michigan for yielding.

The AWACS amendment would reduce the $40 million to $15 million, as the Senate did.

AWACS is an airborne radar and control system likewise designed to detect low-flying Soviet bombers. The reduction would allow the Air Force to continue its research. All it would do is to slow down for 1 year the actual loading of the system into a jet cargo plane for a dry run. Three-fourths of these AWACS units are apparently destined for use against Soviet bombers over the United States, a threat which is infinitely less immediate than the Soviet missile threat.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. RYAN).

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield my 45 seconds to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. REUSS. I thank the gentleman from New York.

A number of changes are likely to be considered in the AWACS system after the Secretary of Defense has completed his 1-year review of the Soviet bomber threat. If, for example, the Secretary of Defense sticks to his intelligence estimate and does not accept the intelligence estimate of the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS), it may well be that there is a firmer and more sensible use of these funds than to build up the continental air defense against a threat of very minor proportions.

The AWACS, for example, could be put in a different airplane.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL).

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, without agreeing with the gentleman in the well, I yield my time to him to let him complete his statement.

Mr. REUSS. I appreciate that statement by the gentleman from Missouri.

The present Soviet bomber threat, according to the best intelligence estimates we can get, is much less than formidable. The main portion of their force is made up of 100 or so propeller-driven Bear bombers dating back to the mid-1950's. Former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford earlier this year in his testimony characterized them as "distinctly inferior" to our own B–52's.

These programs can be diminished. They can be postponed. The Senate decided to do so. We should do so also.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. SCHEUER).

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, I want to yield to my colleague from Wisconsin, but first I will ask him this: In view of the statement of the chairman of the committee that the AMSA is not postulated on any intelligence estimate of what offensive capability the Russians are developing, and he prayed we never postulate our defense program on an intelligence estimate or knowledge of what they are doing, of Soviet development intentions—or the actual military threat they present—whom are we arming against? Are we arming against Switzerland or Uruguay or Nicaraugua?

Mr. REUSS. I wish the chairman of the committee would share his intelligence with the intelligence gathering forces of the Pentagon, who tell me, in a document handed me 10 minutes ago, there is not an augmented Soviet bomber threat, that indeed the information which I have given is the correct information. If that is so, we should not waste our money on this.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER).

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. REUSS. I thank the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. REUSS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Is the amount of the reduction the gentleman is recommending in his amendment the precise action that was taken in the other body on this request?

Mr. REUSS. It is the precise action that was taken in the other body. It maintains funds in the authorization for both the AWACS and the CONUS interceptor program. It simply asks that they be settled down for a year until the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Laird, can come in and give us the considered judgment of the intelligence-gathering systems of the United States as to whether the Soviet bomber threat is something new.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington (Mr. FOLEY).

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. REUSS).

Mr. REUSS. I thank the gentleman from Washington for yielding to me.

I should point out that an AWAC designed solely for tactical use over the battlefields of Europe or in those brushfire wars which President Nixon at Guam told us we were going to avoid in the future would be a good deal different from one which has to deal with Soviet bombers attacking the United States. The DOD may well decide after its 1-year review of the Soviet bomber threat that we should not go ahead with the AWAC for bomber defense in the United States. If that is true, we will need to change it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HUNGATE).

Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the gentleman from Wisconsin, the gentleman in the well, as well as the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER), for framing these questions and issues on a system about which we have to make a decision here. I regret the shortness of the debate, but I do hope that they can find some consolation in the words of the Apostle Paul,

> It is better to speak five words that are understood than 10,000 that are in an unknown tongue.

I now yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. REUSS).

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri has expired.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. ICHORD).

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I, too, regret that we do not have sufficient time to discuss this amendment, not because I intended to participate in the debate but I think that it should be discussed, and I did vote against the motion to limit debate.

My good friend, the gentleman from Wisconsin, could not have chosen a poorer project in the bill where he could save money by reducing the authorization. As a matter of fact, the amendment of the distinguished gentleman would probably cost the Government more money in the long run. This is true because the committee has already reduced the program to an amount which would provide for putting the brassboard of the AWACS system on board either the DC–8 or the Boeing 707 which will be the vehicle to carry the system. The amendment of the gentleman from Wisconsin would just serve to keep the contractors interested and would not give us the brassboard which we need to have in order to make an assessment as to whether we really want to adopt the system. The amendment insofar as AWACS is concerned would merely delay the system and would result in the inefficient expenditure of money.

As has been previously pointed out, the Committee on Armed Services approved funds for the AWACS development in the amount of $40 million. This is $20 million less than the Department of Defense requested. This is a 33⅓ percent reduction on this one item. The committee also approved the full amount, $18.5 million, for the continental air defense interceptor. The Senate reduced this amount by $16 million leaving in their authorization bill $2.5 million to be used to complete studies aimed at identifying the specific airframe to be used for the mission.

The rationale for the reduction in AWAC funds to $15 million was that there were additional carryover funds of $40 million in the fiscal year 1969 appropriation. This is not true. In fact, all of the fiscal year 1969 funds were obligated prior to July 31, 1969. The largest portion, $27 million, went to contractors for system engineering proposals; $9.5 million was used to develop radar components, and $3.3 million for engineering support. In fact, over $5 million of of the fiscal year 1970 funds will have to be used to complete work started in prior years. This leaves $10 million of the $15 million authorized by the Senate. This amount is not sufficient to continue this program.

The $10 million can only be used to maintain the best possible holding position to keep key contractors on the program in anticipation of a more substantial portion in fiscal year 1971. The minimum funds required for the radar development is $40 million; $15.7 million will be required to complete efforts contracted during fiscal year 1969 and $24.3 million will be required for radar program permitting a test flight of one radar within a 24- to 30-month period following initiation of the program.

A reduction of these funds to the Senate level will almost destroy the AWACS program. If these funds, as recommended by the Armed Services Committee, are not approved, both the Air Force and industry will have to sharply reduce their current level of effort at a time when normal program progress would call for an increased level of effort. This will increase both direct and indirect costs. Time phasing with respect to the airframe contractors' facilities may result in very substantial increases in airframe cost.

The initial operational capability for both TAC and ADC will be delayed for more than 1 year. This not only delays improvement in operational capability but also indirectly increases costs since certain tactical and air defense systems will have to be retained that otherwise would have been phased out. The delay in availability of an effective demonstrated radar for TAC may result in the procurement of yet another interim system for TAC with a radar of marginal performance.

The $2.5 million contained in the Senate authorization bill provides for no funds to develop the most important element of the improved manned interceptor; that is, the look-down radar and shoot-down missile. This work must be completed regardless of whether an airframe has been selected for the future interceptor. There are several airframes which have been considered in the past and are presently under consideration, all of which, with some modification, can be utilized with the fire control and missile system planned for development.

The minimum requirement to insure a modernized interceptor and an initial operational capability in the mid-1970's requires the entire $18.5 million recommended by the Armed Services Committee. This contains $2.5 million for interceptor design studies and analysis—and $16 million is dedicated to the long lead effort in the fire control system development and missile development which can be pursued at this time without regard to the choice of an interceptor.

The committee thoroughly reviewed the request submitted by the Department of Defense and is convinced that the funds contained in the bill for AWACS and CONUS air defense interceptor are the minimum necessary to pursue this program without seriously endangering the AWAC concept.

Personally, I am skeptical as to whether the AWACS will do everything the military says it will do in regard to air

defense, but I can forsee a use in the tactical field of great and practically inestimable value. I strongly urge the defeat of the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. GUBSER).

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I listened intently to the remarks offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin. With all due deference to him, I must say his argument is premised on a mistake. He has assumed that the AWAC is designed only as a defense against a bomber threat. That is absolutely false. It is designed as an airborne warning and control system for the purpose of controlling any kind of an air battle. It is an airborne command system.

Just a few months ago, our pilots were flying over North Vietnam. Today 840 of them are either dead or are in North Vietnamese prisons because of air action over North Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. HUNT).

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Chairman, I yield my time to my colleague from California.

Mr. GUBSER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

This system is also for the kind of air battle fought over Vietnam. It is not just a matter of a bomber threat. It is to provide command control of air battles like those which were fought over North Vietnam, to warn of SAM and fighter attacks against our pilots. I say hundreds of pilots today would not be imprisoned in North Vietnam and would not be dead if we had had such a system.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ARENDS).

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. GUBSER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

When you vote on this amendment do not forget that American pilots now dead or in the prisons of North Vietnam would be alive today if we had had an AWACS. I swear to God it is the truth.

Point No. 2: This system will either go into a DC–8 or a Boeing 707 aircraft. Those two production lines, at Boeing and at Long Beach, are going out of existence next year. If you cut this money out for the AWAC, you will upset the timing of the whole operation. To start up a production line once it is stopped is prohibitively expensive.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. WATSON).

Mr. WATSON. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. GUBSER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, if you pass this amendment you will not have an off-the-shelf aircraft available. If you want to scuttle the chance to effectively control an air battle from an airborne command system, then vote for the amendment offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. REUSS).

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GUBSER. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentleman if it is not true it also gives a standoff capability of air control?

Mr. GUBSER. Absolutely. I am glad the gentleman reminded me of that. This is not just the answer to a manned bomber threat; this is required for every facet of air warfare, and we must have it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. WAGGONNER).

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. GUBSER).

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I shall recap my arguments and also discuss the CONUS air defense interceptor.

The AWACS will combine an airborne surveillance capability along with associated command, control, and communications equipment in a commercially available jet airframe. The radar on the AWACS will permit it to detect and track aircraft operating at either high altitude or low altitude over land. Thus, it will provide an integral part of any modernized air defense system.

However, I would like to emphasize that AWACS for strategic defense is not the only use for the equipment—and I fear that our evaluation of the program may be largely overlooking some equally important applications. In fact, I would judge that these other uses might form an even stronger justification for the program, particularly in the international environment envisioned for the future. I refer to the considerable flexibilities of AWACS in what is called the tactical application. The AWACS aircraft will function the same way—that is, it will act as a surveillance station and command post. The differences lie only in the situation being watched and the uses made of the data collected. The Air Force is understandably thinking primarily of AWACS capabilities in conflicts in which our forces participate directly. An airborne command post that was able to track enemy aircraft and direct our own fighters in combat during the Korean war would have had tremendous favorable payoff. A graphic example of the benefits of "seeing eye" air combat control comes from North Vietnam. There our aircraft suffered unnecessary losses by operating without the visibility an AWACS would have provided. Our best airborne control in Southeast Asia has been the specially equipped EC–121 aircraft which is the old Lockheed Constellation. It can identify our fighters, and this has been useful, but hardly adequate for the multiple demands of controlling close air support, airlift, and air rescue aircraft.

These are examples of tactical air battle uses. I am at least equally intrigued by possible AWACS uses which are a bit further removed from the battlefield; namely, in an informational, or even a peace-keeping role. Consider for instance the diplomatic advantages of keeping tabs—from an AWACS vantage point—on air traffic like the operations into Czechoslovakia before and during the recent Soviet intervention. There may be value also in on-the-spot monitoring of the air actions such as those during the 6-day Arab-Israeli war. I am sure we all hope, and are confident, that all-out strategic war can be avoided; but most of us see the future as patches of peace, political tensions, small and not-so-small conflicts among our earthly neighbors. In such a future, instant surveillance and instant communication can provide invaluable defusing opportunities before hostilities start. AWACS can even provide an instant source of air traffic control for mercy missions in case of natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, and famine. These potential uses cannot be overlooked or played down in our judgment of the AWACS program.

Mr. Chairman, I think it would be worthwhile to briefly discuss the funding situation of the program. Some discussions of the AWACS program have led to the belief that the funds authorized and appropriated during fiscal year 1969, are available to support the fiscal year 1970 program. I have been assured by the Air Force that this is not the case. This misconception grew from an analysis of the program's fiscal year 1970 funding needs based on the financial situation as of March 1969.

The Air Force has also assured me that all of the fiscal year 1969 funds for AWACS were placed on contract before the end of the last fiscal year. Due to the continuing resolution, there are some fiscal year 1970 funds available. However, these will only support the AWACS effort through December of this year.

Personally, I will not support a position that either kills or maims AWACS. I think it should be built, and we can demand that it be built effectively and economically. The Defense Department has done a good job of bringing along the basic technology, and there appears to be small risk of program failure. AWACS is a good investment for the type of international future we'll be up against, and I believe it is worthy of our support.

The Soviet Union bomber forces have capitalized on the deficiencies in our present ground based radar and interceptor radars by adopting the tactic of approaching targets at very low altitude. This hides the bomber radar return in the clutter of radar returns from the ground near it. Bombers penetrating at low altitudes are thus hidden and cannot be observed. The radar in the airborne warning and control system will solve this problem by eliminating ground clutter.

Any new interceptor that we select must have a similar capability if the interceptor's radar is to detect and track incoming bombers. A radar capable of the necessary clutter rejection has been developed, produced and flown, and has successfully demonstrated the capability to detect, track, and launch armament against incoming targets at very low altitude over land.

Continued development is necessary now to refine this developmental system into a production design. We also need to work on the various components to improve their reliability, reduce the cost of manufacture and maintenance, and

blend the radar and the missile into an integrated armament system suitable for an advanced interceptor.

Oddly enough, the longest leadtime work in achieving this new interceptor is not involved with the engine or the airframe. These represent relatively straightforward developmental efforts in which we have a great deal of experience. The technological challenge is in the complex electronics of the radar and the missile fire control systems. This is where urgent effort must begin at once if we are to hope for an initial operating capability by fiscal year 1975. Hopefully, the remaining elements of a modernized air defense system will be ready at that time.

The principles and techniques to produce the missile fire control system are well in hand. Funds are needed for the development and testing required to insure an economical, reliable and effective kill capability that will function in an advanced interceptor. The Air Force is studying a number of candidates prior to selecting the interceptor. However, it must proceed with the development of the armament system if the airplane and its radar/missile components are to be wedded at the proper time in the future.

The Air Force has requested $18.5 million for this effort. A major portion of these funds will be used for the fire control system development—chiefly a new, powerful radar transmitter, electronic counter-countermeasure circuits, and digital data processing equpiment. Another large portion is earmarked for work on the missile. Specifically, it will do the following: First, the development of folding wings and a control system which will permit internal stowage of greater numbers of missiles in each interceptor; second, improvement of current state of the art components to capitalize on recent developments in the receiver; and third, improvement of the fusing to increase the missile's kill probability.

The Air Force intends to use some of these funds for designs and analyses to lead toward the selection of the appropriate interceptor. Another portion of the $18.5 million will insure that all radar and fire control system developments which grow out of other development programs are incorporated into the design and development of the interceptor armament system.

These are sensible development efforts and will help us obtain a badly needed modern air defense interceptor for the mid-1970's.

I strongly urge that this body favorably consider funds requested for these programs, and reject the amendment now under consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE).

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to be heard on this particular amendment. I do have, however, an amendment of my own at the desk, and I wonder if we could vote on this amendment first?

The CHAIRMAN. Does any other Member desire to speak on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. REUSS)?

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman from New York has an amendment at the desk it must either be an amendment to the amendment, or a substitute for the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state that the pending amendment will be disposed of in the time allotted.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON).

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, in 45 seconds I have time only to say that, embodied in title II we have authorizations for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, of $7,421,400,000, and to restrict the Members of this body, which is supposed to be the greatest deliberative body in the world, to 45 seconds on an amendment of this importance I consider outrageous.

This is nothing but gag rule.

My constituents in Illinois are going to have to pay their share, and fair share, of the $21,367,000,000 represented in this bill, and I want to hear a discussion of this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. JACOBS).

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, 4½ years ago when I came to this body some on my own side cut off debate on the social programs that were before this body. I voted against it, and I voted against it just now.

The role of a majority, in a democracy, is to make a decision; not to silence the minority in debating what that decision should be. A civilized society does not silence opposition, it answers opposition.

For shame. For shame.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT).

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, even though it now appears improbable that an attack will be made on the new attack carrier, I would like to make some remarks on this carrier. The proposed Moorhead amendment would delete the funds in this procurement authorization bill for the CVAN–69, the second *Nimitz* class nuclear powered attack carrier.

The Navy needs this carrier, and it is needed now, and in any reasonable carrier force level. It is required to maintain the modernity and capability of our attack carrier force. When the CVAN–69 joins the fleet in 1974, it is scheduled to replace one of the aging World War II *Essex* class carriers still in the active attack carrier inventory. These *Essex* class ships are obsolescent today. They have been extensively modified over the years since they first joined the fleet during the Second World War, fitted with angled decks and steam catapults, but they have now simply run out of potential for future growth. Today, because of limited flight deck size and catapult capacity, the *Essex* class attack carriers cannot operate the most advanced fighters, attack planes, reconnaissance or radar aircraft now being delivered to fleet squadrons. It is not feasible to further modernize these older ships. As a consequence, they must be equipped with second line aircraft. In the mid-seventies, these obsolescent aircraft will not be able to survive in the environment of advanced Soviet weapons technology. It is not only in a war with the U.S.S.R. that our military forces will face Soviet arms. The Russians have not been reluctant to provide their satellites with modern, first line weapons. We can expect, and we must be prepared to encounter advanced Soviet weapons technology at all levels of military confrontation.

The Navy's attack carrier force must be kept modern. It is the backbone of our surface fleet. The attack carrier is the principal ship through which the United States is assured continued free use of the seas. Our carrier force is the measure of difference which makes our Navy superior to that of the U.S.S.R.

Carriers provide air power at sea, and World War II conclusively demonstrated that no naval force can survive without local air superiority. The mission of the attack carrier is to provide air superiority for control of the seas and of the airlanes over the high seas, and then to exploit this control of the seas by projecting tactical air power over land to the extent of the range of the carrier's aircraft.

The U.S. Navy developed its carrier forces during World War II. They were essential to our victory in the Pacific. The turning point in the war with the Japanese occurred at the Battle of Midway when the bulk of the Japanese carrier fleet was destroyed by our own carrier-based planes. From this point on, the American Navy was able to maintain local air superiority, and provide the protective cover under which the flow of troops and war material crossed the Pacific to the ultimate defeat of Japan.

By the end of the Second World War, the U.S. Navy had more than 100 carriers of all kinds. The value of the carrier had been proven, its need within our national strategy had been established. An examination of events since World War II will clearly demonstrate the continued requirement for a strong carrier force.

In July 1950, when the North Korean armies crossed the DMZ to invade South Korea, our carrier fleet had been permitted to dwindle to a force of only seven attack carriers. In the first few days of that war, the Communists overran and captured every tactical airfield in South Korea. All of the effective air support for our hard-pressed ground forces had to come from carriers. The lesson having been learned, attack carrier force levels were increased to 17 by the end of the Korean war, and the first post World War II carrier construction program was started. Beginning in 1952 the Congress authorized the construction of one new attack carrier every year, culminating with our first and only nuclear powered attack carrier, the U.S.S. *Enterprise* in 1958.

The parallel of today's carrier construction program is strikingly similar. From 1958 until 1967, only two attack carriers were authorized, both of them

conventionally powered. Then with our increasing involvement in Southeast Asia, the pressing requirement for carriers was again demonstrated. The first strikes against North Vietnam were flown from attack carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964. With the commitment of U.S. troops to Vietnam came the need for tactical air power for their support. While air bases were being constructed in Thailand and South Vietnam, carrier-based air support filled the gap. By 1965, there were five attack carriers in the 7th Fleet conducting combat air operations in Vietnam.

In 1966 the Secretary of Defense informed the Congress of Department of Defense's plans to construct three nuclear-powered attack carriers, the first of which would be the CVAN–68, the *Nimitz,* in the fiscal year 1967 shipbuilding program. Although this plan was approved only after extensive analytical studies which had established the need for attack carriers on a cost effectiveness basis, the demonstrated usefulness of carriers in the Vietnam war had been the deciding factor in the Secretary of Defense's decision. Subsequent history continues to support the validity of the carrier concept. At the time of the cessation of bombing into the North, carrier-based aircraft had flown about half of all of the combat sorties into North Vietnam. In spite of the buildup of air base facilities on land in Southeast Asia, four attack carriers still remain in the 7th Fleet off Vietnam for no other reason but that their tactical air power is needed for support of the troops ashore. It is more effective and vastly less expensive to use these carriers than to attempt to build the additional fields, supply dumps, roads, fuel pipelines, and other logistical facilities required to support the land-based squadrons which would be needed to replace the carriers. Aside from the expense and the feasibility of such a replacement program, it is our objective to take our people out of Vietnam, not put more in.

A fact sheet has been prepared and circulated to support the Moorhead carrier amendment. A line by line examination of this sheet will reveal that it is not particularly factual, and that its conclusions are not supported by any sort of logic or rational reasoning.

The fact sheet starts out by proving U.S. superiority in attack carriers is 15 to zero over the Communist nations. But in the supporting paragraph, only the first sentence is a fact. The rest of the paragraph is simply unsupportable conjecture and illogical reasoning. I quote:

> The Soviet Union does not now have a single attack carrier in their entire fleet. In their modernization program there is no indication that they intend to construct anything but light helicopter carriers. This is not the result of an oversight on the part of their military planners, nor is it, as has been charged, the result of their contiguous land mass. Their sphere of influence extends to a number of countries not adjacent to their home land. They appear to recognize what this country apparently does not—large attack carriers are becoming increasingly obsolete.

As to the reasons why the Soviets do not today have a single attack carrier, I must subscribe to the rationale advanced by the Chief of Naval Operations, the individual who by law is the principal naval adviser to the President of the United States. In his view, it is a case of relative priorities within two different national strategies. The national strategy of the United States is overseas oriented. We have only two international borders. More than 99 percent of our overseas commerce travels by ship. Our military strategy depends upon overseas alliances. Witness the fact that 43 of the 45 nations with which we have treaties are overseas. The bulk of material support for these allies must still travel on the seas. Despite spectacular advances in air travel in recent years, 98 percent of all of the support for Vietnam has gone by ship. It is clearly evident that both our commerce and our security depend upon the continued free use of the seas. Thus our Navy is structured around the aircraft carrier, for air supremacy is essential to control of the seas.

The U.S.S.R., on the other hand, centered in the Eurasian land mass, is surrounded by her allies. In fact Russia has military treaties with only two nations not sharing a common border with her. Russia's naval strategy therefore is primarily designed to interdict the vital overseas lifelines of the Western Powers, the links between the United States and the rest of NATO. Although previous Soviet Navy commanders in chief have stated that the Soviet Union intended to construct a carrier fleet, the first priority has gone to the construction of a massive force of submarines and guided-missile ships, the stated mission of which is to oppose the U.S. Navy's attack carrier fleet. From this fact alone, it should be an obvious and logical deduction that the men in the Kremlin do not consider the attack carriers of the U.S. Navy an obsolescent force.

The fact remains that the Russians are building carriers, relatively small but very modern. At the time of the Cuban missile crisis they learned the need for sea-based air. Without air cover, their fleet and their supply lines were completely vulnerable. Now they are learning the technology of carriers. Large attack carriers are extremely complex. There is only one shipyard in the world today which can construct a nuclear-powered attack carrier. The Russians are becoming knowledgeable in carrier operation and are developing their industrial capacity for carrier construction.

The carrier amendment paper points out:

> Surface vessels are becoming increasingly vulnerable to attacks by submarines and the various missiles that already have been developed. The sinking of the Israeli ship *Elath* by an Egyptian-fired Soviet Styx missile clearly demonstrated this.

It is true that with the advent of the anti-ship-missile and the nuclear powered submarine, surface ships are becoming more vulnerable. The most vulnerable of our vessels are those of the merchant marine which carry our overseas commerce, and the troopships, ammunition ships, and tankers upon which our own overseas forces and those of our allies must completely rely. We cannot abandon our foreign trade or our foreign policy just because ships are vulnerable. Quite the contrary, we must make them less vulnerable by providing the protection a strong, carrier-oriented Navy will afford. Of all the surface ships, the carrier is the least vulnerable. It is a powerful warship designed to survive in a combat environment. More importantly, the carrier's aircraft are the most effective counter to the anti-ship-missile threat, whether ship, submarine, or air launched. The range of the most advanced Soviet anti-ship-missile is about 400 miles. This vastly outranges the guns on our cruisers and destroyers. But the carrier's aircraft, with a combat radius of more than 600 miles, can attack the hostile missile launcher before it can come within range of the carrier. Bombers can sink the guided missile ships. Fighters can destroy the missile-carrying aircraft. Even after the anti-ship-missiles are launched, the carrier's fighters can shoot them down in flight.

The paper goes on to say:

> With more and more nations becoming advanced to the point of having similar missiles within their defensive capabilities, there are fewer and fewer nations against which the carrier becomes part of an effective tactical weapon system.

It is true that the Soviets have provided the Styx missile to the Egyptians. It should be remembered, however, that the missiles which sank the *Elath* were not launched in an attack conducted upon the high seas, but were fired from PT boats hidden inside Port Said.

It is certainly possible that similar missiles could be furnished to the North Vietnamese. Such a possibility has been of concern to our naval commanders in the Gulf of Tonkin. It is of utmost significance to realize, however, that the carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin have operated beyond the range of land-based Styx missiles, and no potential North Vietnamese anti-ship-missile launching platform such as a PT boat or jet aircraft has ever penetrated the U.S. naval defenses in the Gulf of Tonkin to within effective missile range of our carriers. Whenever North Vietnamese PT boats have sortied from their bases into the Gulf of Tonkin, they have been taken under attack, destroyed, or driven back by the combined offensive actions of our carrier planes and surface ships. The point I am making here is that for a nation merely to have the Styx missile is not enough. It must also have a naval or air force capable of gaining local tactical superiority in order to permit the missile launching vehicles to penetrate to within striking range of their seagoing targets.

At this point the paper draws the following conclusion:

> In effect, the carrier serves at the pleasure of any potential enemies who have or are likely to have modern defensive capabilities (i.e. submarines and/or missiles). Under war time conditions, it is highly likely that any carriers that pose a threat to enemies such as these would be quickly destroyed or incapacitated.

The carrier's role, then, is rapidly being limited to:

> (a) Tactical air support in wars against nations with unsophisticated defenses.

(b) Tactical air support in wars of counter-insurgency (when the insurgents are not adequately armed).

(c) A deterrent "presence" in times of near war.

I have pointed out that of the Communist nations which have an anti-ship-missile, the Egyptians were able to sink a small Israeli destroyer when this ship ventured into range of Egyptian PT boats hidden in inland waters. The Egyptians have significantly enough been unable to duplicate this feat on the open seas.

Some nations such as Albania, Egypt, North Korea, and China do have Soviet-supplied submarines in their navies, but, except in the case of China, these are generally training vessels, without any realistic combat potential against a first-line naval force. The greatest underwater threat to navies today is the nuclear-powered submarine and the submarine-launched antiship guided missile. The Chinese Communists have neither of these.

The real truths are these: No attack carrier built during World War II or subsequently has ever been lost to enemy action. Yet many of these carriers, including some in our active fleet today, have been subjected to the most intensive attacks by guided missiles that history has known. In World War II, the Japanese launched 2,314 aircraft in Kamikaze attacks against the U.S. fleet, with the carriers as the principal target. Despite the fact that the Kamikaze was a guided missile with the most sophisticated guidance system possible, not a single attack carrier was lost to them.

Since World War II, not a single carrier has even been damaged by enemy action, despite their active participation in two major conflicts since that time. In contrast, all of the tactical airbases in South Korea were overrun by enemy ground forces in the Korean war. In South Vietnam, over 300 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft have been destroyed and over 3,000 more damaged on the ground by enemy attacks.

The paper goes on to state that the carrier's role is rapidly being limited to first:

Tactical air support in wars against nations with unsophisticated defenses.

In comment, let me initially say that this is the only kind of war I would hope we will fight. Nobody wants wars, but if we must fight to preserve our national security, let us fight to win at the lowest level of intensity. Let us successfully conclude the small wars before they become big ones. Let us demonstrate by our resolve and strength that we are willing to protect ourselves by force of arms. Then we will avoid the big war against a sophisticated enemy such as Russia, China, or the Warsaw Pact.

But I would like to further point out a lack of validity to this fact-sheet statement. The carriers provided about half of all the combat sorties flown into North Vietnam, against defenses so sophisticated that the North Vietnam airspace was effectively denied to a major segment of our airpower—our B–52's. Has it been forgotten that the B–52's never intentionally flew into North Vietnam? It has been estimated that the surface-to-air missiles, radar-directed guns, and modern fighters which constituted the air defense of North Vietnam would have caused losses of 50 percent or more of the B–52's in a single raid.

The second point made in the fact sheet is that the carrier's role is rapidly being limited to tactical air support in wars of counterinsurgency—when the insurgents are not adequately armed. This statement is redundant. The sense of this allegation has already been made in the previous sentence. It would seem as if the intent here is to give the appearance of providing additional arguments, but in reality only repeating the same faulty conclusions.

The final point in this paragraph is that the carrier's role is rapidly being limited to "a deterrent presence in times of near war."

Right here, the authors of this fact paper have scored a major point in favor of the carrier. Any weapon system which would deter war would be worth every penny we could spend on it. Deterrence of war is, after all, the first object of our military posture. To be a "credible deterrent" a force must have the capability to prevail. No enemy will start a war he knows he will lose. The attack carrier is a deterrent because its power is known. It is being demonstrated daily in Vietnam. But more importantly, the carrier is a mobile deterrent, ready on arrival. What other credible deterrent could have been used in place of the carrier providing U.S. presence at the time of the Cyprus crisis? Certainly we could not have landed troops or overflown the island without inflaming, rather than easing the tension. When President Chamoun asked for the presence of U.S. forces in Lebanon to deter a civil strife fomented by other Arab nations, who was the first on the scene: the Marines crossing the beach under cover of carrier aircraft.

The fact sheet then says:

It has not been demonstrated how many carriers are needed to fulfill this somewhat limited role, now, or how much less this role will be ten years from now.

My response to this statement must be that it is simply untrue. The need for a certain number of attack carriers has not been demonstrated perhaps to Congressman MOORHEAD's satisfaction, but the justification for attack carrier force levels is a detailed and complex analysis which is accomplished on an annual basis. These force levels are determined by the Department of Defense, based upon the requirements of our overall national strategy and in consideration of the capabilities of all the services.

As far as their role being a limited one, facts prove just the reverse. The Chief of Naval Operations has pointed out in a recent memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy:

There is no valid plan for overseas military operations of the Army, Air Force, or amphibious forces with embarked Marines which does not depend upon our free use of the seas.

Surface forces cannot survive in the face of a strong air threat without air superiority. The carrier must guarantee this air superiority. The requirements for numbers of carriers is generated by the joint strategic objectives plan which summarizes the forces which the unified commanders require to carry out the contingency plans designed to implement our national strategy. Although this plan cannot attempt to accurately forecast future history, it is a painstaking effort on the part of those charged with the security of this country to provide the best estimate of the forces necessary to afford this protection. The attack carrier remains a major force in this plan to the limit of its future projection.

The fact sheet goes on to say:

Without this information, the Congress is being asked to approve another carrier, the CVAN–69, without knowing whether we may have too many already.

The information is available to those Members of Congress who are willing to study the joint strategic objectives plan. Because this document is top secret, it obviously cannot be publicly distributed. On the other hand, the Congress has been willing to accept studies and justifications for other programs, welfare or urban renewal for example, prepared by people with no demonstrable expertise in this field in comparison to the credentials of our professional military planners in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I fully recognize that it now seems to be in style to criticize the military. I also fully agree that penetrating analysis and detailed review of all of our programs is a necessary function of government, but only when it is used to attain constructive ends.

To discredit the military on the basis of dissent on the war in Southeast Asia, is not only unsound, it is highly unfair. We all are aware of the stringent civilian and political constraints under which the military has had to operate. In Southeast Asia our country is attempting to achieve a political solution by military means. Too often I have heard the phrase "wars are too important to be left to the generals," to permit me to accept the thesis that professional military men should be scapegoats of the Vietnamese war. They did not request the war; nor have they urged that they not be allowed to win the war. The politics of the situation are not in the area of their determination.

Then the paper alleges that:

Attack carriers are an expensive way to provide air support even in limited situations.

Considering the limited role to which the carrier is being relegated by advances in weaponry, it is a fantastically expensive weapon. Each carrier travels with an escort of four destroyers. Together, these ships cost $1.4 billion—not including airplane costs and operating costs.

First, I think I have made it clear that the carrier's role is not limited. Second, the carrier force is not fantastically expensive in view of the fact that the alternative to carriers is an inability to defend our shores without recourse to nuclear weapons. At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, there were plans to invade Cuba in order to destroy the Soviet missile bases posing a threat to our national survival. These plans included the use of three attack carriers. There

were not enough air bases in the United States within range of Cuban targets to provide the level of tactical air required to support our ground forces in the assault phase of this operation. Furthermore, the figures provided in the fact sheet are not accurate. It is not true that each carrier travels with an escort of four destroyers. Carrier task forces are constituted of a mix of ships, operating together to afford mutual support. The number of destroyers included vary with the task and the threat. Also the mission of the destroyers is protective only in the sense that the destruction of hostile ships, planes, and submarines can be considered protective. When enemy naval forces have been eliminated and local control of the seas assured, the destroyers go on to other tasks. In Vietnam, only one or two destroyers have accompanied the carriers, as other destroyers provided gunfire support for our troops and interdicted the enemy's supply lines ashore.

Finally the fact paper states:

In addition to the air support provided from the existing 15 carriers, tactical air support can be provided, and more economically, by land-based aircraft. There are 685 airfields outside the United States with runways longer than 8,000 feet. There are an additional 1,036 airfields whose runways are between 5,000 and 8,000 feet. If none of these 1,700 land airbases are adequate, the Air Force can quickly build one at a cost of $50 to $60 million, instead of shipping in a $1.4 billion mobile airbase.

This argument is completely unrealistic and has no factual basis.

The area of the world covered by our overseas land base system is constantly shrinking. For example, at the end of the Korean war, this country had 551 overseas bases. Today we have fewer than 173. Operational U.S. overseas land airbases have declined in number from 105 in 1957 to 35.

Land bases can be used effectively only when they are within range of the trouble spot. An extensive network of overseas bases would be required to cover the potential crisis areas of the world covered by the contingency plans of our military strategy. Who could decide where we should construct these bases. It is impossible to conceive of where the enemy might strike next. One thing is sure, since the Communists are the aggressors, the time and place will be of their own choosing. They will certainly try to avoid an area in which we are already installed in strength. Even if we could construct enough bases to cover the world, the cost would be astronomical in dollars and in people.

Clearly such an approach is not realistic. Even if we could afford it, there would be no guarantee that we could use these bases when the need arose. Land bases on foreign soil are vulnerable to political action. Regardless of pacts or base agreements, one nation can, and has been demonstrated repeatedly in recent years, unilaterally cancel a treaty, and our bases in that nation are lost to us. This has occurred in Morocco and France. The case of France is particularly disappointing. Throughout the history of the United States, France has been our stanchest ally. Not many people realize that the French suffered more casualties at Yorktown than did our own troops in the Continental Army. If our longtime friends must abrogate base rights because of temporal political considerations we must consider our entire overseas basing system tenuous indeed.

Even when our bases are not taken from us outright, their use can be temporarily denied to us for political reasons. This occurred during the Lebanon incident in 1958, when the Greek Government denied landing and even overflight permission to our land based tactical air forces deploying to the Near East.

Carrier aircraft, on the other hand, with a radius of action of more than 600 nautical miles can reach 85 percent of the earth's land mass covered by our contingency planning.

The conversion of existing airstrips into military bases is not a simple task. To establish one tactical air wing—the approximate equivalent of one carrier air wing—on a bare airstrip involves the movement of over 6,000 people, 7,000 tons of cargo, and 1,500 vehicles in its initial lift. It must be maintained in combat by a daily logistic flow of 3,200 tons of consumables. This daily resupply, if provided by airlift, would require more than 100 C–5A transport aircraft. Since this is obviously impractical, overseas land bases are dependent on keeping the sealanes open for logistic support. Ninety-eight percent of supplies, material, and equipment to Vietnam have been sent by sealift. In many areas adequate air defense of our sealanes, and airlanes over the sea, can only be provided by carrier aircraft.

Nor does the plan to construct bases after the crisis develops eliminate the requirement for carriers. Carriers were required in Korea, Lebanon, and Vietnam to provide the initial tactical air cover while land bases were being established and readied for operations. Today in Southeast Asia, land-based construction has not progressed to the point where the carriers are no longer needed. Four attack carriers are still assigned to support tactical air requirements in Vietnam:

In its final paragraph, the fact sheet summarizes the effects of the amendment to say:

1. This amendment would delete only funds for the CVAN–69, the second of the nuclear attack carriers.

2. This amendment does not curtail construction of the first *Nimitz* class nuclear attack carrier—the CVAN–68.

With these statements I am forced to agree. But with the rest of these conclusions which state:

3. Including the *Nimitz*, this country will have 13 attack carriers which have the capability of handling the most modern naval tactical aircraft. In view of the diminution of the role of the attack carrier in the future, the Department of Defense and the Navy, as yet, have not adequately justified the necessity for another attack carrier.

4. Without the need for this additional carrier being justified by the Department of Defense, the expenditure of public funds for its acquisition must be considered a wasteful extravagance.

I am forced to disagree in most emphatic terms. Without the CVAN–69, the 13 attack carriers in 1974 (when the CVAN–69 is scheduled to join the fleet) will include only two nuclear powered ships. The average age of the carrier force will be more than 15 years. The oldest ship will be 29. Three of the carriers will be World War II designs, with a combat effectiveness of only one-third to one-fourth the *Nimitz* capability. As long as we have a Navy, it must be a strong and capable one. Geography will not change. We will always be essentially an island nation, depending upon the sea and the airspace over the seas for the bulk of our international commerce, and in our foreign relations. The professional judgment upon which we have placed the responsibility for our national security, sees no diminution in the role of the attack carrier in our military posture for the immediate future.

Without carriers, our defense establishment would have a void which would have to be filled by more expensive, less effective, and more provocative systems.

Rather than consider the appropriation of funds for the CVAN–69 as a wasteful extravagance, I consider that the authorization for the funds to complete the construction of this ship, an obligation to the future generation of Americans in the preservation of security of this Nation.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON).

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I believe the gentleman from California (Mr. GUBSER), made the point clearly that what we need and what this bill provides is an airborne early warning and command and control system. We have a great installation out in Colorado, the North American Air Defense System. Surely if we do not provide this air defense system, which we have created to protect our country not only from air attacks but also missile attacks from abroad, if we do not provide them with modern interceptor aircraft, which are contained in this title and with the modern airborne command and control center the gentleman's amendment would strike out, if we are not willing to keep our air defenses up to date we might as well tell them to close up shop at Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS).

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I regret that we do not have more time to discuss this amendment. We have a need for a beefing up in our Air Force, and we have a need for the AWAC's, and we do not have one. Our forces cannot see beyond the horizon. If you want to defend our country, then we need this kind of capability, and this kind of control mechanism so that we can preserve the freedom of the skies.

That is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.

The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. REUSS).

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. REUSS), there were—ayes 41, noes 42.

So the amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title II?

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I ask for the Clerk not to report the amendment, considering the length of time I would have to explain it.

The CHAIRMAN. All time for debate on title II has expired. Is the gentleman from New York addressing himself to title II?

Mr. PIKE. I was addressing myself to title II, Mr. Chairman. I thought I had some time left which I had reserved.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair had recognized the gentleman.

Mr. PIKE. I thought I had 45 seconds to explain my amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognized the gentleman for 45 seconds and at that time the gentleman did not care to take the time.

All time has expired.

The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE III—RESERVE FORCES

SEC. 301. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1969, and ending June 30, 1970, the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the Armed Forces will be programed to attain an average strength of not less than the following:

(1) The Army National Guard of the United States, 393,298.

(2) The Army Reserve, 255,591.

(3) The Naval Reserve, 129,000.

(4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 49,489.

(5) The Air National Guard of the United States, 86,624.

(6) The Air Force Reserve, 50,775.

(7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 17,500.

SEC. 302. The average strength prescribed by section 301 of this title for the Selected Reserve of any Reserve component shall be proportionately reduced by (1) the total authorized strength of units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component which are on active duty (other than for training) at any time during the fiscal year, and (2) the total number of individual members not in units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component who are on active duty (other than for training or for unsatisfactory participation in training) without their consent at any time during the fiscal year. Whenever any such units or such individual members are released from active duty during any fiscal year, the average strength for such fiscal year for the Selected Reserve of such Reserve component shall be proportionately increased by the total authorized strength of such units and by the total number of such individual members.

SEC. 303. Section 264 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by deleting subsection (b) and substituting the following in lieu thereof:

"(b) The Secretary concerned is responsible for providing the personnel, equipment, facilities, and other general logistic support necessary to enable units and Reserves in the Selected Reserve of the Reserve components under this jurisdiction to satisfy the mobilization readiness requirements established for those units and Reserves in the contingency and war plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense, and as recommended by the Commandant of the Coast Guard and approved by the Secretary of Transportation when the Coast Guard is not operated as a service of the Navy. He shall, when a unit in the Selected Reserve is established and designated, expeditiously procure, issue, and maintain supplies and equipment of combat standard quality in amounts required for the training of each unit and shall store and maintain such additional supplies and equipment of that quality that are required by those units upon mobilization. However, if the Secretary concerned determines that compliance with the preceding provisions of this subsection will jeopardize the national security interests of the United States, he may temporarily waive compliance with these requirements after he has notified Congress in writing, setting forth the specific facts and circumstances upon which he made such a determination. Unless specifically authorized by law enacted after the effective date of this section, funds authorized for personnel, supplies, equipment and facilities for a Reserve component may not be transferred or expended for any other purpose."

SEC. 304. Subsection (c) of section 264 of title 10, United States Code, is amended as follows:

In the last line of the last sentence of subsection (c) after the word "within", change the figures "60" to "90".

Mr. LEGGETT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title III be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, a situation has developed here which is really not conducive to the consideration of legislation of this magnitude.

A number of people are upset. I suppose it depends on which foot the shoe is on, and which piece of legislation you might be considering or whose ox is being gored.

Mr. Chairman, it would indeed be better if we could give a little more consideration to some of these amendments. But I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that it is a little inconsistent on the part of some who talk about a gag rule on legislation of this sort when you will recall just a few weeks ago, before the August recess, we had 2 days of debate under a closed rule on a piece of tax reform legislation that is more far-reaching than any tax legislation that we have ever had since the imposition of the graduated income tax itself. The Committee on Rules sent to this House under a closed rule that tax proposal wherein those of us who had some opposition did not even have a chance to offer an amendment, with even 45 seconds to discuss the amendment. We had to vote for or against the entire 368-page package.

So the thing you have to remember and consider is that eventually every road turns and you will be faced with that situation yourself. If you are not willing to face it when the time comes, do not invite it in the first place. You are faced with it now. Too often, and remember this, when you dig a grave for someone else you wind up in it yourself.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WAGGONNER. I am happy to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. MOORHEAD. I think this is water over the dam now. We have this. But I would hope that we would learn from this and that in the future we would program bills of this magnitude early in the week so we would not have this pressure late on a Friday, when Members want to close up.

Mr. WAGGONNER. The gentleman is engaging in wishful thinking, because, since we have a Tuesday-to-Thursday operation, this cannot be done.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Maybe next year similar legislation will be programed differently. I would hope it would be programed for the beginning of the week so we would not have this pressure on us to finish up in haste late Friday afternoon.

Mr. WAGGONNER. It is pressure when you have serious legislation, whether it is scheduled for Monday or Friday. It does not make any difference.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

This has been in large part a very enlightening and a very enlightened debate for these past 3 days. Honest dissent there has been. It has been vigorous. It has involved fundamental assumptions and basic matters of policy. This has been proper and useful. I earnestly hope that what dissent has arisen will not be misinterpreted as discordant dissension. I for one am willing to remain for the rest of the day, tomorrow, or however long it is necessary that there may be ample discussion of any amendment seriously offered.

But I earnestly hope—and this is the reason I take this time—that argument and even acrimony shall not obscure the larger meaning of what we are doing here, as a part of the larger debate that is going on in this Nation.

Even though some Members of the Congress in both Houses—yes, and in both parties—are publicly unwilling to embrace a moratorium on criticism of the President in his conduct of foreign affairs, still what is happening here shows that a majority in both Houses and in both parties is fully willing to give the President the backing and support that he requires if he is to supply leadership to the country. And that is the profound and basic meaning of what we are doing.

May none, therefore, misread what is happening in America. May it be clear to the leaders in Hanoi that although some Americans do delight in criticism, and a vocal minority in its eagerness to abandon the fight may even be willing to abandon President Nixon's insistence on the right of peaceful self-determination for the people of South Vietnam, those people do not represent a majority. They do not speak for America.

Let the leaders of North Vietnam not draw the erroneous conclusion that if they will simply persist long enough in unyielding obstinacy, America will fall to pieces, so dismembered by the bitterness of internal disaffection as to lose its will, and let them have their way entirely.

Mr. Nixon has made overtures to peace. He has declared his willingness to consider any reasonable overture from the other side, and none has come.

President Nixon has stated clearly, and I think forcefully, that we as a na-

tion have only one nonnegotiable purpose, and this is that the future of South Vietnam be determined by ballots rather than by bullets. Most Americans support that purpose. Clearly it is time for some movement from the other side. It is time for some concessions from Hanoi, some suggestion of a basis for settlement, some evidence or indication that the North Vietnam Government is willing to negotiate.

May there be no misunderstanding in Moscow. Let those in the Kremlin see in our actions here that we truly do want peace, that we are anxious to negotiate with them a general reduction in armaments, and toward that end are willing to authorize public moneys for implements which we would greatly prefer to reduce whenever they are willing to join us in that course.

Walter Lippmann, who celebrated his 80th birthday last week, wrote some words in 1914 that have a meaning today. These lines appeared on November 7, 1914, in the first issue of the New Republic magazine. Mr. Lippmann said at that time:

> It is not enough to hate war and waste, to launch one unanalyzed passion against another, to make the world a vast debating ground in which tremendous accusations are directed against the Kaiser and the financiers, the diplomatists and the great manufacturers. The guilt is wider and deeper than that. It comes home finally to all those who live carelessly, too lazy to think, to preoccupied to care, afraid to move, afraid to change, eager for a false peace, unwilling to pay the daily costs of sanity.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words and yield to the gentleman from Texas so he may complete what I think is a very timely and very useful message on behalf of a very thoughtful and conscientious Member of this House.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Oklahoma both for his thoughtfulness in yielding and for his comment.

I simply want all of us on both sides of the aisle and on both sides of these discussions to ponder, as I said, the words of Mr. Lippmann, which he wrote many years ago when he was a very young man. I will repeat in part:

> The guilt . . . comes home finally to all those who live carelessly, too lazy to think, too preoccupied to care, afraid to move, afraid to change, eager for a false peace, unwilling to pay the daily costs of sanity.

It seems to me what all of us on both sides of the aisle need to make clear in these debates underway here today, so that it may be understood by all, is that just as we do ardently desire peace and actively pursue it, we are not so eager for a "false peace" as to be unwilling to pay "the daily costs of sanity."

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield the remainder of the time back to me, I commend the gentleman from Texas for his remarks and commend him for sounding, in the midst of what undoubtedly is being recorded as a divisive debate on many issues, a note of unity and purpose among the American people. It seems to me even though many of us may have disagreements as to the level of activity that should be followed in certain categories of our Armed Forces, even though those disagreements are strongly felt among many of us, this debate and the votes that have been taken have demonstrated very, very decisively the will of the overwhelming majority of this body, that this Nation continue to negotiate from strength and that it continue to prepare adequately for all eventualities that might threaten the security and safety of our country. It has been demonstrated conclusively thus far that this is a majority sentiment felt on both sides of the aisle of this House.

I thank the gentleman for his remarks which put in perspective the sense of unity that does pervade these halls at this time on the major issue of the survival and security of our country—an issue which is directly affected by our actions on this important bill.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, first let me say I come to the well to join my colleague, the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. EDMONDSON) in praising the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT) for the statement he has just made. It was eloquent. It was thoughtful. It was the kind of statement I think does demonstrate, despite some of the statements that are made, that there is a greater degree of unity in this country than the Communist world sometimes realizes.

Frankly, some of us were deeply disturbed several days ago when the senior Senator from Oklahoma, acting in his capacity as chairman of the Democratic National Committee, said that the time had come to take the gloves off on the issue of Vietnam, and he seemed to be bringing that issue into the partisan arena, in the attempt to make this a Republican war. I have never said it was a Democratic war, nor will I ever make that charge, and it certainly is not a Republican war; it is an American war. I think the gentleman from Texas speaks the sentiments of many of us on both sides of the aisle in counseling the kind of moderation he does.

Mr. Chairman, the statement I quoted earlier seemed to indicate that Senator HARRIS somehow views the Vietnam war as nothing more than an arena for a political sparring match that should not be turned into a street brawl. To my mind, Mr. Chairman, this is both a reckless and irresponsible statement. This is no time to play partisan politics with an issue as grave and as delicate as the Vietnam war. I have always favored responsible dissent and open debate on the war, but I will always oppose any attempts to make a political football out of that issue. We have traditionally observed a nonpartisan approach to the Vietnam debate, and I would hate to see that debate deteriorate into partisanship at this crucial juncture in the war and in the negotiations.

And I am not alone in my concern and my belief that Senator HARRIS is trying to make political hay out of the Vietnam war issue. Senator FRANK CHURCH, who is both a Democrat and a war critic, had this to say after his meeting with Senator HARRIS and other Democrats:

> I want no part in any strategem to convert the Vietnam war into a political club for Democrats to use against Republicans.

Senator CHURCH, in remarks before that other body on Monday of this week, went on to make the following statement:

> I object also because it is plainly too soon for Democrats to use Vietnam as a legitimate issue against the Republican Administration. After all, Democrats in the White House led this country into Vietnam. If President Nixon fails to lead us out, it may become his war. But it is not Nixon's war yet. For 8 years, we Democrats bore the responsibility. Now we must wear the hair short longer than 8 months. Quite apart from what our personal positions may have been, we are not yet entitled as a party to hold the Republicans to account.

Mr. Chairman, I commend Senator CHURCH on his statesmanlike remarks. This is neither a Democratic war nor a Republican war; it is an American war. And the President of the American people has pledged himself to achieving an honorable settlement of that war. And the President has already taken a number of positive steps in that direction.

It therefore baffles me that Mr. HARRIS should suggest that the President has "no plan" for ending the war and that he is taking no constructive measures to insure a peaceful and honorable settlement of that war. This criticism is especially baffling in light of remarks made earlier this year by Senator HARRIS. Speaking before the National Press Club here in Washington on April 16 of this year, Mr. HARRIS said the Democratic Party will not make partisan capital out of the solemn cause of Vietnam. On April 29, in a Philadelphia speech, Mr. HARRIS said, and I quote:

> We've got to begin a step-by-step de-Americanization of the war. We've got to bring some boys home, even if it's only a symbolic number.

And on May 25 of this year, in Burlington, Vt., Mr. HARRIS said, and I again quote:

> The level of violence should be reduced by bringing home at least 50,000 American boys in 1969.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that President Nixon is more than following the Harris plan for the de-Americanization of the Vietnam war; that he has pledged to bring home not 50,000 but 60,000 American troops by the end of this year. It is therefore difficult for me to understand how Mr. HARRIS can attack this administration for having no plan, when, in fact, the administration is doing more than Senator HARRIS indicated should be done.

One can only conclude that these irresponsible attacks are based on partisan considerations rather than on rational and responsible alternatives to our current Vietnam policy. We have, in Senator HARRIS' words, begun "a step-by-step de-Americanization of the war," and we are withdrawing more than his suggested "symbolic number" of troops.

Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that this administration is on the right course with regard to Vietnam. I support the

President in his efforts to both increase the capabilities of the South Vietnamese to fend for themselves and to arrive at a negotiated settlement of the war in Paris. This administration deserves our support in its efforts to achieve these honorable objectives.

I also take the well to answer the implication—and I think there was an implied rebuke in what my friend, and he is my friend, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. WAGGONNER) said a moment ago—when he spoke of the wrath of some of us in describing the procedure this afternoon as embracing a gag rule.

If I betrayed anger in my voice, I apologize. I am not angry at anyone in this Chamber, I can assure the Members. I have a great deal of difficulty with the closed rule, although I have supported such a rule on bills coming from the Ways and Means Committee. Maybe as a result of what the gentleman said, I will not be as quick the next time to vote, at the suggestion and even urging of the distinguished chairman of that committee, the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. MILLS) to grant that kind of rule on a tax bill.

But I do not believe I have ever stood in this well, nor have I stood to support a motion, to shut off debate under the 5-minute rule. That is what I have objected to here this afternoon, because I believe this is the one valuable means of debate we have when we are in the Committee of the Whole House in the House of Representatives; to use the 5-minute rule not to filibuster but to bring out some of the important points which ought to be brought out in this debate.

I do not believe the gentleman from California (Mr. GUBSER) should have literally had to spit out his words to try to explain his argument that we ought to support the authorization for the airborne defense system. I do not believe that is conducive to the level of debate we have come to expect in this Chamber.

I do not believe it is irrelevant for those who are not members of the Armed Services Committee to ask whether or not we have a right to challenge some of the underlying strategic assumptions, some of which have gone unchallenged pretty much since World War II. Is the threat today the same as it was immediately after World War II, or has it changed?

I believe we can make a contribution in this chamber in the kind of debate and the kind of examination we make of that question.

I read in the article I referred to when I spoke on the bill the other day, an article by Juan Cameron on "The Case for Cutting Defense Spending," this statement:

> The Nixon Administration has already initiated what promises to be the most profound and basic reappraisal ever undertaken of the political-military threat facing the United States and of the defense structure needed to cope with it. The first results of this review, being carried on jointly by a National Security Council staff under Lawrence Lynn and the Department of Defense under Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, should be reflected in next year's defense budget.

If those in the executive branch find it necessary to make that kind of basic and profound review and reappraisal of the whole nature of the political-military threat, then I believe we have a duty to make some contribution in this branch of Government to that analysis and to that reexamination.

I certainly hope that we do not come to the point in the history of this Chamber where we regard as in the context of irrelevancies the comments which are made by those who are not on the Committee on Armed Services. I respect their expertise. I have not read the AMSA hearings in full. I wish I had.

And now I speak to the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT). I would be very interested to know how much of those hearings is devoted to the purely technological and how much is devoted to the underlying basic rational for the employment of AMSA in a strategic capacity.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has expired.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from South Carolina is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON).

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I appreciate the courtesy of the chairman of the committee in yielding to me.

Mr. RIVERS. Let me ask the gentleman one question.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Surely. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RIVERS. The fact that the gentleman is now talking indicates that people who have anything to say have not been cut off. We have spent over 2 hours on the last title. So far as I am concerned, we can spend another 2 hours on this.

The fact is the gentleman is talking. He makes an eloquent speech, and I am delighted to yield to him.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. RIVERS. The gentleman will remember that before the Rules Committee I said:

> I will take whatever time you give me. If you want me to have four hours give it to me. If you want me to have ten hours and you think I deserve ten hours and need ten hours, give it to me.

Am I right or wrong?

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. The gentleman is eminently correct. He did not ask the Rules Committee to grant only 4 hours.

As I believe I told the House the other day, I was in favor of granting more time under general debate.

I would take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to express the hope that as additional amendments are offered to this bill we will listen patiently and carefully to the arguments that are advanced on both sides so that those of us who are not on the committee, who desperately are seeking further information and knowledge that we need, can at least go home on the weekend and feel that we have been exposed to as much information and material here on the floor as we could be.

Now, if I may, in the brief time I have remaining, I want to point out something else that I think is relevant to the theme that I was trying to develop. This goes back to a statement I read or heard made by the former Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Dr. Herbert York. In an article I believe he wrote in Scientific American a couple of months ago he said that if we want to see an end to the rising crescendo of costs and uncertainties in this whole developing arms race which has gripped the world, we will have to rely not just on technological decisions but on political decisions.

Mr. Chairman, that is why I think it is important, to have full debate on all decisions to bring new weapons systems into our national inventory. Yesterday we had under consideration the F–14. I supported the position of your committee, Mr. Chairman, and I voted against the amendment that would have struck $275 million from this bill, because I listened to the arguments you advanced. We were told here that the Soviets have been developing a new model or a variant of a plane in this category every 2 years since 1961. So I went along with the committee. But I left that debate and went home and wrote down some of these thoughts last night because I wished I had a little more of the basic underlying rationale on why these planes are necessary.

Mr. Chairman, I heard the press conference of the President in Guam where he said that our policy in Asia is taking a new direction, and the clear indication was that we were not going to play the same kind of interventionist role that we have played ever since the post-World War II period. I believe the President when he said that there is a change and I believe that he will make the kind of basic review of our whole politico-military position vis-a-vis the Soviets that can contribute to a more rational defense posture. I think it will be reflected in the budget that is sent to Capitol Hill in January of next year. In the meantime I hope we will be listening to those who have taken the time to study this program—AMSA—or this whole question of strategic arms, not just from the technological standpoint but from the other underlying bases I have mentioned as to whether or not we are really responding to the threat that is surely there.

I have heard and I believe that the Soviet is testing new missiles and week by week they are seeking to increase their offensive strength. However, I want to be sure we are responding to that threat and particularly because of the long lead-times necessary on many of these programs that we are making a prudent use of our resources. The gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT) told us on the AMSA that it would be 8 years before we could put that plane into our inventory to replace the B–52. I want to be sure before we install this new weapons system as a part of our defense that we are responding to the kind of situation in the world that we will be facing in the 1970's.

The ultimate cost of the program carries various estimates ranging from $8 to $23 billion. The rationale by the Pentagon is that we need a mix of bombers,

land-based, and sea-based missiles. However, since we are not planning a first-strike capability and desire only to maintain our assured destruction, or second-strike capability, are not strategic missiles more advantageous from a cost standpoint?

It is difficult to see that a new bomber is really needed to maintain the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. I know of no realistic claim that it would be employed in the context of a conventional war. Therefore, what are the strategic exigencies that necessitate this project during the decade of the 1970's? In essence, what we seem to be arguing in opting for this particular weapons system is that we are planning for future unknown eventualities.

Again there seems to be a developing vacuum between the policy decisions which are essentially political in nature and military planning decisions. I wonder if there are adequate coordinating mechanisms between the policy planners in the executive branch, primarily in the Department of State, and the Defense planners, who project future force structures and force levels. Somehow we have failed, I believe, to mesh these two elements of overall government planning in such a way as to give us a balanced military force, which is related to the goals which we seek to achieve and maintain as a world power. Until we bridge that gap, defense will continue to extract more of our annual gross national product than is necessary.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the pro forma amendment. I had wanted to yield my time to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON) if he desired additional time to complete his statement. If not, let me just add this additional comment on the point raised by the gentleman from South Carolina as well as by the gentleman from Illinois. I had thought we were meeting here this afternoon to consider amendments to this important legislation. I have nowhere to go tonight or tomorrow and I can stay here as long as anybody else, but there are Members who would like to try to get this bill considered and debated and amended, if possible, and then vote it either up or down. The reason I suggested that we bring debate on title II to an end within some reasonable fixed time was that we were having no amendments offered to it. We were discussing the condition of schoolchildren in the District of Columbia. As the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS) pointed out a moment ago, we have had no amendments offered so far to this title, although we have already been debating for a half hour. I think in fairness to Members who may have commitments, we should get on with whatever amendments are to be offered and consider them in whatever time is necessary and then vote them up or down. It is already well into the second hour past noontime.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON) for his magnificent and eloquent speech here today. I would like to associate myself with it as closely as I can cuddle up to it.

I think that it is an absolute travesty that a member of the committee could not get 10 seconds to explain that he was not asking that his amendment to title II be read, simply because it would have been a travesty to try to explain the amendment in 45 seconds. And I was going to withdraw my amendment simply because I did not do very well yesterday trying to explain amendments in 5 minutes, and I know very well it would have made no sense to try to explain my amendment to title II in 45 seconds.

But, Mr. Chairman, I do think that we demean the operation of this House when we pretend it is adequate to devote 2 hours to title II. That happens to come down to $3,700,-and-some-odd millions per hour, and I do not believe that that is an adequate way to debate title II.

We have seen this situation arise again and again and again, and I believe that we hurt ourselves. I believe we hurt our committee. I think we hurt our Congress. I believe we demean our Nation. I think it is a very sad day.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, just to be certain, I stopped by the doctor's office this morning and had him take my blood pressure. I am pleased it is normal. So I am not going to get excited like others are doing. I am not mad at anyone, and I do not propose to be.

But I wonder how the Members of this House can forget so quickly—so very quickly—what has happened and transpired over past years?

I was in this House one day when 12 amendments were on that desk—Republican amendments were on that desk—and we were overwhelmingly denied the opportunity to even read any one of them, leave alone speaking on them.

So let us today attempt to be fair. Let us be honorable and just about all of this business, and our remarks as to one another.

What is happening here today, has been happening over the years, and it is going to continue to happen, because in this House we have 435 prima donnas, and you cannot do anything about that—and neither can I.

I, on occasion, go home at night pretty mad about the day's happenings on this floor, but I get over it. So will you.

Those on our side of the aisle have been repeatedly overwhelmed, slugged, tramped on, and almost demolished time and time again with the overwhelming majority you have had on that side of the aisle. That is the way you wanted it. So we have just taken it. Yet I am still not mad at anyone on that side of the aisle, and never have been, and do not plan to be.

So please look at things the way they are when they happen, and repeatedly happen, because you must know they will continue to happen so long as you and I are here.

So let us make the best of the situation, forget the little innuendos and the little digs, and all the little things that go with it. My colleagues, we cannot have everything we want all the time. This is a give-and-take business.

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, in this Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, where the king's men cannot penetrate, let us look at what has just happened.

I am glad that the blood pressure of the distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ARENDS) is OK. So is mine. And my cholesterol count is fine, too.

But my sense of fairplay is outraged. It is outraged because we have just completed a span of 20 minutes, with 45 seconds allotted to Members who had a message to tell on a vitally important amendment, and we did it without getting the facts on the table.

Three days ago I put on the Clerk's desk, and on the desk of the majority and minority of the Armed Services Committee, my amendment. They knew what it was. It was also quite clear to those who brought forward the motion to restrict Members to 45 seconds that I had that amendment and wished to press it.

It is a source of great sadness to me, because I respect the leading members of the Committee on Armed Services on both sides of the aisle and our great Speaker, that they saw fit to restrict Members to 45 seconds.

So I ask, Mr. Chairman, is this a just and fair way to conduct the affairs of this deliberative body? Does it keep faith with the American people who sent us here to use our best and most honest efforts so that truth might prevail?

Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, speaking from this side of the aisle, I merely want to say very briefly that I would like to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman fom Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON) on the subject of the limitation of debate. I will add also with the remarks of my colleague, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. REUSS).

In fact, these two gentlemen have stated it so eloquently that there is really nothing for me to add on that subject. But I would just like to say this. I consider myself a conservative, and I am in favor of a strong national defense. I have sat here for 2 days voting with the committee and against the amendments. I will probably continue to do so. But I do not want it to be said that only these flaming liberals over here are in favor of free speech and debate because I am, too.

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, the pending amendment to the naval, Army, aircraft procurement bill is a continuation of series of amendments offered yesterday, and no doubt a considerable number of amendments will be offered to this bill today. I gathered from some of the speeches made on the floor of the House yesterday that the proponents of some of the amendments were not convinced that the Defense Department needed certain items but they had some concern

about our middle and lower bracket taxpayers. As a one-time member of the Naval Affairs Committee, and my observation over the last 20-odd years pertaining to the military budgets, I am fully convinced that the military brass hats, more than any branch of our Government, are not the least bit backward about budgeting in the military by billions for projects, and do not possess too much concern as to the difficulties the Congress has in getting money to finance these $100 billion annual budgets.

It is remarkable that during the dark days of World War II our military budget was around $10 to $15 billion annually, which was during a highly involved international war. During the Korean war, our military budget was around $9 to $10 billion. A few years later it kept going up and up until about 10 years ago it approximated $50 billion and today we find the stupendous figure for the 1969 military budget approaching $80 billion.

Older Members of this House remember a distinguished Pennsylvania colleague, Congressman Bob Rich, who daily would cry out, "Where are you going to get the money?"

I want it strictly understood that I have supported and will continue to support necessary funds for the best defense that our Nation can afford to buy for the money available.

But the picture I would like to place on the minds of my colleagues that it was only in the first part of August of this year when we debated the tax reform bill that we heard from very few of the leaders on both sides of the House, and certainly not from the well of the House, recommendations that all segments of our taxpaying public be required to finance these annual budgets of over $100 billion, of which approximately three-fourths is for the Defense Department.

Ample funds to finance education and schools in the urban areas of America are nonexistent. In my industrial area of the Calumet region thousands of children are jammed in crowded schools and school boards are renting warehouses and garages to accommodate the overflow of children. The same situation exists in New York, Pittsburgh, Los Angeles, and all congested areas of the United States.

We have word from the White House that the education budget must be reduced for next year. In yesterday's paper, which I hold in my hand, headlines state, "Model Cities Fund Slash Amounts to 42 Percent." It was only 2 weeks ago that the White House sent out word that the $1 billion for funds necessary for the purification of water in our urban areas must be slashed from $1 billion to $214 million. This budget reduction will jeopardize the health of millions of our citizens in the urban areas.

The administration recommended the federally impacted area funds be cut from $521 million to $202 million for 1970.

The administration also recommended that the library funds budget for the elementary and secondary education be cut from $405 million down to $70 million.

Also that equipment and minor remodeling for our schools be reduced by $40 million.

Word from the White House is that the poverty program for the unemployed and needy in our ghettos must be reduced by almost one-third.

I can continue other items of reduction which will be cut from millions of Americans who need help and need Government assistance in this exploding population which is now over 200 million.

During the tax reform bill which was debated on this floor over 2 months ago, the Members of this body had the opportunity to close a great number of fabulous, and in most cases fraudulent, loopholes of mammoth corporations making fabulous profits, but our Federal Treasury will profit very little from the so-called tax reform bill. Most Members paid little attention to the fact that over $12 billion could have been brought into the Federal Treasury for 1970 on our tax reform bill if only they could have resisted some of the powerful lobbyists that infested Washington like bees in a honey patch, to protect their tax-free profits. Do most of the Members realize that this stupendous amount is $21 billion and the rest of the defense budget will total, in all, about $80 billion; two thirds will be paid by salaried and wage earners of America.

I hold in my hand a breakdown estimated by the U.S. Treasury that there was a 1968 revenue loss as a result of major tax loopholes, which I will ask unanimous consent to incorporate with my remarks. This includes oil depletion, intangible drilling deductions, travel and entertainment deductions, capital gains not reported on tax returns, capital gains that escape tax at death and unreported dividends and interest. These are just some of the major loopholes that escaped the Congress 2 months ago.

1968 revenue loss as a result of major tax loopholes (estimated by U.S. Treasury)

	Millions
Nontaxed interests on tax-free bonds	$1,800
Depletion deductions (corporations included)	1,500
Intangible drilling deductions (oil and gas)	750
Travel and entertainment deductions (estimated excesses)	400
The 50 percent of capital gains not reported on tax returns	5,000
Capital gains that escape tax at death	2,000
Unreported dividends and interest	1,000
Total loophole revenue loss in 1968	12,450

Also I wish to give you a couple of examples of how big oil escaped defense taxes, along with other necessary taxes to keep our Government operating.

From 1962 through 1966 the Atlantic-Richfield Oil Co. had profits of $411,621,000. But after deducting its 27½-percent oil depletion allowance, "intangible drilling costs" and other items it came up with a whole string of goose eggs. Its total income tax obligation for those 5 years was zero.

In 1962 the Marathon Oil Co. had a net profit of $36 million. After deducting its depletion allowance and other items, Marathon not only paid no income tax but received a tax credit of $2.2 million.

Let us consider the tax "bonanza" enjoyed by the 27½-percent exemptions under the oil depletion allowance. In this case you determine your income from a producing well and deduct 27½ percent of that amount before beginning to calculate your income tax. You do the same next year, and the year after that, and every year as long as that well produces. You don't stop when you have retrieved your investment; in fact, the average well is "depleted" 12 times over. If your drilling cost was $50,000, your total income tax deductions on its production might be $600,000. This bill reduces the depletion loophole 7½ percent and most Members feel that it should be repealed entirely.

Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last three words.

Mr. Chairman, it has repeatedly been charged during the course of the debate that we are neglecting certain social programs and falling over and playing dead when the Defense Department asks for funds. I think it would be helpful before the debate ends if some facts on this subject should be placed in the RECORD.

In 1961, the administrative budget of the United States was $81 billion. Of that sum national defense came in for $47 billion, or 58 percent. Housing, health and education had only $5.5 billion in that budget, or 6.7 percent.

In 1969, let me show you how the percentage of the funds in the administrative budget for national defense has gone down and the percentage of funds for the social programs has gone up. The record shows that in 1969 the administrative budget was $148.6 billion, of which national defense accounted for $80 billion, or only 54 percent, as contrasted with 58 percent in 1961, whereas that part of the budget for housing, health and education had gone up to $20 billion, or an increase from 6.7 percent to 13.6 percent.

May I say also that since 1956 while the budget for national defense was going up 100 percent, the budget for the social welfare programs has gone up 700 percent. So I do not think the argument can be sustained that we are increasing funds for national defense and decreasing funds for social programs. However, there will not be any social programs to support if we fail in the national defense of our country.

The funds devoted to national defense are provided to protect the security of the people of the United States.

May I make one other statement which has not been emphasized during the course of the debate. We are not spending any money here today when we vote. When we vote on this bill we are not spending one dime. I have heard it said repeatedly during the course of the debate that a vote for this bill is a vote to spend so many billions of dollars for this program and so many billions of dollars for that. Those who have made these statements would not, I am sure, deliberately mislead those who read the RECORD, but unless the RECORD is corrected many will be misled. The fact is, as all Members know, this is not an appropriation bill but merely an authori-

zation one. Another committee of the House will have to review what is authorized here today and decide on a spending level to be recommended to the House, and you will have another chance, another day, to decide what sums will be appropriated. What the Defense Department will have to spend will depend upon what we later appropriate and not what we authorize today.

All we are doing in this bill is providing a ceiling about which the Committee on Appropriations cannot go.

Now some may say the Appropriations Committee just goes along and rubberstamps what the Defense Department asks. That is not the case. Let me remind Members that last year in the Defense Department Appropriation Act the House Committee on Appropriations reduced the budget by $4.8 billion in the Military Construction Appropriation Act the budget for military construction was reduced from $2,031,500,000 to $1,765,-019,000 or by $266,481,000.

So we are not deciding today how much will be spent on these programs. What we are doing is fixing as I have said, a ceiling beyond which the Committee on Appropriations cannot go in recommending future appropriations.

I yield now to my friend the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HALL).

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding.

I certainly appreciate the comments made by the gentleman from North Carolina. I think it puts this in the proper frame of reference and context.

Apropos of what the last gentleman in the well, before the gentleman from North Carolina, said, is it not true the executive branch of this government in this fiscal year is operating under a continuing resolution?

Mr. JONAS. The gentleman is quite correct.

Mr. HALL. Secondly, is it not furthermore true that when the Congress exceeds the budget request by, say, $2.3 billion on the Department of Labor-HEW Appropriations Act, there is nothing left under the function of a continuing resolution for the Chief Executive to do than to put on embargoes such as have been pointed out, until all appropriation bills are completed, so the President can best expend and pro-rate the funds appropriated by the duly elected Congress according to proper priorities?

Mr. JONAS. The gentleman is correct, and the President started off that program by announcing through the Secretary of Defense that projected spending by the Defense Department would be cut by $3 billion.

Mr. Chairman, I am for economy in the Defense Department, as much as any other Member of this Congress, but I am also for protecting the security of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE IV—GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 401. Subsection (a) of section 401 of Public Law 89-367 approved March 15, 1966 (80 Stat. 37) as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Funds authorized for appropriation for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes to support: (1) Vietnamese and other Free World Forces in Vietnam (2) local forces in Laos and Thailand; and for related costs, during the fiscal year 1970 on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine."

SEC. 402. After January 1, 1970, no contract or grant for Research and Development projects shall be awarded by the Department of Defense or any of the Armed Forces to any school, college or university or to any affiliated organization of such school, college or university, or to an individual in the employment of such school, college or university or its affiliated organization until sixty days after a full disclosure of the purposes, cost, and duration of such contract together with a statement setting forth in detail the number of research and development projects already awarded to that institution but not yet completed; the dollar amount of each said contract; the purpose of each of the contracts previously awarded; and for the contract or grant for which the notice is being given, a description of the facilities required to perform the research project, the cost of such facilities, a statement of whether such facilities are in existence and if so, a description of the ownership of such facilities, is made to the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives. In addition, such notification will include a statement summarizing the record of the school, college or university with regard to cooperation on military matters such as the Reserve Officer Training Corps and military recruiting on its campus.

SEC. 403. Title 10, United States Code, is amended as follows:

(1) Section 3015(c) is amended to read as follows:

"(c) The Chief of the National Guard Bureau holds office for four years, but may be removed for cause at any time and may not hold that office after he becomes sixty-four years of age. He is eligible to succeed himself. An officer now or hereafter serving as Chief of the National Guard Bureau shall be appointed as a Reserve in his armed force in the grade of lieutenant general for service in the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States, as the case may be, while serving as the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. The position of Chief of the National Guard Bureau is in addition to the number of lieutenant general positions authorized by section 3066, 3202, 8066, or 8202 of this title, or any other provision of law."

(2) Section 3692 is amended by adding the following new subsection:

"(d) Upon retirement or being granted retired pay, a reserve commissioned officer of the Army who has served as Chief of the National Guard Bureau in the grade of lieutenant general may, in the discretion of the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, be retired in, and granted retired pay based on, that grade."

(3) Section 8962 is amended by adding the following new subsection:

"(c) Upon retirement or being granted retired pay, a reserve commissioned officer of the Air Force who has served as Chief of the National Guard Bureau in the grade of lieutenant general may, in the discretion of the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, be retired in, and granted retired pay based on, that grade."

(4) The catchlines of sections 3962 and 8962 are each amended by deleting ": regular commissioned officers."

(5) The analysis of chapter 369 is amended by striking out "regular commissioned officers" in item 3962.

(6) The analysis of chapter 869 is amended by striking out "regular commissioned officers" in item 8962.

SEC. 404. (a) Section 136 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by inserting after the first sentence in subsection (b) the following new sentences: "One of the Assistant Secretaries shall be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. He shall have as his principal duty the overall supervision of health affairs of the Department of Defense.", and

(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(g) Within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs there shall be a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Dental Affairs who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Subject to the supervision and control of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the Deputy Assistant Secretary shall be responsible for all matters relating to dental affairs within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs."

(b) Until otherwise provided by operation of law, the individual holding office as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Medical) on the effective date of this section shall perform the duties of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs established by this section.

SEC. 405. Section 412(b) of Public Law 86-149, as amended, is amended to read as follows:

"(b) No funds may be appropriated after December 31, 1960, to or for the use of any armed force of the United States for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, or naval vessels, or after December 31, 1962, to or for the use of any armed force of the United States for the research, development, test, or evaluation of aircraft, missiles, or naval vessels, or after December 31, 1963, to or for the use of any armed force of the United States for any research, development, test, or evaluation, or after December 31, 1965, to or for the use of any armed force of the United States for the procurement of tracked combat vehicles, or after December 31, 1969, to or for the use of any armed force of the United States for the procurement of other vehicles, weapons, and munitions, unless the appropriation of such funds has been authorized by legislation enacted after such dates."

SEC. 406. (1) Chapter 7 of title 37, United States Code is amended as follows:

(a) The following new section is inserted after section 427:

"§ 428. Travel and transportation allowances: dependents at permanent station outside United States

"Under regulations prescribed by the Secretaries concerned, which shall be, as far as practicable, uniform for all of the uniformed services, a member of a uniformed service who is on duty outside the United States at a permanent station, and when such benefits are not made available in kind by the United States, is entitled to a travel and transportation allowance, to assist in providing transportation for his dependents who are authorized to accompany him, as follows:

"(1) A travel and transportation allowance is authorized to meet the travel expenses of the dependents of a member to and from a school in the United States to obtain an undergraduate college education, not to exceed one round trip each school year for each dependent for the purpose of obtaining such type of education. All or any portion of the travel for which a transportation allowance is authorized by this section will be performed wherever possible by the Military Airlift Command on a space-required basis. Notwithstanding the area limitations in this section, a travel and transportation allowance for the purpose of obtaining undergraduate college education may be authorized under this clause for dependents of members stationed in the Canal Zone.

"(2) The term 'United States' shall, for

the purpose of this section, mean the several States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Canal Zone.

"(3) The words 'permanent station' shall, for the purpose of this section, include the home yard or home port of a vessel to which a member of a uniformed service may be assigned.

"(4) Notwithstanding section 401(2)(A) of this title, 'dependent' in this section may include an unmarried child over twenty-one years of age who is in fact dependent and is obtaining an undergraduate college education."

(b) The analysis is amended by inserting the following item:

"Sec. 428. Travel and transportation allowances: dependents at permanent station outside the United States."

(2) Section 912 of title 26, United States Code, is amended by adding the following new paragraph at the end thereof:

"(4) EDUCATION TRANSPORTATION ALLOWANCE.—In case of a member of a uniformed service, amounts received under section 428 of title 37, United States Code."

SEC. 407. Section 2 of the Act of August 3, 1950 (64 Stat. 408), as amended, is further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 2. After July 1, 1970, the active duty personnel strength of the Armed Forces, exclusive of personnel of the Coast Guard, personnel of the Reserve components on active duty for training purposes only, and personnel of the Armed Forces employed in the Selective Service System, shall not exceed a total of 3,285,000 persons at any time during the period of suspension prescribed in the first section of this Act except when the President of the United States determines that the application of this ceiling will seriously jeopardize the national security interests of the United States and informs the Congress of the basis for such determination."

SEC. 408. (a) After December 31, 1969, none of the funds authorized for appropriation by this or any other Act for the use of the Armed Forces shall be used for payments out of such funds under contracts or agreements with Federal contract research centers if the annual compensation of any officer or employee of such center paid out of such funds exceeds $45,000 except with the approval of the Secretary of Defense under regulations prescribed by the President.

(b) The Secretary of Defense shall notify the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives promptly of any approvals authorized under subsection (a), together with a detailed statement of the reasons therefor.

SEC. 409. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an officer of an armed force who—

(1) served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

(2) after he was retired, but before October 1, 1963, was ordered to active duty; and

(3) was released from that active duty after July 31, 1969;

shall, effective as of the date he was released from that active duty, be entitled to retired pay computed under the formula set forth in the table in section 1402(a) of title 10, United States Code, but using the monthly basic pay prescribed at the time of his release from that active duty for an officer serving in pay grade O–10. The provisions of this paragraph do not affect or modify any prior commitment made by such officer in regard to participation in the Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan.

Mr. RIVERS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that this title IV be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. NEDZI

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. NEDZI: On page 16, after line 8, insert a new section, as follows:

"CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

"SEC. 410 (a) The Secretary of Defense shall submit semiannual reports to the Congress on or before January 31 and on or before July 31 of each year setting forth the purposes of and the amounts spent during the preceding six-month period for research, development, test, evaluation, and procurement of lethal and nonlethal chemical and biological agents. The Secretary shall include in such reports an explanation of such expenditures including the necessity therefor.

"(b) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other Act may be used for the procurement of delivery systems specifically designed to disseminate lethal chemical agents or any biological agents or for the procurement of any part or component of such delivery system.

"(c) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other Act may be used for deployment and/or storage, initiated after the effective date of this Act, of lethal chemical agents or any biological agents at any place outside the United States, or for the deployment, initiated after the effective date of this Act, at any place outside the United States of delivery systems specifically designed to disseminate any such agents unless the country exercising jurisdiction over such place has prior notice of such action. In the case of any place outside the United States which is under the jurisdiction or control of the Government of the United States, no such action may be taken unless prior notice of such action has been given to the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations and, when appropriate, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations and, when appropriate, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the House of Representatives. As used in this section, the term "United States" means the several States and the District of Columbia.

"(d)(1) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or any other Act shall be used for the transportation of any lethal chemical or biological agents to or from any military installation in the United States, its territories or possessions, except upon a determination by the Secretary of Defense after consideration of the advice of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare as to the hazards to the public health involved and the measures reasonably necessary to be taken to protect the public health in the light thereof, that such transportation is necessary for the national security. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed so as to affect in any way the applicability of the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 831–835 and 46 U.S.C. 170.

"(d)(2) The Secretary of Defense shall provide written notification to the Congress, to the Secretary of Transportation, to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and to the Interstate Commerce Commission at least thirty days in advance of any operation involving the transportation of lethal chemical or biological agents to or from any military installation in the United States, its territories or possessions. The Secretary of Defense shall provide appropriate notification to the Governor of any State through which such agents will be transported.

"(d)(3) The Department of Defense shall detoxify all lethal chemical or biological agents before their transportation for disposal as provided in subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2) of this section whenever it is practical to do so.

"(e) None of the funds authorized by this or any other Act shall be used for the testing, development, transportation, storage, or disposal, initiated after the effective date of this Act, of any lethal chemical agents or any biological agents outside of the continental limits of the United States if the Secretary of State determines that such testing, development, transportation, storage, or disposal will violate international law. The Secretary of Defense shall notify the Secretary of State prior to any such testing, development, transportation, storage, or disposal and the Secretary of State shall report all his determinations with respect to such activities to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and to the appropriate international organizations, or organs thereof, whenever required by treaty or other international agreement.

"(f) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other Act shall be used for the open air testing of lethal chemical agents or disease-producing biological agents except upon a determination by the Secretary of Defense, under guideline provided by the President of the United States, that an open air test is necessary for the national security, and then only after consideration of the advice of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare as to the hazards to the public health involved and the measures reasonably necessary to be taken to protect the public health in the light thereof. The Secretary of Defense shall report his determination and the advice of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, to the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and to the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives at least thirty days prior to any actual test. The Secretary of Defense shall set forth in his report the name of the agents to be tested, the time and place of any test, and the reasons therefor.

"(g) The provisions of this section shall not apply during a war declared by Congress or the President, after the effective date of this Act. As used in this section, the terms "chemical agents" and "biological agents" mean agents designed specifically for the conduct of warfare and nothing contained in this section dealing with chemical and biological agents shall be deemed to preclude, limit or restrict in any way the research, development, test, evaluation, procurement, transportation, storage or use of any chemical or biological agent or material for the purpose of medical diagnoses, evaluation, research or treatment of any illness, disease, injury or other physical or mental condition or for purposes of public health disease control."

Mr. NEDZI (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with and that it be printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, unlike the previous amendments which we have

offered for the consideration of Members here in the Committee of the Whole, this amendment does not cost any money. It is an amendment that in essence was passed by the Senate 91-to-0. It is an amendment that has the approval of the Department of Defense. I am at a total loss to find a rational explanation as to why the Committee on Armed Services failed to approve this amendment, and I am prsenting it to Members at this time. Let me try to summarize as briefly as I can what the amendment is and what the essentials of it are.

In the first place, the Secretary of Defense shall submit semiannual reports to Congress setting forth the purposes and the amounts spent on chemical and biological warfare in the preceding six months for research and development, testing, evaluation, and procurement. This is to provide Congress an opportunity of knowing that precisly what is taking place in this very controversial area which so little has been known about until our colleague, the gentleman from New York (Mr. McCarthy) brought to the attention of the country some of the problems that exist.

In the second place, no funds authorized by this Act may be used for delivery systems specifically designed for dissemination of chemical and biological agents.

It has to be emphasized that this is for delivery systems specifically designed for this purpose.

Third, no funds authorized by this act may be used for deployment or storage of chemical and biological agents outside of the United States or for deployment of delivery systems abroad without prior notice to the country in question. In the case of any place outside of the United States but under U.S. control proper notice is to be given to the appropriate congressional committees by the Defense Department.

Fourth, no funds authorized by this act shall be used for the transportation of chemical and biological agents to and from military installations in the United States or its territories except upon a determination by the Secretary of Defense, after consideration of the advice of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare as to the hazards to public health and the protective measures taken, that such transportation is necessary for the national security.

Fifth, the amendment provides for written notification by the Secretary of Defense to Congress, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, and to the Interstate Commerce Commission at least 30 days in advance of transportation of lethal chemical and biological agents. Appropriate notification to the governors of the States to be transversed is also required.

Sixth, detoxification of all chemical and biological agents before their transportation for disposal is required whenever practical.

Seventh, testing outside the continental limits of the United States is barred if the Secretary of State determines that such testing, development, transportation or disposal violates international law.

Finally, open-air testing of chemical and biological agents may take place only when "necessary for the national security" and "after consideration of the advice of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare as to the hazards."

Now, since the passage of the amendment by the Senate certain changes were suggested by the Department of Defense which would make this amendment more acceptable.

The changes, in my judgment, Mr. Chairman, are minor and are acceptable.

Very briefly they are as follows:

The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare is substituted for the Surgeon General, not to make a positive finding of no hazards but to be consulted in the matter.

The Secretary of State is no longer required to make a positive finding that international law will not be violated; instead, he is to be notified, and should he determine the violation of international law will occur, CBW activities will not be permitted outside the continental limits of the United States.

Finally, chemical and biological agents are defined so as to exempt any agents which are not designed for use in the conduct of war.

We have been very fortunate that no major disaster has befallen us in the development of our CBW capability, and it is time to enact further safeguards and to tighten up, and for Congress to be assigned a necessary role in the entire process.

We regard ourselves, justifiably, as a humane nation. We want to survive as a nation without doing damage to our ideals, traditions, and well-being. This amendment is framed with these ideas in mind. I move its adoption.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired.

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word, and before the gentleman from Michigan leaves the well I should like to ask a question.

I should like to ask the gentleman from Michigan this: In offering this amendment, is it his intention, in requiring reports on moneys expended for chemical and biological warfare research and procurement, that those reports include classified information with regard to, for example, the details of formulas and that sort of thing?

Mr. NEDZI. I would assume that classified information would be submitted to the appropriate committees by the Secretary of Defense if it would be essential to describe precisely what we are doing in the area of CBW.

Mr. WAGGONNER. Would it be correct to interpret it to the gentleman's intent that classified information ever be released as provided in these reports to the general public?

Mr. NEDZI. Certainly not.

Mr. WAGGONNER. I thank the gentleman for those answers, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NEDZI. The gentleman from Louisiana has the time.

Mr. WAGGONNER. I now yield to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Howard).

Mr. HOWARD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Louisiana for yielding to me.

I support the amendment and congratulate the gentleman from Michigan for his amendment and the gentleman from New York for his efforts in this area.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by Representative Nedzi to establish a semi-annual reporting procedures on expenditures and programs for chemical and biological warfare, and to prohibit development of delivery vehicles for lethal agents.

As the Members of this House know, a slightly more restrictive amendment has already been approved by the Senate on a 91-to-0 vote, and I feel that we, too, should overwhelmingly approve this important amendment.

Mr. Chairman, 1 ounce of botullinus toxin, effectively spread, could kill all of the people in the United States and Canada. We have that toxin on hand now. We have now available enough chemicals, if evenly distributed, to kill everyone in the world.

Knowing the terrible possibilities of this material; knowing that shipping, testing, storage, and research programs in this field have repeatedly proved unsafe in recent years, I do not see how this Congress can reject this amendment, which would provide some measure of protection for all our citizens. This amendment, while not cutting funds from the program, would add a responsible approach to the entire question of chemical-biological warfare.

This amendment would require a semiannual report to the Congress on expenditures and programs for CBW. The Congress needs to have this information, as it affects every one of the citizens we are here to represent. This amendment would also prohibit secrecy in foreign and domestic shipping and storage of materials, thereby improving U.S. compliance with international treaty commitments. It would put a ceiling on stockpiles of CBW agents as of June 30, 1970. I think, Mr. Chairman, that having enough of this material to kill everyone in the world should constitute a sufficient stockpile—we need not kill them all twice or three times.

The Department of Defense has conducted these development programs in such secrecy that neither the Congress nor the electorate can review or even be aware of the costs and dangers involved. I think both the Congress and the electorate should be aware of matters which affect them so deeply. I think these programs should be thoroughly reviewed in order to insure the safety of our citizens from mass contamination. Secretary of Defense Laird has agreed that this would be consistent with national security, as well as public safety.

Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I failed to again pay tribute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. McCarthy) for the outstanding contribution he has made to the people of this country by calling attention to just how involved we are in chemical warfare research and development. And I would urge all of my colleagues to support this amendment, in order that we may continue to be aware

of the activities of our country in this field.

Mr. WAGGONNER. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. PHILBIN).

Mr. PHILBIN. Can the distinguished gentleman in the well advise me as to whether or not there is in his amendment a provision that would provide that none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other act may be used for procurement of delivery systems of chemically related biological and lethal, warfare agents to be used in any delivery system?

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, in response to the gentleman, that is subsection (b) of my amendment, but I might say to the gentleman that this is language that has the approval of the DOD.

Mr. PHILBIN. Has the DOD approved this amendment?

Mr. NEDZI. Yes. The DOD approved this language.

Mr. PHILBIN. Otherwise, generally the gentleman's amendment is similar to that adopted by the Senate?

Mr. NEDZI. In substance it is identical. As a matter of fact, in my judgment, it is somewhat milder than the Senate amendment. This was because the DOD suggested certain language changes which I have introduced today.

Mr. PHILBIN. As I understand it, they require reports from various officials of the Government, and certain agencies, to the DOD concerning the feasibility of procedures required under the bill.

Mr. NEDZI. The Surgeon General is no longer involved in the DOD amendment. There was some concern on the part of the DOD that it would forbid experimentation with certain biological agents for medical purposes. Consequently a definition has been included to prevent this from happening.

Mr. PHILBIN. Otherwise, with the exception of the amendment that I have referred to, and which the gentleman says was approved, by DOD, this amendment is largely the Senate amendment. Is that correct?

Mr. NEDZI. It is virtually identical.

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. GUBSER).

Mr. GUBSER. I thank the gentleman from Louisiana for yielding to me, and through him I would like to ask the gentleman from Michigan for a recapitulation of paragraphs (d) and (e) of his amendment. In a nutshell, could you give us the essence of them? Does the fourth proposal actually prevent the shipment of chemical and biological warfare materials within the United States?

Mr. NEDZI. The question is whether my amendment would forbid the transportation of chemical and biological agents. It would not forbid it. It would require consultation with the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to determine the extent of the hazards involved and then, if it is determined that it is in the interests of national security to transport or deploy them—it would be done.

Mr. GUBSER. The gentleman is aware of the fact that that is currently the case, is he not?

Mr. NEDZI. To some extent. Notice is not required.

Mr. GUBSER. I think it is 100 percent.

Mr. NEDZI. Notice is not required to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. There are other agencies.

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Chairman, while I still have the time, let me say that I object very strenuously to turning any authority of the Department of Defense over to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Would the author of this amendment give me his attention? As the bill now stands there are no funds for the procurement of biological lethal chemical agents. I believe that is correct. And this would not change it in any way. Is that correct?

Mr. NEDZI. As I understand, there is no such money in the bill.

Mr. BRAY. I wanted to clarify this. I wish I had a copy of your amendment. I know generally what is in it, but I do want to ask certain questions.

There is $88 million in the bill for research, but only one-seventh of that refers to any lethal program. Six-sevenths is the authorization for warning devices and defense equipment.

There is in your part no contemplation of eliminating the warning devices of defensive equipment in any way; is that correct?

Mr. NEDZI. That is correct.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, the reason I am asking this is that I do know that in World War II the enemy did not resort to chemical warfare; that is, no chemical agents were used by the enemy against American troops. I understand that the Japanese did use some against the Chinese troops. The Germans and the Japanese, however, did not use any chemical and biological agents against the American Army.

The reason that the Japanese or the Germans did not use chemical agents against the American troops was because they knew we were ready to respond in kind if they did. I am certain that the gentleman does not want to cripple America in matters of meeting enemy aggression in this field if it is necessary for this country to do so.

Mr. NEDZI. That is absolutely correct. That is not the purpose of this amendment.

Mr. BRAY. I have discussed this with the gentleman earlier, and I certainly am a little more than casually familiar with the subject because, during part of World War II I was located near a large storage of poisonous gas which our country had in the Pacific. I would not want the amendment the gentleman has offered—and I know he does not want it, either—to cripple our defensive capacity and injure our ability to protect ourselves in the future. Is that correct?

Mr. NEDZI. That is correct.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, thus far virtually all the amendments we have considered have dealt with hardware. This amendment deals with human beings. Its main thrust is to protect American citizens and, indeed, the citizens of allied countries.

Now, this whole program—of recent years—at any rate—has been marred and marked with a series of mishaps and accidents which this amendment is designed to correct. Let me cite a few instances:

A few years ago at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal they dumped their waste into ponds of the arsenal property. This found its way out, and killed off 6 square miles of sugar beets and some livestock.

The Army then spent half a million dollars to disprove that they killed the sugar beets. Then they felt that they had better get a better spot, so some fellow came up with the idea, and they dug a deep well and they pumped it all down there. They set off 1,500 earthquakes in the Denver area.

Now, of late the surplus material has been stored near the end of the Denver runway in the path of airplanes, or near the path, with the threat of an airplane accident, or even a lightning bolt which could send this lethal material—one-fiftieth of a drop of which will kill you in a matter of minutes—out into possibly the Denver atmosphere.

Then they decided to get rid of that out near the airport, and they said we will put it in 800 railroad cars and send it clear across the United States through Indianapolis, Dayton, Elizabeth, and Philadelphia, and we will put it into four Liberty ships and sink them out at sea.

The National Academy of Sciences reviewed that plan. They said that is extremely hazardous. A railroad accident—and they have doubled in the last 7 years—could create a disastrous situation in any metropolitan area through which this train would pass.

They further noted that if this material were dumped into the Atlantic Ocean and it exploded, as previous of these operations had done, it could kill all marine life in 600 cubic miles of the Atlantic Ocean.

Then of course there was the famous incident in Utah where an Air Force jet was testing this deadly nerve gas. It came in over the target, sprayed out the nerve gas, and the pilot turned off the jets that were spraying out the nerve gas, but they did not turn off; they continued to pour out of this airplane.

The wind picked it up and carried it almost 50 miles away killing in the process 6,400 sheep. Some human beings said that they were affected.

Fortunately, it snowed that night and most people were inside. But Salt Lake City was only 80 miles away and this nerve gas was carried for 50 miles.

Then we had an incident that was revealed on an Air Force map. The Army tested a deadly disease known as anthrax in the atmosphere over Utah and had so contaminated an area that will probably remain that way for 100 years because the anthrax spores live for a century.

Then there was the revelation that Venezuelan equine encephalitis had been tested there and has escaped outside the arsenal. Tests on wildlife disclosed signs that animals outside the Dugway Proving Ground had been exposed to this disease.

This amendment passed by a vote of 91 to 0 in the other body with the en-

dorsement of our former colleague, the gentleman from Wisconsin, now Secretary Laird.

Since then, as the gentleman from Michigan pointed out, the Pentagon has rewritten certain sections of the amendment.

I do not know how we can explain to the people of Denver and Salt Lake City and Indianapolis and Dayton and Elizabeth and Philadelphia how we happen to turn this amendment down.

The distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services has prevailed on every amendment thus far. Those amendments dealt with hardware. This amendment deals with software; that is, human beings principally, American citizens.

Mr. Chairman, I think this is a good amendment. As I said, it passed the other body unanimously. I think we should prevail at least on this amendment that deals with the safety of American citizens rather than with military hardware.

The amendment concerning chemical and biological warfare introduced by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. NEDZI) is a limited amendment. It does not deal with the fundamental policy questions concerning CBW. Rather, it directs itself to the questions of information, some limitations on further procurement, and public safety in transportation and testing operations. As a number of you are aware, President Nixon ordered a full-scale executive branch review of our policies governing chemical and biological warfare last June. This review is still underway and will not be completed until the middle of October at the earliest. It would be premature, therefore, to introduce an amendment to the fiscal year 1970 military procurement bill that deals with the basic policy questions. Amendments to basic policy should more appropriately be introduced following President Nixon's recommendations on CBW policy that will follow the executive branch review and subsequent congressional consideration of his recommendations.

Mr. NEDZI's amendment on chemical and biological warfare deals with the questions that have been of concern to the public this year. These questions are:

Are the elected Members of Congress informed about the chemical and biological warfare activities of the Department of Defense? Is there an unnecessary cloak of secrecy around CBW activities that keeps even Members of Congress uninformed about the nature of this activity?

Are CBW agents tested with sufficient safety precautions to insure that the public is protected against an accident?

Are CBW agents transported in a manner that insure that there will be no significant danger to the public?

Are the appropriate congressional committees and executive branch agencies informed when CBW agents are to be taken outside the United States?

The information on these aspects of our CBW activities that has become available this year indicates that the public is legitimately concerned and that it would be useful for the Congress to express its views on these areas of concern.

The amendment to the fiscal year 1970 military procurement authorization bill is divided into seven sections; they are designated section 402.

Section 402(a): This section requires that the Secretary of Defense submit a semiannual report to Congress on research, development, test, evaluation, and procurement of chemical and biological agents during the previous 6 months, including an explanation of the reasons for procurement.

Comment: This section of the amendment meets the needs of Members of Congress for information about the CBW activities of the Department of Defense. During the course of my review of CBW this year, I learned from the distinguished Member of the House of Representatives, CLAUDE PEPPER, that in his service in the Congress during the past 30 years he had never been informed about our CBW activities. He attended the briefing held by the U.S. Army at my request on March 4, 1969, and learned for the first time some of the facts about our activities in this field.

Senator ALLEN J. ELLENDER, a member of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee for 20 years, said on July 26, 1969, that in the period of his service he had never come across a line item for the production of nerve gas, the principal lethal chemical agent in our CBW arsenal.

Section 402(b): This section states that none of the funds authorized by this bill may be used for the procurement of offensive lethal chemical or biological warfare agents. It is designed to temporarily stop further procurement of weapons for offensive use until the outline of our policy governing the use of CBW weapons has been developed by President Nixon and approved by Congress.

Comment: It has become clear this year that the Department of Defense has a sufficient stockpile of CBW weapons to meet current planning needs. The disposal of the nerve gas GB indicates that we have sufficient stocks of weapons in the chemical and biological warfare category on hand. In as much as Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, indicated in his letter on CBW policy of April 15, 1969, that nerve gas was not considered a strategic weapon, it would not seem necessary to use funds for procurement of further weapons in this category until we know what our policy will be.

Section 402(c): This section requires that we notify other countries when we place lethal chemical and biological warfare weapons within their territory. It also requires that the appropriate congressional committees will be informed when such weapons are placed in territory outside of the United States yet under our control.

Comment: This section of the amendment will prevent a repetition of the very embarrassing incident that occurred this summer when the Japanese Government learned for the first time that the United States was storing nerve gas on its territory, Okinawa. Information available on that incident also revealed that President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers were apparently unaware that we had these weapons on Okinawa and in West Germany. The amendment would also insure that the appropriate congressional committees are aware of storage of such weapons in areas outside the United States, such as the Trust Territory of the Pacific, where we have certain international obligations concerning the use of these territories.

Section 402(d): This section requires that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare insure that any transportation of chemical and biological agents by the Department of Defense is conducted with adequate safety precautions.

Comment: This section of the amendment is designed to insure that the shipment of chemical and biological agents by the Department of Defense is done in such a manner that it will not result in danger to the public. It would prevent a repetition of the planned movement of large quantities of deadly gas by train last spring. That plan was found by the National Academy of Science committee headed by President Eisenhower's Science Adviser, Dr. Kistiakowsky, to have a potential for disaster. As a result, the committee recommended that the Army's surplus gas be disposed of at the arsenals where it is stored. We also learned that the ships of the type in which the gas was to be placed for subsequent sinking had been involved in previous accidents where one had blown up only 5 minutes after sinking and another had broken loose from its tugs and had bounced around on the high seas for 6 hours. We also found that the Department of Defense has no safety regulations for the transportation of hazardous materials other than those imposed by the Interstate Commerce Commission which are admitted by the Department of Transportation to be weak.

Section 402(d)2: This section of the amendment requires that the Secretary of Defense notify the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Governors of the appropriate States at least 30 days in advance of the movement of chemical and biological warfare agents.

Comment: This section is basic to the protection of public safety in the movement of CBW agents or weapons. Although the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare already has responsibility for civil defense procedures that might be used if there were an accident involving the transportation of gas or biological agents, he currently does not have information on the movements of CBW agents or weapons.

As a result, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare could not promptly respond to a request for help from a State or community. Similarly, the Governors of the States have not been provided with the necessary information to allow them to protect the safety of the residents of their States when dangerous poisonous gases are moved through their States. Both Governors Ray of Iowa and Hughes of New Jersey made it clear this year that they needed this information if they were to meet their responsibilities and stated that they would raise legal obstacles to the shipment of such materials through

their States if adequate information was not available.

The remarks of Mr. James Burke, civil defense director of Webster, Mass., regarding what could be done in the event of an accident involving poison gas are illustrative of the problem that we face in not notifying appropriate State officials of movements of dangerous CBW agents.

In answer to those who say that notification of gas or biological agents will reveal our intentions to an enemy even to American dissidents who might wish to sabotage shipments of this type, it should be pointed out that the Atomic Energy Commission and its contractors are currently required to notify a number of local authorities before they move nuclear materials through tunnels, over bridges, or long turnpikes. The Department of Transportation's regulations found in 49 CFR 170 through 190—Code of Federal Regulations—applies to the shipments of these potentially dangerous materials. These materials must be packed in a certain way, must not be mixed with certain types of cargo, and must have placards posted on the outside of the truck or train showing exactly what is inside the carrier. Current regulations thus insure that the public will know what is in a carrier when they see it—the exception being when the carrier has been in an accident and the placards have been burned off as occurred in the Dunreith, Ind., train wreck. Local authorities also require notification. The Port of New York Authority requires notification and permits only the use of certain bridges in the city. Explosives are not permitted in its tunnels. The Massachusetts Turnpike and other turnpikes require prior notification before these materials can be moved and in some cases they provide an escort with the State patrol for the shipment. In asking the AEC about these requirements, Mr. Barker of the AEC stated that notification and the use of escorts actually provided more protection against possible sabotage of shipments than was available without notification because the required placards made it clear what was in the trucks.

Section 402(d)3: This amendment requires the Department of Defense to render harmless deadly gases or biological agents before their disposal insofar as it is practical.

Comment: This section insures that adequate plans are made for the disposal of CBW agents before we are faced with the problem of getting rid of vast quantities of material that may do serious damage to our environment or have the potential for disaster in transportation. The National Academy of Science committee recommended that the Department of Defense take into consideration adequate disposal facilities and plans in the future. The committee also pointed out the dangers that disposal of mustard gas in the ocean posed. This amendment would insure that CBW agents do not become a disposal problem after they have been manufactured.

Section 402(e): This section requires that any testing, development, transportation, storage or disposal of CBW agents outside of the United States shall be done in conformation with the requirements of international law. It requires that the Secretary of State determine that the provisions of international law have been met and it requires that he so inform the appropriate committees of the Congress.

Comment: This section would correct the situation now existing where the Secretary of State first learned of our plans to dispose of chemical agents in international waters after a number of such operations had taken place and just before the massive dumping operation was to take place in spring. It would also prevent a repetition of the incident that occurred on Okinawa where the Department of State apparently did not know that we stored nerve gas there. It would also correct the current situation where a number of agreements have been reached by members of our Armed Forces with members of the armed forces of other nations to store CBW agents in their countries without notifying our policy level civilian officials outside of the Department of Defense.

Section 402(f): This section of the amendment requires that the utmost care be taken in the open air testing of chemical and biological warfare agents. The Secretary of Defense is required to determine that such tests are needed and are to be conducted with sufficient safety, under guidelines established by the President and with the advice of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. It also requires that the appropriate committees of the Congress be informed of such tests.

Comment: This section is designed to prevent a repetition of the Skull Valley sheep-kill that occurred in March 1968, as the result of an Army nerve gas test at the Dugway Proving Grounds. It is also designed to insure that we do not suddenly find ourselves faced with an epidemic caused by one of the diseases that the Department of Defense is testing. It cannot be left up to the Department of Defense to solely determine whether these tests are needed and whether adequate safety precautions have been taken. The potential for disaster is too great. The nerve gas cloud from Dugway might well have dropped on Salt Lake City, Utah.

Although I personally believe the dangers of testing disease in the open air are too great to warrant their continuation, this amendment would at least insure that better safety precautions are taken.

Section 402(h): This section of the amendment states that the amendment will not apply during time of war or national emergency.

Comment: It is presumed that this section would only be used when necessary during the time of war or national emergency. It is assumed that the provisions of the amendment would have been in force throughout the Vietnamese conflict.

In summary, this amendment was endorsed by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird just before it was brought up for Senate action. The Senate passed this amendment by a unanimous vote of 91 to 0 on August 11, 1969. The amendment as introduced today contains some further modifications recommended by the Department of Defense so we are discussing an amendment that is fully accepted by our military leaders. I urge that you vote for this amendment.

Regarding Civil Defense Director Burke, I cite the following article:

[From the Worcester (Mass.) Sunday Telegram, Aug. 31, 1969]

POISON GAS ON RAILS: WHAT PROTECTION?

(NOTE.—The Bureau of Safety of the Federal Railroad Administration reports that 4,470 trains were derailed in the nation in 1967. In Western Massachusetts, 24 Boston & Maine and 12 Penn Central trains have gone off the tracks in the last few months. Mrs. Katherine E. Baumeister, Telegram correspondent in Dudley, asked officials in neighboring Webster what would happen in that town if a train carrying poison gas went off the tracks there. Here is the answer.)

WEBSTER.—This question was put to James Burke, Webster civil defense director: "If a train carrying phosgene or other lethal gases were wrecked passing through town, releasing the deadly gas into the air, what emergency measures would civil defense take to protect the population?"

Burke at first was silent. Then he said, "It's incredible, but I have to say I just don't know. We're prepared here for just about any other kind of disaster you can think of, including atomic war; but I've never even heard of any chemical or biological warfare disaster training."

NOT A THING

Some days later, Burke called back. "I have the answer for you," he said. "In the event of such a disaster, we couldn't do a darn thing. What's more, neither could anyone else. I've asked everyone, police, board of health, National Guard. No one knows anything about it. No one has been given any information about it."

There are many other gases whose effects differ. In any case, experts are needed to identify the lethal agent and treat the victim. In the event of accidental release of lethal gases into the community, the job of neutralizing areas where the persistent blister gases or vesicants have spattered, is beyond the power of the ordinary person. This requires the services of specially trained and equipped decontaminating squads, according to the U.S. Office of Civil Defense and the Chemical Warfare Service, U.S. Army.

Emergency preparedness functions were assigned to HEW by presidential executive order 11001 on Feb. 16, 1962. This preparedness includes "development of medical means for the prevention and care of casualties, (including those from . . . biological and chemical warfare.)

"Emergency plans and programs, and emergency organization structure required thereby shall be developed as an integral part of the continuing activities of the Department (HEW) on the basis that it will have the responsibility for carrying out such emergency. . . ."

"But there is no emergency organization structure that I know of for this aspect of defense" Burke said. "It's puzzling that HEW doesn't have information channeled down to the local level telling us who, what, when and where. I've been in rescue work too long to discount the possibility of such an accident. And, how would we know if that gas were being shipped through here? What I want to know is, what do we do if such an accident occurs? Who do we turn to?"

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word and rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we could talk about the amendment and its effects because that is what we have to consider now; not horror stories.

I have some serious misgivings about the amendment. First, it would place a

very serious administrative burden on the Department of Defense and on the services in coordinating and reporting chemical and biological defense activities. It would require more paperwork and redtape than any amendment that has been considered by the House of Representatives in a long, long time.

This amendment would bring into the picture in addition to the Department of Defense, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Department of Transportation, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and a very large number of the committees of Congress. It would require voluminous, frequent, and regular reporting.

It is obvious that it would place a major administrative burden on the Department of Defense and the Services in coordinating and reporting chemical and biological defense activities. Possibly these administrative reporting requirements can be met, but the total administrative impact is not yet assessed, nor do we know the costs involved. We do know the operational details to be imposed would be enormous in scope and apparently totally unnecessary.

Mr. Chairman, I am quite concerned about the prohibition of procurement of delivery systems, specifically designed for delivery of chemical lethal weapons. We have had a trying experience in this field in very recent years.

When we undertook the use of chemical weapons—tear gas and defoliants—in Vietnam—we found that all of our delivery systems were outdated and could not be used on present-day aircraft. Our forces were subjected to long delays, which limited the effectiveness of the weapons, while new delivery systems were developed.

This prohibition could be a major problem in future years. Probably it would not be serious in fiscal year 1970, but it certainly could be a problem in future years.

I do not think it is clear just what this would do to our future ability for procurement.

Certainly an area of major impact is the prohibition of procurement of delivery systems specifically designed to disseminate chemical lethal agents. This could be a major problem in future years. Without procurement, our current chemical deterrent capability will erode and the stockpile will be neither adequate to deter enemy use of chemical weapons nor to retaliate if an enemy uses these weapons against U.S. forces. Development and future procurement are required if we are to modernize our deterrent capability and defense preparedness by introducing the munitions which are designed for improved protection and safety in handling, transport and storage.

Please remember—and this has never been disputed—the Russians have eight to 10 times our capability in chemical and biological weapons, and there is no agitation to restrict their capability to develop and procure these weapons. Development and future programing are required if we are going to stay modern and to retain a capability in this field.

The distinguished sponsor of the amendment has said—and I know he does so in good faith—that his amendment is addressed to defense only. But the language of the amendment leaves a serious question in my mind. I do not think the amendment does clearly distinguish, and I am afraid that it does preclude research, development, test and evaluation in use of chemical or biological agents or materials for medical diagnosis, evaluation, research, treatment of disease, illness, injury, of any physical or mental condition for the purpose of public health and disease control.

Our defense activities in biological research have cooperated for many years with public and private medical research programs and have contributed significantly to National, State, and local public health and medical research institutions. I do not think we ought to risk unduly restricting those valuable contributions to health. But I am afraid we would in this amendment. I think it is very important that this point be clarified, and I do not think it can be clarified at this time. But I am afraid the adoption of the amendment would limit continuation of medical research now done in this area.

There has been intense adverse reaction to the Defense transportation of chemical material, but I beg the Committee to remember that this is similar, in large respect, to thousands of commercial shipments of chlorine, phosgene, and similar materials that are used in industry.

I raise this question: Do you propose by this amendment to stop those commercial chemicals from being transported? These may offer a more serious threat than anything now being done in the military program. But what is the possible effect of the amendment on transportation of commercial chemicals? Should they not have the same safeguards as defense shipments?

Some of those who are opposed to the use of chemical and biological defense activities apparently are willing to limit and even to prevent the present-day use of chemical weapons in Vietnam. Before the House goes overboard in the scramble to prohibit the use of chemical and biological weapons, let me point to the fact that every U.S. field commander has enthusiastically approved the use of tear gas and defoliants in Vietnam. These are the only chemicals used there, but their use could definitely be limited or even prohibited by amendments of this type. These weapons in Vietnam have saved American lives and the lives of Vietnamese nationals time and again. They have made it possible to seize enemy strongholds which could not be taken through the use of other conventional weapons. They have forced the surrender of enemy troops without the danger to allied forces which would have come from attempts to overrun these strong points or to overcome them by rifle and artillery fire or bombardment. They have helped to avoid needless killing and maiming of civilians who were held as hostages by Communist forces. These mercy aspects are totally ignored by some who simply want to do away with all chemical and biological weapons. It is strange reasoning.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. VANIK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. VANIK. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of these amendments to restrict the large-scale production and distribution of lethal chemical or biological items of warfare.

It is shocking that this Nation in recent decades has deliberately and secretly constructed an awesome arsenal of offensive, as well as defensive, chemical and biological agents. Recent accidents in Utah and Okinawa, diplomatic incidents in Japan and Germany, controversies over transporting toxic materials across land, and revelations about testing in Maryland and Alabama have deeply disturbed many Americans.

A complete investigation of our Government's program of testing, developing, producing, and stockpiling of all forms of chemical and biological items should be undertaken as an urgent priority. Searching questions must be posed about the role of these weapons in our strategic military and foreign policies and concerning our international legal obligations. Public confidence and scrutiny must be restored. Congressional responsibility must be reasserted.

Certain facts emerge out of the present situation with regard to this complex problem:

First. Public information has been absent while the Government, according to the General Accounting Office, has spent over $1.7 billion since 1963 on research, development, and procurement of chemical biological warfare weapons.

Second. Large-scale back-door expenditures are reported to be involved, as well as substantial maintenance costs.

Third. Procurement of these weapons has increased dramatically with our involvement in Vietnam.

Fourth. Recent events call into question the safety regulations applicable to all phases of chemical biological warfare, from testing to stockpiling to disposal, and suggest that the very existence of these weapons constitutes an alarming public health hazard.

Fifth. The consequences of employing these unreliable weapons are potentially disastrous to all sides in a conflict.

Sixth. The Government acknowledges that there is no effective protection or even detection for civilian populations.

Seventh. Strategic reliance on the deterrent capability of chemical and biological warfare weapons is unsound and unethical: nuclear weapons provide this country with the best deterrent to any kind of attack.

Although it is in the interest of the United States to secure the necessary means to protect this country from all forms of aggression, we must rigidly control the accumulation of offensive lethal chemical agents, disease-producing biological organisms or biological toxins.

The paramount interest of America, and of all civilized nations, is to achieve the eradication of existing arsenals of chemical and germ-warfare capabilities.

The United States is founded on principles which affirm the dignity, freedom and decency of man. This country has declared, though it never ratified the

Geneva protocol of 1925, that it would never be the first to use these instruments of doom. America must put its emphasis on the preservation of life and life-preserving environment.

The President has ordered a National Security Council study of our whole program. Its results will be welcomed as a major contribution to the review I recommend. I am a cosponsor of a resolution in this chamber urging the President to resubmit the Geneva protocol to the Senate for ratification. The Secretary General of the United Nations has recently released a comprehensive report on all aspects of chemical biological warfare, compiled with worldwide assistance, which calls for dramatic steps to curb these systems. Currently, the 18-Nation Geneva Disarmament Conference is considering a draft convention with a prohibition of all development, testing, and production of biological agents.

The amendments adopted by the Senate mandate periodic reports setting forth the purposes and the amounts spent during every 6-month period for research, development, tests, evaluation and procurement of lethal and nonlethal chemical and biological agents. The Senate amendments restricting deployment and storage are a step in the right direction.

The House of Representatives has a chance to act rationally and decisively today on the issue of chemical and biological warfare.

The preservation of life and the life-sustaining environment should be the paramount goals of American policy, foreign, domestic and military. Democracy and the preservation of life are synonymous. We should invoke every reasonable restraint we can devise on offensive biological and chemical warfare. Our good judgment in such policy might become a contagious thing.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, this is a subject, the subject of chemical warfare, on which I think we have seen already too much demagoguery in this past year, and I think that before we begin to incorporate an amendment on this subject, we get away from some of this demagoguery and headline-hunting we have been seeing and talk a little hard sense about the defense of our country.

I do not imagine that anybody likes chemical warfare or biological warfare. But I do not think anybody likes the other kind of warfare either. And I do not think it is worse to be killed by a chemical agent than it is to be killed by a bit of shrapnel or by a bomb.

The fact of the matter is we do have a chemical and bacteriological warfare capability for exactly the same reason that we have long-range missiles. We have them because we hope that capacity will deter the enemy from using his capability, and that we will never have to use them. We have so far succeeded very largely in that regard both with respect to our long-range missiles and with respect to our chemical and biological warfare. Obviously we cannot have a deterrent effect unless these weapons are available where they are likely to be needed and in the theaters of warfare where they may be needed to deter possible enemy action. I think most of us are aware of the fact—and some of these incidents may be classified—that the Germans had this capability in World War II and on two specific occasions would have used it except that they understood that we also had a capability in that field and that we were ready and well equipped to retaliate.

Before we are too overwhelmed by what has happened at the other end of the Capitol with respect to the action of the Senate, let me just point out that, first of all, there were no hearings on the subject of CBW in the Senate or in the committee.

Second, this amendment, according to my understanding, was really the result of a shotgun marriage.

There was a great deal of uncertainty in the other body, you will recall, when the defense authorization bill was up, as to whether they were going to be able to pass that bill, whether the ABM was going to remain in it, and whether some of these other items that were under attack there were going to be eliminated.

In order to win the votes of some of the wavering Senators, according to my information, it was agreed in the cloakrooms to accept this particular CBW amendment. There was no deliberation on the part of the Department of Defense, and our distinguished former colleague who is now the Secretary of Defense, as I understand, tried to get the best of a very bad bargain. But that should be no excuse for us today to accept this amendment adopted in haste in the other body.

Let me point out just what is in this amendment. I think the gentleman from Florida has already indicated that if we pass this amendment, we are not just putting in a few restrictions on the testing of stuff in Utah, to prevent the killing of a few sheep, as the gentleman from New York (Mr. McCarthy) has suggested. We are not just trying to prevent the dispatch of a few dangerous chemicals to Lockport, N.Y.

First of all, section B says that none of these funds shall be used for the procurement of delivery systems. In other words, if this passes, we are not going to stay in this CBW business at all. If you cannot deliver it, you have no capability. This is a unilateral disarmament amendment in the field of chemical and biological warfare. If that is what the Members want, then vote for it.

The second section has another strange provision, that none of the funds shall be used for future deployment to any foreign country unless somebody advises the Committee on Armed Services, the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, the Appropriations Committee, and the Interior, and Insular Affairs Committee of the Senate.

Maybe this information will be classified when it is sent, but I do not believe if we are going to transport some of our critical weapons we ought to advertise it to all these committees and to their staffs and then to the world. We do not do it with other weapons. Why should we write this into the law, that we must advise the world any time we want to move these weapons?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment, and I will yield to the gentleman from New York, but before I do I will say I am a realist. I see the purpose of this amendment. I am positive the other body did not go into it. If the gentleman will give us the opportunity, we will positively try to work out something in this field. The way we can do it is when we will be in conference with the Senate. This is all we can do. This reporting could be a very dangerous thing.

It took us forever to find out what came from the Senate.

Members can vote in this amendment if they want to, but I think it is very dangerous. If the Members will give us the opportunity, we will try very hard to work out something in the conference, because we will have people in the conference who will be knowledgeable.

I cannot help the mistakes the U.S. Army made. They woke up in the morning and found out what sort of foolish mistake had happened in the day. I do not want sugar beets killed. I do not want sheep killed, but I cannot help those things. We cannot judge total needs on the basis of one or two incidents.

Mr. Chairman, I ask Members to defeat the amendment and give us a chance to work on it in conference.

Mr. Chairman, I yield now to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Stratton).

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for yielding.

I want to point out that we do not have copies of this amendment available, but it is a modification of the Senate language. The next section provides that when it comes to transportation within the United States, these notifications have to go to the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Interstate Commerce Commission. We might as well publish these things in the Washington Post and the New York Times. If we announce that these items are going to pass the Lockport Bridge at 12 o'clock, for example, that amounts to notification to any possible saboteur to be there at that time to blow it up.

Not only that, but let me point out still another item, that when we send these weapons abroad, under this amendment the Secretary of State would be required to inform not only the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, but also the appropriate international organizations. So we are going to have to tell the U.N. where all of our chemical agents are stored and where they are transported. I think this is ridiculous in this kind of legislation.

As the chairman said, let us reject this amendment. Let us take it over to the conference committee instead. If there is anything in it to prevent the kinds of tragedies which have happened in the past, let us act to eliminate those. But let us not conduct unilateral disarmament here today on the floor of this House.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GUBSER. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RIVERS. We do not even have a copy of this amendment; all I have is a yellow sheet.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GUBSER. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. NEDZI. This is the same amendment which was offered in the committee. This is the same amendment which I discussed with one of the staff people who is employed by the chairman. This is precisely the language that we concluded to be acceptable to the Department of Defense.

I think it is unfair and I think it is disgraceful we do not have an objective exchange of views on the subject.

The gentleman from New York talks about demagoguery, and gets in the well and refuses to yield so that we can point out the fallacies and misconceptions he has created with respect to this amendment.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GUBSER. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RIVERS. This amendment was taken up in the committee. Why were we not given a copy of it here? The amendment was taken up in the committee and was badly defeated. It was defeated by a record vote, if my memory serves me correctly.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I believe it is important to point out that neither the philosophy nor the morality of chemical and biological weapons is at issue in the consideration of this amendment, because this is only a limitation on the shipment and the control of these weapons. The weapons will continue to exist. So I do not believe anyone who rises in opposition to this amendment is inhumane, and he should not be charged as being inhumane.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GUBSER. I cannot yield further. I have given up most of my time already. I am sorry.

I was inclined to be for the gentleman's amendment. I believe it is well intentioned. I commend him for the spirit in which he has offered it. But I do believe he has raised some questions which are administratively impossible to handle.

I am concerned about the restrictions in part (d) regarding transportation. He is going to bring in the Foreign Relations Committee, to bring in the Foreign Affairs Committee, to bring in the Secretary of HEW, and to bring in the Secretary of Transportation, and the Secretary of Defense, on a decision regarding the shipment of biological weapons. One might as well have a Chautauqua-type convention, to make that kind of decision. It is administratively impossible.

May I point out that in the year 1967 private industry, not the Defense Department, shipped three million tons of ammonia, a poisonous gas; shipped four million tons of chlorine, a poisonous gas used in warfare; shipped 6,200 tons of phosgene, a poisonous gas used in warfare; and shipped 13,000 tons of hydrogen cyanide, also used in warfare.

At that time the ratio of civilian shipments of toxic gases and lethal chemicals to Army shipments was 1,000 to 1. Private industry shipped 1,000 times more than the military.

Of course, that is a moot question today because the Army has now agreed, through regulation, to submit to controls of the Department of Transportation and the Secretary of HEW. Containerization requirements must be met, and all types of shipping requirements of the Department of Transportation and the Interstate Commerce Commission imposed on private industry must also be met by the services.

So, Mr. Chairman, I point out that though this is a well-intentioned amendment we should go to conference and try to work out a reasonable restriction which is administratively sensible. I am afraid this amendment, well-intentioned though it may be, will create an administrative jungle that will cause more trouble than it will do good.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I would simply like to say that I find it very difficult to believe that the DOD would endorse a proposal that they felt was administratively impossible. I find it equally difficult to believe that the Members of the other body, no matter what we think of them, simply passed this amendment unanimously as a part of some machinations to get votes on some other subject.

I am now happy to yield to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. NEDZI) and congratulate him for offering this amendment.

Mr. NEDZI. I thank the gentleman from New York for yielding to me.

I will try, in the brief time I have here, to set the record straight with respect to some of the allegations that have been made with respect to this amendment.

The chairman or the opponents of this amendment suggested that sufficient deliberation did not take place with respect to this amendment. Let me point out that on August 9 of this year Secretary Laird issued a press release in which he stated the following:

> Members of my staff, principally Dr. John S. Foster, the Director of Research and Engineering, have been working with Senator THOMAS MCINTYRE, of New Hampshire, and other members of the Senate Armed Services Committee on a revised amendment to the pending Defense authorization bill. I am in agreement with the goals of the new amendment which the Senate is scheduled to consider on Monday, August 11. I believe this revised amendment will allow us to maintain our chemical warfare deterrent and our biological research program, both of which are essential to national security.

Since that time the Department of Defense has had this matter under review up until last week when they suggested minor changes in language which I described to the committee in making my initial presentation.

Now, let me make clear that there is nothing in this amendment which forbids the production or the research or the test and evaluation of chemical warfare weapons. It is strictly a reporting amendment that would require the DOD to make reports to the interested agencies in his regard.

I echo the sentiments of the gentleman from New York when he said that he doubts the DOD would approve any amendment which was impossible to administer. They have had this amendment under consideration for over 2 months, and it still meets with their approval. Consequently I am at a total loss to understand why the members of the House Committee on Armed Services by and large refuse to support this amendment.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PIKE. I am happy to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. McCARTHY. I think it is relevant to point out here that the text of the Presidential Order No. 11001, on February 1962, requires the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to develop plans for contingencies where biological and chemical warfare agents created a disaster in a community. The director of civil defense in Webster, Mass., was asked what he would do if one had occurred in his community. He said, We would not do "a darn thing," because we do not know what to do. HEW has not advised us. What the amendment would require is that the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare would be advised so that his Department could prepare disaster plans and assist communities like Webster.

The gentleman from New York makes a big point about sobatage. But you could have a half blind Russian spy and he could still spot a sign like this which says in bold, red letters: "Poison Gas" and which are now posted on rail cars carrying chemical agents. But the Governor of Iowa did not know it was coming through his State or the Governor of New Jersey. I quoted what the civil defense director, Mr. Burke, of Webster, Mass., said. Mr. Burke says it would be "incredible." To paraphrase him: "If that happened, we would not do a darn thing, because we would not know what to do."

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PIKE. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to congratulate the gentleman from Michigan on his excellent amendment, and particularly my colleague from New York, for the very wonderful job he has done in developing information for this Congress with regard to the dangers in the shipment and storage of these chemical agents.

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PIKE. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself with the amendment offerred by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. NEDZI) and I also particularly want to thank our colleague from New York (Mr. McCARTHY) for having alerted the country to this problem.

I think we are all in his debt.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to give my reasons for my supporting the amendment on chemical and biological warfare introduced by Mr. NEDZI. This amendment is designed to provide protection of the public from the dangers associated with the transportation and testing of CBW material. It is also designed to provide Members of Congress with the basic information on all CBW activities.

The information that has been revealed in hearings held by both the Senate and House of Representatives this year shows that inadequate consideration has been given to the protection of our citizens. It also shows that there is a lack of information on CBW at this policy level in both the executive branch and in Congress. This has been perhaps as much the fault of Congress as it has of the executive branch, because Congress has not required that knowledge of the basic CBW operations be made available to its Members. This amendment will correct those faults.

The protest of a number of Governors, including Governor Ray of Iowa and Governor Hughes of New Jersey, shows that local authorities have not been given sufficient warning when extremely hazardous CBW materials are moved through the States. I believe that it is a basic responsibility of the Federal Government to make information on transportation of CBW materials available to the Governors of the appropriate States. We already do this for a number of local authorities in the case of nuclear materials; certainly we should do the same for CBW materials.

However, although I support this amendment it does not deal with many of the broader public policy questions of concern to Congress and the public. The question of whether the United States should ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925, banning of first use of chemical and biological materials is not covered in this amendment. The highly important question of whether we should use anticrop and antifoliage weapons in war is also not covered. These are the policy questions that are currently being debated by the executive branch and must be debated by Congress.

In introducing House Joint Resolution 691 calling for an international study of the effect of defoliants, I pointed out that we do not know what we are doing to the environment of Vietnam when we engage in widespread application of herbicides and defoliants. We may be permanently altering the ecology of that nation. One of the questions then, that must be asked in any basic review of CBW policy is whether all nations should join together in a ban on defoliants. Although further information is needed before a final conclusion can be reached on this question, it is clear that there can be no delay in obtaining that information and there can be no delay in considering that question.

I urge that my colleagues vote in favor of Mr. NEDZI's amendment relating to chemical and biological warfare. This is a limited but useful first step toward better protection of the public and points toward a more rational CBW policy.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PIKE. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the amendment offered by my distinguished colleague from Michigan to require certain safeguards in the Pentagon chemical and biological warfare program and a policy of open and honest reporting of this program.

In the last 6 months we all have witnessed the lengths to which the Defense Department has gone to conceal these activities, showing what I must consider a too casual disregard for both the risks to our population and our environment.

Because of the serious interest of Members of this body, it was learned in late spring that the Army planned to ship lethal gases from Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Denver across country and similar gases from the Edgewood Arsenal north of Baltimore through Philadelphia. The eventual destination of these gases was a depot on the northern New Jersey coast from which the gases were to be taken to sea and dumped. The Army argued that this was the most economical means of disposal. Members of Congress, myself included, questioned the feasibility of this plan, contending that rail shipments were unsafe and represented a needless hazard to millions of Americans, including the 6 million residents of the Philadelphia metropolitan area. We also contended that dumping the gas in the ocean raised the specter of potentially catastrophic pollution of the ocean environment. The National Academy of Sciences was asked to study the problem and its report agreed essentially with the objections raised in Congress. It recommended that the gases be disposed on site.

Early in the summer, congressional vigilance disclosed that the Army was testing lethal gases in the open air at Edgewood, Md., a location squarely in the middle of the crowded eastern metropolitan corridor. Despite the Army's announcement that the testing was done close to ground level, unlike the high altitude tests conducted at Dugway some years ago in the West, it nevertheless, under congressional pressure, agreed to suspend the open air testing. More recently, it was disclosed that a collision had occurred in Buffalo, N.Y., involving a train carrying phosgene gas sold by the Army to a private firm. We all have seen the reports of the gas train accident in Mississippi, which routed Senator EASTLAND from his home.

The events of the last 6 months have made one thing perfectly clear: the Defense Department and the Army, if they could, would prefer to conduct the testing and transportation of poisonous gas secretly and without public oversight. While I dispute the military's contention that a poisonous gas program is necessary in the nuclear age because potential enemies will develop the same capacity, that is not the question here today.

The question this amendment raises, gentlemen, is simply: What are the rights of the American people living in an open society when confronted by hazards to their life and environment over which they seemingly have no control?

Should the public know that chemical and biological warfare agents are being stored near their homes?

I think American people have the right to know this.

Should the public know when hazardous and lethal gases are being shipped by train through their communities?

Considering that the Transportation Safety Board reported more than 5,000 derailments in the United States in 1968, I think the people should have this information.

Should the public know that germ and gas weapons are being tested in the open atmosphere?

In a time when we are increasingly aware of the poison spilling into the air we breathe everyday, I think the public has the right to know this.

And finally, is it unreasonable to ask that the Defense Department report twice yearly what chemical and biological warfare programs are underway and what these programs are costing?

I think the public has the right to know how its money is being spent and on what programs and, since the Defense Department has demonstrated a sedulous reluctance to openly report its activities in this area, I believe that Congress has the responsibility to require the open and full disclosure of this activity. Therefore, I applaud the wisdom of my colleague from Michigan in offering this amendment and I urge all Members of this body to support it.

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PIKE. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. NEDZI) and I want to add my words of commendation to our colleague, the gentleman from New York (Mr. MCCARTHY), for the public attention he has drawn to this very vital issue.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment is an amendment which would do no harm to our national security, and I suggest that the charge of demagoguery is quite out of place in this debate.

This amendment with minor changes recommended by the Department of Defense is similar to the amendment which passed the Senate unanimously. It would create guidelines and controls over the procurement, storage, transportation, disposal, maintenance, and testing of chemical and biological warfare agents.

Not until March of 1968 did the CBW program come to the surface. At that time, accidental release of nerve gas at a Utah proving grounds occurred, killing 6,000 sheep.

Since the Utah incident, other accidents and injuries caused by the chemical and biological warfare program have come to light. In addition, public concern has been increasing steadily about the transportation of lethal gas across the country, and the possibility that the release of these substances could cause public contamination.

The CBW program has been going on

with little notice for many years. It has used $300 to $350 million a year scattered throughout the Defense budget.

The nature and the extent of the CBW program has been deliberately hidden from most Members of Congress. Several years ago I called for a full investigation of this program which the Department of Defense has been allowed to carry on for too long without proper scrutiny and supervision.

The amendment calls for a full and complete semiannual report by the Secretary of Defense to the Congress setting forth in detail the total CBW research, development, test evaluation, and procurement program.

This would provide Congress with the kind of detailed information Congress and the public need in order to understand the programs and to determine future direction.

It provides for a full range of reports to the interested congressional committees, and will also insure consultation with foreign nations before CBW agents are deployed on their soil.

It requires advance notice to the Congress and executive agencies of rail shipments of lethal CBW agents.

Chemical and biological warfare is alien to our concepts of the conduct of war, and the amendment makes clear that CBW agents should not be used as offensive weapons and prohibits expenditure of funds for any device designed to deliver these agents.

Finally, the amendment would eliminate open air testing except in those instances when the Secretary of Defense, under the direction of the President of the United States, declares that our national security requires such testing, and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare would give his advice as to the hazards presented.

Furthermore, the appropriate committees of the Congress would be informed of all proposed open air tests at least 30 days in advance.

Mr. Chairman, to dismiss as demagoguery serious questions relating to the CBW program and the potential effects of testing, storing, and transporting CBW agents upon our environment and our population does a disservice to the principle of open debate and is an attempt to foreclose further public discussion of a matter of major public importance which can no longer be ignored.

Mr. ECKHARDT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PIKE. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. ECKHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I am in support of this amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I take this time with the idea of seeking, or trying to seek some information. I tried to take notes during the discussion of the amendment. It has been agreed that copies of the amendment were not distributed. I did not even receive the buff-colored sheet distributed by the DSG. I can find no answers to some questions I would like to have answered. So I am taking this time to try to find out some answers from the gentleman from Michigan.

One of my questions is about reporting. I am wondering to whom is the reporting to be made? Then I thought I heard the gentleman say his amendment required suspension of further evaluation of CB weapons? I could not tell whether his amendment covered both testing and evaluation. I thought I heard the gentleman say that testing outside of the United States is barred, if the Secretary of State believes such is contrary to international law. I certainly would be for such a provision.

Then I listened and I thought I heard the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON) say he believed the amendment might require the revelation of some of our classified information. If this is true of course there is reason to be disturbed about the amendment, if it is proposed we reveal classified material.

So, Mr. Chairman, I want to ask the sponsor of the amendment to respond to some inquiries. First, can he tell us to whom these reports are to be made? Then how often? Then whether the reports will include classified information?

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RANDALL. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The first section of my amendment provides the following: The Secretary of Defense shall transmit semiannual reports to the Congress on or before January 31st, and on or before July 31st of each year, setting forth the purposes of and the amount spent during the preceding six-month period for research and development, test, evaluation and procurement of lethal and non-lethal chemical and biological agents. The Secretary shall include in such reports an explanation of such expenditures, including the necessity therefor.

This is language that the Defense Department did not see fit to amend in any wise, and it is the identical provision that passed the Senate 91 to nothing.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman read the section after that?

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, I have control of the time.

Mr. NEDZI. If the gentleman will yield further, I might add that there is nothing in this amendment which provides for the suspension of any kind of tests of research and development. The problem is—and if I may here try to answer the gentleman from New York on his question—in section (b) it says that none of the funds appropriated may be used for the procurement of delivery systems specifically designed to disseminate lethal chemical agents or any biological agents.

Now, when we talk about delivery systems specifically designed, we are narrowing this amendment down to almost nothing, in my judgment, because obviously an airplane is not specifically designed to disseminate lethal agents, nor is an artillery shell, nor is a mortar, nor many others delivery systems.

Mr. RANDALL. I would like to ask the gentleman a question.

I am grateful to find out the Secretary of Defense must make semiannual reports. Now I am still wondering to whom are these reports to be directed and delivered.

Mr. NEDZI. The reports are directed to the Congress, as are other departmental reports.

Mr. RANDALL. To the Speaker and to the President of the Senate?

Mr. NEDZI. That is correct.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RANDALL. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. STRATTON. Does the gentleman from Michigan, since he has not had the courtesy to supply us with copies of his amendment, maintain that section 3(e) of the Senate bill, which is almost identical with the gentleman's amendment, is not in his amendment, which section 3(e) says:

(e) None of the funds authorized by this or any other Act shall be used for the testing, development, transportation, storage, or disposal of any chemical or biological weapon outside of the continental limits of the United States unless the Secretary of State determines that such testing, development, transportation, storage, or disposal will not violate international law and reports such determination to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and to the appropriate international organizations, or organs thereof, whenever required by treaty or other international agreement.

Mr. RANDALL. I am grateful to both gentlemen for their answers. I am sure the answers have been beneficial to all Members.

Mr. GUDE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by Mr. NEDZI. It differs from the Senate amendment and it therefore must be considered in conference. It would certainly be better that when going to that conference this House go as being in favor of some measure of control and logic in the testing, storing, and shipping of these chemical and biological warfare agents.

There has been talk that measures which could save lives might involve paperwork. When you consider the toxicity of some of these agents and what is involved, I do not believe we want to oppose some lifesaving paperwork. I want you to bear in mind that we are not just discussing agents like ammonia gas which are relatively mild, but agents like the nerve gas GB. One ounce of GB nerve gas has the potential, gentlemen, when inhaled, to kill 14,000 people.

The VX nerve gas which was tested at Dugway, Utah, and which was responsible for the 6,000 sheep killed on ranges outside of Dugway grounds, is also fantastically toxic and far more persistent than GB.

Biological and chemical warfare agents are not only being tested in the so-called open spaces where sheep seem to be the only victims. We have Fort Detrick in Frederick, Md., and Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Harford County, Md., where chemical and biological agents are being tested—some in open air tests.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GUDE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the gentleman. I think what the gentleman is saying is quite relevant.

The gentleman from Florida (Mr. SIKES) said that the Soviets have the capability of carrying on chemical and biological warfare. I believe he said it was seven to eight times that of the United States. I believe that is false and I would quote from the hearings the statement of General Stone, head of CBR and nuclear operations with the Army:

> There is no clear evidence that any foreign country is presently testing biological weapons, in the sense that an operational delivery means is being used to disseminate either live microorganisms or stimulants.

I was intrigued by a report in the New York Times recently that the United States has no hard evidence of any Soviet capability in offensive biological warfare. I must say nothing I have encountered would dispute that statement.

I do not believe the United States has any hard evidence of any Soviet biological offensive capability. They have plenty of defensive capability, but there is no hard evidence of any Soviet capability—much less capability seven or eight times that of the United States.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GUDE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. RIVERS. We have positive intelligence that they are carrying on a very intensive R. & D. program. We have estimates that their stockpiles are not seven times ours but approximately 10 or 12 times what we have.

Mr. GUDE. We have a tremendous potential in the United States, too—enough to kill the population of the entire earth and then some.

I would like to give you an idea of why we should have HEW, Interior, and other agencies involved. In regard to the sheep kill in Utah, at first the Army denied that there had been any testing of the agent which was suspect in the sheep kill. Then when they finally did agree that they had released the VX nervegas, a Utah veterinarian was assured by an Army doctor that VX nervegas would be rendered harmless in 4 days of open-air exposure. The subsequent investigation which had to be carried on by the Department of Agriculture showed that VX retained its lethal toxicity in the open air for 3 weeks, and the harmful effects continued for 3 months.

And this is one of the reasons that I rise in support of this amendment which would provide guidelines and regulations for military work with chemical and biological warfare agents.

As in the case of this amendment and others offered, dealing with the C–5A, ABM, advanced manned strategic aircraft, the short-range attack missile, the Cobra, and the continental air defense, it is a serious mistake to categorize them as pacificistic or designed to destroy adequate national security for our citizens.

These amendments and the debate of the last 3 days strike to the very heart of the question as to whether the taxpayer is getting his tax dollars worth in military preparedness. There is also the important question whether the programs which are established by the appropriation bill correspond to the foreign policy of the Executive. For example, the Manila policy recently set forth by the President, to me, calls for a careful scrutiny of our Military Establishment in the Orient and whether it corresponds to our foreign policy posture.

In the above context the program for chemical and biological warfare needs to be scrutinized by the Congress and by the Executive.

This spring the Conservation and Natural Resources Subcommittee of the Government Operations Committeee, of which I am a member, conducted extensive hearings on the environmental dangers of open-air testing of lethal chemicals.

As you well know open air tests of VX nerve gas at Dugway, Utah, caused death and injury to more than 6,000 sheep and contaminated thousands of acres of rangeland outside the proving grounds for months.

Testimony offered at our hearings gave me the strict impression that lack of knowledge of the agents utilized and the conditions of open air testing can lead to catastrophies involving the lives of American citizens as well as prolonged or even permanent contamination of segments of our environment.

As I stated these agents have a fantastic toxicity and the Army evidently is not cognizant of some of the crucial qualities of some of the material being tested in the open air.

Testimony, in part by Surgeon General Stewart, has brought me to the conclusion that open-air testing is not only fraught with dangers but can be a real waste of the taxpayers' money. To the extent that we should continue our military work with chemical and biological agents, closed laboratory testing would not only yield reliable data from which scientists could draw sound conclusions, but would eliminate deadly dangers to American citizens and to polluting segments of our environment.

Testimony also demonstrated that harmless stimulants could well be used in place of lethal materials for open-air testing purposes.

Further testimony at our hearings demonstrated that Army scientists did not adequately consider the many atmospheric variables at Dugway. It raised the question whether the open-air testing conducted was really befitting of the term "scientific research."

In the above context our amendment to establish guidelines for control of chemical and biological warfare are modest.

They would in no way jeopardize our national security but would guarantee our citizens some measure of safety and economy in just one area of our military operations.

Mr. ANDERSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

I rise in support of Mr. NEDZI's amendment, which I believe to be reasonable, moderate, and responsible.

No longer can we tolerate the lack of attention which has been the case with our Nation's chemical and biological warfare program. We must tighten procedures in this extremely sensitive and hazardous area and, in doing so, not endanger our national security.

We are fortunate that no major disaster has occurred, although there have been incidents and causes for alarm with our CBW program. Therefore, it is time that the Congress spell out, tighten up, and enact real safeguards. We owe this to ourselves as a nation, and I see no reason why this cannot be done, with both the Nation's health and the Nation's security fully in mind.

We also need this in the interest of our posture with other nations of the world.

I wish to compliment the gentleman from Michigan for bringing this amendment before us at this time.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDERSON of California. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. BINGHAM. I would like to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman in the well and to commend the proponent of the amendment particularly, my colleague from New York (Mr. McCARTHY) for his great work in alerting the Nation to the dangers involved.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDERSON of California. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. NEDZI. I thank the gentleman for yielding very much, because I want to clarify the record and apologize to the House and to the gentleman from New York if I have misled him. We had an exchange earlier in the debate with respect to sending notice to appropriate international organizations. That requirement is still in the amendment. However, the qualifying language is as follows: "whenever required by treaty or other international agreements."

I, as a lawyer, believe that to mean that all the amendment asks is that the Secretary of State abide by international law.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDERSON of California. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. STRATTON. I appreciate the gentleman from Michigan acknowledging that he gave the House inaccurate information. This is one of the problems of this amendment. It is a very sweeping amendment. The gentleman himself apparently is not entirely familiar with all that is included in it, and since it does contain a reporting requirement to the U.N. or other international organizations, it will take a Philadelphia lawyer to decide whether it should not go, and I do not think this is the place where classified information should be disseminated.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDERSON of California. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. McCARTHY. I think it is important in answering my distinguished friend from New York to point out that so far as notification is concerned, the Atomic Energy Commission and its con-

tractors are required to notify a number of local authorities before they move nuclear weapons or nuclear materials through bridges, tunnels, and what have you. Right where we are sitting, in the District of Columbia, there are restrictions. They cannot move nuclear materials during peak hours. They have to have escorts. The State of Maryland has a similar restriction. The Port of New York has, also. You cannot move any nuclear materials through tunnels. They must be notified.

The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority: Mr. Burger of the AEC told my office that notification and escorts actually provided more protection against sabotage than if they were not notified.

Mrs. MINK. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment. Our recent experience in the State of Hawaii on this issue prompts me to express my deep and firm conviction that this Congress must set policy guidelines to assure Members of Congress and the American people full and complete information on all testing of chemical and biological warfare agents in this country.

In 1966, the Army entered into a 5-year lease with the State of Hawaii for 1,145 acres of land on the big island of Hawaii. The lease provided that the purpose was for "meteorological" and related tests.

Early in 1969, I received information that the deadly nerve gas GB had been tested on the big island. Inquiries began, with no success. In July 1969, Seymour M. Hersh in an article in the Washington Post stated that these tests did take place in Hawaii. Inquiries again were made with a flat denial from the Army.

On July 19, I wrote to the Secretary of the Army asking for a complete list of all test sites used in the last 20 years for testing of all CBW substances, offensive and defensive.

On August 4, I sent a series of questions to Secretary Laird for reply. One of these questions was "Has the Army ever tested either chemical or biological warfare weapons or agents in Hawaii?"

The reply dated August 11 to this question was "No. The Army has not tested either chemical or biological munitions in Hawaii. The Army has conducted limited chemical tests under strict safety precautions to obtain defensive information."

On September 11, I received another letter from the Army responding to my earlier inquiry of July 19. The letter said:

> The Secretary of the Army has asked me to reply to your inquiry concerning the nerve gas testing in Hawaii. To the best of our knowledge, the Army has not denied that nerve agent tests have been conducted in the past in Hawaii. For reasons of national security, the Army cannot release lists of all test sites used in the past. Limited small-scale testing of chemical nerve agent and incapacitating agent has been conducted in Hawaii. This was done with the concurrence and knowledge of State officials.
>
> Four chemical tests were conducted on the Island of Hawaii at an Army jungle environment test site in the Waiakea forest reserve. Three of the tests involved the non-persistent nerve agent GB and were conducted during April–June 1966, March–April 1967, and April–May 1967. One test involved the non-persistent chemical incapacitating agent BZ and was conducted during May–June 1966. All of the testing was open-air and was conducted in a 1.5 square mile area.
>
> There has been no testing of biological research agents in the State of Hawaii in the past nor are there any plans to do so.

I wrote to the Secretary of the Army again on September 16 requesting information on who in the State was informed and concurred. I challenge his statement that there had been no denials.

On September 20, the Secretary replied: First, yes; the Army had lied and that the denials of these tests when they in fact did take place was regretted; second, that the statement that the Army is not conducting tests of munitions is also unfortunately inaccurate; third, that chemical munitions were in fact exploded; fourth, that due to an administrative error Members of Congress had been supplied misleading information; fifth, that it was a lie that the State knew about the tests and concurred—the Governor of Hawaii was not informed of the mission of this test facility; and sixth, it was not true that biological research had not been done in the past because in fact biological and chemical simulants in addition had also been tested on Oahu as well as on the big island of Hawaii.

The credibility of the Army has been irrevocably damaged as a result of this incredible series of letters. Passage of the pending amendment will prevent a repeat of this kind of deception which could just as easily have occurred in any one of your districts. I urge your support of this amendment, for the protection of the public safety, for the sake of a free society, and for the sake of humanity.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment. This amendment is a very small addition to this procurement bill, but its consequences are far reaching. Although this amendment provides no reduction in funds, it requires the Department of Defense to alter its reporting and handling of chemical and biological weapons.

This amendment is necessary as the incidents of the last year have demonstrated. The Dugway episode in which numerous sheep were accidentally killed by a shift in the wind carrying nerve gas, incredible decisions to ship dangerous gases all over the country and finally "dump" them off shore, and reported inadequate safety provisions in the shipment of dangerous gases suggest the need for continual Congressional supervision. This is what the amendment does. It requires the Department of Defense to provide, semiannually, more and complete information on the expenditures and programs of Chemical Biological Weapons. It also stipulates that there will be adequate notice of open air testing so that the Dugway experience will not be repeated with more disastrous consequences.

Another feature of the amendment would prohibit secrecy in domestic and foreign shipment and storage of CBW agents. This provision has important implications. First it enables the American public and more important local authorities to be aware of these shipments so that adequate safety measures can be instituted. It also has foreign policy implications because this provision will bring U.S. behavior more in compliance with international treaty commitments.

It is incredible, Mr. Chairman, that most Members of Congress were not informed of the extent of our CBW effort. It has been through the untiring efforts of some of my colleagues that the extent of this program and its implications have reached the public arena. By passing this amendment we can assist in the efforts to keep the problems of CBW before the Congress. By insisting on full and complete reports, Congress can oversee an area that is necessary for national security, but is potentially dangerous to those same citizens it is designed to protect.

I urge support of the amendment.

Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, much has been said here today about the chemical tests out in Utah, which is in my congressional district, where approximately 6,000 sheep were killed as a result of one of these tests.

My purpose here today is not to defend the Army or the military, because I believe many mistakes were made. However, I believe it is very important in a debate such as this pertaining to the Nation's preparedness and national security for the facts to be kept straight.

One of the things which has disturbed me about the report throughout the country concerning the sheep deaths has been the fact that there have been exaggerations approaching distortion. For example, the Washington Post and Newsweek issued reports of allegations that as a result of the Utah tests, in addition to the deaths of the sheep, there were also destroyed, 1,700 head of cattle; further, that 100 square miles of pastureland were contaminated outside of the proving ground for 2 to 3 years.

The thing which disturbed me was that it was definitely disproved: there were no cattle deaths. And it was definitely disproved: no 100-square-mile area had been contaminated permanently as a result of these chemical tests. But the media did not see fit to correct this misinformation which had been distributed throughout the country.

I have been a little disturbed today also to hear one of the sponsors of the amendment state that this information which would be reported to the various congressional committees and their staffs would be officially designated as classified; in other words, the information would not be distributed to the general public. But there are so many committees and so many staff members who would receive this information it would seem to me to be extremely difficult for this to remain in a classified state.

I should like to say also, not so much in defense of the military but again to report what actually happened in Utah, a year ago last March when this test was made, the military was first asked, "Has there been a test for biologicals here?"

The answer was "no." Of course, that is not full disclosure. I say they should have said there had been chemical tests, but they did not.

The claim was made there was a denial of chemical tests. I went out there a few days later, as soon as I could leave my responsibilities here in the House. I found no effort on the part of the military to hide anything. As a matter of fact, the land company, owners of the sheep, employed attorneys to present its case, and they asked me if I could persuade the military to allow their attorney to go out to participate in the investigation. I did ask the military. I expected to be denied this, but they said, "Surely, come on."

It seems to me there is a proper legal distinction between denying something and a failure to admit. It is true the Army failed to admit. They refused to admit. It seems to me, however, in a sensitive area involving national security they very properly refused to admit something they could not then prove was the direct result of the chemical test at Dugway, Utah.

I saw nothing particularly immoral about the position that they took. I did find great reassurance in the fact that they did say to me, "Yes, the lawyer representing the owner of the dead sheep may come out and participate in our examination."

The chemical tests in Utah have been going on since 1952. In all that time there has never been a single case of a proved fatality or casualty to a human being.

This does not mean it cannot happen.

My own great criticism of this program has been there has not been sufficient disclosure. I believe the military has been remiss in not having that full disclosure. But I do consider it essential that when we here debate matters of sensitive national security, we keep the facts straight and not surrender to excessive alarm not warranted by fact.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LLOYD. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the gentleman from Utah.

The gentleman from Utah is aware of the fact that there have been fatalities from germ testing right out here at Fort Detrick. There were at least three cases of death in recent years, and one other case where a lifeguard caught the plague.

Mr. LLOYD. I say to the gentleman, that may well be so. I am here to speak of my own district, where so much of this national publicity and advertising has taken place. There has never been a fatality or a case of a human casualty in all that time of testing since 1952.

I believe that we must be very careful that we do not allow exaggerations to discolor the evenhanded attitude which we should take in the consideration of this issue.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from Missouri yield?

Mr. HALL. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. ARENDS. I just take this time to inform the House that I am going to object to any request to come in early tomorrow.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we could wind up the debate on this particular subject and that we might reduce it to the context in which I presume it was presented, to the essentials that should be considered by this House.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HALL. I am glad to yield to the distinguished chairman.

Mr. RIVERS. This is very poorly worded. Listen to this:

> The provisions of this section shall not apply during a war declared by the Congress or the President after the date of this Act.

When can the President declare war?

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I think the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services has made a very good point. I know this is a popular discussion topic due to mishaps that have occurred. I have had one such mishap in the district that I am privileged to represent, not from CBR products being moved under MTMSA—the Management and Traffic Agency of the Department of Defense of the United States—but from dehydrated alfalfa being transported, along with basics for explosives.

Mr. Chairman, I am happy to say that we have made some improvement in our means of transportation, including undercoating and the proper shodding of our brakes, as well as other means of correcting transportation difficulties. I believe more of that can be done. I do not think because we have over 50,000 people killed per year in our highway accidents that we are going to do away with our highway system or do away with automobiles. We try hard to improve them, as we have indeed done in this House.

Mr. Chairman, at this time I rise because I have had probably as much or more experience with chemical and biological and radiological warfare agents than anyone in this room. I had experience with them during World War II. In fact, I staffed the teams that investigated the biological warfare attacks on the United States, especially in the Great Northwest. I supplied the medical personnel in my capacity during World War II to Fort Detrick and Edgewood Arsenal and other testing stations in Maryland. I am basically a scientist and physician as you know.

I am concerned about this amendment and oppose it with all of the vigor that I have, because it affects our ability to act in case of a contingency and removes our deterrent. It has a bad effect on our further development of delivery systems. We recognize it is a motherhood amendment, but I plead with you because movements are controlled and are being improved by MTMSA, including the Central District, which happens to be headquartered in St. Louis, Mo., for the entire United States, including these weapons of deterrent warfare as well as explosives, and all barge traffic; because it affects storage and transportation and because it affects the use of medically active radioisotopes, if you please—I plead that we should vote it down, because we need hearings to work out language on a bill like this. I believe it should be voted down overwhelmingly. Finally, I think we must have the current capability in our stockpile, as we did, to my personal knowledge, in World War II, and as the United Arab Republic did in Yemen in 1967, and as the Italians did in Ethiopia when they attacked with "mustard" and other gases. Believe me, noxious gases are many times worse now in their reactions. We do not want to be hobbled by an amendment that was not considered and on which hearings were not held, and on which the details have not been worked out. I recommend for all of these reasons and even in the interests of humanity, based on the concept that gas warfare may be immobilizing rather than maiming or wounding or killing, that we support our Nation's capability to deter. I wonder how many know of our protoplasmic tests, reactions, and studies under the various nuclear reactors and accelerators, in an effort to prepare humanity in the sad event of nuclear attack by the aggressor.

I repeat and beseech, Mr. Chairman, that we allow this amendment to go to conference, work out what we may, but better still, to hold hearings so that the Committee on Armed Services, which has the benefit of information that is distilled into intelligence and presented regularly, can be properly utilized.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri has expired.

Mr. HOWARD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I am in favor of the amendment. However, I believe it reprehensible that a few minutes ago, the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON) labeled anyone who is concerned about nerve gas in this country, about the transportation of nerve gas and the behavior of the Department of Defense in connection with the distribution and movement of nerve gas, as indulging in demogoguery, and in headline hunting.

I do not believe that is a fact, and I feel very badly that the gentleman from New York made that statement.

It was not very long ago—that anyone who asked anything of the Committee on Armed Services or the Defense Department, or the Department of State, or had any question about what they were doing, were labeled "Communist." A little while later anyone who had any objections or any differences were called "un-American." And the day before yesterday, when some Members felt that we needed more than 4 hours of debate to handle a bill of this magnitude, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services was talking about "bleeding hearts" in this Chamber.

I might remind the Chamber that most bleeding hearts and bleeding heads, and arms, and legs, are not in this Chamber, but they are over in Vietnam in the front lines, and they are bleeding American blood.

As to this amendment, and the demagoguery that may be involved, I believe when the Department of Defense determines that it will move 27,000 tons of poison gas across the country through places like Elizabeth, N.J., where a train

wreck sent seven railroad cars into Newark Bay a few years back, just think what might have happened if those 7 railroad cars had contained nerve gas; or in Woodbridge, N.J., where a tremendous train wreck occurred a few years back, with many, many deaths; to a Member's congressional district where they want to take these old train cars full of poison gas and put them in World War II ships to be hauled out through the harbor a short way off the shore and dumped in the ocean—without having the faintest idea of what they are going to do to the fish and wildlife, or the people who live on that shore, I think that if the Member is concerned it is not demagoguery. I think also——

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOWARD. I will yield in a minute.

I believe also that when the Governor of the State of New Jersey, a State of 7 million people, is not informed about this operation until he reads about it in the paper, and when he sends a telegram to Secretary of Defense Laird, and 6 days later, when the committee is going to hold hearings, the Governor of New Jersey has not even had an acknowledgment of receipt of his request for information, much less an explanation—then I think the people who are concerned at that time are representing their districts. And if the gentleman from New York wishes to call them demagogs, he may, but I think they ought to continue what they are doing, and concern themselves with what happens in their congressional areas because they are the only representatives that the half million people in those districts have.

I hope this amendment is agreed to.

Now, I will be happy to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, putting aside the question of demagoguery from what we are talking about, is it not true that the Army has been conducting this testing and this production and storage for certainly 20 or 25 years?

We have had this transportation going on for that length of time.

As the gentleman from Utah quite properly pointed out, and made a very down-to-earth statement, there have been no fatalities in his area.

Who was protecting the country before the gentleman from New York happened to look at the television? I think we are exaggerating the problem because there happens to be an antimilitary hysteria sweeping the country, and this kind of thing suddenly is front-page news.

Mr. HOWARD. Mr. Chairman, this dumping has been done. It has been going on for quite some time. There have been two dumpings off the New Jersey coast and until those dumpings occurred, we never had a case of red tide. It is very serious and the scientists could not tell whether this poison gas was or was not the cause and the Department of Defense did not even talk to the Department of the Interior about it beforehand.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOWARD. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. RIVERS. Sometime ago the gentleman came to me with a problem concerning Monmouth, N.J.

Mr. HOWARD. I hope the chairman will not hold that against me.

Mr. RIVERS. Did I call the gentleman a Communist, or did I help the gentleman?

Mr. HOWARD. You helped the people who work at Fort Monmouth because they had a justifiable claim. I am certain the Chairman would not want to give favors to favored people. The gentleman was very helpful and I am grateful that he was fair in this instance.

SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. PHILBIN

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer a substitute amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. PHILBIN as a substitute for the amendment offered by Mr. NEDZI: On page 16. after line 8, insert a new section 410 as follows:

"(a) The Secretary of Defense shall submit semiannual reports to the Congress on or before January 31 and on or before July 31 of each year setting forth the amounts spent during the preceding six month period for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation and procurement of all lethal and nonlethal chemical and biological agents. The Secretary shall include in each report a full explanation of each expenditure, including the purpose and the necessity therefor.

"(b) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or any other Act may be used for (1) the transportation of any lethal chemical or biological warfare agent to or from any military installation in the United States, or (2) the open air testing of any such agent within the United States, unless—

"(A) the Secretary of Defense (hereafter referred to in this section as the 'Secretary') considers that the transportation or testing proposed to be made is necessary in the interests of national security;

"(B) the Secretary advises the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare of the particulars regarding the proposed transportation or testing.

"(C) the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare reviews such particulars with respect to any hazards to health and safety which such transportation or testing may pose, and reports his findings, together with any precautionary measures that he recommends be taken to avoid or minimize such hazards, to the Secretary;

"(D) the Secretary considers the findings and recommendations made by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare under paragraph (C) and takes such action consonant therewith as he deems appropriate (including, where practical, the detaxification of any such agent, if such agent is to be transported to or from a military installation for disposal); and

"(E) the Secretary provides notification that such transportation or testing will be made to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives at least ten days before the date on which such transportation or testing will be commenced.

"(c)(1) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or any other Act may be used for the deployment, or storage, or both, at any place outside of the United States of——

"(A) any lethal chemical or biological warfare agent, or

"(B) any delivery system specifically designed to disseminate any such lethal agent, unless the Secretary gives prior notice of such deployment or storage to the country exercising jurisdiction over such place. In the case of any place outside the United States which is under the jurisdiction or control of the United States Government, no such action may be taken unless the Secretary gives prior notice of such action to the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. As used in this paragraph, the term "United States" means the several States and the District of Columbia.

"(2) None of the funds authorized by this or any other Act shall be used for the testing, development, transportation, storage, or disposal of any lethal chemical or biological warfare agent outside the United States if the Secretary of State, after being notified by the Secretary that such action is contemplated, determines that such testing, development, transportation, storage, or disposal will violate international law. The Secretary of State shall report all determinations made by him under this paragraph to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, and to all appropriate international organizations, or organs thereof, whenever so required by treaty or other international agreement.

"(d) Unless otherwise indicated, as used in this section the term "United States" means the several States, the District of Columbia, and the territories and possessions of the United States.

"(e) After the effective date of this bill, the operation of this section, or any portion thereof, may be suspended during the period of any war declared by Congress and during the period of any national emergency declared by Congress or by the President."

Mr. PHILBIN (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with, and that it be printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. ECKHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I object.

The Clerk continued the reading of the amendment.

Mr. RIVERS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with and that it be printed in the RECORD, and that the gentleman from Massachusetts be given an opportunity to explain it. It is possible that we might get some kind of substitute on which we can get our teeth into, and we can arrive at some language which we can vote on affirmatively. I am not infallible. If you do not know that, get in touch with me and I will tell you later. I will try to work out something.

Mr. NEDZI. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, may I have a copy of the amendment?

Mr. PHILBIN. The gentleman will be provided with a copy of the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts will be recognized in support of his amendment.

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Chairman, this amendment would in essence be very similar to the provisions on chemical

warfare in the bill passed by the other body. However, I think it includes some language not in the bill of the other body, and also some excisions of amendments or language of the other body.

It may be very helpful in trying to resolve this question, not only here before this House, but also in the conference which we are looking forward to with the Senate on this very important bill. Moreover, I think we all are agreed that the ruthless destruction of life by the deadly and lethal substances involved in possible chemical and biological warfare is revolting and abhorrent to all of us.

I do not think there is any disagreement in the House on that question. We all have a built-in aversion and detestation of chemical and biological and lethal warfare, and I doubt very much that we would ever use them.

It is true that other nations do not entirely share our humane feelings, or our unyielding opposition to the use of these destructive agents, the use of which would be violative of the Geneva protocol covering chemical and biological warfare. These nations are known—and I say that advisedly—they are known to be vigorously and ably conducting research programs in both lethal and nonlethal areas in this field.

They have active, and operational, military capabilities and large stockpiles. Make no mistake about that.

Under the circumstances it would be foolhardy for us to ignore or overlook these facts. Obviously, we must keep abreast of the developments of weaponry and the lethal substances and their accessories that are in the hands of potential enemies, who in some conceivable situations may not have the same hesitancy and unwillingness that we would have about using these horrible, awesome agents of destruction.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PHILBIN. I yield to the very able, distinguished gentleman from New York, who has made such a great contribution to the study and public exposure of this subject in its profound and widespread ramifications.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank my dear friend from Massachusetts. I wonder if you could give us briefly an idea of how your amendment varies from the Nedzi amendment.

Mr. PHILBIN. Briefly, it removes the reference to delivery systems and cuts down somewhat the extensive reporting requirements of the Senate bill. In my colloquy with my good friend and valued colleague, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. NEDZI), I pointed out that my amendment takes out a number of the provisions requiring agency reports and notifications which are contained in the language of the other body.

Mr. McCARTHY. What report would you leave in?

Mr. PHILBIN. We would leave in those that we think are helpful. We would include those which would refer to advising the concerned Government agencies. Our own Government agencies are involved. The revelant committees of Congress also would be advised. HEW will be advised.

Mr. McCARTHY. HEW would be kept advised?

Mr. PHILBIN. Yes, and the Surgeon General. There is very little difference between my amendment and the gentleman's from Michigan except that mine cuts down the rather extensive reporting requirements of the Senate bill and also takes out the reference made to the delivery systems, which would be academic at this time for lack of funds available.

Mr. McCARTHY. Does the gentleman's amendment require that Governors be notified?

Mr. PHILBIN. That provision is retained in my amendment.

Mr. McCARTHY. How about Civil Defense? Would they be covered under the gentleman's amendment? Would they be notified through the executive branch?

Mr. PHILBIN. Yes; they would be. They are on our list of those officials and agencies.

Mr. McCARTHY. They would?

Mr. PHILBIN. Yes; they would be.

Now, unfortunately, until the time comes that we have clear, definite assurance that other nations will not use these terrible agents to destroy life we cannot allow ourselves to fall behind. I want to stress that very much. We cannot allow ourselves to be at the mercy of ruthless, reckless, irresponsible leaders of any nation.

I have the greatest respect for the distinguished gentleman who offered this amendment. He is a very able and distinguished colleague, and a very useful member of our committee. The gentleman has made a great contribution to our work, and in a sense, I am sorry indeed that I feel constrained at this time to oppose the gentleman's proposal and substitute my own.

But I do feel that the amendment I present would be probably more helpful, a more viable vehicle in enabling us to hurdle the obstacles that remain and also give us a better opportunity and more favorable prospects of a successful, economical and beneficial conference with the other body.

I ask most respectfully that the House very carefully consider and approve the constructive substitute amendment that I have offered and is pending before you now.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time I am not going to use my 5 minutes. I have been listening as attentively as I could to the substitute offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts. Since it is in agreement with what probably the Department of Defense would be willing to live with, I would suggest we accept the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman, which will give us the opportunity of going into the conference committee and working out some language which I think will be acceptable to everyone in this House. I trust that would be the case.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ARENDS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, I discussed this in general with the gentleman from Massachusetts. I must say the substitute is not as strong as the Nedzi amendment, but then the Nedzi amendment was not as strong as I wanted. Facing the realities of the situation, I support the substitute amendment offered by the very distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. Chairman, the amendments concerning chemical and biological warfare offered today to the 1970 military authorization bill have now been considered. The Members of the House of Representatives have had a chance to indicate their position on these proposals to provide basic information on our chemical and biological warfare activities to Congress, to insure that weapons and materials of this type are tested and transported in safety.

I supported the first amendment, similar to that passed by the Senate, today because I believed it to be a useful first step in reestablishing a sound U.S. policy concerning chemical and biological warfare. This amendment recognizes the responsibility of the Department of Defense to insure that its activities do not endanger the public. Also, it recognizes the right of the elected representatives of the public to information about the activities in this area.

Action on this first amendment may be more symbolic of the concern of many Members of Congress about the problems in this area than specific in supplying remedies unless the Department of Defense interprets this amendment in the spirit in which it was offered. My colleagues have shared the concern of the public about the dangers involved in storage, transportation and testing of gas and biological agents whether they be the deadly nerve gas, GB, or whether they be the mindshattering LSD-like hallucinatory gas, BZ, or whether they be the sometimes deadly but usually incapacitating diseases like Venezuelan equine encephalitis. The requirements for reporting, safety in transportation and testing, and the ban on procurement of offensive weapons should apply to the complete range of chemical and biological weapons and agents with the exception of the tear gases CN and CS and flame, smoke and pyrotechnic munitions. Members of Congress are as much concerned about 155-mm. shells or 4.2-inch mortar shells to be filled with gas or bacteria as they are with specialized spray tanks. And they are as much concerned about the testing of tularemia in the open air as they are with the testing of incapacitating or deadly toxins. If we find that the greater part of the chemical and biological warfare activities of the Department of Defense are not covered by this amendment when carried out, then Congress probably will demand that the requirements be made more specific. I trust that any limitations in wording or any changes in the Military Procurement Act when it is finally passed will be remedied by the Department of Defense in its administration of this act.

I welcomed the passage of this first CBW amendment by the Senate on August 11, 1969. The unanimous vote of 91 to 0 was an encouragement to those who

have sought a policy of reason in this field. The support of many Members of the House of Representatives is a reflection of their concern.

The first amendment, however, did not deal with the basic public policy questions concerning the use of or nonuse of chemical and biological weapons. In one sense an amendment relating to these questions should not be offered now because our basic policies concerning chemical and biological warfare are being reviewed by the executive branch. Public interest and the requests of Members of Congress led to the first such comprehensive review in more than a decade. The positions of the various executive departments will be discussed in a National Security Council meeting that will occur either at the end of this month or early in November. Following that meeting the executive branch should adopt a policy for chemical and biological warfare that can be considered by Congress. At that time, I believe that Congress should carefully consider the recommended policies and incorporate any changes in the appropriate military and foreign policy measures that come before the Congress at that time.

At this point, I should summarize the fundamental policy issues that underlie a rational national position on chemical and biological warfare. The executive branch and Congress must decide whether:

We should ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 that bans the first-use of chemical and biological weapons;

We should stockpile chemical and biological weapons in our arsenal and in what quantities;

We should ban the use of tear gas for other than humanitarian purposes;

We should use antifood and antifoliage chemicals on a massive scale, especially when we do not know what the effects of this use will be;

We should or should not use disease as a weapon of war.

These are some of the questions that every thoughtful American should consider at this time. They should be considered because, in my opinion, the United States has drifted far off the correct course in the practices that we employ in Vietnam and in the policies gradually creeping into our military guidelines and training manuals.

It takes no great genius to see that our traditional policies in the areas of chemical and biological warfare have been gradually eroded. We have changed from the nation that introduced and signed the ban on chemical warfare at the Geneva Convention of 1925, from the nation whose Presidents spoke out in the name of humanity against the use of these weapons, to a nation that uses gas—even though it is tear gas—as an aid in killing the enemy. We are breaking down the traditional barriers against the use of chemical warfare rather than upholding one of the few international agreements that have limited man's inhumanity to man. There have been only a few minor uses of gas in the world following the signing of the Geneva Protocol. Yet we have added to that list with our massive use of an advanced form of tear gas, CS–2, as an aid in killing in Vietnam.

The use of tear gas in Vietnam always opens the path to further escalation. If we use tear gas, might not the enemy use mustard gas? It was in this fashion that gas was first used in World War I. Both the Germans and the French used tear gas in the early stages of the war. It was only one short step from the use of tear gas to the use of deadly chlorine, phosgene and mustard gas. By the end of that war more than 1 million casualties had been caused by gas. It was the horror and revulsion to these casualties that were responsible for the Geneva protocol. Yet we appear to be willing to risk the same escalation in Vietnam or in future conflicts.

We also have abandoned our traditional policy of no first-use of these weapons—a policy that led us to decide not to use blight against the rice crop of the Japanese during World War II —to a policy that employs antifood and antifoliage chemicals on a massive scale in Vietnam. Our planes in Vietnam spray herbicides on the rice and vegetable crops of the Vietnamese in an antifood campaign. We do this despite the knowledge that this type of campaign hits the old and the young, the sick and the feeble, hardest. Dr. Jean Mayer, President Nixon's nutrition adviser, studied the effects of starvation on Biafrans and Nigerians as well as information on other occasions on which a people have been deprived of food. He found that the men in military service were the last to feel the effects of a food shortage. Yet we continue to destroy rice and vegetables with chemicals sprayed from our aircraft.

We also have engaged in a vast antifoliage campaign using defoliants on thousands of acres of Vietnamese countryside. A number of these defoliants are long lasting and do not decay readily. Just what the effects of repeated spraying of these chemicals will be on the Vietnamese ecology is hard to tell. Even the Department of Agriculture's expert on defoliation, Dr. Fred Tchirley, admits that we do not know what the effect of this massive chemical warfare operation will be. Although defoliants and herbicides are not specifically banned by the Geneva Protocol of 1925, I believe that we should know considerably more about their use. And I do not believe that we should use antifood chemicals at all.

In an even more disturbing erosion of our traditional policy in this area, I understand that the United States seriously considered using disease as a weapon against Cuba during the missile crisis. Although I have been unable to confirm this information from official sources, I do know that a number of military advocates of CBW believe that we should use both deadly and the so-called incapacitating diseases as weapons of war. Gen. William Stone, in testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, expressed reservations about the use of a deadly plague that might spread from man to man. But he expressed no such reservations about the use of a disease that might not spread or the use of the so-called incapacitating diseases that are supposed to only make a person sick.

I find a policy that would use disease as a weapon abhorrent. I did not learn in the American history textbooks that I studied that the United States found it necessary to rely on a weapon of such repugnance. Rather, I learned of Clara Barton and the Red Cross bringing aid to the sick and wounded on the battlefield. I learned of Dr. Walter Reed, an Army doctor who found the cure for yellow fever. I learned about the invention of wonder drugs to cure diseases. How far from this tradition have we moved?

Aside from the question of ethical principle, it has been made clear by both a number of highly competent biologists and biological warfare experts who prepared the U.N. report on the subject that disease as a weapon is too uncertain a weapon to have a place in our arsenal. In using such a weapon a country would risk starting an epidemic that might spread around the world—what Nobel Laureate Dr. Joshua Lederberg calls a pandemic. Also, in using such a weapon, a country might find that the disease that it used traveled around the world and came back to its own citizens in a form that could not be cured. We have enough difficulty controlling such common diseases as the Asian flu. Each year we must prepare a new vaccine against the latest version of this virus. Yet we claim that we would use disease as a deterrent.

The recent report on chemical and biological warfare released by Secretary General U Thant pointed out that a country using disease against one nation might find that because of meteorological conditions that it had infected a neighboring country. We also learn that if we were attacked with biological weapons that we probably wouldn't know which country had done so. Toxins or bacteria released by covert agents would not be traceable to any one country. We also know that at present there is no way of detecting whether we have been attacked until people become ill and it is too late to take effective countermeasures. Disease also strikes with varying speed so that if a nation suddenly found many of its people becoming ill, it might launch its nuclear weapons in fear that the crews manning those weapons might become ill. Unplanned chaos of this type is not wanted by any military strategist. Knowing these limitations on this weapon, I do not think that disease is either a credible or a practical deterrent.

In 1943, during the height of World War II when we had more than 12 million men under arms, President Roosevelt said that we would under no circumstances be the first to use either chemical or biological weapons. Our military leaders, such as Admiral Leahy, Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur also believed that we should refrain from using these weapons. If during a time of trial we find that we do not need to use these weapons, why do we need to adopt them now? I believe that the United States should back up its announced support of the Geneva protocol of 1925 by ratifying it. I have urged President Nixon to re-

submit the protocol to the Senate for ratification and almost 100 Members of the House have joined me in sponsoring a resolution for this purpose. More than 20 Members of the Senate have joined Senator VANCE HARTKE in sponsoring a similar resolution in the Senate. Let our actions speak as loud as our words. Let us adopt the protocol that we introduced.

Going beyond the Geneva protocol of 1925, I believe that the United States should support the resolution that has been introduced in this session of the Geneva Disarmament Conference that would ban the development, production, stockpiling or use of biological weapons. This resolution would go into effect when the 12 or so nations that have a significant capability in this field agreed to it. It would not require stringent inspection or verification because the weapons it bans are not as effective as either our conventional or nuclear ones. I was informed by the White House staff that we support this resolution in principle. I urge that we go beyond this and agree to wording toward which we can actively work.

A number of compromises to the principal CBW amendment were accepted on the floor of the House of Representatives today. In the interests of passing the amendment I supported these changes. I do believe however, that the Senate version more accurately meets our needs for safety and information. It is my belief that the Senate version should be adopted in conference.

The House has expressed its concern about the problems of chemical and biological warfare today. I know that this concern will also extend to the executive branch review and subsequent consideration by Congress. During the review by Congress I believe that we can reassert a basic policy of humanity. Nothing less is acceptable in the light of America's highest principles and tenets.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, in an effort to try to get something done in this area, certainly I will say the efforts of the gentleman from New York cannot go unrecognized and I think he should be applauded.

I will be very glad to accept the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts. The gentleman has rendered us a great service and has gotten us to this point. As far as I am concerned, we will accept the amendment as amended.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. PHILBIN) for the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. NEDZI).

The substitute amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question now is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan, as amended by the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts.

The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. WHALEN

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. WHALEN: Add a new section to title IV:

"SEC. 410. (a) After January 1, 1970, the Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Comptroller General, shall develop a reporting system for major acquisition programs managed by the Department of Defense, any department or agency thereof, or any armed service of the United States, for the acquisition of any weapons system or other need of the United States.

"(b) The Secretary of Defense shall cause a review to be made of each major acquisition program as specified in subsection (a) during each period of three calendar months and shall make a finding with respect to each program as to—

"(1) the estimates at the time of the original plan as to the total cost of the program, with separate estimates for (a) research, development, testing and engineering, and for (b) production;

"(2) the department's subsequent estimates of cost for completion of the program up to the time of review;

"(3) the reasons for any significant rise or decline from prior cost estimates;

"(4) the options available for additional procurement, whether the department intends to exercise such options, and the expected cost of exercising such options;

"(5) significant milestone events associated with the acquisition and operational deployment of the weapon system or item as contained in the plan initially approved by the Secretary of Defense, actual or estimated dates for accomplishment of such milestones, and the reasons for any significant variances therein;

"(6) the estimates of the department as to performance capabilities of the subject matter of the program, and the reasons for any significant actual or estimated variances therein compared to the performance capabilities called for under the original plan and as currently approved; and

"(7) such other information as the Secretary of Defense shall determine to be pertinent in the evaluation of costs incurred and expected to be incurred and the effectiveness of performance achieved and anticipated under the program.

"(c) The Secretary of Defense after consultation with the Comptroller General and with the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall prescribe criteria for the determination of major acquisition programs under subsection (a).

"(d) The Secretary of Defense shall transmit quarterly to the Congress and to the Committees on Armed Services and to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives reports made pursuant to subsection (b), which shall include a full and complete statement of the findings made as a result of each program review.

"(e) The Comptroller General shall, through test checks, and other means, make an independent audit of the reporting system developed by the Secretary of Defense and shall furnish to the Congress and to the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations not less than once each year a report as to the adequacy of the reporting system, and any recommended improvements.

"(f) The Comptroller General shall make independent audits of major acquisition programs and related contracts where, in his opinion, the costs incurred or to be incurred, the delivery schedules, and the effectiveness of performance achieved or anticipated are such as to warrant such audits and he shall report his findings to the Congress and to the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

"(g) Procuring agencies and contractors holding contracts selected by the Comptroller General for audit under subsection (f) shall file with the General Accounting Office such data, in such form and detail as may be prescribed by the Comptroller General, as the Comptroller General deems necessary or appropriate to assist him in carrying out his duties. The Comptroller General and any authorized representative of the General Accounting Office is entitled, until three years after the final payment under the contract or subcontract as the case may be, by subpoena, inspection, authorization, or otherwise, to audit, obtain such information from, make such inspection and copies of, the books, records, and other writings of the procuring agency, the contractor, and subcontractors, and to take the sworn statement of any contractor or subcontractor or officers or employee of any contractor or subcontractor, as may be necessary or appropriate in the discretion of the Comptroller General, relating to contracts selected for audit.

"(h) The United States district court for any district in which the contractor or subcontractor or his officer or employee is found or resides or in which the contractor or subcontractor transacts business shall have jurisdiction to issue an order requiring such contractor, subcontractor, officer, or employee to furnish such information, or to permit the inspection and copying of such records, as may be requested by the Comptroller General under this section. Any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof.

"(i) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be required to carry this section into effect."

Mr. WHALEN (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that this amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order that the amendment is not germane to title IV and therefore it is out of order.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Ohio wish to be heard on the point of order?

Mr. WHALEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will hear the gentleman from Ohio on the point of order.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, first I should like to make a very general observation. This is, of course, an authorization bill. It authorizes funds for military procurement. Certainly the Congress of the United States has the authority to prescribe certain procurement procedures.

I should like to make three specific observations with respect to the point of order made by the gentleman from South Carolina.

First, as I suggested previously, this bill deals with military procurement. The proposed amendment likewise deals with military procurement.

Second, the committee in drafting and approving this bill and bringing it to the House floor provided title IV, general provisions. Since the amendment does not deal with specific dollar authorizations it certainly is in order to come within the general provisions area, title IV.

Third and most important: section 402 of the bill provides certain contracting limitations. It also provides for certain

contract reporting. This new section, now 411, would provide the same thing. There are certain restrictions imposed. It does also call for reporting on contracts.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is prepared to rule.

The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN) has offered an amendment inserting a new section in title IV of the bill. The amendment would require the Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Comptroller General, to develop a reporting system for major acquisition programs managed by the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense would be required to submit quarterly reports to the Congress, including his findings with respect to estimated program costs, cost overruns, program performance, and other information pertinent to the evaluation of costs incurred and expected with respect to any weapons program. The amendment would give the Comptroller General authority to make independent audits of the reporting system developed by the Secretary, as well as authority to obtain records from the defense contractors involved.

Nothing in this title involves the General Accounting Office or the Comptroller General.

The Chair has reviewed several precedents in connection with this amendment. In the 75th Congress, an almost identical situation was presented. There the Committee of the Whole had under consideration the naval authorization bill, which contained a provision relating to the allocation of contracts for construction of the vessels herein authorized, as well as for the procurement and construction of airplanes. An amendment was offered by Mr. Dirksen, of Illinois, which provided in essence that the Comptroller General of the United States was authorized and directed to make an investigation of the accounting system employed by the Navy Department and requiring him to report his findings to the Congress. The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole on that occasion, Mr. O'Conner, of New York, ruled that the amendment introduced into the bill another branch of Government other than the Navy Department, and directed that agency to perform certain duties. He held the amendment not germane.

The Chair feels this precedent is decisive in the pending situation. The amendment is not germane to this title and The Chair sustains the point of order.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. SIKES

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. SIKES: On Page 10, after line 18, add a new section 403B as follows:

"Section 3019, Title 10, United States Code is amended to read as follows:

"'(c) The Chief, Office of Army Reserve, holds office for four years, but may be removed for cause at any time. He is eligible to succeed himself. An officer now or hereafter serving as Chief, Office of Army Reserve, shall be appointed in the grade of lieutenant general for service in the Army Reserve while serving as the Chief, Office of Army Reserve. The position of Chief, Office of Army Reserve is in addition to the number of lieutenant general positions authorized by section 3066 or 3202 of this title, or any other provision of law.'

"Section 8019, Title 10, United States Code is amended to read as follows:

"'(c) The Chief, Office of Air Force Reserve, holds office for four years, but may be removed for cause at any time. He is eligible to succeed himself. An officer now or hereafter serving as Chief, Office of Air Force Reserve, shall be appointed in the grade of lieutenant general for service in the Air Force Reserve while serving as the Chief, Office of Air Force Reserve. The position of Chief, Office of Air Force Reserve is in addition to the number of lieutenant general positions authorized by section 8066 or 8202 of this title, or any other provision of law.'"

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. SIKES) in support of his amendment.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I would hope this is an amendment on which there is no disagreement and which will be accepted by the committee. I propose to keep on an equal basis the leadership of the Army Reserve, the Air Force Reserve, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. I believe the membership of this body will recognize the desirability of the proposal, plus the implications of justice, fairplay, and merit which it embodies.

I endorse the legislative proposal of the committee to improve the statutory position and authority of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. The Chief of the Bureau, at the present time, for the first time in the history of the Bureau, is an Air Force officer and commands both the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard of the United States.

Now let me get down to the simple facts in the case. The Army National Guard has a strength authorized in the pending bill of 393,298, and the Air National Guard 86,624. The officer responsible for the fitness and readiness of these large organizations should have three-star rank. The Army Reserve in this bill is provided a paid drill strength of 255,591. However, there is in addition in the Army Reserve, subject to callup for Federal duty at the will of the President, a total of 1½ million reservists. To maintain this entire organization in a state of fitness and readiness is the responsibility of the Chief of the Army Reserve, along with the Secretary of the service to whom he is responsible. The maintenance of an Army Reserve is specified by law which we passed last year. It is as permanent as the National Guard, or for that matter, the Regular Army. There is no prospect in the foreseeable future that it will be abolished, or even reduced. For a fact, there is every indication that our national policy must be to increase the strength, support, and hence the importance of the Reserves in the future, and thus to place upon the Army Reserve Chief a far greater responsibility than even today taxes the incumbent in that office.

The Chief of the Air Force Reserve, also a statutory position, is under present law, responsible to his Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force for the total complement in his service. The bill before us provides a paid drill strength of the Air Force Reserve at 50,775. However, the total strength of officers and enlisted men in the Air Force Reserve, the vast majority of whom train without pay and yet are subject to callup for service, number nearly one-half million. The fact that most of them do serve without pay and yet must be encouraged to maintain a state of readiness and efficiency imposes an even greater leadership responsibility on the Chief of the Air Force Reserve. The service given by the Air Force Reserves during the Vietnamese conflict has been outstanding, and readiness for this contribution, too, is a part of the responsibility of the Chief of the Air Force Reserve.

Now let me call to your attention the fact that there are dozens of lieutenant generals in the service; the Army has 46, and the Air Force 42. None of these exercise a command responsibility over numbers that even remotely approach the number in the Army Reserve or the Air Reserve. These are major commands of great responsibility and importance to America's defense.

I do not believe it necessary to belabor the issue. I think the picture is very clear.

Most of the Members of this body were here during the critical days from 1962 to 1968 when we participated in a national debate about what to do about the Reserve Forces, including the National Guard and Reserves. You remember, that after going tediously, laboriously, and meticulously into every aspect of the issues raised, the Congress by an almost unanimous vote—in both bodies of the Congress—reached the conclusion that for the safety of this country both the National Guard and the Reserves, comprising the Reserve components of the Army and Air Force, and the Reserves of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, must be maintained as separate entities; that they must be given better management and support; and that the chiefs of these components should occupy positions created by law and filled by appointment by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate. All of us are familiar with the legislative history of Public Law 90–168. I do not recall any law ever considered and enacted which had more deliberate, careful and statesmanlike handling. The chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, Mr. RIVERS, and the chairman of the subcommittee which actually drafted this bill, Mr. HÉBERT, received and merited in this body the respect and acclamation of every Member for the hundreds of hours they spent in objective and selfless dedication to the problem—this issue involving the current and long-range legal status of the Reserves.

Their work and that of the members of the great Committee on Armed Services has been splendid and inspired. We honor them for it. The amendment which I offer is fully in consonance with the philosophy and the actions which have contributed to the security and safety this Nation enjoys today.

Mr. Chairman, I would not consider it appropriate at this time to ask the House to consider the relative standing, competence, and leadership qualifications of the three officers involved and who would be affected at this time.

Each of them is outstanding in his field and are recognized for their sterling gifts in leadership and management. I believe that the military services and the Presi-

dent of the United States were honored by their choices in filling these positions. I believe it is fair to say that they are considered to occupy relative or comparable military positions and to share relative or comparable responsibility.

This is completely aside from the personalities involved, because what we are talking about are three military positions, which will be filled in the years to come by others. Each position will be filled, under law, by appointment by the President of the United States. Each officer selected will have tremendous responsibility, not only to the President who will appoint him and the Congress who must confirm him and who will review his performance as it is required of us to do by law, but to the people of the United States.

In any war or national emergency the safety of this country rests upon its citizens. In all of our history the ranks of our military forces have been drawn in a large part from our civilian population. The citizens of this country, from all walks of life, must continue to protect this Nation, to keep it safe and secure.

They are our reserves. They are entitled to the best leadership we can provide them. My amendment will recognize the importance of this leadership. It will insure that for the future that we can attract outstanding leaders to these positions.

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIKES. I am happy to yield to the distinguished gentleman from Louisiana who has been very helpful to me in developing this amendment.

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from Florida for yielding to me. He is a great man to work with. He is a great Member of this Congress.

I wish to associate myself with his remarks and the position he has taken in this matter. I do support fully what the bill provides for the Chief of the Guard Bureau. I do believe, as he does, that it is a matter of equity to provide this same language and thereby the same rank for the Chiefs of the Air Force Reserve and the Army Reserve.

I am happy to support this amendment. We have been working on it together.

Mr. SIKES. Now let me say to the distinguished chairman of the great Committee on Armed Services, if you are on my side, as I think you are, I want to yield to you.

Mr. RIVERS. If the gentleman will yield, I did not know that there was anything but your side. Of course, the gentleman is so persuasive I do not know of anything to do but accept his amendment. I do think, though, we will have to work out something in conference to take care of the other Reserve components, such as the Navy and the Marines.

I do want the gentleman to know that as far as I can I certainly am persuaded by his excellent argument, and as far as I am concerned I will accept his amendment.

Mr. SIKES. I am most grateful to the distinguished chairman for his comments.

I recall very well the gentleman's great contributions to the development of the comprehensive and effective reserve legislation that we now have in the statutes.

Mr. CABELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIKES. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Texas. He has always shown a commendable interest in the Reserves.

Mr. CABELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I wish to commend the distinguished gentleman from Florida for bringing this inequity to the attention of the committee, and I rise to associate myself with the remarks made by the gentleman from Florida.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. SIKES).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. MIKVA

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendement.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. MIKVA: On page 15, line 2, insert immediately after the period and before the quotation mark the following: "In addition, whenever the total number of persons serving on active duty in Vietnam is reduced on or after December 31, 1969, this limitation of 3,285,000 shall within 180 days thereafter be reduced by a like number. Nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring the reduction of the permanent active duty personnel strength of any component of the Armed Forces below the level for such component prescribed by law."

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Chairman, I must confess that I am one of those "instant experts" about whom you have been hearing so much sneering. I must confess that until I came to the Congress not too long ago, I was not aware that we had the largest standing Armed Forces in thew orld. That figure is true numberwise, percentagewise, dollarwise, everywise.

Nor was I aware that Congress had in all effect abdicated its responsibility for setting the overall size of our Armed Forces in terms of manpower.

Until this year, Congress had at regular intervals completely suspended the statutory ceilings on the size of our Armed Forces to the extent that the Department of Defense had a blank check for 5 million men. The bill that has been reported out by the committee removes those blank check aspects to the extent that it reduces authorized personnel to the number that actually were in uniform at the close of last fiscal year. Indeed, it reduces it by 176,000 below that figure. This is commendable action and I would like to think that it has something to do with the spotlight of attention that has been focused on the world's largest Armed Forces.

Let me say one other thing. The amendment that the Clerk has read, if adopted, cannot have any of the afterbirth that has been used as a basis for attacking the other amendments. Your constituents can only cheer if this amendment is adopted and is effective, because the commodity involved is the children of your constituency. What this amendment would do is to require that the authorized active duty military strength of the United States be reduced by one man for every man withdrawn from South Vietnam after the end of this year. The committee has set the strength of the Armed Forces at 3,285,000 as of July 1, 1979. The amendment would reduce that overall ceiling on active duty strength on a one-for-one basis as men are withdrawn from South Vietnam after December 31, 1969. The cosponsors of the amendment believe that it is a responsible and conservative solution to the problem of what should happen to the extra men who were brought to duty for the war in Vietnam. I would like to make four points very quickly in support of the amendment.

First, it does not in any way involve a timetable for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. For this reason I believe that it can be supported by hawks and doves, and falcons, and even pigeons—by those who advocate slower withdrawal and those who advocate faster withdrawal. In short, the amendment deals with what happens only after withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. It does nothing to force the President's hand on the war. The committee report says at page 115 that the 176,000-man reduction which the committee has written into the bill "will not adversely affect our military combat capability in Vietnam." Since this is true, and since the amendment under consideration here concerns only what happens after withdrawal of troops from Vietnam, the question of withdrawal timetables or quotas is simply not involved.

Let me also state that the reduction required by the amendment that I have offered in no way overlaps the reduction made by the committee. This amendment would apply to troops withdrawn after December 31, 1969. Any withdrawal of troops prior to that point that may, in fact, have been included in the 176,000 reduction proposed by the committee would not require any reductions in authorized strength under this amendment.

Second, some Members who favor faster withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam fear that linking troop withdrawals to reduction in overall strength ceilings will have an adverse effect on the pace of American disengagement. They believe that if troop withdrawals will lead to automatic reductions in overall strength, then military leaders will have strong arguments against such withdrawals, since they will require proportionate reductions in overall U.S. military manpower. Thus the generals can argue, it is said, that troops could not be withdrawn from Vietnam and stationed nearby for use if needed in Vietnam, because once withdrawn they would have to be deactivated. I would suggest three answers to this contention.

In the first place, it is sheer speculation. Of course the generals might argue this way to the President. But there is no way to know this now. It appears from the last few days as if U.S. troop withdrawal will be well enough discussed and debated that there will be plenty of other, more important considerations for the President to take into account. He will not have to worry about the generals' arguments about the effect that with-

drawals will have on overall troop strength.

Some Members are dubious about how many more men will be withdrawn from Vietnam in the next year. Others are very optimistic. This amendment will not aid or abet either side of that dispute. But it will much such a withdrawal a meaningful event to our entire posture as a nation, moving us away from our militaristic expenses and adventures. This amendment will neither hurt nor help to find a solution to the quagmire of Vietnam. But it can help to prevent further Vietnams.

An equally plausible scenario, I think, is that the President may decide to withdraw troops for strategic reasons or for the purpose of spurring the Paris talks. He has already stated, in his Manila press conference, that he foresees and desires a decreasing U.S. military presence in Asia. Thus when the President withdraws troops for reasons of strategy or the peace talks, he will want to remove them from the area. We may very well be giving the President a very effective argument against keeping the Vietnam troops elsewhere in Asia. The President can simply respond, if we pass this amendment, "No, the Congress has spoken. As soon as troops are withdrawn, troop strength must be decreased. These troops cannot be stationed elsewhere in Asia." Thus we may be strengthening the President's hand against the generals with this amendment.

An amendment almost identical to this amendment was approved by the other body by a vote of 71 to 10. The debate and approval of that amendment are at pages 25802 to 25808 of the September 17 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator STENNIS, supported the amendment. More important, the Department of Defense accepted the amendment. One has to have a very cynical view of the Machiavellian nature of the Department of Defense if we are to believe that the formula involved in this amendment could be used as a ploy to persuade the President not to cut our troop presence in Vietnam.

We added an additional 800,000 men to the size of our Armed Forces because of Vietnam. Of that number, only 475,000 will be left in Vietnam after the announced withdrawals are completed; only these forces would be affected by this amendment. Parkinson's law applies to military forces just as it does to every other kind of personnel. This amendment would see to it that once the purpose for which the extra manpower was added to our Armed Forces; namely Vietnam, becomes moot, most of the ill effects of Parkinson's law would be averted and the manpower would not be diverted to other purposes. Put another way, our Military Establishment would be given a Parkinson's law dividend of 300,000 men rather than 800,000 men. What a modest first step indeed for Congress to again claim its constitutional prerogative to decide the size of the Armed Forces that it is supposed to raise and support.

Only by such an amendment as this will the American people get the full economic benefit of troop withdrawals from Vietnam. If troops are withdrawn from Vietnam and stationed next door in Thailand, or in Okinawa, or elsewhere in Asia, they will cost the American taxpayer almost as much as they do now. We may have withdrawn the troops from Vietnam, but still be paying for them. Thus, in order to get the full economic benefit of the Vietnam disengagement—which will be far more than the $2 billion saved by the committee's cuts—we must provide deactivation of troops proportionate to the Vietnam withdrawals. This amendment would do just that.

To illustrate this last point, I refer to page 3757 of the hearings on this bill. In discussing the first 25,000-man withdrawal of troops from Vietnam, General Westmoreland said that of the 15,000 Army personnel included in the withdrawal, 7,000 were going to Hawaii and only 8,000 were being deactivated. The taxpayers will still be supporting these 7,000 men who were theoretically brought to service only for the Vietnam war. We will be supporting them next year, the year after that, and who knows how long after that. This is exactly what happened after the Korean war. We had a statutory ceiling of 2.3 million men. We have not been close to that ceiling since the buildup for Korea began. In order for the American taxpayer to get the full benefit of our troop withdrawals from Vietnam, we must have a formula for proportionately reducing overall manpower—such as contained in this amendment.

Finally, the reason that this amendment would have no adverse effect on the withdrawal schedule is that the President, in the last analysis, has the discretion to inform Congress that the ceilings imposed by this amendment—and by the committee—will jeopardize national security interests. When the President does this and state the basis for his determination, the ceilings will no longer apply. Thus, if the President wants to withdraw troops and not have a proportionate reduction in overall active duty troop strength, he need only make the required finding and inform Congress of the basis for it.

Third, I believe that we should adopt this amendment because it is the quickest and simplest way to reduce the enormous size of the defense budget. Complex weapons systems take years of leadtime and R. & D. money. Once the investment is made, we are naturally loath to abandon our investment. But there is no such restriction on troop strength. We can cut overall troop strength now—as I believe the American people would like us to do—and if it is necessary to increase it later, we can increase it. This can be done on a fiscal-year-by-fiscal-year basis. Short-term cuts can be immediately translated into cuts in the defense budget and savings to the taxpayers. There is really no other area of the defense budget which is so directly amenable to congressional control.

And yet important as manpower ceilings are as a means of congressional control of the Armed Forces and the defense budget, there is almost nothing in the hearings about overall manpower levels. Aside from my own statement to the committee, there is no discussion in the hearings of reducing military strength levels—no discussion even of the 176,000-man cut which the Armed Services Committee made. The general debate yesterday did not even touch this important area. I believe it is time for Congress to begin thinking about military manpower levels, and doing something about them. This is where the real savings lie. This is the subject which goes to the very heart of issues like our overseas commitments, the size of the defense budget, and national priorities.

In economic terms, moreover, cuts in troop strength inevitably mean cuts in operations and maintenance—savings which are almost impossible to estimate in advance. They will probably be much greater than the estimates which we and the committee are using. How much greater we will not know until we try. Over 15 years ago the House Armed Services Committee said we could save $10,000 for every man taken out of uniform. The committee's report indicates a saving of about $11,400 per man. I believe that $15,000 per man would be a conservative minimum when we include related costs of operations and maintenance, family housing, and so on, which would all be reduced.

Finally, and I believe most important for this body and this Nation, the heart of this amendment is that it puts Congress back in the role which the Founders intended that we should play—raiser, supporter and limiter of the size of the Armed Forces. Mr. Chairman, it is difficult to think of any responsibility of the Congress which is more clearly defined in the Constitution than its duty to set the size of the Armed Forces. And yet for almost 20 years, ever since the statutory ceilings were first suspended before the Korean war, Congress has not set any meaningful ceiling on the Armed Forces. The committee's amendment this year is the first attempt in 18 years to lower that ceiling to something close to what our real security interests require.

But even the committee cut only reflects decisions already made by military planners at the Pentagon. The committee report says on page 114: "Thus, the committee amendment would reduce the temporary strength ceiling to reflect the proposed end strengths planned by the Department of Defense." The committee's cut is not a cut made by Congress, it is a cut which was made, and has already been announced, by the Secretary of Defense. The real issue on this amendment is whether Congress will begin to take back the authority to set military manpower levels—its constitutional authority—from the Pentagon which has exercised it for almost 20 years. I believe that the American people want and expect Congress to begin to exercise its powers over U.S. troop strength. I believe that this is an opportunity, a rare opportunity, for Congress to retrieve some of its prerogatives from the executive branch. I hope that my colleagues will seize that opportunity and assert that prerogative by voting for this amendment.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

In my view this amendment is shortsighted. Reference was made to the acceptance of an amendment by the Department of Defense. But, of course, that is not the amendment suggested by the gentleman here today, but an amendment which came out of the other body. That was quite a different amendment, because it had a different base of the numbers of people involved.

The Department of Defense has, in fact, said what they could live with, and the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois cuts it very much underneath that figure.

Under the proposed amendment, the authorized strength ceiling for military personnel on active duty would be reduced by the total number of persons withdrawn from Vietnam on or December 1, 1969. However, these reductions in the numbers of personnel withdrawn from Vietnam would further reduce the end strength proposed by the committee language of 3,285,000.

Stated another way, despite the fact that the Department of Defense has already included possible personnel reductions from Vietnam in its overall strength reduction of 176,000, to be effected within fiscal year 1970, the proponents of this amendment would conveniently ignore this fact and require further reductions in the personnel ceiling.

Let me point out that the strength ceiling of 3,285,000 is an end-strength to be achieved by the Department by the end of fiscal year 1970, or July 1 of calendar year 1970.

The language of the proposed amendment would, for practical purposes, make this end strength ceiling of 3,285,000 become effective on December 1, 1969. This result obtains since all reductions in the number of persons serving on active duty in Vietnam which occur on or after December 1, 1969, would further reduce the strength limitation of 3,285,000. This is so because the Department of Defense has found 3,285,000 to be the minimum safe level reachable by July 1, 1970; and therefore, for the first 6 months of calendar year 1970 any reduction in Vietnam would reduce our worldwide minimum below the minimum safety level set by our defense authorities.

The effect of this amendment therefore is to push the President, as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, into the position of being required to cut military manpower below the level which, in his judgment, and those of responsible officials in Government, is absolutely required to meet our national security requirements.

Now the proponents of this amendment would reply that the President could, under the language in the committee bill, avoid this result by making a finding that the national security interests of the United States require a larger manpower force and so informs the Congress "of the basis for such determination."

Obviously, the President of the United States, for practical and apparent reasons, would be most reluctant to take this step. Consequently, the end result of this amendment would be to deter the President of the United States from making any further troop withdrawals from Vietnam—a result which I am sure the proponents of this amendment never contemplated.

The long and short of this question is that we are playing politics with the national security.

The language of this amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois is identical to that included in section 407 of S. 2546, the Senate bill on this subject. However, the reduction-in-strength ceilings on personnel withdrawn from Vietnam in the Senate bill apply to a figure of 3,461,000, which was the estimated end strength of our Armed Forces on June 30, 1969.

Thus, the amendment offered here today, since it applies against an end strength of 3,285,000, goes much further in cutting authorized military personnel ceilings than either the Senate bill or the House bill as reported out of committee.

I think it important to point out that the temporary manpower strength ceiling in existing law is 5 million. The committee bill will reduce this to 3,285,000. The action taken by the committee reflects long-range planning in the Department of Defense and incorporates the personnel reductions announced by the Department as proposed to be effected during fiscal year 1970.

It is also significant that this strength ceiling is far lower than that which would be imposed by the Senate bill.

The Senate bill establishes a manpower ceiling of 3,461,000 to be achieved by the end of fiscal year 1970 with a proviso that this number would be further reduced by future reductions in our Vietnam forces.

To place this matter in better perspective, under the Senate language 176,000 men would have to be returned from Vietnam by June 30, 1970, in order to achieve the same strength ceilings provided in the House committee bill.

The action taken by your House Committee on Armed Services represents, in our collective judgment, the deepest cut that we can make in authorized military strengths without creating greater difficulties for our Commander in Chief in meeting our national security requirements.

The action proposed by this amendment is therefore, in my view, capricious and arbitrary. It conveniently ignores the facts.

Finally, let me point out that the placing of this proposed additional reduction on our manpower ceilings as offered in this amendment could only be construed by the North Vietnamese and the so-called peace negotiators in Paris as proof positive that we have given up our intention to reach an honorable conclusion to the Vietnam war.

I, therefore, trust that this amendment will be resoundingly rejected by the Members of this body.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one further observation. It was I in the committee who tried by amendment not to reduce to the 3,285,000 figure. I believe that the President of the United States, when he is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and when we are at war as we are today, should have the right and power in that capacity to defend our country as best he can with the end strength we have given him before, which is 5 million, not 3 million. Therefore, I opposed the reduction in the committee, and many of the members of the committee backed me. In fact, the vote in the committee was the largest vote cast for any amendment. I sought not to set a 3,285,000 figure at all, but to allow the flexibility to the President that we have under the existing statute.

So as I come here today, I am not speaking for myself personally in support of the 3,285,000 figure, because I think this figure should be more than that. It is dangerous indeed to cut it below what the Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have said is the absolute minimum they can live with, under the circumstances. It is dangerous both in Paris and Vietnam. It is a negative approach to the whole matter.

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENNETT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. MIKVA. Did I understand the gentleman to say that the troop strength approved by the committee involved some of the cuts already made in Vietnam? Was that what the gentleman said?

Mr. BENNETT. I said the figure that you apply your formula to was a figure much smaller than the figure in the Senate bill. Therefore, your amendment would make an end figure much lower than the figure the Department of Defense says is safe.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words and oppose the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I applaud the action of the President in withdrawing, by the end of the year, over 60,000 U.S. military personnel from South Vietnam and applaud the action of the Secretary of Defense in making meaningful reductions in our overall manpower active duty strength. But I think there are some things about this amendment that, if approved, would be harmful in case of any subsequent emergency that might develop.

First, let me say that I firmly believe that the Congress of the United States has the right as well as the obligation to set manpower ceilings or limits or strengths. That is part of our responsibility under the Constitution. On the other hand, I do not think we should tie the hands of the President and the Secretary of Defense arbitrarily in the event some critical emergency might arise.

Let me present to the gentleman from Illinois a hypothetical contingency that might happen. I trust it will not. But supposing the President is able, as I hope he will be, to make further manpower withdrawals from Vietnam. Then under his amendment there would be an arbitrary reduction in the active-duty military personnel. Supposing in the process or in this time frame there should be some critical development; for example, in Europe or in the Middle East where it might be essential for immediate action. If the requirements of the

gentleman's amendment were law, the hands of the Secretary of Defense and the President could be tied in such an emergency.

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. MIKVA. I am glad the gentleman asked that question, because I call his attention to page 14, line 21 of the bill, which I have not changed by the amendment. That language states: "except when the President of the United States determines that the application of this ceiling will seriously jeopardize the national security interests of the United States and informs the Congress of the basis for such determination."

Then the ceiling is off. I think that would be in answer to the point made by the gentleman from Michigan that we would tie the President's hands in the case of an emergency.

This is merely to begin to restore that prerogative of which he spoke so highly, and that is, the Congress ought to set troop ceilings.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, let me add, if the gentleman's observation is accurate, I see little or no need for the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois. May I add this observation? If the Defense Department approved the amendment in the other body, which to a degree is somewhat similar to the amendment suggested by the gentleman from Illinois, I do not see why the gentleman from Illinois did not subscribe wholeheartedly to the amendment of the other body. Then there would have been no problem. But apparently there is a distinct and serious difference between the amendment in the other body and the amendment the gentleman from Illinois is offering.

If that is the case, the gentleman's amendment is arbitrary and inflexible. On the other hand, if the proviso remains in the bill which the gentleman has cited, it is really meaningless and altogether unnecessary.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I will take a minute to say, first of all, that I commend the committee for its action in reducing the manpower ceiling by 185,000, I think it was. As the gentleman from Washington (Mr. HICKS) made clear, if we are really going to save any money in the defense budget, it has to come in the manpower area. I think that is eminently true. That is why I appreciate what the committee has done. I do think reducing the authorized ceiling as we withdraw troops from Vietnam makes sense. This is why I support the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I wou'd like to direct the House's attention to page 4298 of the hearings which the Armed Services Committee held on this bill. On that page and the pages following, there is a report on military manpower. Forty-eight Senators and Representatives, listed on page 4228 of the hearings, endorsed this report. I recommend it to all Representatives, for this report illustrates how 1,200,000 troops could be returned to civilian life after the Vietnam war is over, at an estimated saving of $12 billion.

It is the last section of this report, which starts on page 4304, to which I would like to address my remarks at this point. That section discusses the possibilities for more efficiency and economy in military manpower management. These efficiencies could take place without diminishing the combat strength of U.S. forces in any way, but with a considerable saving in money and in the number of troops required to do essential military jobs. The annual savings possible have been estimated in the billions of dollars. I would like to mention some of the possible management improvements and urge that they be studied and adopted so that the money now wasted for inefficient defense manpower can be diverted to our domestic problems.

Congressman MIKVA has already mentioned the dizzying pace of reassignments and the lack of specialization which lower the quality of management in the armed services and result in such things as major procurement programs being managed by officers who lack the necessary skills to safeguard the Public Treasury. He has also described how the military bureaucracy, and low salaries, make military careers less attractive to qualified men, resulting in the massive "brain-drain" of the most talented men out of the services—including a large percentage of the graduates of military academies.

I will discuss three additional subjects. First, the way the Defense Department plans for manpower needs; second, the way the Department keeps track of its millions of men; and third, the way it budgets for all this manpower. Major reforms are necessary in each area, reforms which could save billions of dollars from the defense budget.

First, the way the Defense Department plans for its manpower needs. For years, the services have maintained total strengths which have rarely changed except in time of war, these total strengths are largely unrelated to the amount of military force required; they are just arbitrary quotas which the service department headquarters divided up and apportioned among their combat and support commands. In the last few years, the Secretary of Defense has made some progress toward relating total strength to the combat forces planned to be on duty—the programed forces. Congress should require that troop strengths be clearly relatable to the programed forces, and require the Defense Department to explain the relationships between the forces and the huge domestic military establishment, the vast overseas support commands. Congress should look into the opportunities to deactivate support and troop units which have no clear relation to the combat forces deployed. I am told that at the present time the planning procedures used for manpower are so confused that when Secretary Packard tells the services that they must cut their support establishments by a few thousand men each, it is impossible to prove whether these cuts have been made or not, because such small cuts get lost in all the paperwork of the planning procedures.

This brings up my second point—that the way the military services keep information on their personnel are inefficient. Most Members have heard stories of hundreds of court-martial cases being thrown out of court because the morning reports were hopelessly wrong, of statements of troop strength in Vietnam being wrong by thousands of men, of Ph. D's put in warehouses and laborers assigned to technical units, and of the story that five men have to be put on orders to Vietnam in order to get four there. Most of us have probably assumed that such things were inevitable in a large bureaucracy. This is not as inevitable as it might seem. Fifteen years ago, the same stories were told about supplies—but those stories are not as common any more. The reason for the improvement is that Secretary McNamara took a look at all the different forms, systems, and procedures for handling supplies, and combined them into modern, standardized, streamlined systems—almost 10 years ago. I feel that we should have the same things for personnel now—we should have standardized, automated "information systems" for personnel in all the services. All this means is consolidating the proliferation of archaic regulations and paper forms into a modern, simpler system. This reform is 10 years overdue.

Finally there is the matter of budgeting for personnel. I am not talking about budgeting at the Defense Department level—I am talking about economizing on personnel out in the military installations around the world, except in combat units. We do it for supplies—why can we not do it for personnel? The average installation or base commander around the world has a fixed budget for supplies, and within that budget he must run an efficient operation. But personnel are free, for all practical purposes. Even small bases often have hundreds of extra men assigned to them, troops that are not needed for anything. If a commander had a fixed budget for personnel, related to his missions, then extra manpower would eat into his budget, and there would be healthy pressure for those men to be reassigned to another base where they were needed and where the missions had resulted in a budget which provided for the extra men.

This proposal has been made time and time again, but there is no determination on the part of the Secretary of Defense to implement the plan. The name of this proposal is Project Prime. This proposal has been languishing for several years now. Project Prime is a new accounting system which focuses on the possibilities of middle-level management in the Defense Establishment to operate more efficiently. It could save millions of dollars.

When it was first introduced, it might have been premature; but now, its implementation would be salutary. It would be symbolic of Secretary Laird's intent to reduce Defense waste.

I hope these proposals are not too detailed to interest the Congress. Congress was instrumental in spotlighting possible improvements in the Defense Establishment in the last 1950's; if Secretary McNamara's changes really did save as much money as we are told, then Congress should get much of the credit for

these reforms. Similar reforms are possible in manpower management now, and I recommend the subject to the distinguished Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. ESCH. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I will not take my full time, but with due respect to my distinguished minority leader, the point is that this House has the responsibility to give direction to the Department of Defense. That is the purpose of this amendment: to indicate to the Pentagon that we wish to reduce the size of military personnel in direct proportion to which troops are withdrawn from Vietnam. Now it has been made very explicit the Commander in Chief, if another emergency occurs, will have the opportunity to increase the size of our forces, so that is not the issue here.

If we believe that this body has the responsibility to determine the size of the military, and if we believe that we do not want young men who are withdrawn from Vietnam to be sent elsewhere, then we will vote for this amendment.

Let us make it clear, then, if we vote for this amendment we are in no way tying the hands of the Commander in Chief.

Let us make it clear if we vote for this amendment we will be attempting to decrease the size of the military in direct proportion to which the President is going to withdraw troops from Vietnam.

Let us make it clear we are not in any way attempting to tell the President when and how he will withdraw troops from Vietnam.

What we will do by this amendment is simply this: cut responsibly this military budget and maintain the size of the military personnel at a pre-Vietnam level.

Mr. Chairman, that is why I ask the Members to support the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ESCH. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON).

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I support the gentleman. It has been alleged that the amendment which the gentleman is offering differs substantially from the amendment offered in the other body, which was accepted by a vote apparently of 72 to 11. I wonder whether the gentleman who is the author of the amendment can enlighten us on that particular point, as to what extent this amendment does differ from the Senate amendment.

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ESCH. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois, (Mr. MIKVA).

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Chairman, in answer to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON), I will say the only difference between the amendment that was adopted in the Senate and the amendment I offer is that a portion of the Senate amendment was adopted by the committee; namely, to reduce the authorized strength down to the number of men who were in service as of July 1, 1969; so this amendment builds on the action of the committee. In other respects it is exactly identical to what was done in the Senate.

Mr. HICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I shall not take 5 minutes, but I rise in support of the amendment. As I stated earlier, the only justification I can see for the military hardware bill that we have supported, and that I support wholeheartedly with the exception of the anti-ballistic-missile system, is the fact that we are going to provide our men with the very best weapons and we do not need as many men to run them.

The way to start, so far as I am concerned, is to start reducing personnel. This is a good way to start.

As has been pointed out very adequately, there will not be any time limit on the President's hands. There will be no timetable to say when the troops shall be withdrawn, but as they are withdrawn the total strength of the Armed Forces shall be reduced.

Members all remember when we were debating the C–5A, the value of a remote presence was discussed. One of those values is the speed in which we can get troops around the world. When we can do that we do not need as many men. For that reason I suggest the gentleman's amendment should be adopted, though I have no illusions it will be.

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HICKS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HOSMER. This proposed amendment seems to assume some kind of symmetry between the number of people withdrawn from Vietnam and the general overall need for forces in the U.S. military services. As I understand the amendment, if the President wanted to reduce and had reason to reduce the total Armed Forces at a higher rate than he withdraws people from Vietnam he would be prohibited by the amendment from doing so. Therefore, I cannot see any reason or rhyme in such a proposal.

Mr. ECKHARDT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HICKS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. ECKHARDT. I support the amendment.

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to commend our colleague, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. MIKVA), for his efforts in the area of military manpower. This amendment strikes at the very crux of the alienation and unrest which pervades our Nation today.

Military manpower represents almost half—$35 billion to be exact—of the almost $80 billion military budget. The sum of $21 billion of that $35 billion is allocated for salaries and allowances, and the remaining $14 billion is earmarked for manpower operation and maintenance costs. If substantial money is to be saved in the military budget, certainly, the manpower area is a place to start.

The United States spends more maintaining its Armed Forces than it does providing for the health, education, and welfare of its citizens.

Although our gross national product is the highest in the world, the United States spends a greater percentage of our gross national product on military pursuits than does any other country in the world today, including those nations who are actually fighting for their very existence.

The United States maintains the largest standing Armed Forces in the world today—larger than all the Warsaw Pact nations, including the Soviet Union.

As of July 1, 1969, there were 3.46 million persons serving in the armed services. This does not include the Coast Guard, the Reserves on active duty, the military academies, or the ROTC.

The statutory ceiling limiting force size is set at 2.3 million. Therefore, there are 1.1 million persons over that ceiling.

Thirty-three percent of all our active duty forces are permanently stationed on foreign soil. We have 750,000 serving in Asia—three-quarters of a million men—with some 511,500 in Vietnam and 45,000 in Thailand alone. We have 23,000 stationed in Latin America, 10,000 in North America—Canada, Greenland, and Iceland—10,000 in North Africa and the Middle East, and a total of 320,000 men stationed in Western Europe. There are 1,113,000 men permanently stationed outside the United States, and on foreign soil.

At the present time we are committed by treaties and agreements to defend 42 nations. In addition, there are another 30 nations with which we have some type of agreement involving their defense or military installations.

It is time that we analyzed our commitments. It is time that we analyzed our manpower requirements in relation to those commitments.

As of 6 months ago we were maintaining 395 major overseas bases. We were also maintaining 2,809 minor overseas bases. That makes a total of 3,204 overseas bases being maintained by the United States.

Article I, section 8, of the Constitution gives Congress the full responsibility for raising and supporting an army. To my knowledge there has been no recent congressional review of our manpower commitment.

The last study was conducted in the 86th Congress—1960–61—by a special Subcommittee on the Use of Military Manpower. One would think that, due to the vast deployment of our troops, and the continuing extension of the statutory ceiling limiting force size, there would have been a thorough review of the military manpower situation.

Somewhere Congress lost control over the military—controls delegated to Congress.

Vietnam, Thailand, Laos—commitments made, 40,000 American lives sacrificed, billions of dollars spent. Has the right to make agreements, the right to set policy, and the right to spend money on new weapons systems been usurped by the Department of Defense?

If our "excessive military presence abroad" has raised serious questions about our international position, I am sure I do not have to remind you of the catastrophic consequences at home. One in every 16 males—ages 19 to 65—are presently serving in the Armed Forces.

The pressures of our overseas commitments have thrust them into the Armed

Forces. Many young Americans have conscientiously refused to serve in a war deemed immoral. It should give us pause to realize that Americans, who have traditionally been ready to fight for the cause of freedom, whether it be here or abroad, are electing to go to prison or into exile rather than serve in the Armed Forces. Many have accepted the lifetime stigma of a dishonorable discharge rather than be sent to Vietnam, as recently happened at Camp Pendleton in California.

In June we considered appropriations for the Department of Housing and Urban Development and then in late July we deliberated upon the Health, Education, and Welfare budgets. At those times, the tone in this Chamber was one of economy. These budgets were to provide decent homes and adequate educational and health facilities for our citizens.

Today we are considering the Department of Defense procurement authorization bill, and the committee from which this bill emanated not only met the Department's requests nearly line item for line item, but it also in several instances gave the Department more than it had actually requested. This is no tone of economy.

The military budget must be brought into line and under the control of the Congress, for until such time as it is in line, there is little hope to correct our domestic ills.

There has to be a more efficient method of manpower management established. For example, there should be an integrated manpower management program created, thereby relieving the inefficient method of manpower management by the separate services.

There should be a 5-year plan as the basis of detailed plans for manpower requirements. Training, recruiting, inductions, and promotions should all be programed on this basis.

Manpower costs should be charged to a fixed operating budget of the unit to which they are assigned. Idle troops would then cut into budget allocations and efficient deployment would be encouraged.

These are but a few of the many avenues open to the military in bringing about more efficient management of manpower.

This amendment leads to a slow but sure deescalation of the military controlled economy and the release of members of the Armed Forces in numbers equivalent to withdrawals from Vietnam.

It has been argued that this amendment would tie the hands of the President. This is simply not so. The President would be permitted to exceed the ceiling if he determines it is in the interest of national security and so informs Congress.

This amendment is only a modest step, reducing the overall military manpower ceiling to the extent that members of the armed services are withdrawn from Vietnam. What it will do is signal to the country that we are prepared to recognize the necessity for a reassessment of our use of military power in international politics and a reappraisal of the foreign policy assumptions which led us into the quagmire in Vietnam in the first place.

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RYAN. I am happy to yield to my colleague from New York.

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, there has been much talk this year about saving money through manpower cuts. I think that once the Vietnam war ends, we should cut our forces by a million men; Senator STENNIS has called for such a reduction.

But troop cuts can only go so far, and I question whether Congress should try to determine exactly how many troops we should have, other than to impose ceilings.

There is, however, one aspect to the problem well within the concern of the Congress: I refer to economy and efficiency in the use of defense manpower.

Most Members have served in the Armed Forces and have seen the military's tremendous waste of human talent. In an effort to make every officer a jack-of-all-trades, the Pentagon reassigns officers so often that these officers spend almost half of their career either adjusting to a new organization, adjusting to a new job, or both. Enlisted men specialize somewhat more, but rotate just as often. The Pentagon estimates the transportation and shipping costs alone at $2 billion per year. It is legendary that high-ranking military officers are given responsibilities for operations about which they know comparatively little. This is especially true right here in Washington; it is particularly true in the administrative, managerial, and procurement activities of the Department of Defense—the very operations that have had the huge cost overruns and long delays. A military man spends the first half of each tour learning his new job, and the second half getting ready for his next one. In effect, the services deprive most of their junior officers of the challenge really to become an expert in a field or to make a significant impact on an organization. The Military Establishment is full of men who, instead of being leaders, are mere followers of regulations. This was brought out with frightening clarity in the investigations of the *Pueblo* and EC–121 incidents.

The military bureaucracy is overcentralized, faceless, and unresponsive. Longer tours for military personnel, and end to rotation between career fields, and some creative thinking about decentralization in the Military Establishment, would go a long way to make more effective use of our military manpower.

With less rotation, more specialization, and the resultant higher quality of personnel, commanders, and managers, the possible annual savings can be counted in the billions.

These reforms alone would not do the job. Although important strides have been made in military salaries, not enough has been done to equate the salaries of military jobs with comparable civilian jobs. The direct result is the "brain-drain" from the military into civilian life. All too often the less-talented men remain in the services and become available for promotion to high rank.

Of course, our military leaders do not serve for salaries alone; but if specific jobs earned specific salaries—so as to be competitive with private industry—the military would be better able to retain more of the young men lost each year to well paying industry positions.

Though some of the money saved by modern manpower management would go to these higher military salaries, the country would still be getting more for its military manpower dollar. The Pentagon spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on a similar proposal last year, called the Hubbell Report. Despite the Nixon administration's apparent indifference to this study, the Hubbell Report should be a beginning. It should be promptly implemented.

These proposals by no means exhaust the list of improvements the Pentagon could make in manpower management. Other possibilities are:

First. The 5-year defense program should be made the basis for detailed plans for manpower requirements. Recruiting, draft calls, training, promotions, rotation, and mustering-out should all be based on the 5-year program.

Second. Standardized personnel and manpower information systems—including cost information—should be developed. Present systems are archaic, error-prone, and frequently inconsistent and in conflict with each other. Such improved systems were adopted for inventory and supplies almost a decade ago.

Third. Manpower costs should be charged to a fixed operating budget of the organization which uses the manpower. Idle troops would then be assigned to live item budget programs, thus encouraging efficiency.

Fourth. New, more efficient forms of organization should be developed, both for combat and noncombat units.

Present obsolete manpower policies waste billions of dollars of the taxpayers' money annually. But more important than dollars are the wasted careers in the bureaucracy and wasted years of young men's lives. The Congress should conduct a detailed investigation of the possible savings of manpower and tax dollars.

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RYAN. I am happy to yield to my colleague from New York.

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Chairman, I commend the Congressman from Illinois for his amendment which would guarantee that troops withdrawn from Vietnam will not be redeployed elsewhere but will be deactivated and permitted to rejoin their families. Since the bill reported by the committee endorses troop cuts only to the approximate figure already announced by the administration, it is logical to ask the question, What is planned for additional Vietnam troops which are withdrawn exceeding the 175,000 troop cut?

This amendment to the bill warrants the full support of every Member of the Congress in behalf of our American boys who are fighting in Vietnam. This is not a question of national security since the President still retains his prerogative in the event of a national emergency. It does not prescribe a schedule for the Defense Department to follow in the case of troop

withdrawals, and it would not prevent any one of the military services from operating at less than its present statutory ceiling. This amendment, in fact, reasserts the constitutional authority granted to the Congress.

There is no question that if the Defense Department can operate under the terms of this amendment why would anyone persist in objecting to it?

I urge passage of this amendment. Yet, I would like to make it clear that this in no way reflects a decrease to support our boys who continue to fight the battle in Vietnam.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RYAN. I am happy to yield to my colleague from New York.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman from New York for yielding, and join my colleagues in supporting the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Illinois.

The other day I suggested that each of these proposed amendments be weighed on its merits, not judged by rote.

I wonder if it can be said that that is what is occurring, when proposals adopted overwhelmingly, and even unanimously, by the Senate, are rejected here, sometimes after what might gently be called rather limited discussion.

Have large numbers of Senators suddenly turned indifferent to national security? Do members of the House committee have access to important data denied to Senators—and in some instances, apparently, to the Department of Defense and the President as well?

We are always indebted to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. MIKVA) for the great energy with which he applies his remarkable intelligence to the affairs of this body, but never more so than now. I wish the Members of the House would listen carefully to his proposal, and to his argument in support of that proposal. If they did so, I cannot believe it would carry here by any less lopsided a majority than it did in the Senate.

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. RIVERS

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move that all debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto close in 5 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from South Carolina.

The motion was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. REID).

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this amendment, which would reduce the overall manpower in the military—now set in the bill at 3,285,000—as our involvement in Vietnam decreases in direct relation thereto.

The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. MIKVA) has already spoken at length on several points, and I concur with his arguments. I would like to add just a few others.

First of all, as we all know, on June 25 the Senate voted 70 to 16 to adopt the national commitments resolution, on the grounds that our military commitments overseas were excessive. According to the State Department, we are definitely committed to defend 42 nations; Pentagon figures reveal that we have a total of 3,204 military bases overseas, with the total cost of retaining this force level estimated at $35 billion annually. They enable us, in short, to plunge into local conflicts on a moment's notice.

I think it is more than time to reevaluate this aspect of our foreign policy which with some accuracy was noted as the 20th century equivalent of the Roman Legions—in the excellent August 1 article in Fortune magazine. I think, for instance, that Vietnam has proven to us that straight military force is a weak weapon to effect political change and that if a country lacks the will to reform or to permit free elections it is not likely to meet the future.

This amendment in itself would not force the President's hand in reducing our troops overseas; as we know, the President and the Secretary of Defense have already begun to question the value of a large standing Army for our needs today. I applaud their decision to reduce the troop level at present by approximately 175,000 men, and I applaud the Committee for incorporating this. It is a good first step, both for the economy of our Nation and for the conduct of our foreign policy. When estimates for the cost for one man in the military service per year range from $6,000—which counts only salary and allowances—to between $13,000 and $14,000—which includes operations and maintenance—I think we should attempt to reduce the number in that service.

Finally, I think it important that the House of Representatives consider their role in the making of foreign policy. The power to raise and support armies is specifically attributed to the Congress in the Constitution, and yet we have as a body abdicated these responsibilities for at least the last 20 years. In 1947 statutory ceilings were set for each branch of the service, which totaled 2.3 million men. The ceilings were suspended shortly thereafter, and in the early 1950's an overall ceiling on the Armed Forces was set at 5 million. These have not been challenged; we have offered our constitutional powers to the Pentagon, and I believe we should reassert them.

The Cook-Bayh amendment in the Senate, similar in principle though not in exact detail, was passed by that body by a vote of 71 to 10, with the support of both the chairman and the ranking minority member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Furthermore, the Department of Defense indicated no objection to the principles involved.

Mr. Chairman, I think the debate is clear, and I strongly urge my colleagues to accept this amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT).

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

If the President is correct, he wants a new direction in Asia and does not want to follow the follies of some of the past administrations. We should help him to burn those bridges and as we bring back the kids from Vietnam we should discharge them properly.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina to close debate.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I oppose the amendment, and I ask that we vote.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. MIKVA).

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. MIKVA) there were—ayes 38, noes 85.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise just for the purpose of asking a question of the chairman of the committee on one section of the bill; namely, section 402, in which it is required that before any contract goes to a university certain information must be filed with the Congress about the nature of the contract and the competence of the university to perform the contract and so on. At the end of that section there is included in the required information the following requirement: "a statement summarizing the record of the school, college, or university with regard to cooperation on military matters such as the Reserve Officer Training Corps and military recruiting on its campus."

M. Chairman, I have only one question to ask the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS). Is it your idea that in the awarding of contracts to universities and colleges for research on the Nation's defense that the granting or withholding of those contracts should be influenced by the decisions that the colleges or universities may have made on ROTC training and military recruiting?

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRASER. I am glad to yield to the distinguished chairman.

Mr. RIVERS. I would not think we would go out and reward a college who had the same sort of facilities another college had for not supporting our military. If I were our Secretary of Defense, I would not do that. We just want the report on it. We will cross the other bridge when we get to it.

Mr. FRASER. I thank the chairman.

I would only call attention, as I will when I extend my remarks in the RECORD, that there is a relation between the policy of the university with the ROTC being rewarded or granted a contract or the withholding of a contract.

I might add for your information, Mr. Chairman, that I got into the Navy through the Naval ROTC program, so I myself do not have the problem that some universities have with them. But I strongly disagree with the implication that if the university in its own judgment thinks it is not wise to have an ROTC program that they will, therefore, be penalized from receiving some of the flow of funds which pours forth for research for the Department of Defense.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, I would not reflect on the service record of the gentleman. I know he has a distinguished

record. But I am sure the gentleman would not want me or anybody else to, if we had two colleges, one that permitted the Marines to be painted like I saw them up at a certain place the other day by somebody, to give them $100 million in contracts, or whatever they have, and give another college nothing. I know the gentleman would not want anything like that done.

This is just to get the information, then we will be better able to make whatever recommendations are necessary when we present the bill next year to the committee.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's statement. I think it reflects our difference in philosophies.

I am going to vote against this bill finally for several reasons, but the mere existence of this provision would be enough, because it is one of the most unwarranted invasions by the Congress on the academic freedom of universities in the United States that I have ever seen come out in a bill from the Committee on Armed Services.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, if I may have the attention of the Chamber, we are told that there will be a motion to recommit likely offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. O'KONSKI). The motion to recommit will be to strike the ABM, not just procurement, but research and development as well. I know of no one who holds that position in the House, and it appears clear that this kind of a motion to recommit is aimed at avoiding a clear vote on the issue.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRASER. If the gentleman will be relating to that subject, then I will be glad to yield to the gentleman, if he can enlighten us.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I shall endeavor to enlighten the gentleman on this, but I would first like to ask a question: If a person is for research and development of the antiballistic missile system, is this not a fair assumption of his position, that he is for deployment when it is proven that it will work?

Mr. FRASER. Oh, I think that is quite a different matter. I am in favor, as a matter of fact, of a number of research and development programs, but I recognize that once you get to that stage it is an entirely different question whether to actually deploy the weapon. That will depend on the effectiveness of the weapon, the projected cost of deploying it and the changed world scene since research funds were authorized.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, as the first congressional sponsor of a resolution calling on the President to halt further flight testing of multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles—MIRV's—so long as the Soviet Union does likewise, I wish to comment on the funds for MIRV development and procurement contained in the legislation currently before the House—the fiscal year 1970 military procurement authorization.

I have prepared an amendment to this legislation which would prevent funds in this bill from being used for further MIRV flight tests so long as, from date of passage of this act, the Soviets refrain from flight testing their MIRV's. However, after careful consideration, I have decided that it would serve no good purpose for me to offer this amendment.

My concern has been that testing be halted prior to the projected SALT talks so that such testing would not subvert the talks entirely or reduce the chances of reaching agreement with the Soviets on a mutual moratorium on MIRV's. This would require, and I have proposed, that testing be stopped immediately. Funds for the present testing program, however, are apparently already available from previous authorizations and appropriations. To restrict the use of the funds for MIRV flight tests in the fiscal year 1970 military procurement authorization would presumably not affect testing soon enough to achieve the intended effect on the climate for SALT talks.

In addition, soundings indicated that the vote for such an amendment would not fairly reflect House sentiment in opposition to MIRV testing.

Hearings were conducted on my resolution, and similar resolutions offered by other members, by the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Affairs. Those hearings were most enlightening and useful, and the chairman of that subcommittee, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ZABLOCKI) and the members of the subcommittee should be congratulated for their penetrating examination of the important issue at stake here.

I am hopeful that the subcommittee and the full Foreign Affairs Committee wil report out a resolution for floor action. Whether or not they do, the very fact that hearings were conducted has achieved many of the purposes of the resolution. One of the significant facts that emerged from the hearings, for example, is that there is uncertainty and disagreement over the extent of our intelligence capacity to distinguish MRV and MIRV tests conducted by the Soviet Union. I was interested to read, therefore, in yesterday's New York Times, an article by William Beecher announcing a White House level review of all our intelligence capabilities "to determine what types of accords that Nation can live with if on-site inspection cannot be negotiated" in the upcoming strategic arms limitation talks. I certainly welcome that review, and hope that the White House will report at least the essence of its findings to the appropriate committees and officers of the Congress. I have no doubt that the hearings on MIRV testing conducted in the House helped illustrate the pressing need for this review.

In addition, several of President Nixon's recent statements on the SALT talks indicate acute awareness on his part of the significance of MIRV development as an escalating influence on the arms race, and his intention to place that issue high on the agenda of the arms limitation talks if and when they get underway. I believe that several congressional resolutions on MIRV signed by over 130 Members and the hearings on them, were helpful in bringing the full nature of this matter to the prominent attention of the President.

Let there be no mistake about it, I am disappointed that the President has failed to act to halt testing, so long as the Soviets refrain from testing, as a means of improving the climate for the SALT talks and avoiding the possibility of a misunderstanding about our MIRV capability that might make it impossible for the Soviets to enter into a permanent MIRV moratorium. In failing to take such action, I feel that the President has needlessly and callously risked the success of the SALT talks before they are even started, with no reason or benefit for the United States or U.S. security. With no realistic means of forcing a halt to U.S. testing within the time frame that is crucial to the SALT talks, I can only renew my call upon the President to go beyond his commendable review of our intelligence capabilities and recognition of the importance of the MIRV issue as an item for the SALT agenda. I again urge him to halt U.S. testing now, so long as the Soviets do likewise. To fail to do so may well mean that our intelligence capabilities as they relate to arms control agreements may become irrelevant because there will be no SALT talks and no agreements.

As I said yesterday, we must ponder the failure of the Soviets to set a date for the SALT talks to begin. It may well be that, as their own press has suggested, the Soviets are nervous about the United States going ahead with a combined ABM-MIRV program. If this is so, for the United States to hold back on deployment of ABM and on testing of MIRV's would greatly improve the atmosphere and increase the likelihood of successful SALT talks.

Turning to the motion to recommit which I understand will be offered, to strike not only the funds for deployment of ABM but also the funds for continuing research and development, I consider the decision of the minority leader that this should be the form of the motion an outrageous example of the use of arbitrary power. The position stated in the motion to recommit is not a position that has been advocated by any Member of the House during the course of debate. To word the motion to recommit in this way represents a crude effort to reduce the number of votes on record against the Safeguard system.

I will vote against the "previous question" motion I understand will be offered on the recommital to register my opposition to the form in which the recommital has been put and my opposition to deployment of the ABM system. Should the "previous question" fail to pass, I would welcome the chance to vote for the 10-percent across-the-board cut in this authorization several Members hope to offer as an alternative recommital motion. Should the "previous question" motion pass, I will still vote for the recommital motion, but I want it clearly understood that I am not and never have been against continuing research and de-

velopment for antiballistic missiles. Finally, I shall vote against the bill as a whole for a number of reasons, including the fact that it authorizes deployment of the ABM and continued testing and deployment of MIRV's, the fact that it contains dangerous provisions interfering with academic freedom, the fact that almost a billion dollars was added to the bill for the naval shipbuilding program, and that overall it represents a continuation of luxury spending for military purposes at a time when we are not doing the necessary minimum to meet our homefront needs.

Mr. BOLLING. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I take this time only to ask the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services a couple of questions about two sections that have not yet been read, and I take this time now so that I will have the opportunity to have 5 minutes, rather than having my time cut off.

The two sections are section 502 in the next title, and section 503.

Section 502 reads:

SEC. 502. The Committees on Armed Services are authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities and personnel of any Government agency.

I really would like to know what that means.

I have not been here, and I have not participated in this debate before, and that seems to me to be remarkable language. If we have not been doing that before, why not?

What additional duties does this place on any Government agency that it does not now have?

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOLLING. I am delighted to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. That language was taken from the Atomic Energy Act. It is already in the existing law. However, our committee decided, because of the concern on the part of many of our colleagues, that we would ask that it be deleted. By taking this currently and fully informed provision out of the Atomic Energy Act, we took all of the provisions that were included in the act in connection with it.

Mr. BOLLING. Section 503 says:

The Committees on Armed Services may classify information originating within the committees in accordance with standards used generally by the executive branch for classifying defense information or restricted data.

Did I understand the gentleman from Illinois to indicate that this language was going to be stricken out by the committee?

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. That particular language was in the committee amendment. I do not know whether it will be now, but probably there will be an amendment to delete that language from the bill.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield so that I may answer the gentleman's question?

Mr. BOLLING. I am delighted to yield to the gentleman so that I may get an answer.

Mr. RIVERS. We found later that it conflicted with the jurisdiction of the committee chaired by the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. FRIEDEL) and no one—but no one—wants to take on Mr. FRIEDEL and we are still going to knock out that language if we can.

Mr. BOLLING. I would still like to repeat my question. What is the purpose? You are going to vote to strike this out—that is fine. What was the purpose of putting it in in the first place?

Mr. RIVERS. Because the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. FRIEDEL) says, "You can do that by coming to our committee anyway." We thought we could copy the AEC Act and the Joint Atomic Energy Act and so wipe out the conflict of jurisdiction. So far as I am concerned, we will strike it out.

Mr. BOLLING. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to be the least bit difficult, but I just want to know why the committee put it in in the first place? What has happened in this year, 1969, to make the committee decide that it needed this law when it has not had it before? What was the thinking of the committee?

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. If the gentleman will yield, I can tell the gentleman why the individual paragraph or provisions were put in there.

We have been concerned for a long time. Sometimes we are advised of things after they happen. We think we should be currently and fully informed just as the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is. When the Atomic Energy Commission has a desire for anything, they usually come up and advise the Congress beforehand. In other words, under the present situation, sometimes we get advance information, but a great many times we get it after the fact.

Mr. BOLLING. All I can say is that I consider this a most extraordinary situation.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I would like at this time to make an observation about the implications of the action this body may decide to take. I refer, of course, to the discussion by the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER) about what might very well happen on the motion to recommit. I certainly hope that what he warned us to beware of will not be the case and will not come back to haunt us.

I want, however, to go back to what the gentleman from Minnesota said at the outset of his statement. He indicated that the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. O'KONSKI) will offer the motion to recommit and that this motion will contain instructions to delete all money for the ABM. And by all money, I mean both money for deployment and money for research and development.

I want to make it clear to this Committee and to the people of the United States that this motion, deleting all funds for the ABM, will not—I repeat—will not be a test vote of the question we have been debating. This motion was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 89 to 11.

Now, as my colleagues very well know, we have been debating the question of whether to deploy the ABM, not the question of whether to continue research and development on it. No one in this body has addressed himself to or spoken against research and development on the ABM.

The issue, as I have already said, is whether to deploy the ABM. This specific question was defeated by a very close vote of 50 to 50 in the Senate. And it is that specific question to which we must now direct our attention.

Since that is the real issue—and I doubt that anyone would disagree with me that it is—we must have it presented to this body and to the people in a clear and precise way. The people have every right to know just what the sentiment of the House is on deploying the ABM.

For this reason, the motion to recommit should contain instructions to merely stop the deployment of the ABM. It should not—I repeat—it should and must not contain instructions to stop research and development on the ABM because this is not the question and because this would give a highly inaccurate and unfair picture of what we in this body sincerely feel.

It is pretty obvious to me why this is being done. Some of my colleagues, I regret to say, want a massive vote in favor of the ABM. But this is the wrong way to do it. As I have said, it is not only an inaccurate barometer of House sentiment, but it is also unfair. And we will be highly criticized for it for all the reasons I have stated.

As if this were not bad enough, I also understand that the gentleman who will offer the motion on the ABM, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. O'KONSKI), which motion will cover both research and development and deployment of the system, voted for the bill by proxy. In other words, he voted for the ABM, but he is now introducing a motion against the ABM. This is one of the clearest cases of inconsistency that I have ever seen. I want the record to be clear on this and I want the people of this country to understand what is being done.

Now the only one present on the minority side, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN), voted against the bill in committee. Therefore, and this seems clear to me, he should be the one offering the motion with his instructions attached to it.

I would, at this time, like to make it crystal clear to all of my colleagues how, under the rules of the House, we can face the real issue—deployment of the ABM—and face it squarely.

The only way the motion to recommit can be amended is when the previous question is ordered, defeat it. Therefore, on that motion, I will ask for a rollcall vote on the previous question. The previous question, as I have just said, must be defeated. This defeat will then open up the motion to recommit to amendment. I would hope that in these new amendments, after the previous question is out of the picture, we could face deployment of the ABM squarely for all the people to see.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONTE. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I

thank the gentleman for yielding. I congratulate the gentleman for the courage he has shown in making this statement. I am proud to associate myself with his remarks.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California.

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONTE. I yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. REID).

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I commend my able colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. CONTE), for the point he has made. I think it is highly unfortunate that in this House the debate on the ABM was curtailed to something under 4 hours, when it went on for a number of months in the Senate. I think cutting off the debate further characterizes this Congress as not being responsive and relevant to the public will.

I would hope, as the gentleman in the well hopes, that this motion to recommit would not be offered, because it would not represent a fair rollcall vote. If we are to vote on the ABM, it should be on the question of deployment and not on the question of research, which most Members, I believe, want to continue.

So I hope the gentleman's point will register, and, if there is a motion to recommit, that it will fairly represent the thinking the American people are entitled to and be a fair vote for or against ABM deployment.

Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONTE. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Chairman, I share the sentiment of the gentleman in the well. I hope whoever offers the motion to recommit will so phrase the question as to fairly reflect the issues involved. That is, whether we should deploy an ABM system or simply provide funds for research and development for such a system. I hope the motion to recommit will permit us fairly to express our sentiment on that. My sentiment is that because of the cost, the questionable effectiveness and because of our national domestic needs, that we should limit our authorization to funds for research and development.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONTE. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I have been somewhat embarrassed by the fact that on my side of the aisle Members have come to me, recognizing I was the only one on the minority side to vote against this bill, and saying to me they understand I am going to be offering a recommittal motion which will strike all funds for research and development and deployment of the ABM.

Mr. Chairman, if I am recognized to offer the motion to recommit, I intend to submit this motion:

Mr. WHALEN moves to recommit the bill H.R. 14000 to the Committee on Armed Services with instructions to report the bill back forthwith to the House with the following amendment: On page 16, after line 8, insert the following new section:

"SEC. 410. Notwithstanding the respective separate authorizations of appropriations contained in the preceding provisions of this Act, the total amount appropriated pursuant to all such authorizations shall not exceed $19,988,886,000."

Mr. Chairman, this would do two things. This would reduce the authorization in the bill by $1.34 billion, and the decision as to how this reduction would be made would be determined by the Defense Department.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Chairman, is the gentleman asking for a 10-percent reduction?

Mr. WHALEN. No, this is a dollar reduction of $1.34 billion.

Second, it would make the House version of this procurement bill exactly the same in terms of dollars as that approved on the Senate floor.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GUBSER. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, R. & D. expenditure has been $4 billion on the ABM. In this bill we cut around $801 million on R. & D. generally. We have spent a ton of money on R. & D. They have laid very few eggs. I would think if we are going to continue to put money into the till and never get any eggs, God help R. & D.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I refer to the statement made in the well by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. CONTE). I would remind the gentleman this Congress is a continuing body and it will be in session next year.

If, after 1 year of experience, after saving 1 year of the precious commodity, time, it is determined that the ABM should not go forward we could stop it then.

To ask for a separation of R. & D. and deployment at this point in time is to ask for a haven and ask for a point of retreat. If one is for it, vote for it, and if against it vote against the whole thing. If you vote for research and development you are in effect saying, "I am for deployment of an ABM when it is proved that it will work."

We can do that next year. In the meantime, we will have saved 1 year. So let us not be "chicken". If you are for it, vote for it. If you are against it, vote against the whole thing.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, at a later time I had planned to announce what the motion to recommit would be, but in light of the observations of the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER) and the comment by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN), I believe it is appropriate I do it now.

First let me say the motion to recommit will be to strike all of the ABM authorizations, $746.4 million. It will not be the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON) which was defeated yesterday by a vote of 219 to 105.

Let me speak, if I may, to the gentleman from Ohio. About last Tuesday, I went over to the gentleman from Ohio and said we wanted a vote on the ABM on the motion to recommit. I offered to him the motion to recommit on the ABM. I said he had 24 hours to discuss it, to think about it, but I would appreciate within 24 hours his answer. The next day the gentleman from Ohio came back and said that he did not want the motion to recommit on those terms, he wanted to offer a motion to cut dollars out of the authorization bill.

Am I correct or incorrect?

Mr. WHALEN. The gentleman is exactly correct. I would hasten to add one other comment he made. The gentleman indicated to me—and I am sure I am correct on this—if I did not offer this recommital motion he would get someone who would.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. That is perfectly true. That is my responsibility, and I intend to carry it out, and we are going to carry it out this way, subject, of course, to the will of the House.

Now, may I proceed.

The defeat yesterday by a vote of 219 to 105 I believe laid to rest the denial of the deployment of the ABM. A rollcall on that issue in motion to recommit at this time would be totally repetitious. Therefore, I believe the time has come that we actually have a vote on the basic issue, which is whether or not we are going to have an ABM system.

We have been appropriating money for research, development, test, and engineering for some 15 to 16 years, and now the time has come to lay the matter to rest, to fish or cut bait.

So far as I am concerned, the vote today will be on that basis.

Under the parliamentary situation, of course, Members can try to get a vote on the previous question, open it up, and then we will see what happens, but from my point of view a 1-year delay in the authorization will bring about the dire result the committee points out.

Let me read that. On page 23 of the committee report it is stated:

A 1-year delay in authorization would mean at least a 2-year delay in deployment because of requirements to reopen development production lines, reassemble the technical teams, recommence site acquisition and on-site engineering, and retrain necessary personnel.

Let me say right here and now that the time has come where the issue ought to be settled fundamentally. I believe I exercised good sense and good judgment in offering to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN) an opportunity. He did not accept it. We have made other plans, and I hope that the House as a whole backs up this decision to make the basic decision one way or the other on the ABM.

May I add one other thing. I point out, as has been said many times here in the last 3 days, bear in mind that the Soviet Union is proceeding not with a first generation, not with a second generation, but a third generation anti-ballistic-missile system, and I do not think we should fiddle under these circumstances.

Further let me state that we know very well the Soviet Union is proceeding

with more advanced offensive capability testing. If we have one grain of sense here today, we ought to take the affirmative position and do what we can to make sure that the United States is prepared defensively to meet that challenge.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we cannot now come to the point where we can at least dispose of title IV and get on to another title.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further amendments to title IV?

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. RIVERS

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move that all debate on title IV come to a close at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from South Carolina.

The motion was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read title V.

The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE V—COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS

SEC. 501. The Department of Defense shall keep the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and of the House of Representatives fully and currently informed with respect to all of the Department's activities. Any Government agency shall furnish any information requested by either Committee on Armed Services with respect to the activities or responsibilities of that agency in the field of national security.

Mr. STRATTON (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title V be considered as read and printed in the RECORD and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I would like to ask whether or not there will be opportunity to pursue some of the issues that have been developed before we entertain a motion to close debate.

Mr. RIVERS. We are not going to cut off debate.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York to dispense with the further reading of title V?

Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I object.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will continue to read title V.

The Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 502. The Committees on Armed Services are authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities and personnel of any Government agency.

SEC. 503. The Committees on Armed Services may classify information originating within the committees in accordance with standards used generally by the executive branch for classifying defense information or restricted data.

SEC. 504. As used in this Act—

(a) "Government agency" means any executive department, commission, independent establishment, corporation, wholly or partly owned by the United States, or any board, bureau, division, service, office, officer, authority, administration or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government.

(b) "Defense information" means any information in any category determined by any Government agency authorized to classify information, as being information respecting, relating to or affecting the national defense.

(c) "Restricted data" means data classified as "Restricted data," in accordance with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. STRATTON

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I offer a motion.

The Clerk read as follows:

Motion offered by Mr. STRATTON: On page 16, line 9, strike all of Title V.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, this is the amendment that was referred to earlier by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE) and by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS) in the colloquy with the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. BOLLING) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. THOMPSON).

Because of the problem of the overlap with the Committee on House Administration that is involved in section 502, and because of the controversy arising also with respect to section 503, the committee has felt that it would be better to delete the title in its entirety.

I therefore urge the adoption of the amendment. This will eliminate the disputes that are involved with these sections.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON) is proposing to strike the entire title V. However, I understood in the explanation offered previously in response to the question propounded by the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. BOLLING) that his objections related to sections 502 and 503. What could possibly be objectionable in section 501 wherein it provides that the Department of Defense shall keep the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and of the House fully and currently informed? I would think this would be very excellent language to keep in this bill. I would suppose that the purpose of striking title V is really to prevent the offering of amendments to that title. I frankly had planned to offer an amendment to add a new section to this title, to provide for a program reporting system to formalize to the system that the Secretary of Defense has already set up.

Mr. STRATTON. In view of the lateness of the hour and the controversy that has arisen over sections of this title, it was our feeling that in the interest of time and speed it would be simpler to strike the entire title.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Is our interest in saving time so great that it outweighs the interest that the committee formerly had in making sure that they were kept fully informed?

Mr. STRATTON. I am delighted that the gentleman from Illinois is so enamored with some of the language that we have put in the bill.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I like it very much.

Mr. STRATTON. It seems to me there is indeed something to be said for that particular section, but we have in fact been kept well informed, and I think perhaps even without this particular section we will continue to be kept informed. I believe that I speak for the entire committee, that it was our feeling that it would be better to delete the entire title, and that is the amendment I have offered.

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I share the concern of the gentleman from Illinois about striking section 501. This requires the Department of Defense to keep the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House fully and currently informed with respect to all Department activities.

For many years this kind of clause did not appear in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration authorization bills, and I know from experience the great difficulty we had in receiving specific information from that agency. We finally wrote into the authorization bill, over the strenuous objections of the agency, language similar to the language which is now in the bill that has been brought to the floor.

I would hope that the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services would insist that this language be retained so that all Members of this House can then ask and find out from the chairman what information the committee has obtained on a particular issue from the Department of Defense.

Mr. STRATTON. I believe the members of our committee certainly appreciate the gentleman's concern, and we will take the gentleman's comments into consideration. However, my amendment still stands.

AMENDMENT TO TITLE V OFFERED BY MR. JACOBS

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to title V.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. JACOBS to title V: On page 17, immediately after line 13 insert the following:

"SEC. 505. (a) The Comptroller General of the United States (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Comptroller General") is authorized and directed, as soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this section, to conduct a study and review on a selective basis of the profits made by contractors and subcontractors on contracts on which there is no formally advertised competitive bidding entered into by the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, the Coast Guard, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration under the authority of chapter 137 of title 10, United States Code, and on contracts entered into by the Atomic Energy Commission to meet requirements of the Department of Defense. The results of such study and review shall be submitted to the Congress as soon as practicable, but in no event later than December 31, 1970. The Comptroller General is further authorized, upon request of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate for the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, to conduct a study and review regarding the amount of profit which has been or may be realized under any contract referred to in the first sentence of this subsection. The Comptroller General shall submit to the committee which requested such study and review a written re-

port of the results of such study and review as soon as practicable.

"(b) Any contractor or subcontractor referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall, upon the request of the Comptroller General, prepare and submit to the General Accounting Office such information as the Comptroller General determines necessary or appropriate in conducting any study and review authorized by subsection (a) of this section. Information required under this subsection shall be submitted by a contractor or subcontractor in response to a written request made by the Comptroller General and shall be submitted in such form and detail as the Comptroller General may prescribe and shall be submitted within a reasonable period of time.

"(c) In order to determine the costs, including all types of direct and indirect costs, of performing any contract or subcontract referred to in subsection (a) of this section, and to determine the profit, if any, realized under any such contract or subcontract, either on a percentage of cost basis or a return on private capital employed basis, the Comptroller General and authorized representatives of the General Accounting Office are authorized to audit and inspect and to make copies of any books, accounts, or other records of any such contractor or subcontractor.

"(d)(1) The Comptroller General, or any officer or employee designated by him for such purpose, may sign and issue subpenas requiring the production of such books, accounts or other records as may be material to the study and review carried out by the Comptroller General under this section.

"(2) Within five days after the service upon any person of any subpena issued under this subsection relating to any contract or subcontract, such person may file in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which such person transacts or has transacted business relating to that contract or subcontract, and serve upon the Comptroller General, a petition for an order of such court modifying or setting aside that subpena or demand. Such petition shall specify each ground upon which the petitioner relies in seeking such relief, and may be based upon any constitutional or other legal right or privilege of such person. Such court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter presented by such petition and to enter thereon such order or orders as it shall determine to be just and proper.

"(e) In case of disobedience to a subpena, the Comptroller General or his designee may invoke the aid of any district court of the United States in requiring the production of books, accounts, or other records. Any district court of the United States within the jurisdiction in which the contractor or subcontractor is found or resides or in which the contractor or subcontractor transacts business may, in case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpena issued by the Comptroller General, issue an order requiring the contractor or subcontractor to produce books, accounts, and other records; and any failure to obey such order of the court shall be punished by the court as a contempt thereof.

"(f) No book, account, or other record, or copy of any book, account, or record, of any contractor or subcontractor obtained by the Comptroller General under authority of this section which is not necessary for determining the profitability on any contract between such contractor or subcontractor and the Department of Defense shall be available for examination, without the consent of such contractor or subcontractor, by any individual other than a duly authorized officer or employee of the General Accounting Office; and no officer or employee of the General Accounting Office shall disclose, to any person not authorized by the Comptroller General to receive such information, any information obtained under authority of this section relating to cost, expense, or profitability on any nondefense business transaction of any contractor or subcontractor.

"(g) The Comptroller General shall not disclose in any report made by him to the Congress or to either Committee on Armed Services under authority of this section any confidential information relating to the cost, expense, or profit of any contractor or subcontractor on any nondefense business transaction of such contractor or subcontractor."

Mr. JACOBS (during the reading of the amendment). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, is this an amendment to the amendment or is this another amendment?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state that this is an amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana to title V.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I submit that this amendment is not germane because the amendment before embodied is to strike the section. How can you have an amendment to a section that is to be stricken?

So, Mr Chairman, I make the point of order that the amendment is not in order and is not germane to the section.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is ready to rule.

The Chair has gone through the precedents and has found that where the Committee of the Whole has agreed that the further reading of a title of a bill is dispensed with and open to amendment at any point, a perfecting amendment adding a new section may be offered notwithstanding the fact that an amendment proposing to strike out the title is pending. Perfecting amendments to a title in a bill may be offered while there is pending a motion to strike out such title.

This is a ruling of Chairman Harris of Arkansas on March 31, 1950.

With regard to section 502, the part acting amendment would be germane to the bill. Therefore, the Chair overrules the point of order.

Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order.

I make the point of order that the pending amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON) is before the House and that the gentleman from Indiana should be offering an amendment to the Stratton amendment, and that this amendment just offered is not germane to that amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Stratton motion was to strike out. The Chair has just read the precedent rendered by Mr. Harris on March 31, 1950 and ruled on the point of order.

The Clerk will continue the reading of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and be printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Indiana?

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, a further parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, is the Chair ruling irrespective of the pending motion that the amendment automatically is regarded as a perfecting amendment?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state that the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana is to title V; a perfecting amendment, and it is in order to offer perfecting amendments when a motion to strike is pending.

Mr. EVANS of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, a further parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. EVANS of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, if the amendment of the gentleman from Indiana passes, and thereafter the motion of the gentleman from New York passes, what is the status of the amendment of the gentleman from Indiana?

The CHAIRMAN. If the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana is agreed to and the motion offered by the gentleman from New York to strike the whole title is agreed to, then the amendment will be stricken.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a hypothetical parliamentary inquiry? If I had gotten the floor and moved the previous question, I would have had a better chance; is that correct?

The CHAIRMAN. In the Committee of the Whole the previous question is not in order.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, a point of order. My recollection is that on a previous amendment, the Chair ruled it out of order because it brought in another agency.

The CHAIRMAN. That was because the Whalen amendment was not germane to that title or section of the bill.

Mr. STRATTON. Does not that same point lie against this amendment?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has ruled that the Jacobs amendment is germane to title V.

Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. JACOBS) to dispense with further reading of his amendment?

There was no objection.

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, my, my, my. How badly, how badly, how badly some do not want to talk about studying tne profits of defense contractors. I never heard so many points of order and parliamentary inquiries made since I have been a Member of this body. I wonder why some do not want to talk about studying the profits of defense contractors.

Let me explain briefly what this amendment does. It does not provide for a study of the profits of all defense contractors. It provides for a study of only those who are given the monopoly of the negotiated contract, not the competitive-bid contract. I am not going to demagog and say that every contract in the Defense Department should be a competitive-bid contract. I know better than that. There are some things that only one fellow sells, just as when you

need a telephone. You have your choice between going to the telephone company or using a Dixie cup and a thread. So I know that there must be certain kinds of monopolistic relationships in this area, just as there are in the utility area.

But in the public utility area, once we grant that kind of monopoly, we give Government agencies, quite rightly, the power to determine whether the price is right in lieu of competitive bidding.

That, my dear friends, is all in God's world this amendment does.

Everyone here has played chess. You are familiar with the concept of the checkmate. We have all heard about not being able to have your cake and eat it, too. I can predict with absolute certainty that my amendment will either be defeated or, if passed, struck dead in its cradle by the motion to strike. But I am going to stand before my colleagues and take credit for the first success in this entire debate in getting something changed around that this committee has brought to the floor, because this committee had no intention of striking any of the provisions of the bill until my amendment showed up, and it was clearly germane to title V. Then suddenly they were faced with the choice of "having your cake and eating it, too." They know if they keep title V, my amendment comes with it. And they really, really do not want this amendment.

Now, I do not know how much cake the defense contractors have. Secretary McNamara said that they do not have enough. He said that profits are not sufficient. Others have said that they are unconscionable. This Member of this body does not know, and this Member of this body is old fashioned. He would like to know the facts before he makes a judgment of that kind one way or the other. If the facts show that the defense contractors merit more profits, I would cheerfully support more profits. And if the facts would show that the defense contractor merits less profits by his privately negotiated contract, I would call upon all fairminded Americans and their Representatives in this body cheerfully to oppose unconscionable profits. So there is where the matter stands.

I ask my colleagues not to judge this amendment by its author. And for those who cannot even judge it by its merits, I ask you to judge this amendment by its support in the other body. Senator STENNIS supported this amendment. Senator THURMOND supported this amendment. Senator JACKSON supported this amendment. Senator GOLDWATER supported this amendment. Let not history tell, "but not the House of Representatives."

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

I take this time to comment briefly on the motion to recommit. There has been some colloquy on the floor as to what diabolical course of events may occur here very shortly, and there seems to be some concern on behalf of some of those that are very strongly committed for the deployment that we not proceed just with research and development for the antiballistic-missile program.

I say that the $4 billion we have spent for research and development for the ABM is peanuts compared to the possible $400 billion that this bill is possibly going to commit us for. I do not think it is inconsistent at all to be for research and development, but not to be for deployment. Former Secretary McNamara has testified if we had spent the money for the Nike-Zeus system we would have wasted $5 billion or $10 billion or even $15 billion in that deployment.

I say if the rules of this House are dumb enough to allow somebody to come to the floor of this House who has voted against the bill in committee and then presents himself to the House as now being against the bill and we are aware all the utterances made by that individual are in favor of the ABM system, and now he comes forward and says he is against an ABM system, and if a vote is taken then on that course of events and state of the record, and if the President of the United States is dumb enough to make anything out of this dumb vote, I say God save the United States.

I intend to vote "present" if this is the state of events and the record.

It is too bad we cannot have an honest vote on recommittal and at least have some kind of fair showing or display of the sentiment of this House on some of the important things that are before this Congress and the Nation.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, since amendment after amendment designed to reduce the military procurement authorization have been defeated and since I am unable under the proposed restrictive recommittal motion that gives me no opportunity to exercise my right to vote against deployment of the ABM I shall vote present to indicate my disapproval of this motion and I am convinced of an obligation to vote against this authorization so that it can be full reconsidered in committee and returned with its many flaws corrected.

The legislation, I consider, an excessive authorization that unjustifiably invokes our national security as the reason to give the go-ahead for many unnecessary projects.

Certainly our national security must be preeminent in our minds. Only yesterday, when speaking here on a different matter, I pointed out that "without that security our national ideals and goals are immediately in danger."

But the simple fact is that we are being asked to authorize many programs and expenditures that will not enhance our national security. We are being asked to spend unnecessary billions at a time of great economic stress and when inflation threatens our entire economy. We are being asked to authorize excessive sums for projects unrelated to our security when there are vital priorities for which we are told money is unavailable.

Thus, I am prepared to vote against this authorization, not because of an invalid, blind objection to military spending, but because I believe strongly that at a time when America's economy is overheated and her peoples' needs unmet, we cannot indulge ourselves with wasteful programs.

The reasons that I oppose this bill include, but are not limited to, the following:

Permission to go ahead with the deployment of the Safeguard antiballistic system that substantial scientific evidence indicates will not work. Authorization of this system could well open the door for the expenditure in future years of up to $100 billion without any appreciable benefit to our security. I would encourage further research and development on antiballistic systems, but strongly feel that deployment should be postponed until a workable system can be devised.

Authorization for the Navy to go ahead in purchasing a billion dollars' worth of ships not requested by the Department of Defense. I feel certain that the Secretary of Defense and President would have requested these funds if they were essential to our security, for that is the constitutional responsibility of the executive branch. In a time of great economic stress and severe inflation that plays havoc with our economy this unnecessary excess expenditure of a billion dollars in the current fiscal year would be clearly contrary to our national interests.

Purchase of a fourth squadron of the C–5A aircraft. Inclusion of almost half a billion dollars for this project in this year's budget is sheer folly since the currently authorized purchases are 6 months behind schedules and serious structural flaws have been discovered in aircraft already built. Since these planes could not be delivered this year the authorization could be postponed without any impact on our defense strength.

Other programs authorized above original requests from the Department of Defense and at levels higher than those approved by the Senate. I do not take exception to necessary research and development of advanced weapons systems that could some day improve our defensive posture, but I do take serious exception to the procurement of systems whose effectiveness has not been demonstrated and on which the cost has not been established. I also take exception to the authorization of funds not requested by the civilian authorities whose responsibility it is to oversee our Military Establishment.

I wish to reiterate, lest I be misunderstood, that I have always and shall continue to support sufficient military appropriations to insure that our defenses are adequate for our security.

But we are in a period of great economic stress and our "security" has become the guise for further inflationary spending that will continue to erode the savings of millions of Americans. This is not the way to save our country; it is certain invitation to greater fiscal havoc and excessive taxation.

Moreover to permit the unnecessary expenditure of billions of dollars is unacceptable when there are necessary pro-

grams starved of funds. Even a cursory list of our domestic problems dramatizes our needs: education, housing, environmental pollution, urban and rural poverty, hunger, deteriorating cities, and so forth.

What we have here, then, is a confrontation with the much discussed question of priorities. There are priorities of a civilian nature that preclude, on humanitarian, practical, and fiscal bases, the authorization of military projects not associated with our security.

To summarize my position: I believe we have a clear responsibility to authorize military systems associated with our security and I see as clear a responsibility to oppose military systems not associated with our security that will, by wasting billions, creating greater inflation, and diverting our resources, prevent us from addressing ourselves to the legitimate needs of the American people.

I do not regard lightly my vote in opposition to this authorization; but then I do not regard lightly my responsibility to my constituents and all Americans to do what my conscience and mind tell me is best for the people of this Nation.

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, it is quite stylish these days to criticize the defense contractors and to insist upon more accurate reporting, and of course, everyone is interested in more accurate reporting being accomplished. But let us just see what kind of reporting and what kind of policing is required to be carried out in this respect.

The Defense Contract Audit Agency has more than 3,500 resident auditors assigned to defense contractors' plants now. The Defense Contract Administrative Services Office has 24,000 contract administrators and inspectors assigned to defense contractors' plants now. These 27,500 auditors and inspectors are in addition to the large GAO staff of auditors assigned to defense contract auditing, a force sufficient to accomplish all the auditing that may be necessary.

On August 1 the GAO wrote to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee as follows:

> Before legislation of this type is enacted it would be our recommendation that the most careful consideration be given to it by the Congress.

Mr. Chairman, this refers particularly to the Schweiker amendment, which also involves GAO.

> The type of reviews made by this office and the needs of the interested committees of Congress need further development and exploration . . . For these reasons we believe legislation describing a particular form of reporting at this time would be unwise. In general we believe the basic authority of the GAO is adequate to carry out the program which we have outlined.

This amendment is somewhat comparable to the so-called Schweiker amendment which was adopted by a one-vote margin in the Senate. The author of that amendment admitted during debate it would require 200 additional employees to be added to the staff of the GAO at a cost of $4 million per year. I understand this is not the Schweiker amendment, but it does involve the GAO, and it does involve a further recruitment of auditors that would undertake this massive procedure that would be required if this amendment were adopted.

This amendment is unnecessary. The Comptroller General can now make independent audits of negotiated defense contracts under authority provided by 10 United States Code, section 2313, and Congress can presently obtain all necessary cost information and progress reports on contracts upon request to the Department of Defense.

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a correction?

Mr. FISHER. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, as a matter of fact, this is the so-called Proxmire amendment, which passed the Senate by a vote unopposed by anyone. It passed unanimously.

Mr. FISHER. I understand, but it invokes the services of the GAO. This amendment would be an invitation to confusion and harassment of contractors. Its adoption would not be in the public interest.

Mr. FULTON of Tennessee. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, the amendment to the military procurement authorization offered by the gentleman from Indiana to authorize the Comptroller General to make a select study of defense contractor profits will have no effect on the authorization we vote today but may save the Government and taxpayers billions of dollars in the future.

It will, at the same time, give the Congress and the public a clearer view of the scandalous picture of the extravagant waste in Defense procurement, this picture has been painted nowhere more clearly than by the Joint Economic Committee's Subcommittee on Economy in Government in its report of May 1969, "The Economics of Military Procurement."

The report documents on a case-by-case and item-by-item basis the fact that there is extravagant waste in the Defense Department, there is shocking mismanagement and lack of concern for tax dollars by certain contracting officers, and that there is no guaranteed procedure available to the Department of Defense or the Congress to require Defense contractors to reveal, explain or justify their costs and profits.

The report asserts:

> The extensive and pervasive economic inefficiency and waste that occurs in the military procurement program has been well documented by the investigations of this subcommittee, by other committees of the House and Senate, and by the General Accounting Office. The absence of effective inventory controls and effective management practices over Government-owned property is well known. In the past, literally billions of dollars have been wasted on weapons systems that have had to be canceled because they did not work. Other systems have performed far below contract specifications.
>
> Actual costs of expensive programs frequently overrun estimated costs by several hundred percent. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Robert H. Charles testified that "The procurement of our major weapons systems has in the past been characterized by enormous cost overruns—several hundred percent—and by technical performance that did not come up to promise."

The report was particularly sharp in its criticisms of cost overrun in new weapons systems. This is of particular significance, therefore, to this bill because in this authorization we are being asked to approve $345.5 million for procurement of the President's Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system, a new weapons system.

Inherent in the authorization of this new system are all the potential dangers and evils which the report has revealed in connection with other new weapons systems: a system of exorbitant cost overrun potential, a system whose need is still questionable, a system of doubtful performance capability, and a system for which there is no guaranteed oversight procedure.

The Safeguard ABM system, without meaningful oversight guarantee, is as tempting a morsel of potential abuse as an apple in the Garden of Eden.

This amendment would provide the guarantee against abuse by granting subpena power to the General Accounting Office.

The need for this power was clearly demonstrated in the report, "The Economics of Military Procurement." The report illustrated that obtaining from Defense contractors information on costs and accounting is difficult at best. According to the report, in some instances contractors will simply refuse to sell to the Government if this information is required, adopting a "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude. In a free market competition could overcome this problem. But in Defense procurement we do not find a free market situation. We find a situation of low competition and high concentration coupled with an insensitivity by certain contract officers to cost overrun. This leads not only to waste but, too often, inferior product.

Giving the General Accounting Office the power to subpena will provide incentive to the Defense Department, its contracting officers and its contractors to more conservatively estimate and accurately judge costs and profits.

Finally, the information which would be supplied the Congress through the adoption of this amendment is vital to its Members. Today, more than ever before, the cost of our Defense Establishment and concern that our defense investment is made efficiently, economically and prudently, is a growing concern to our people, our taxpayers and the Congress. We cannot know too much about the quality of product from Defense spending when that spending is costing the taxpayers $80 billion a year.

Mr. Speaker, this amendment will not effect one cent of the funding requested in this bill. It will not weaken our defense posture or potential. It will provide us with information which we need today and will need in the future to form judgments and make decisions as we determine how we should most wisely spend in providing for the defense of this Nation.

I urge adoption of the amendment.

Mr. FULTON of Tennessee. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. JACOBS).

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, with reference to the point made by the gentleman from the Armed Services Committee, there is a letter in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD from the Comptroller General of the United States under date of September 15 which avers that the study contemplated in this amendment, which unanimously passed the Senate, can be carried forward by the GAO without adding any personnel whatsoever.

I might add that the Logistics Management Institute in the Department of Defense has conducted a study of this nature, but it was a study based on voluntary information, and 42 percent of the contractors asked did not volunteer, even on request, would not give the information.

Also, the Renegotiation Board has only 200 employees today whereas during the Korean war it had 700 employees, and the Board in its own report has cautioned against any other than generalized conclusions from its reports.

So I repeat, Mr. Chairman, obviously this is a unique amendment. Obviously it is a more effective way to study the defense profits, also we would not have had all these points of order and all these attempts to keep me from saying anything in the first place about it.

It is a little bit like what used to be said of the Russian foreign trade policy; they exported the things they needed and they imported the things they needed worse.

The Armed Services Committee thought they needed section 502 and 503 under title V, but they decided they needed worse not to have this amendment in the bill whereby this objective study of profits would take place. Therefore, they are exporting sections 502 and 503 in order to erect a huge tariff wall and not import this impartial study of defense profits in negotiated contracts.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The CHAIRMAN. For what purpose does the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS) rise?

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we can arrive at some time to vote on this perfecting amendment? We will be here until one day next Tuesday.

I wonder if we could close debate on this in 10 minutes?

I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto close in 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object—Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I have an inquiry of the chairman of the committee. I had intended to offer an amendment in the nature of a substitute for the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON).

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my request.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. KEITH. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. KEITH. Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding, if we should act favorably on this amendment to the amendment now pending, we would still have before us the entire section.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will clarify the position.

First, there is no amendment to an amendment pending. There is a motion to strike the title, and there is an amendment pending to perfect the language.

Mr. KEITH. My parliamentary inquiry, then, is should we act favorably on the motion that is now being discussed or debated, then the pending amendment would be on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York and would still have within it sections 502 and 503 to which reference has been made earlier.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state that sections 502 and 503 will be stricken out of the bill if the motion to strike is agreed to.

Mr. KEITH. Yes. If the motion to strike is agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Mr. KEITH. So you are going to throw out the baby with the bath if we do not at some point entertain a motion to amend the amendment to strike the entire section so that it only pertains to the objectionable part, sections 502 and 503.

The CHAIRMAN. An amendment to a motion to strike is not in order. The pending amendment is to perfect title V.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that the House will not look upon this amendment as an endorsement of motherhood or a renouncement of sin. I hope you will look deeply into it, because I honestly believe there is much more to it than meets the eye. I hope we will not say that because the Senate, during the course of a debate which it was anxious to conclude and when it was probably in the same frame of mind as each of us are at the moment, passed what appeared to be an endorsement of motherhood by an overwhelming vote. This is a matter that concerns a very important item that affects the industrial segment of our Nation.

It was brought up on the floor of the Senate and brought up here, and in both instances discussed rather hurriedly. Not one single witness from our industrial community had the opportunity to come before a committee of the Congress and state his views. I can assure you, had that opportunity, to which they should be entitled in a democracy, you would have found that there are serious objections to this amendment.

When the gentleman from Indiana sent around his little brochure he had one question and answer which excited my attention. The question was "Would not the General Accounting Office also study profits in private and commercial business conducted by a defense contractor." The answer was that the General Accounting Office will necessarily have to study the private commercial aspects of the defense contractor in order to make an honest differentiation between commercial and defense work. However, the amendment prohibits the Comptroller General from disclosing this as business information.

I am not going to talk about Lockheed and General Dynamics, and Boeing, Ling-Temco-Vought, and big companies like that. This will not hurt them. They will just hire 50 more accountants to comply with the amendment, and the cost will be allowed and added to the price of the hardware we buy. They will not be harmed. But for the moment let us consider the little businessman in this country who has a mix of commercial and defense business, who sells a standard catalog item to customers in the trade and also sells it to the U.S. Government. This company in a private enterprise system has a right to corporate privacy. It is essential to its existence in the competition of modern industry. To safeguard corporation confidential information, is a long-established tradition in this country.

In a purely commercial or private transaction I do not think the GAO should have a right to subpena records. There are many businesses which intermingle commercial with defense production, and it is impossible to separate out the nondefense business transactions. Thus, despite allegations to the contrary, it is inevitable that cost data of commercial businesses will be disclosed, and it is my experience that such disclosure inevitably results in price fixing, which can only work to the disadvantage of the Government in the long run.

Mr. Chairman, this legislation is not necessary. We have Public Law 87–653, with the strengthening amendments passed in the last Congress. Every negotiated contract between the Defense Department and private industry requires that full disclosure on costs or pricing data must be made. The General Accounting Office has every device that it needs in order to investigate these transactions and determine whether the Government is getting a fair deal.

On top of that, we have the Renegotiation Act and the Renegotiation Board, which is admittedly understaffed, and behind in its work. But if you want to attack the question of unreasonable defense profits, there is the way to attack it; you should not add another harassment and burdensome requirement to business when it already has too much. These harassments are contributing to the trend whereby small businesses is getting out of the defense business and making the determination to concentrate future growth on commercial business instead of defense work. If this trend continues all you will have left will be a few General Dynamics, and Ling-Temco-Vought's. You will have only a few big corporate structures that will do all of the business with the Defense Department in this country. A sound defense industry cannot be based on a cartel system of the Middle Ages. It must be broadly based to include small as well as big business.

If you want our national defense and our national safety to be broadly based and to employ a broad spectrum of our national expertise, then vote "No" on this amendment.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I think the RECORD should be put straight on the motivation for striking title V. I must assume some responsibility for conferring with the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services because of language in section 503.

The gentleman from Maryland also discussed the matter with him because of other language, and we were treated graciously in the matter. I think it had no bearing upon the amendment pending before this body at this time.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, as a matter of fact, if the gentleman will recall, it has been something like that, that we have done in the past. And we have had no trouble getting information and could always through a public hearing get anything we could not get otherwise. Is that correct?

Mr. MOSS. That is quite correct.

Mr. RIVERS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. MOSS. Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to speak very briefly about the motion to recommit. I was amazed to learn that the motion to recommit is not a matter of right under the rules of the House, but rather a matter of grace from the minority leader. This to me was a shocking thing, because I, during my 17 years here was so naive as to believe that the rules spelled out the method of arriving at who would have the right to offer a motion to recommit.

Now, the strategy is to fashion a bomb here, at least, that is the prayerful hope; you are going to strike out all of the antiballistic missile money. I do not believe anyone spoke on the floor yesterday or the day before urging to strike the research and development money. But to the distinguished minority leader I say I am willing and ready to fish and cut bait. And I believe I qualify as having a grain of sense, and I know when I am being blackmailed, and I am perfectly willing to vote precisely for the motion to recommit because I know that in conference the research and development, at least, would be put back.

And it gives me the opportunity to carry out fully a commitment that I made during the course of my campaign for election to this House of Representatives last fall.

I think it would have been wiser and a greater reinforcement to the President, if that is what is sought, to offer a motion reflective of the will of the House. But then judgments are made by people on the basis of their own convictions and their own experience. The gentleman certainly qualifies as an experienced and able Member of this body—of course, I do not challenge that. But I say in this instance in my judgment he outfoxed himself.

So I would strongly urge no one to be cowed by this marriage which was never proposed on the floor and which only will appear in the motion to recommit.

Vote on the major issue. Give the public some feeling of the response of this House and fear not—the research and development money will be there before the House adjourns the first session of the 91st Congress.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, first of all I want to comemnd my colleague from Indiana (Mr. JACOBS). I warmly support his amendment.

I want to express my own regret that the Committee cannot see fit to accept this amendment which is so obviously needed.

It is something, however, that may well come back in any event in the conference as similar language is contained in the Senate bill.

Now I want to say something about the motion to recommit. I want to plead with the minority leadership, if I may, from the floor of this House. I think when you reflect on the problems that we are having in this country with student unrest, the attitudes and legitimate concerns of our young people, the doubts they have about their political institutions, it seems to me we are setting a poor example. In fact, today we find a priceless illustration of some of their complaints. The proposed parliamentary maneuver is a transparent piece of political gamemanship where we find a Member capturing the motion to recommit with the clear purpose of confusing the issue in respect to voting on a proposition that greatly concerns millions of citizens in this country as well as the rest of the world. It will indeed be hard for some of us who come from university communities to explain it to them.

I want to announce, with the gentleman from California (Mr. Moss), that I am going to vote for the motion to recommit. I am going to do it unashamedly because I am on record on this issue. There has not been a time since I had the honor to serve on the great Committee on Armed Services until this very moment that people have not understood where I stand on this issue, especially on R. & D. and deployment.

May I say that all of the authorities, whether they are for or against the ABM, say that we should continue research and development in this area.

I am one who feels that we should exploit and understand our technology. Whether or not we can control our destiny is a separate question. I therefore plead with the minority side, controlling the motion to recommit, to give the country an opportunity to maintain full confidence in its institutions. I think you have the votes—what is wrong with that? Why can we not get a clear cut vote on it?

I invite Members on both sides of the aisle who oppose deployment of ABM and want to take a position on this, to vote for the motion to recommit. I personally consider this move by the minority leadership to be a bit of political gamesmanship and I submit that this is a poor time in our national history not to provide an opportunity to express the clear will of the House.

If you are in the majority, and indeed I believe you are, it would seem to me that this would constitute a clear cut disposition of the issue. You are then going to have your mandate and whatever is going to happen so far as the ABM is concerned is going to be decided by the Executive.

So in conclusion I urge the distinguished minority leader from Michigan, to reconsider and give the House the opportunity to have a clear-cut vote on this issue.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to find out how many Members wish to speak on title V. Then I think we can get to the other subject later on. Can we determine how many Members wish to speak on title V and dispose of that title, and then we can get to the motion which is coming up? Is there anyway that we can make that determination?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair observes 16 Members standing.

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. RIVERS

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move that all debate on title V and all amendments thereto close in 15 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from South Carolina.

The motion was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. DENNIS).

Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I will simply say that I support my Democratic colleague from Indiana. This is one amendment I am going to vote for. I cannot see any reason why we should not study profits. That is all this asks us to do. We are not accusing anybody of anything. We are studying profits, by the use of a governmental organization to conduct that study, and I think the people we represent, who pay the taxes, are for that, and I am for it.

SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. ANDERSON OF ILLINOIS FOR THE AMENDMENT TO TITLE V OFFERED BY MR. JACOBS

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I offer a perfecting amendment to title V.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois: On page 16, line 13, after the period, strike out the balance of the language of title V which appears on pages 16 down to the period on line 24, and add a new section 502 which reads as follows:

"SEC. 502 (a) The Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Comptroller General, shall develop a reporting system for major acquisition programs managed by the Department of Defense, any department or agency thereof, or any armed service of the United States, for the acquisition of any weapons system or other need of the United States.

"(b) The Secretary of Defense shall cause a review to be made of each major acquisition program as specified in subsection (a) during each period of three calendar months and shall make a finding with respect to each program as to—

"(1) the estimates at the time of the original plan as to the total cost of the program, with separate estimates for (a) research, development, testing and engineering, and for (b) production;

"(2) the department's subsequent estimates of cost for completion of the program up to the time of review;

"(3) the reasons for any significant rise or decline from prior cost estimates;

"(4) the options available for additional procurement, whether the department intends to exercise such options, and the expected cost of exercising such options;

"(5) significant milestone events associated with the acquisition and operational deployment of the weapon system or item as con-

tained in the plan initially approved by the Secretary of Defense, actual or estimated dates for accomplishment of such milestones, and the reasons for any significant variances therein.

"(6) the estimates of the department as to performance capabilities of the subject matter of the program, and the reasons for any significant actual or estimated variances therein compared to the performance capabilities called for under the original plan and as currently approved; and

"(7) such other information as the Secretary of Defense shall determine to be pertinent in the evaluation of costs incurred and expected to be incurred and the effectiveness of performance achieved and anticipated under the program.

"(c) The Secretary of Defense after consultation with the Comptroller General and with the chairmen of the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall prescribe criteria for the determination of major acquisition programs under subsection (a).

"(d) The Secretary of Defense shall transmit quarterly to the Congress and to the Committees on Armed Services and to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives reports made pursuant to subsection (b), which shall include a full and complete statement of the findings made as a result of each program review.

"(e) The Comptroller General shall, through test checks, and other means, make an independent audit of the reporting system developed by the Secretary of Defense and shall furnish to the Congress and to the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations not less than once each year a report as to the adequacy of the reporting system, and any recommended improvements.

"(f) The Comptroller General shall make independent audits of major acquisition programs and related contracts where, in his opinion, the costs incurred or to be incurred, the delivery schedules, and the effectiveness of performance achieved or anticipated are such as to warrant such audits and he shall report his findings to the Congress and to the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

"(g) Procuring agencies and contractors holding contracts selected by the Comptroller General for audit under subsection (f) shall file with the General Accounting Office such data, in such form and detail as may be prescribed by the Comptroller General, as the Comptroller General deems necessary or appropriate to assist him in carrying out his audits. The Comptroller General and any authorized representative of the General Accounting Office is entitled, until three years after the final payment under the contract or subcontract as the case may be, by subpoena, inspection, authorization, or otherwise, to audit, obtain such information from, make such inspection and copies of, the books, records, and other writings of the procuring agency, the contractors, and subcontractors, and to take the sworn statement of any contractor or subcontractor or officer or employee of any contractor or subcontractor, as may be necessary of appropriate in the discretion of the Comptroller General, relating to contracts selected for audit.

"(h) The United States district court for any district in which the contractor or subcontractor or his officer or employee is found or resides or in which the contractor or subcontractor transacts business shall have jurisdiction to issue an order requiring such contractor, subcontractor, officer, or employee to furnish such information, or to permit the inspection and copying of such records, as may be requested by the Comptroller General under this section. Any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof.

"(i) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be required to carry this section into effect."

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. COLLIER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know whether the reading of this amendment is charged against the limited time allotment.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not charged against the limited time.

Does the gentleman from Illinois offer this amendment as a substitute for the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. JACOBS)?

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Yes.

The Clerk proceeded to read the amendment.

Mr. OTTINGER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON) be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, what this amendment does is take section 501, which I indicated is a good section, and says the Defense Department shall keep the committees currently and fully informed, and it deletes the language on lines 13 through 17, and eliminates the offending sections 502 and 503, and adds a new subsection which is substantially the Schweiker amendment adopted in the other body, with certain improvements. Instead of referring to contracts, it refers to major new programs. It says the reports will be made on a program rather than on a contract basis.

If I had the time, I would refer to this correspondence I have had with the Secretary of Defense and the Comptroller General in which they indicate their approval of this changed language. I am not suggesting they have endorsed the amendment per se, but they do feel this is a better amendment than the one passed by the Senate. I take my stand alongside such stalwart conservatives as the senior Senator from Mississippi and the junior Senator from Arizona.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. OTTINGER yielded his time to Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois.)

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I yield to the chairman of the committee.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, is this the Schweiker amendment?

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Yes, this is the Schweiker amendment with the exception that we have changed the language to provide these program status quarterly reports—that are to be worked out by the Secretary of Defense in cooperation with the Comptroller General and made available to the House Committee and the committee on the other side of the Capitol as well as to Members of Congress—will be made on the basis not of contracts, but on the basis of major programs.

Let me quote very briefly from the letter I received from the Comptroller General:

> We visualize no problems arising from your proposed changes in the Schweiker amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT).

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON).

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I continue:

> We especially favor your proposed change from "major contract" to a broader concept. In this connection we note that under the amendment intended to be proposed to H.R. 14000 by Congressman Whalen, the term "major acquisition program" is used, which we favor in lieu of "major contracts."

That is the language. It refers to a quarterly report on major acquisition programs. I do not believe it will impose any impossible burden on the General Accounting Office.

I believe it will give your committee, Mr. Chairman, and the Members of the House the kind of information we need.

I would point out that the Director of Research and Engineering himself, Dr. Foster, said recently in a speech——

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. FRIEDEL).

Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON).

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Dr. Foster, in a speech he made before the Armed Forces Management Association Conference, put it this way:

> The hard truth is this: Our past and present methods of acquiring weapons have lost us the confidence of the public and are threatening our country's future security.

This amendment is offered in the hope we can restore public confidence.

Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Chairman, I now yield to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS).

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Maryland declines to yield further to the gentleman from Illinois. The gentleman from Maryland now yields to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I hope the gentleman is correctly stating the information. According to what I have received, the Comptroller General is opposed to the Schweiker amendment.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. I am glad to yield.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I have in my file a letter which was a reply to the letter I sent to the Comptroller General. I can assure the gentleman he is not in

violent opposition. He believes the language is substantially improved.

I support this amendment because I think it will help to restore the confidence of the American people in their Government. And let there be no mistake about it, that confidence has been badly shaken by reports of waste and inefficiency in Government spending.

The Defense Department's Director of Research and Engineering, Dr. John Foster, Jr., in a speech before the Armed Forces Management Association Conference, put it this way, and I quote:

> The hard truth is this: Our past and present methods of acquiring weapons have lost us the confidence of the public and are threatening our country's future security. Unless we change our practices drastically, our future ability to deter war and to fight can be seriously jeopardized.

Mr. Chairman, I am as concerned as Dr. Foster that we regain the public confidence and that we do not jeopardize our future ability to deter war. The amendment that is being offered today would help to insure the changes in procurement practices which Dr. Foster feels we so drastically need.

There is really little that is new in this amendment. The program status reports system and GAO audits called for in this amendment are already operational. This system was established earlier this year at the request of the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee, and the quarterly reports on some 34 major acquisition programs are being made to the House and Senate committees concerned with defense. This amendment would simply require as a matter of law that this reporting system be conducted on a continuing basis and that the reports be made available to all Members of Congress. In addition, it gives the Comptroller General the subpena power, something which he has personally pleaded for and something which the Congress has already granted to 40 some executive agencies.

Mr. Chairman, I do not think it will be necessary for me to deal at length on the need for the reporting system envisaged in this amendment; that need has been amply attested to by the fact that the system has already been established at the request of Senator STENNIS, the distinguished chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. It was recognized, after the disclosures of huge cost overruns in certain major weapons programs, that the Congress is not adequately equipped to exercise proper control over the programs it has authorized. We had no systematic means of identifying contract abuses at an early stage. We consequently learned of cost overruns and other abuses, too late to correct them.

The program status reporting system goes to the heart of the problem by requiring quarterly reports from the Secretary of Defense, on the status of major acquisition programs. These reports will alert the Congress as to any changes from the original plan in terms of cost, performance, or schedule. And the General Accounting Office, as an arm of the Congress, will conduct its own audits on both the reporting system, and on those programs which do begin to deviate from the original plan.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is significant to note that the improvements which have been made in this amendment over its counterpart in the other body have the endorsement of both the Comptroller General and the Secretary of Defense. In a letter dated September 27, from Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, on behalf of himself and Secretary Laird, the following comment is made:

> Secretary Laird and I believe the proposed changes, particularly the notion of reports to Congress on a program rather than a contract basis, which you are considering to the Schweiker amendment, are clearly beneficial and improve that amendment substantially.

And Comptroller General Elmer Staats has also endorsed these changes in a letter to me dated September 30, and I quote:

> "We visualize no problems arising from your proposed changes in the Schweiker amendment. We especially favor your proposed change from "major contract" to a broader concept. In this connection we note that under the amendment intended to be proposed to H.R. 14000 by Congressman Whalen, the term "major acquisition program" is used, which we favor in lieu of "major contracts".

Mr. Chairman, the improvements which have been made in the language of this amendment bring it more into line with the existing reporting system and makes it more suited to the needs and requirements of the committees, the GAO, and the Department of Defense.

The only concern expressed by the Comptroller General and the Secretary of Defense in their letters, is that legislation at this time might prohibit the flexibility that is needed to improve upon the reporting system and make it fully responsive to the needs of the Congress.

Mr. Chairman, let me allay that concern by pointing to the fact that flexibility is a built-in feature of this amendment. This amendment will in no way interfere with attempts to improve the reporting system.

The fact of the matter is, this amendment both encourages and requires an ongoing review of the reporting system with a view to improving it. This amendment in no way prescribes in detail the form and content of the reporting system other than to require the inclusion of current information on cost, performance and schedule. You will note that section 505(a) leaves it to the Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Comptroller General to develop the reporting system. Section 505(e) requires that the Comptroller General conduct an audit on the reporting system and report to the Congress at least once a year as to its adequacy and make recommendations for its improvement.

Another flexible feature of this amendment is that it does not prescribe criteria for which major acquisition programs shall be reported on. Instead, this is left to the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Comptroller General and the chairmen of the Armed Services Committees and Defense Appropriations Subcommittees of the House and Senate. This provision is contained in section 505(c) of the amendment and thus insures that the reporting system will always be fully responsive to the needs of the committees.

The passage of this amendment will therefore in no way hinder the Secretary of Defense, the Comptroller General, or the respective committees in their attempts to arrive at a responsive and responsible reporting system. Quite to the contrary, it will, by the force of law, insure the perpetuation of a systematic and flexible reporting system for the benefit of the entire Congress and the American people.

Mr. Chairman, I urge adoption of this amendment because I think it offers the only fiscally sound approach to dealing with the problems of procurement which we have encountered. We owe this both to ourselves and the American taxpayer who deserves a dollar's worth of defense for every tax dollar allocated to defense.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to be joining with our distinguished colleague from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON) and others, in amending the fiscal year 1970 military procurement bill, to provide for a standard auditing and congressional reporting system on major defense contracts.

Defense spending accounts for 41 percent, or about $80 billion, of our national budget and military expenditures have increased $37 billion over the past 10 years. Yet, there is a very disturbing lack of accurate and current military procurement information which is available to us in the Congress.

There has been considerable discussion and, I believe, misunderstanding over the provision of this amendment which grants the Comptroller General with subpena power. Some claim that the present "examination of records" clause contained in all negotiated contracts, as required by the Armed Services Procurement Act, is sufficient. However, the simple fact of the matter is that this often involves time consuming litigation. As the Comptroller General himself stated only a little over 2 weeks ago in testimony before the Senate Government Operations Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization:

> Experience indicates that several years' loss of time and much effort on our part and on the part of the Department of Justice were required to settle a dispute of this kind in the courts.

If the audits of the Comptroller General are to have any effect in correcting contract abuses before they get out of hand, then time is an essential factor.

I am aware of the September 12, 1969, letter from Comptroller General Elmer Staats to Chairman RIVERS but I believe he fully clarified the GAO's position in testifying before the Senate subcommittee 4 days later:

> We could avoid the loss of much time if the Congress were to grant to the Comptroller General the authority to compel by judicially enforceable subpoena the production of those books, accounts and other contractor records covered under the examination of records.

In addition, Mr. Chairman, by granting the GAO subpena power, the hand of Defense Department contracting and procurement officials would be strengthened. The prospective contractor would be on notice that his records would be susceptible to the scrutiny of the Comptroller General and the Congress, without his being able to employ delaying

tactics. The mere fact of the existence of subpena power will, without its exercise, have a salutary effect on contractor practices.

We must also realize, Mr. Chairman, that the Congress has granted the power of subpena—the power to secure records—to over 40 executive agencies, including the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Small Business Administration, the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, and Labor, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Internal Revenue Service. Nevertheless, we deny this basic investigative tool to the one major arm of the Congress—the one agency totally independent of the executive branch. By denying the subpena to the GAO, we are certainly limiting its effectiveness.

I believe the outstanding performance of our present and past Comptrollers General should allay any fears that the subpena powers will be abused. In discussing the matter before the Senate committee last month, Mr. Staats noted:

> I would not even imply that we would have to use it a great deal, but instead of having a controversy with respect to records being so long and go on for literally months, I feel that having this authority available to us would make it easier to come into agreement with the contractors on what records should be made available to us.

It seems perfectly clear to me, Mr. Chairman, that the GAO must have the power of subpena in order to effectively fulfill its duties. The Congress has given the GAO a mandate to account for defense spending and we must also provide it with the authority—the muscle if you will—to back it up.

Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Chairman, I am glad to note the amendment to H.R. 14000, title V, section 502 eliminating the authority for the Committee on Armed Services to utilize personnel on a loan basis from any Government agency. Under the Rules of the House of Representatives and present law, approval for the loan of personnel from any Government agency is vested in the Committee on House Administration.

In the rules of the House, rule XI, paragraph 29(e), page 370, it is stated:

> No committee shall appoint to its staff any experts or other personnel detailed or assigned from any department or agency of the Government, except with the written permission of the Committee on House Administration.

In connection with the jurisdiction of the House Administration Committee over committee personnel, rule XI, paragraph 9(c), page 339, gives jurisdiction to the House Administration Committee by stating: "Employment of persons by the House, including clerks for Members and committees."

Title 2, United States Code, section 72 (f) states:

> No committee shall appoint to its staff any experts or other personnel detailed or assigned from any department or agency of the Government, except with the written permission of the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate or the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives, as the case may be.

The basic purpose in vesting authority for the approval of loan personnel from Government agencies in the Committee on House Administration is to recognize officially for recordkeeping and financial purposes an appropriate connection between the person on loan and the committee utilizing his services. Should the person on loan incur any expenses in carrying out his duties with the committee, he would be eligible for reimbursement of such expenses only if employed officially by the committee. When the Committee on House Administration approves loan personnel, all affected House departments are notified.

I wish to emphasize that the House Administration Committee has approved requests from committees for the loan of personnel with a minimum of delay. I cannot recall a single instance where a request has been delayed. This policy of expeditious approval is expected to continue.

The CHAIRMAN. Do any of the Members whose names the Chair has read care to speak to the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON)?

Mr. TAFT. Mr. Chairman, I wish to speak to the substitute and to the original amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. TAFT).

Mr. TAFT. Mr. Chairman, it was said earlier today that none of the major defense contractors opposes these provisions.

I have a telegram from one of the most important and responsible defense contractors, which I should like to read in part. It states:

> I respectfully request that during the House consideration of the Defense authorization bill you consider rejecting the Proxmire and Schweiker floor amendment to the Senate Defense authorization bill. * * * In view of their complexity, it would be preferable that they be handled by the Government Procurement Commission just recently authorized by H.R. 474. The burdensome reporting requirements * * * are unnecessary in view of present reports and restrictions. Competition in bids and proposals and growth in technology will be stifled by the arbitrary limitations of money for such purposes contained in this amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio has expired.

The Chair would again inquire as to whether any Member would like to speak on the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON)?

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. COLLIER).

Mr. COLLIER. I thank the Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to my colleague from Ohio (Mr. TAFT).

Mr. TAFT. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The telegram goes on to say:

> The studies called for unduly emphasize one aspect of the contract without consideration of others. In light of the present powers of audit and supervision, the sections are unnecessary.

I go on to point out that obviously it would be a futile exercise if we passed the amendment of the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. JACOBS) and the amendment of the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON). It is going to conference, anyway. I hope they can come out of the conference with a workable provision.

Members should vote against both these amendments, and the Senate provision will go to conference and, hopefully, we will get a reasonable substitute that will work and provide any needed protection.

The CHAIRMAN. Does any other Member desire to speak on the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON).

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. COUGHLIN).

Mr. COUGHLIN. Mr. Chairman, I heartily support the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON). It is a good amendment.

If there is any idea whose time has come, it is to provide responsibility to the taxpayers for our defense expenditures. Certainly I, as one Congressman, would like to know how 40 percent of our entire national budget is being spent.

Mr. Chairman, as a new Member of this body and a nonmember of the committee, I rise with some temerity, but the amendment proposed by the distinguished Member from Illinois is a good amendment.

Different from other amendments proposed so far in this debate, it is a "responsibility to the taxpayers" amendment and was passed by the other body under the sponsorship of my predecessor and your former colleague and member of the Armed Services Committee, DICK SCHWEIKER.

It does not strike at programs proposed by the committee. Rather, it is a matter of giving us in Congress the tools to exercise our prerogative of oversight of defense programs. This is demanded by the taxpayer.

In recent months it has become increasingly clear not only that billions of extra dollars are being wasted in defense procurement, but also that Congress learns of this after the fact and does not have the tools to exercise its oversight to assure the American taxpayer that his dollar is well spent.

We have witnessed estimated overruns of $2 billion for the C–5A transport plane, $4 billion in the Minuteman contract, and many others. It is appalling with how little information we make key spending decisions.

Under the provisions of this amendment, the Department of Defense would be required to provide the Congress with quarterly reports on the cost, performance and schedule for major acquisition programs. The Comptroller General would be given the necessary authority to audit the reporting system established by the Secretary of Defense and would report his findings annually to the Congress.

We are told that the proposed reporting and auditing system is unnecessary because the Department of Defense is already providing this kind of information and the distinguished chairman has re-

ceived a letter from the Comptroller General indicating his current ability to perform this function. There are, however, three significant differences between the amendment and the proposal made to the distinguished chairman by the Comptroller General.

First, by enacting the amendment we can assure continuation of the review and auditing of major acquisition programs. Under the existing informal arrangement, nothing assures us that this will not be discontinued once the current tumult and shouting dies.

Second, the amendment calls for a reporting program by the Secretary of Defense in cooperation with the Comptroller General. The present informal arrangement leaves the matter entirely up to the Secretary of Defense and Congress' own agent, the Comptroller General, has no real authority.

Third, the amendment provides that information on major acquisition programs be provided not just to committees, but to all Congressmen. Should we not require this by statute on what amounts to 40 percent of our entire national budget?

We also hear that the Comptroller General should not be given the power of subpena to audit defense contracts effectively. If that is the case, why have a General Accounting Office? The GAO was established for this very purpose—to enable the Congress to fulfill its responsibilities as fiscal watchdog over the executive departments and agencies. We give the subpena power to almost every other agency, why not to our own agent, the GAO?

Mr. Chairman, if ever there was an idea whose time has come, it is this proposal to establish a reporting and auditing system which would enforce fiscal responsibility in defense procurement. With the evidence of recent events, is there anyone who doubts the need for immediate action?

The Secretary of Defense has recognized the need in the terms of reference established for the so-called blue ribbon commission inquiry into the Defense Department. And we in the Congress are taking steps to establish a commission for the purpose of looking into the whole question of Government procurement.

But we cannot wait upon the reports of these commissions. Where the need for action is so clear and present, as in the case of defense procurement, we must act without further delay.

We are all concerned with providing the essential requirements for national security. By adopting this amendment, we can serve this end by insuring that the moneys authorized and appropriated for defense purposes are utilized in the most efficient manner possible.

The reporting and auditing system required by this amendment can go far to enforce better management in the development and procurement of major weapons systems. Through better management, substantial cost reductions can be achieved, thus freeing resources for other essential purposes.

The amendment provides that cost, performance and scheduling information on major acquisition programs be provided not just to committees, but to all Congressmen. I, for one, would like the right to know how 40 percent of our entire national budget is being spent.

Mr. KEITH. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Anderson of Illinois substitute.

Mr. MELCHER. Mr. Chairman, I have voted on the teller vote, Mr. Chairman, with the minority which wished to limit expenditures on anti-ballistic-missile weaponry to research, development and procurement, eliminating funds for use of this terrible weapon at this time.

I believe that we must do research and development work on any system of weapons which potential enemies are developing; we must always match or exceed them in knowledge about weapons systems, even though we forgo immediate deployment for use in the interests of encouraging disarmament, or a termination of the arms race. We cannot at anytime forgo the acquisition of the knowledge necessary to match any weapons system which might be turned upon us.

In the Senate, where this matter was thoroughly and extensively debated, a proposal to terminate all activity in relation to the ABM—research, development, procurement and deployment—was defeated by a one-sided vote of 89 to 11.

An amendment to limit work on the ABM to research, development and procurement, without deployment, was defeated by a very close vote of just 51 to 49. Many Senators took the position which I support: the development of necessary knowledge and know-how must go on. Actual deployment for use should not proceed at this time.

If the motion to recommit this bill to committee takes the form of a motion to eliminate all work on ABM—research and development included, then I shall have to vote against it, Mr. Chairman.

This Nation cannot forgo the acquisition of the knowledge necessary to match any opponent's weapons. To do so would undermine the basic concepts of a sound defense policy.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON) for the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. JACOBS).

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois) there were—ayes 70, noes 77.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers.

Tellers were ordered, and the Chairman appointed as tellers Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois, and Mr. RIVERS.

The Committee again divided, and the tellers reported that there were ayes 97, noes 100.

So the substitute amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes, to continue the debate on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. JACOBS), the gentleman from California (Mr. SMITH).

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Chairman, I simply want to call to the attention of the Members of the House one sentence in title V commencing on line 13:

> Any Government agency shall furnish any information requested by either Committee on Armed Services with respect to the activities or responsibilities of that agency in the field of national security.

Mr. Chairman, I think the House would be very foolish to leave that sentence in, and I am simply mentioning it because someplace along the line I want to get that sentence out because our national security has to do with the CIA, with the FBI, espionage, sabotage, and all national security. We would not want to make that information available.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. ECKHARDT).

Mr. ECKHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I am for the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. JACOBS).

I should like also to say that I have voted for every military authorization of this type that has come up in my time in the Congress. But I am forced to vote against this one and one of the reasons for that is the procedure that has been adopted here.

When I first came to the Congress, one of the first things I heard was the Speaker asking a person who was moving to recommit a bill to the committee with instructions: Are you against the bill? The gentleman said, "I am against it."

I have thought when a man said he was against a bill he was expected to tell the truth.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. JACOBS).

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, I suspect the Committee is going to rule today that the "proper study of mankind" is not defense profits.

But I urge you, since this matter will go to conference, at least to vote for this amendment. Of course, the motion to strike will probably carry but at least vote for this amendment so that when this matter does go to conference we can tell the United States of America whom we represent that when it comes to Government business, everybody's business is everybody's business rather than the assumption so callously made by so many people in this land that everybody's businsss is nobody's business.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. GROSS).

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. JACOBS).

Mr. Chairman, I want the closest possible scrutiny of defense contracts. I have not forgotten the TFX aircraft scandal. I have not forgotten that the Comptroller General testified under oath before the Senate investigating committee that he could not obtain the information from Secretary of Defense McNamara that might have saved the taxpayers of this country hundreds of millions of dollars.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment and against the motion to strike title V.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS).

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, you have heard a lot of misinformation on this amendment.

If you want to have a ton of trouble, go ahead and vote for it. I never heard anybody so wrong as my dear friend, the gentleman from Iowa.

The General Accounting Office does not want this thing.

We have many who want to dip into the defense contractors. We tried to strike out this section because we do not want to get in something that we could not be sure of.

We will try to work out something in conference. But irrespective of the fact that the other body had a vote on this of 85 to 0, you will not see me standing up and voting for something that I fear will bring everlasting consternation and confusion to the Government.

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment to authorize the General Accounting Office to make a study of profits made by contractors on Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard contracts. It would also include profits made on NASA and AEC contracts which fall under Department of Defense requirements.

The results of the study would be presented to the Congress at the soonest possible date, but it could not be submitted any later than December 31, 1970.

The amendment would provide the General Accounting Office with subpena power. This study would be conducted on a selective basis in an attempt to get a representative group of companies that do business with the Defense Department.

There is a great need for an objective and comprehensive study of the profits made by defense contractors. In the past there have been studies, but they have come up with differing figures. One study, supported by the Defense Department, indicated that the profits are low. Another study, however, made by the recently appointed Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, has indicated that profits were at an industry average of 155 percent.

This amendment has been widely supported. It has been given the endorsement of the Comptroller General.

In addition, a similar amendment, which was introduced by Senator PROXMIRE, was given the support of Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman JOHN STENNIS. It passed the Senate by an 85 to 0 vote.

Mr. Chairman, I am a sponsor of H.R. 11762, which would provide for annual reports to the Congress by the Comptroller General on each Government contract in which the price was increased by 10 percent in excess of the original estimate or which was delayed in completion by more than 6 months beyond the estimated completion date.

It is time for Congress to assert its authority over military contracts in order to attempt to reduce costly overruns and slippages in schedules.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. JACOBS).

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers.

Tellers were ordered, and the Chairman appointed as tellers Mr. JACOBS and Mr. RIVERS.

The Committee divided, and the tellers reported that there were—ayes 89, noes 109.

So the amendment was rejected.

PERFECTING AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. RYAN

Mr. RYAN, Mr. Chairman, I offer a perfecting amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. RYAN: On page 16, after the period on line 13, strike out the remainder of line 13 and lines 14 through 25, and on page 17, strike out lines 1 through 13.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York is recognized.

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I find it most strange and curious that the committee has advocated deleting that part of section 501 which requires the Department of Defense to keep the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services fully and currently informed with respect to the Department's activities. What my amendment does is to restore that language. The committee must have had a reason for including it. There must have been a necessity or it would not have been here. I know from experience the lengths that some executive agencies will go to avoid responding to congressional committees. To strike out the language which makes it clear that the Department of Defense must be responsive to Congress is to deny Congress a means to exercise its responsibility and to require the disclosure of information which might otherwise be withheld. It is a very strange position, it seems to me, for the sponsor of the amendment to take. I am sure there will be rejoicing in the Pentagon if his amendment to strike section 501 is adopted.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. RYAN).

The amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further amendments to title V?

The question is on the motion to strike offered by the gentlemen from New York (Mr. STRATTON).

The motion was agreed to.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. OTTINGER

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

On page 17, immediately after line 13 insert the following:

"TITLE V.

"LIMITATION ON APPROPRIATIONS

"SEC. 501. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aggregate amount which may be appropriated under this Act may not exceed $19,213,074,000."

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, we are coming to the end of this debate. I am pleased to be the anchorman for those who think the authorization in this bill should be cut.

Those of us who feel very strongly as a matter of national priorities that some thing has to be cut in this bill to appropriate funds for the military procurement have tried to do it in the way the experts have told us would be the wise way—to become informed upon the individual items of this bill and to try to strike them one by one or to cut from them. We have experienced that we have not been able to cut one penny from the bill that way—from the ABM, or the shipbuilding that was added by the Armed Services Committee, or the C–5A, or the Cobra, or the AWAC, or the SRAM or the advanced manned strategic bomber, or the manpower limitations under this bill. We even incredibly failed to get a better system of accounting so that we could better avoid waste within the Defense Department.

But this still leaves us at the bottom line with that gnawing question of priorities, as to whether we should really be spending about $80 billion on the Defense Department, some 41 percent of our budget, some 60 percent of the free funds within our budget.

Defense appropriations now amount to 250 times what we spend to alleviate hunger within the United States. They amount to almost five times what we spend in its entirety on health and education and welfare within this country.

We are told we have to authorize all this money for defense as a matter of national security. There are many of us who believe that the national security is more threatened by internal explosion within this country than it is from any external invasion.

We are told that if we do not give the military everything it wants, there are not going to be any cities left for us to rebuild and there are not going to be any children left for us to educate. I believe that statement can just as well be turned around to say that if we do not do something for the cities of this country and if we do not do something for the impoverished who suffer amidst plenty in this country, there are not going to be any cities left for the military to defend. How quickly we forget the lessons of Watts and Newark and Detroit and the other cities that were devastated last year.

We have just experienced in these past weeks severe cuts in the model cities program, in the neighborhood development program, in health research, in education, in libraries, and in the Job Corps and other poverty and employment programs.

This very morning we read that the internationally acclaimed heart attack study in Framingham, Mass., which could save the life of any one of us here is having to be discontinued because of lack of funds.

This amendment would cut 10 percent from the funds authorized by the committee. It seeks to restore at least some sanity to the overall budget priorities.

Congressional Quarterly estimated, after a thorough examination of our defense expenditures, that $10.8 billion could be cut from our defense budget without impairing our defense.

The Brookings Institute, after similar thorough research and study, concluded even more could be cut, down to $50 billion or $60 billion.

This amendment would cut a mere $2.1 billion from our budget. We have spent since World War II $19 billion on missiles that were never put into place because they were either obsolete or did not work by the time they were to be deployed.

You will never convince me we cannot save 10 percent on this budget, $2.1 billion, and still have an adequate defense.

In the past Congress there were many motions offered by the gentlemen on the other side of the aisle to cut 10 percent from various budgets in the Congress. I was privileged to support some of them in areas where I thought the expenditure was wasteful and inflated. Some succeeded.

I submit, in the name of economy, to fight inflation, to permit sensible priorities, you should support this amendment.

There is no place within the budget where more waste has been disclosed than in the defense budget, from the C–5A to the B–70 bomber and 100 different places. The history of military procurement is replete with examples of huge cost overruns, payment of exaggerated prices and profits, and procurement of unused and unusable equipment. The $2.1 billion could probably be squeezed out of waste alone.

But there is another reason to support this amendment—to fight inflation. The greatest single cause of inflation is exaggerated Federal spending, and the greatest bulge in Federal spending is in the military.

Indeed, if the President delivers on his promises to end the Vietnam war this year, this cut may not be nearly deep enough. The savings on the $25 to $30 billion a year we are spending in Vietnam would surely produce more than this $2.1 billion cut.

I urge support of the amendment.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, it is always easy to say that the military is wasteful. They cannot talk back. Hit them with a meat ax. We do not need them until the bands begin to play.

As Churchill liked to quote:

God and the soldier we adore,
In time of crisis, not before;
Crisis past and all things righted,
God is forgotten and the soldier slighted.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment should be defeated.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from South Carolina has expired.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the pending amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I think we have had enough debate on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. OTTINGER). We have now been engaged on this bill for 3 days. There has been extended debate on all of these items. The House has worked its will on the numerical figures, and I do not believe we can really attempt to try to do now what we did not do earlier, and I ask for an immediate vote on the pending amendment.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. OTTINGER).

I shall not take much time, due to the lateness of the hour, but I have something on my heart which I think I must say at this particular time.

Mr. Chairman, most of us who serve in the Congress, and I think the vast majority of the American people, are very much distressed that there are those in high places on both sides of the political aisle who would seek to advance their own political ambitions at the expense of our country's international status.

I am sure that most of us deplore the unjustified criticism being made of our President's efforts to bring the Vietnam war to an honorable settlement. Last week former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, a distinguished Democrat, in a speech here in Washington before the Women's Democratic Club lamented the growing criticism of our President's efforts and our apparent decline in unity. He urged support for the President and not criticism for every step he is taking to end this unfortunate conflict. In saying what he did, Secretary Acheson proved himself a true patriot who places country above party.

Surely we are not unmindful that under our Constitution the President of the United States has primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations. In the Truman administration the then Republican Senator from Michigan and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the 80th Congress, Senator Vandenburg, established the principle followed by the Congress that "politics ended at the water's edge." This should continue to be our policy.

President Nixon is the President of all the people. He, no less than anyone else, strives for an end to the Vietnam war. The surest and quickest way to achieve an honorable settlement of this unfortunate war is to unite behind him in his efforts. Those who criticize his efforts, be they Democrats or be they Republicans are merely obstructing the realization of a final settlement. Those who advocate a fixed date for the complete withdrawal of our troops are actually advocating a surrender date. They advocate "cut and run," bug out, or call it what you will.

We daily look for some sign or signal from Hanoi to show the way for a settlement. To even the most anemic signs or signals we have affirmatively responded, but without a comparable response from Hanoi.

Those who persist in criticizing our President's efforts and who persist in a specific plan for our withdrawal are simply saying, unwittingly or not, to Hanoi that there is no need to negotiate—in due course the United States will capitulate. This we must never do. At no time in our history has this great country of ours, set upon an honorable course, hauled down its flag and surrendered.

Gentlemen—stop, look, and listen. Your country's future is at stake.

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, during this worthwhile and enlightening debate, we have heard numerous references to the importance of maintaining a strong industrial base, both for military security and to insure our Nation's continued prosperity. We have heard references to the necessity of taking advantage of modern technology in today's building programs. In this body, we are aware of the great technological strides being made by science and industry in the fields of propulsion, not only in space but on land and sea. Some of the technology which made it possible for man to explore the moon can be used by man on the earth. Some of the industrial planning for space achievement can be applied to one of the most difficult and practical problems facing the Nation: How to revitalize and rebuild our merchant marine. It is quite obvious if military craft, capable of skimming the earth's surface at 100 knots, can be built and utilized, those same craft will have commercial application.

I am told that the technology now exists to build air cushion vehicles capable of speeds up to 100 knots. Air cushion ships of comparatively short range are now in use commercially in Europe. I am told these ships could go great distances across the oceans and that they would have vast commercial, as well as military potential.

In this connection, I was most interested in Resolution 370, which was passed by the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States at their 70th national convention.

The resolution states:

MOON TECHNOLOGY FOR A NEW AGE OF CLIPPER SHIPS

Whereas, the Veterans of Foreign Wars is deeply concerned with the dwindling strength of the American Merchant Marine; and

Whereas, this fleet is a vital component of the nation's defense force, as well as a vital factor in America's trade and balance of payments position; and

Whereas, efforts to rebuild the Merchant Marine in recent years have been plagued by mounting costs, foreign competition and limited federal subsidies; now, therefore,

Be it resolved, by the 70th National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, that we take the lead in urging radical steps to apply the new technology of the Moon Age to a new fleet of clipper ships that can recapture the eminence on the sea that was the mark of this nation's rise to global leadership; and

Be it further resolved, that United States Navy and private shipbuilding interests be encouraged and directed to explore the feasibility of air-cushion ships and other radical designs that can move vessels at speeds up to 100 miles an hour, and engage in intensified research into nuclear power and other revolutionary forms of propulsion for both ships of war and merchantmen. A point in history is that when the war ships and merchantmen that won World War II have reached obsolescence the time has come to encourage new ideas.

I commend the VFW and their leadership for looking beyond today's horizons; both for our military security and our economic prosperity.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. OTTINGER).

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

I am merely going to take a moment or two to make clear what will happen to the motion to recommit. It appears that our fears were well founded. The minority leader has found someone who,

though having voted for the bill, will make the motion to recommit and that will be, as we understand it, as we have been told, to strike all the procurement money and all the research and development money for the ABM.

I just want to say this: When the motion is made to order the previous question, I hope that those who do not think that this is the right procedure will vote "no" as well as those who would like to have an opportunity to vote on the question of whether or not there should be a reduction in the overall authorization.

If the previous question is voted down, then there will be a motion made to amend by way of a substitute to provide, instead, for a recommit with instructions to reduce the total authorization by 10 percent.

So I urge this body to consider carefully what has happened with respect to this motion to recommit, and I urge this body to make clear that the procedure that is being followed in this regard is not really in accord with the spirit of the rules. The recommit motion is not being formulated by a person who has expressed his opposition to the bill by his vote in the committee but, instead, by the minority leader by his own admission. This is the position of the minority leader, who favors the bill and favors the ABM while he has gone around carrying in his hand the recommit motion. So the choice would be between a sham in the sense that the ABM position put forward is not really anybody's point of view, and we can either go for that, or we can go for a realistic, honest chance to express our views on the question of whether there should not be a modest reduction of 10 percent in the total authorization in order to help fight inflation, to effect some economy, and to try to get some of our national priorities reordered.

Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. As long as the gentleman from Minnesota took the well at this time and imposed upon the time of the body at this late hour, I think it is apropos that I allude to a statement that he made earlier today, which I believe demands a response. Earlier he bemoaned the transgression upon academic freedom because of a provision in this bill which is discretionary as it deals with the award of our R. & D. contracts to colleges and universities.

As is so often the case, it was again a matter of interpreting academic freedom on a one-way street basis. As I recall the gentleman's words, he said that provision was the most flagrant attack upon academic freedom included in any bill that has come before this House in the time he has been here.

But I would remind the gentleman from Minnesota, that where any college or university by an arbitrary action of a board, frequently prompted by coercion, deprives any young man of the right to benefit from the Reserve officer training program, it constitutes an attack upon his academic freedom. The ROTC program over the years has been successful and we should be thankful we had it before the last two wars. Since it is a voluntary program, authorized by Federal law, depriving any young man of his choice to avail himself of the benefits of it, is an arbitrary denial of his academic freedom. And I repeat that academic freedom is meaningful only if it is a two-way street.

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WAGGONNER. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ARENDS).

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I think one thing should be explained to this House. A moment ago the gentleman from Minnesota, if I understood him correctly, stated the individual who would make the motion to recommit voted for the bill out of committee.

May I simply inform the House he did no such thing. I happened to have his proxy. Without his instructing me one way or the other, I voted his proxy, because like many other dedicated Members of the House, I thought the bill should come to the House for consideration.

That ought to set the record straight.

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Chairman, we are at the close of this debate, and I want to urge the Members to vote "aye" on the previous question.

Mr. Chairman, during the course of these 3 days we have had amendment after amendment offered to strike and to take from this procurement bill money for every weapon that the Department of Defense has in every branch of our military service. There might be some argument for reducing the number of weapons we have in our Defense Department, but is there a logical excuse for denying the people of this country a defense weapon such as the ABM system?

First, they wanted to strike procurement money, and now they want to strike ABM, purely defense money. I personally think the motion to recommit is a logical motion, because, as the distinguished minority leader has said, once and for all we will have the opportunity to make a decision whether or not the U.S. Congress favors or opposes an ABM system; not whether we favor research money, not whether we favor deployment money, but whether we can have our cake and eat it too. So we are going to get the chance to vote for or against, in a clear-cut way, on the question of the ABM system. I am going to vote against the motion to recommit, because I am for that ABM system.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, many of us have sat through this debate in increasing sadness and disbelief.

We are dealing with huge sums of money, with the security of the country, with the future of the planet. All of us were elected to deal with these matters by similar numbers of citizens, in procedures designed to give an effective voice to the voters and to gain respect for representative government as the way that a free people should conduct their business.

I am sorry the debate has been punctuated by explosions of personal animus among Members, for I am one of those who has come to have great respect and affection for all the Members involved, including the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, who has always treated me with consideration and fairness.

It is my view that what has been wrong during these past few days is what is wrong generally with the way the House operates, and that is not something that can be blamed on individuals or cured by expressions of personal hostility. The fault is in the way we view ourselves, the way we take our responsibilities. This ought to be a place of high debate. There ought to be a clear record of how elected representatives voted on great issues. The proceedings ought to be relevant to the pulse of the Nation, ought to reflect some of the mood and concern of the world around us. Sometimes these things happen here, but more often they do not. I love this place. To be elected to it is as high an honor as I expect to attain. But we demean this place—and ourselves—when we allow procedural tricks to throttle debate on the greatest issues facing the country and to prevent our votes being recorded on these questions. I think it is fair to say that for many Members the last few days have reinforced the determination to begin soon to correct the rules that produce situations like the one we are in now.

Can anyone justify rules that make it impossible for us to have a record vote now on whether or not the ABM should be deployed? Does anyone think it adds to the prestige or effectiveness of the House of Representatives when we are literally not permitted to vote on proposals that are supported by half the Members of the United States Senate? Does it add to our prestige or effectiveness when men elected to represent millions of Americans are not allowed to speak at all, or are told to confine their remarks to 45 seconds?

What it does do when these things occur is to deny the House the opportunity to hear the views of millions of Americans in even remote proportion to their strength outside this House. So the House deludes itself that it reflects the feelings of the public, and increasing numbers of citizens doubt that representative democracy is functioning in this country. This does little to weaken the efforts of those who prefer government by decree, or government by confrontation, for government by democratic legislative process.

We have heard speech after speech today supporting the national policy in Vietnam. But to conclude from these speeches that the American people are united behind this policy, one would have to be oblivious of what is going on in the country. I do not rise at this moment to discuss whether there should be unity behind this policy. I simply want to observe that we fool no one but ourselves when we allow this sort of discussion to create that sort of illusion.

Similarly it is not primarily the merits of deploying the ABM that are in question in this situation. What is in question is a procedure that says we cannot vote on deploying the ABM so the people who elected us will know where we stood on this issue. Can anyone suggest that

doing business this way will increase faith in, or respect for, either this House or the concept of representative democracy?

What, in fact, is wrong with letting the American people know where we stand? The ABM was an issue in many of our campaigns. We have a new Member from Massachusetts, just elected, and his opposition to deploying the ABM was a part of what he won. Can it be that the people who favor deploying the ABM are afraid of a rollcall, or because they are afraid of being on record for deployment when they come up for reelection? And in any case should their fears—whatever they may be—be determinative of our procedures?

Surely we can find ways to protect the public from this kind of transgression of democratic process, even if we do not respect ourselves enough to protect ourselves from it.

Too much that happens here simply reminds everyone that we are not conducting ourselves as we should, that we are not conducting the necessary business as this decade, this period of trauma for the American people, requires us to do. We have greater obligations than we have met by our behavior today, or during this session generally, for that matter. Everything in our rules and traditions that impedes the efficient operation of democratic process—everything in committees and on the floor, everything from minority rights and seniority to how we determine if a quorum is present and how we record what occurs—all these things ought to be reexamined and overhauled soon.

The House of Representatives need not continue in its present condition. It dare not. I hope that if nothing else constructive comes of all the frustration and irritation of the past few days, a greater incentive—and resolve—to revise our procedures will survive. That would be an important gain, much more useful than acrimonious personal attacks.

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I yield to the gentleman from Kentucky.

Mr. CARTER. I would say at this time, with charity for all and malice toward none, now is the time for us to proceed with the business of the day and to have no more of the recrimination which we have had.

We have a great body here of distinguished people. Let us get down to our business. After all, we have work to do.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. With all deference to the gentleman, I will conclude by saying I believe that was what I was trying to do.

I hope there will be a sense not of recrimination but of reexamination of procedures and tactics, so we can say to the country that those things democracy requires of an elected body are in fact possible here. Sometimes as one watches these procedures one wonders if they have been concocted primarily to shatter the illusions of those who study civics in school or to minimize the relevance of those who are elected to serve here.

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts. I want to concur in the remarks of the gentleman from New York. In the last 2 days we heard the minority leader and we heard the minority whip quote Dean Acheson and ask us to keep the war out of politics.

We will be having a vote in a minute. Let us keep the vote out of politics. Let us have an opportunity to really vote on the real issue—not the issue of research and development but on the issue of the ABM. That is the issue. Let us take politics out of it. In the Senate the motion as proposed to us was defeated 87 to 12 but on the true issue, deployment of ABM, the vote was 51 to 49. This is the issue we should be voting on. The people are entitled to a vote on this matter.

Mr. DANIEL of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, section 402 relates to programs of the Department of Defense and the Armed Forces and the university community. It ties together the attitudes of colleges and universities and their record of cooperation with the Department of Defense and the Armed Forces in the areas of the Reserve Officer Training Corps and the military recruiting on the campus with contract and grants for research and development to the school and to individuals on the faculty and staff of that school. While it does not preclude a contract or grant, it requires a 60-day notice to the Congress before such an award can be made. In the report to the Congress, a full disclosure of the purposes, cost, and duration of such a contract or grant is required together with a summarization of the record of the school, college, or university with regard to cooperation on military matters such as the Reserve Officer Training Corps and military recruiting on its campus.

Included in the research and development request is approximately $291 million for research projects at universities. While the committee strongly believes that national security depends critically upon first rank science and technology, and, further, that certain skills both in basic and applied research is often found only at our Nation's universities, we also believe that when the scientific efforts are believed to be equal at several institutions, such research projects should be placed in universities which are cooperating fully with the Department of Defense in the national defense efforts.

The second major reason for including this reporting provision is to allow the Congress to ascertain the validity of such contracts and grants.

The amount authorized and funded for such research has been given on a lumpsum basis and Congress was never apprised until after the fact how such funds were spent. By the prior reporting, the Congress will be able to enter a more complete partnership arrangement concerning the direction and utilization of such funds for research and development purposes.

The committee is concerned about an overconcentration of research projects at any one school, college, or university. By requiring this type of report, it believes that it will pinpoint this issue, thus requiring Department of Defense personnel to face the problem of overconcentration. It will also furnish to the Congress sufficient information so that, if diversification is not achieved voluntarily by the military, Congress will possess sufficient information to consider legislation to achieve that goal.

There are 5,000 separate research and development contracts involving 260 universities and colleges. For practical purposes, the Congress knows nothing about them. The Congress is responsible for the funds for these contracts. This section requires that a greater amount of information be made available to the Congress before any additional contracts can be awarded.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, I voted yesterday for the amendment to strike the $345.5 million sought in this fiscal 1970 military authorization bill for President Nixon's Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system.

The amendment, as you know, was defeated—defeated soundly in a vote that threatens national security rather than strengthens it. By rejecting yesterday's amendment the House has voted to make a downpayment on a $11 billion military weapons system whose workability is in doubt and whose escalatory impact in the arms race will be staggering. Even if the system will work—and mounting evidence indicates it will not—the Safeguard ABM would not provide meaningful protection for our land-based, fixed-site Minuteman ICBM silos. Studies have demonstrated that the Soviet Union could easily neutralize Safeguard ABM and overwhelm it—merely through the use of simple penetration aids. Nor would ABM protect us from a full scale Chinese missile attack.

The Safeguard ABM system is primarily intended to shield the U.S. land-based missile force against a Soviet attack. Yet there is no hard evidence from the White House—nor from the Pentagon, for that matter—that the Soviets would be able to challenge, destroy or seriously damage our diverse and dispersed nuclear retaliatory forces of Minuteman, Titan, and Polaris missiles and manned bombers in the next decade.

I am not opposed to continuing research and development on an anti-ballistic-missile system. The Pentagon will have a half billion dollars in fiscal year 1970 for the continuation of research, development, testing, and evaluation of the whole variety of defenses against a future missile attack on this country.

The $11 billion in taxpayers money we would save on the deployment of the Safeguard ABM system could be diverted to urgently needed domestic programs—programs for the poor, for the aged, for the burgeoning student population, for education, for our urban rebuilding and transportation programs, for water and air pollution abatement, for the health of our citizens and for a measure of relief for our overburdened middle-income taxpayers.

Mr. Chairman, I also support the amendments to delete $36 million in research and development funds for the

F–5 Freedom Fighter plane; to cut $86 million sought for Cobra helicopter procurement; to cut $17 million for research and development and $60.4 million for procurement in the SRAM air-ground strategic nuclear missile program—a program that lags 2 years behind schedule, that shows a cost overrun of 194 percent over the original estimate, and that has yet to produce a successful series of flight tests.

I support, moreover, the amendments to defer the $481 million requested for procurement of the fourth C–5A giant transport aircraft squadron; to defer $483 million earmarked for two more nuclear aircraft carriers; to delete $45 million for the new AWACS airborne radar system, $16 million for an improved CONUS interceptor, and $75 million for the new SAM–D missile.

Only through the diligent and persistent investigations by Members of Congress in the past year did the Nation become aware of the startling—indeed scandalous—Pentagon mismanagement, of lack of management, in defense procurement programs—mismanagement that led to staggering cost-overruns for hardware and exorbitant profits by contractors.

I support the amendment that would require the Department of Defense to submit quarterly reports on major weapons systems and projects in research and development—or in production—the reports would be audited by the General Accounting Office and transmitted to the Congress. The GAO would be empowered to conduct independent audits of the projects and to subpena books which defense contractors have in the past refused to supply.

I support, still further, the amendment to require the General Accounting Office to provide the House and Senate Armed Services Committees by December 31, 1970, with a study of the profits made by contractors and subcontractors on negotiated contracts with the Department of Defense. This amendment also provides GAO with subpena power to obtain needed information.

And I support the very critical amendment seeking to establish a semiannual reporting procedure on expenditures and programs for chemical and biological warfare, and to prohibit development of delivery vehicles for lethal agents. This amendment would also prohibit secrecy in foreign and domestic shipping and storage of CBW material, thereby improving U.S. compliance with international treaty commitments; insure notice of open-air testing, and put a ceiling on stockpiles as of June 30, 1970.

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Chairman, life in America is beset by problems today—rich and poor, it does not matter who or where you are. Crime, inflation, taxes, and pollution affect everyone. Indeed, there is a feeling Americans are being cheated despite our material affluence.

For what has happened is that while national wealth has increased, the lion's share of it has gone into fueling America's military machine, a staggering monolith that has come to have its own life—free of public approval or congressional review.

What this means is that we have allowed our tax dollar to be wasted on costly weapons systems that do not really increase America's defense, while our domestic needs wallow in perpetual fiscal crisis.

And if we have been guilty of procuring useless new weapons, the Military Establishment is also guilty of violating our trust—indulging in wasteful practices costing billions and allowing contractors to earn excessive profits.

Indeed, although the threat to our national security has not increased in recent years, and we continue to have the world's most powerful military machine, defense spending continues to escalate, while our real national priorities are ignored.

The latest Harris survey indicates that over half of the American people place defense expenditures on the bottom of their list of spending priorities. What Americans want is more money for job training, the fight to curb crime, medical care, improved schools and better housing, and the battle against pollution.

The facts are that, in fiscal 1970, health, education, and welfare spending totals only $3.2 billion, while the swollen defense budget is peaking $82 billion.

Social spending will equal about 1½ percent of the Federal budget. Defense, combined with the $16.5 billion interest for postwar debts, will account for over 60 percent of the budget.

So when Americans complain they are not getting their fair share of America's wealth, they need only look to the defense budget. For Congress recognized its commitment to help create a decent life at home, but we have allowed ourselves to be bled for wasteful armaments.

The gap between amounts Congress authorized and what was actually appropriated for domestic social programs this year totals some $6 billion. And it is estimated that over $30 billion would be needed to meet the full cost of domestic programs within the next 3 years.

However, the funds for combating crime, aiding education, and improving the environment have been absorbed by the military machine, with procurement rising $37 billion in a decade, to say nothing about the multibillion-dollar cost of fighting in Vietnam.

But let me make it very clear: criticizing military spending does not mean the United States should compromise its defenses. The fact is, our military superiority over the Soviet Union has reached the stage of overkill, and alleged stories of Russian buildups are pure fantasy, which if believed, could only lead us to escalating the arms race to doomsday proportions.

The U.S. Polaris nuclear submarine fleet is unmatched; we have three times as many ships as the Russians do; we have the only intercontinental bomber force, as well as numerous advanced strategic armament systems unknown to Communist Russia, and we have the world's largest Army, 3.5 million soldiers.

Is there any chance of our defenses being depleted or our security slackened? Obviously not, but there's an awful lot of waste, inefficiency and false assumptions in that defense budget that should be eliminated.

The review of defense spending should start with H.R. 14000, the $21.4 billion military research and development and procurement authorization before us.

What is involved is our efforts to assure more efficient and economical allocation of funds for defense programs that are essential to the national security. Probably about $10 billion is at stake.

We are also concerned about the post-Vietnam division of the $30 billion being spent on the war. The needs of the poor, the environment, and the oppressed taxpayer must be met. Yet defense industries are pressing for new weapons to avoid problems of economic conversion such as lower corporate earnings.

But behind the public debate at issue over defense spending is the nature of our future defense postures. From an isolationist fortress America to a global pax Americana—the administration is hard at work designing post-Vietnam foreign policies and assigning defense dollar costs to each, which could create defense budgets ranging from $35 to $115 billion for the 1970's.

If many of the dubious strategic systems incorporated into this hastily, ill-conceived procurement authorization before us are approved, ultimately they will cost the Nation billions and threaten to accelerate the nuclear arms race.

Mr. Chairman, I lend my support to prudent efforts to curtail the senseless escalation of America's military machine and the dangerous staging of global confrontations inherent in these unilateral, defense buildups.

Simply stated, the Defense Department has not presented Congress with sufficient rational explanations for why we should siphon off billions needed to meet the aspirations of Americans at home. The Safeguard ABM, the C–5A transport, the legally questionable chemical and biological warfare program; the reliability of the advance manned strategic aircraft; the credibility of the short-range attack missiles and the necessity of new naval buildups—all of them are vulnerable to the reasoning of sane men, suggesting that for too long, Congress has given the Pentagon carte blanche to do as it pleases.

If the problems plaguing us are going to be solved, then, I believe we better justify every tax dollar allocated for defense spending to the American taxpayer if we want to restore trust in the Defense Department, and more importantly, in the belief that we have the resources to secure the promise of America.

Mr. PREYER of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, if there is one lesson we have learned well in this country, it is that the leaders of the Soviet Union respect military power and understand resolve. The Cuban missile crisis is the most recent example. We must keep our country strong, at whatever cost.

It also seems probable—even if it is not absolutely clear—that the Soviets are determined to destroy our American deterrent power. All signs indicate that this is why they are continuing the development of the SS–9 missile—to take out our ICBM's even in their hardened sites—their attack submarines—to take out our Polaris subs—their nuclear Polaris-type submarines—to catch air

manned bombers on the ground. Thus, they could destroy the delivery systems of our three deterent systems—the ICBM, the Polaris submarine, and the B–52 bombers and we would be helpless, no matter how many nuclear bombs and missiles we might have. This frightening possibility—even probability—must be met. And this is why I am in favor of the deployment of the ABM system. It would serve to protect two of our three weapons systems—the ICBM and the B–52 bomber.

Thus, the immediate reason for the ABM—to make sure our deterrent power is invulnerable.

But there is a long range benefit that accrues from emphasizing the ABM: this is because of the role that purely defensive systems can play in a cutback in offensive nuclear weapon systems. Undefended offensive weapons invite a "hair-trigger" posture and lead to dangerous talk of "launch on warning" and "preemptive strikes." Defensive weapon systems on the contrary are a stabilizing influence; they do not constitute a threat of immediate destruction and so improve the chances for a negotiated arms agreement with the Soviet Union.

Finally, defensive weapons systems are in the humane American tradition. Their purpose is to save lives, not destroy lives. An emphasis on defense, rather than solely on offensive weapons, can help destroy the false image of America, as an aggressive "imperialistic" nation and make clear the true America that seeks peace—to all the world and to ourselves.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I voted for every one of the amendments to reduce the 1970 military procurement authorization bill. I did not do so on a reflex basis, nor out of paranoid feeling toward the military-industrial complex. Rather, I did so because I found upon careful examination that each amendment could have been accepted without impairing our national security. Furthermore, I am convinced that some of the amendments, such as that offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) to delay deployment of the Safeguard ABM, would have increased national security.

It is time to examine our long-held assumption that the road to safety and prosperity is paved with ever-increasing military appropriations. It is time to face up to the fact that our obsessions with communism and with the arms race have caused us grieviously to neglect our own people. It is time to acknowledge, and I say this with no personal rancor toward the chairmen of the military committees, that what is good for Charleston, S.C., for the State of Georgia, or for the State of Mississippi may be very bad for the country.

If I were to make a general criticism of the amendments offered to this bill, I would say they do not go nearly far enough. The state of our Nation requires that broader and deeper cuts be made in our military spending. In my view the bulk of our military establishment does not contribute to national security. Much of it exists to serve outmoded and discredited concepts of foreign policy. Much of the rest exists to serve nothing but itself.

If we were to examine our defense budget with the same zero-base attitude we attempt to apply to other Government programs, the results would be startling.

Why do we spend billions to prepare for further Vietnam-type wars, when the events of the past decade conclusively demonstrate that our national interest requires us not to win these wars but to steer clear of them? Why do we spend billions to prepare for naval warfare with the Soviet Union, when we know any such conflict would quickly escalate to global nuclear war and the fate of our fleet would be of no importance? Why do we spend billions to prepare for a major land war in Europe, when we know we will not risk nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union for anything less than a direct attack on our own soil? Why do we spend billions on deployment of air defense and missile defense, when at the present state of technological development we know these efforts to be futile?

We cannot go on this way. We must preserve national security, but we cannot afford military make-work projects. We cannot afford to rush mindlessly into a new strategic arms race that will increase international tension and with it the probability of nuclear war. And we cannot afford to continue to neglect the needs of our own society.

Let there be no doubt that these needs are urgent. Health, housing, education, employment—every one of these is a national disgrace.

The United States ranks first in military strength, but we are not even in the top 10 in life expectancy or infant survival. This is not because good food and medicine are not available; it is because many Americans simply cannot afford to pay for them. Infant mortality in the black ghettos is twice the national average. Life expectancy on the Indian reservations is 42. Twenty-five million Americans are presently unable to afford adequate diets.

Similarly, American education is fine—for those who can afford it. But a child born in an urban ghetto has only a 30-percent chance of graduating from high school, and if he graduates he will have only a 50-percent chance of having received what is normally considered an eighth grade education.

Unemployment in our ghettos, Indian reservations, and depressed rural areas now exceeds the national average sustained during the Great Depression, and it is going up. The Russians never tire of telling us how there is no unemployment in their country. There should not be any in ours either.

These problems can be cured, but not without the infusion of large amounts of money. This money is not available. It is being spent on such Edsels as the F–14A fleet defense plane, which is designed to launch a missile that probably would not work in an attempt to defend an aircraft carrier we do not need against a supersonic bomber threat that does not exist in a war in which none but the most incompetent foreign policy would ever involve us.

It is said that America has the resources to maintain an inflated military budget and to deal with its domestic programs at the same time. This may be true in theory, but the practical political fact is that we have an either-or situation. As our shining supersonic war machines roar over our stinking cockroach-infested ghettos, let there be no doubt that the former are prime contributors to the condition of the latter.

The advanced manned strategic aircraft program will cost at least $12 billion and the F–14 will cost even more, yet the need for either is most dubious. How many teachers could we train with this money? How many doctors could we send into the ghettos? How many children could we save from the irreversible mental retardation that results from early protein deprivation? For the cost of the advanced manned strategic aircraft, we could build more than 1,200 public schools, each capable of educating 1,000 people per year for 30 years. It staggers the imagination. In order to finance these unnecessary weapons systems, the President is actually cutting back on such essential programs as job training, aid to medical research, and aid to education.

This is madness. We must choose between the needs of our people and the needs of the military-industrial complex, and we must choose the former.

Before closing, Mr. Chairman, I must comment on the debate that accompanied this bill. I for one feel that the conduct of this debate has called into question the very adequacy of our traditional procedures. Except in the case of the ABM amendment, we were forced to operate under gag-rule conditions so severe as to be almost comical. The author of the amendment to reduce the air defense authorization was forced to spit out his case in 45-second segments. Proponents of the amendment to reduce the new manned bomber authorization were limited to a single 5-minute speech because the committee chairman felt the matter just should not be discussed; one wonders how the other body was able to discuss it for the better part of 3 days without giving away vital national secrets. In a crowning act of high-handedness, the leadership denied us the opportunity for a record vote on even a single one of the amendments we supported.

Mr. Chairman, the days of the sacred military budget are over. It will not be easy to cut such a powerful and resourceful bureaucracy as the military-industrial complex down to size, but it must be done. The danger of nuclear war and the needs of our people demand that it be done. Some of us have made a small start this year. There is little doubt in my mind that our numbers will grow steadily, and that eventually we will succeed. I hope we will be in time.

In my view, the bill before us represents a distorted sense of priorities and wastes a great deal of money. It provides authority for weapons that would not work, weapons we do not need, and weapons we are better off without. It contributes significantly to locking millions of Americans into the vicious cycle of poverty. And it has been railroaded through the House by procedures which do no credit to this body. For these rea-

sons, I shall vote against it on final passage.

Mr. CLAY. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the amendment which relates not just to military money—but to military manpower. If peace in Vietnam is a real and sincere commitment of this Nation, then steps should be taken to reduce our military manpower to a peacetime level.

The Pentagon has taken the same liberties with congressional responsibilities for determining the size of U.S. military forces—as they have with congressional responsibilities for appropriating the money for military activities. Their requests are based on their assumption of our benevolence in the name of security and on our inability to question military-made policies. I am the first to concede that the Congress and the public are in the dark so far as military analysis of policy is concerned. We are not given to understand their true reasoning—due to past negligence in congressional scrutiny of military policy—we have lost touch with the military view of its responsibility for policy.

We are maintaining a force of 3.5 million men in our armed services. At least 800,000 of those men were added as a direct result of the war in Vietnam. Our President has stated his intent to withdraw certain troops from Vietnam and should, therefore, not object to the deactivation of these troops as they are withdrawn.

The present strength of our military manpower is determined by a scale little known to the American public. A study group at Columbia University, under the direction of Prof. Seymour Melman, notes that present force levels assume we must be prepared to fight three wars simultaneously—a major nuclear war in Europe, a major conventional war in the China area, and a small war elsewhere. Only recently I learned the acknowledged fact that we are maintaining military forces in accordance with what military minds believe would be necessary should we fight a land war in China.

I daresay the American people would find little security in these calculations on which military manpower is based.

It is this sort of view of our defense responsibilities which has given the State Department its long third arm for making foreign policy. We have military installations all over the world—including 429 major and 2,972 minor overseas military bases staffed by over a million men. Our very presence in these large numbers in these faraway countries leaves the crucial determination of our commitments to the discretion and interests of the State Department and to the foreign powers affected. The State Department freely relies upon and influences military placement of our forces as a main determinant of foreign policy agreements and relations—which are clearly beyond the reach of the Senate. When it becomes clear that we have been committed to certain questionable policies and activities, the American public and, indeed, the Congress—is left to wonder why or how it all came about.

We are left to wonder or to speculate why we maintain such numbers of men all over the world. We are left to speculate why there are 1,400,000 American soldiers on foreign soil—and 500,000 tax-supported dependents. Secretary Laird told us recently that he would cut back 100,000 troops, but he did not tell us that in West Germany alone, we maintain 228,000 men and their dependents—not for defense, but to boost the German domestic economy which buys support and instigation of American policy.

At present, not the Congress nor the American public has any working knowledge or control over the determination of the strength of our Armed forces. It is determined by the generals who flout their trumped up notions of security and war over the heads of the public interest and welfare. With the present military establishment to protect us, we do not need foreign enemies. They will, given the authority they presently wield, protect us right into holocaust.

It is, therefore, with deep and sincere concern that I give my support to the Mikva amendment to this military procurement authorization before us—that we must deactivate troops withdrawn from Vietnam rather than reassign them and in this way, reduce the numbers of men to a level more consistent with a peacetime level.

Hopefully, the Congress will, in the near future, be given an opportunity to determine exactly what basis should determine that peacetime level. By adopting this amendment, we can reduce U.S. troop strength from its present 3.5 million to about 2.8 million. It is a step and a start for reinstigating congressional authority over military manpower policy.

I rise, also, to make the point that the excessive money outlay for this proposed research and new weaponry to wage war and to flex our military muscle—does not fall within my interpretation of this Government's responsibility for the defense and security of this Nation.

It is not in the interest of this country that defense has become our No. 1 industry. It is not in the interest of this country that almost 50 percent of all Federal Government outlays goes to defense. It is not in the interest of American people that we lay victim to Pentagon powers and their ability to wield their militaristic views upon American commitments. We cannot tolerate much longer the domination of our welfare by the warfare notions of Pentagon elite and profit-driven industries.

Mr. BRASCO. Mr. Chairman, I have listened intently to the debate on the military procurement bill for the past three days. I had hoped that my own research, embellished by debate here in the House Chamber, would answer many questions, not only on my mind, but on the minds of millions of Americans.

I was deeply distressed when debate was severely limited, and the national question of "How much should we spend on defense programs?" was just superficially touched. Like the majority of Members of the House, and the overwhelming majority of Americans, I believe that America must be strong militarily; and, to that end, we must expend the necessary funds.

However, I believe that a strong America also needs well-educated, well-fed, well-clothed, well-housed, and medically attended people with a real opportunity to grow with their country. We must show our countrymen that we are willing to spend some small portion of our national budget on them, as well as billions for the military, when the question of need in the latter category is in doubt, and while questions as to whether or not some of these programs are just excess fat given to the defense industry go unanswered.

My own conscience is deeply moved when the Armed Services Committee rejects an amendment to delete $1 billion from this bill that was not requested by the Defense Department or the Chief Executive, and which they gratuitously added to the budget of the Department of the Navy.

Overall expenditures in this bill exceed $21 billion. I cannot believe that we cannot prudently trim this and use the excess to begin to fight our domestic problems.

Mr. Chairman, not too long ago, the House was locked in a bitter fight to increase our education budget by $900 million. The argument then was that we could not afford it. I find that totally inconsistent with what is going on in this Chamber today. I could cite case after case in which our reasoning followed along the same lines—shortchanging the taxpayer, as well as those in need. The balance we seek to strike here today is one that I personally find I am unable to agree with. Therefore, I have no alternative but to vote against this bill.

Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Chairman, yesterday, some of my friends were chiding me saying that my opposition to the Pike amendment was due to the fact that the Newport News shipyard was in my constituency. It is, of course, but in that particular case the amendment did not materially affect the carriers abuilding there. Today, I was prepared to oppose a proposed amendment which would have deleted the construction funds for the CVAN-69, the second *Nimitz*-type carrier. My opposition to these drastic proposals was not entirely parochial. Regardless of where these ships were to be built, I would have felt the same way. My opposition is sincere.

I am most pleased that a decision has been made by the proponents not to offer the amendment which would have cut out one of our carriers. Had it carried it would have, in my opinion, been detrimental to the best interest of this Nation.

Mr. Chairman, aircraft carriers—particularly nuclear carriers—are the very backbone of our naval seapower. Naval experts have told us that we need a minimum of 15 such carriers to provide for our national defense.

They are used to provide bases for tactical aircraft operations on short notice in places where land bases cannot be used. They also give this Nation an "extra out" when land bases in foreign countries are denied us.

These floating bases are, fast, maneuverable, and difficult to pinpoint on any enemy's target. But in truth, attack carriers are relatively the least vulnerable

of our major weapons systems. They cannot be pretargeted because of their mobility. Unlike land bases, the carrier cannot be preplanned for a ballistic missile attack. A fleet of 15 such carriers places 95 percent of the world's population within range of the aircraft she carries.

Admiral Rickover says:

> We no longer have friendly oceans to protect us. The Atlantic and Pacific, once our shield and our protection, are now broad highways for launching attacks against us on, above and beneath the surface of the seas. From our island position, the only way by which we can project our national power beyond the range of our land bases is through the Navy. For this, other than by all out nuclear war, we must depend primarily on our attack carriers.

There is no question in my mind that this country has to have, at all times in the foreseeable future, an adequate fleet of up-to-date aircraft carriers.

The big question is time. To build and equip a modern aircraft carrier takes 5 years. If we do not have enough of them when war erupts, it will be too late—no matter what effort and money, we may then be willing to expend.

The Navy has presented us with a package program giving expert consideration to the mix of the various type of vessel needed.

The CVAN–69 is the second nuclear-powered attack carrier of the *Nimitz* class. This ship and a third planned in fiscal year 1971 will be procured on a multiyear contract from a single shipbuilder in order to acquire them at the least cost.

This ship is authorized in order to maintain our carrier force capabilty. She is scheduled to replace the *Bon Homme Richard* which will be 30 years old on her replacement date in 1974.

The third carrier CVAN–70 is scheduled for delivery in 1976 replacing the *Oriskany* which at that time will be 30 years old.

Secretaries McNamara, Clifford, and Laird have confirmed the need for this program.

I understand the gentleman's amendment would have deleted the funds for the CVAN–69, the second of the nuclear carriers in this program. We have already contracted $133 million in lead-time items. Delay in completing the funding of this vessel would only have increased its cost. But all of this is academic because we have to have it now.

For the sake of the adequate defense of this Nation, I am pleased the amendment was not offered.

Mr. HANLEY. Mr. Chairman, for the past 3 days, the House of Representatives has been debating one of the most important and indeed costliest bills ever presented to it for consideration. The military procurement bill for fiscal 1970 is unique in that it is the first one truly dissected by this body. For the first time, at least since I have been a Member of the House, the military procurement bill has been subjected to fine-toothed scrutiny. In this connection, I feel I have had two principal responsibilities during this consideration. The first involves supporting an adequate defense posture, as I have always done. The second involves examining in detail the variety of expenditures in this bill to establish to the best of my judgment and conscience where responsible cuts and deferrals could be made without impairing our national security. I feel I am meeting this latter responsibility by my votes on the individual amendments which we are presently considering and which have been considered. I feel I shall meet the former responsibility by voting for the passage of the final version of this bill.

Like my colleagues, Mr. Chairman, I have spent a good deal of time studying the issues at hand. I have followed the hearings before both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and I have paid particular attention to the debate on the bill in the Senate. It was my considered, conscientious opinion that the Senate version contained a number of provisions which are not essential to an adequate defense posture, either present or in the near future, that are of questioned and questionable value to that pasture, and whose deferral or cutback would not upset the balance of our national security. After lengthy consideration, I reached the decision that we did not need the entire complement of the controversial C–5A being sought by the Air Force, a project which in my estimation has been grossly inflated and horribly mismanaged, and so I supported that cutback. After lengthy consideration and study, I reached the conclusion that more research and development were needed on the Safeguard ABM system and so supported the amendment to continue funding for R. & D. but to defer actual deployment at this time. I also supported the amendment to require the Defense Department to submit quarterly reports to the General Accounting Office on all major systems and research and development projects. A rash of reports on cost overruns of these programs prompted me to the belief that this sort of requirement was long overdue. I also supported the CBW amendment, which I felt was a needed improvement in the committee passed bill.

There is another element in this measure, however, Mr. Chairman, which deserves a comment also. We have a responsibility to provide for the national security of our country; we have also a responsibility to establish priorities which will afford us both adequate security on the international scene and proper progress on the domestic front. Just yesterday there were ominous rumors making the rounds about a cutback in model cities funds. We are already far behind in our battle against water and air pollution, and unless adequate funding is provided soon our educational system will be in shambles within a few years.

I shall support the bill on final passage, but I want the record to show that I felt it could and should have included cuts which would not have impaired our national security and which would have allowed us to move forward with our badly needed domestic programs.

Mr. KARTH. Mr. Chairman, I have listened to nearly every aspect of this debate. In fact, I am impressed that so many Members of the House have done likewise. As I expected, everyone desiring to speak has had an opportunity to do so. They have been afforded that opportunity during general debate or during the past 2 days under the 5-minute rule. The debate has been healthy. A record has been made that can be studied in the libraries and the schools of our land; the pros and cons of each amendment have been set forth so they can be read and a judgment formed by those who are desirous of doing so. Let us hope the public will.

My personal study of this bill prior to the debate led me to certain conclusions. After listening to the debate, I must say my judgment has not changed.

I have often said and I say again: there is nothing that can contribute to a weakening of our national security more quickly and more completely than wasteful duplication, unnecessary and unwise expenditures of funds, and the demand to go beyond an intelligent appraisal of our need. Whether the need is for the military or civilian sectors of our Nation is not the question; the question is going beyond that need. The question is, Is there waste? Is there duplication and redundancy? Will certain actions on our part further accelerate the arms and armaments race between nations?

I am one who disagrees strongly with those who insist that our Nation is the lone culprit; that, if our country refrained from providing for a national defense, all other nations would do likewise; that our leaders are the rascals and the Hos and the Maos, and others, are nice guys. Please be assured, that is hogwash, pure and simple.

However, as I have studied each of the questions I have raised—and I have studied them often and long—I have come to the same conclusion.

We have gone beyond an intelligent appraisal of our need.

We have indulged in unnecessary duplication.

We are guilty, I think, of unnecessary, costly, and unwanted redundancy. In other words, our defense expenditures are too large.

Yes, I believe strongly that we must maintain a viable national defense posture.

But any time we spend unjustifiably—in or out of defense—we weaken, not strengthen, our national security.

For these reasons I have voted for amendments to reduce this authorizing request. I hope a reasonable figure can finally be arrived at.

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, those who have disparaged U.S. naval aircraft carriers during this debate seem to base their case primarily on two highly tenuous claims: First, that surface ships are overly vulnerable to enemy attack in the missile age; and second, that they are too expensive in comparison to overseas tactical air bases.

Neither of these arguments makes much sense to me. The carrier today is less vulnerable and less expensive by a considerable factor than the available alternatives. Indeed, the carrier is one of this Nation's most valuable weapons. Without it, I am afraid that our Navy would be less than superior to the Soviet Navy.

I would like to address myself to these two points—vulnerability and cost—which seem to be the issues at hand.

For decades, the Congress has heard charges that the carrier is too vulnerable—sitting there high on the water like a duck. I would point out that these arguments were heard in this Chamber long before the advent of tactical air missiles and even before this Nation built its first carrier. And despite the lessons of the past 30 years, we are now suddenly asked to start taking this canard seriously.

Why, for example, should we believe that a high-speed, unlimited endurance, nuclear-powered, attack carrier, operating without restriction over 70 percent of the earth's surface, is more vulnerable than an unmoving tactical airstrip planted on foreign soil? If surface vessels are becoming increasingly vulnerable to attacks by submarines and missiles, then I would point out that this is doubly or triply so for land-located overseas airbases.

A carrier, because of its mobility and toughness, is at least as survivable in a general war as a foreign land base, which is a fixed point, easily targetable by missiles as well as aircraft. On the other hand, the carrier is less vulnerable in other limited kinds of wars, since it is neither subject to ground attack, as in Vietnam where hundreds of land-based planes have been destroyed or damaged by mortars, nor capture as in Korea.

Vulnerability is often cited as a general criticism of the carrier without consideration of the alternatives. All military forces are vulnerable in time of war. Our job is to provide the least vulnerable forces we can afford.

Which brings me to the subject of cost. Carriers are not more expensive than overseas land bases, even if we had sufficient overseas airbases, which we do not. In 1953, the United States had rights to over 551 bases abroad, 120 of which were air bases. Today, the total is down to 173, including only 35 airbases, the use of some of which is highly restricted by agreements with the host countries. And I think it is safe to assume that our already shrinking number of overseas bases will continue to diminish, either through our own decisions to cut back forces or political eviction.

It is imperative that this Nation maintain a strong forward posture in the strategic areas of the world. If we cannot do this by land bases and carriers, then we must do it by carriers alone. And if we are to maintain our control of the seas and the air over the seas; if we are to cover our own and friendly warships and merchant ships; if we are to maintain our sealines of communication; and if we are to cover and support ground forces and amphibious operations, then we must have an assured base structure on which to deploy our aircraft.

We have recently been evicted from our extensive, carefully constructed, and very expensive base network in France. This resulted in further crowding of base and support facilities in Germany and England. Our presence in Spain, Libya, Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, and Thailand, is tenuous at best. When the Vietnam war is concluded, we will abandon most, if not all, of our airbases there.

In the 1970's, we would be reduced to an assured foreign-base structure in Europe with sufficient capacity to support about five tactical air wings at the most, and in the Far East about three air wings. My point is that, short of an actual combat situation, the maximum assured buildup capacity of available land bases would total only seven to eight air wings.

As a further complication, other nations are becoming increasingly unwilling to permit flights of military aircraft over their sovereign territories. Only on the oceans does freedom of overflight parallel the freedom of the seas.

I think, therefore, we could make a case for continued construction of aircraft carriers even if they were more expensive than overseas land bases. However, on a weapons system basis, carriers are not more expensive.

The kind of quick-response tactical air deployment capability the Air Force needs for just one air wing would cost about three to four times as much as buying and sending an aircraft carrier with its air wing to the same crisis area. And this is just the mobility costs, not the costs of ferrying the land-based aircraft to the scene, not the costs for base rights nor for many other things. The higher costs for land bases are due to the fact that such a quick-response would require assigned airlift which must be charged to that response capability.

If we look at these costs from the standpoint of mobility readiness for 10 years to respond to just that one crisis—that one crisis where prompt action might deter aggression or stop it in its tracks—the cost of a *Nimitz*-class carrier and its 10-year operating expenses would be over $900 million. Similar mobility costs just for the new airlift aircraft necessary to deliver all of the required operation and maintenance supplies to the same place would be over $3 billion.

Carriers are expensive, but it is absurb to compare the cost of a carrier with the cost of paving an airstrip in some foreign country. We must compare all the costs.

Each land-based tactical air wing and its basing system costs about the same as a carrier air wing and its basing system. This year, the cost is about $500 million per wing in average overall procurement, operation, maintenance, direct and indirect support costs. Thus, when we apply a unit cost of production formula, we can avoid the tunnel-vision errors of comparing only one piece of equipment with another.

But cost and vulnerability aside, the carrier has and will always have one major advantage over land-based aircraft, and that is flexibility. There is no way we could deploy land-based aircraft to some remote trouble spot in a hurry unless we already had a base there.

A carrier can be deployed with a crisis, shifting as the situation develops. And if this applies generally to all carriers, it is especially true of nuclear-powered carriers. I am fully confident that just as nuclear power meant a quantum jump in the effectiveness of submarines, the same applies to carriers.

A nuclear-powered carrier like the *Enterprise* and the *Nimitz* now under construction can steam at full speed for unlimited duration without refueling. And since they do not have to carry propulsion fuel like fossil-fueled carriers, there is greater capacity in these vessels for aviation fuel and other consumable combat supplies. In my opinion, the advent of nuclear power makes the case for continued construction of carriers even more compelling.

And it is this kind of speed and flexibility which is necessary if we are to keep ourselves out of future Vietnam-type entanglements. Carrier task forces successfully prevented aggression in the Quemoy-Matsu crisis, and again during the Lebanon crisis. The United States was able to move quickly to the trouble spot, firmly declare its attention and prevent the outbreak of a major conflict.

It could be argued that the United States might have cooled the Vietnam situation many years ago with the deployment of 10 to 12 carriers along the Vietnam coast, with a Marine expeditionary force aboard. This awesome sight might well have dissuaded Ho Chi Minh from invading South Vietnam.

It also could be credibly argued that carriers may be our most useful future weapon for preventing future Vietnams. Swift deployment is the most effective way to change an aggressor's mind.

Carrier task forces, therefore, are one of the most useful, flexible, and effective instruments of our national power. They are mobile airbases, moving as necessary to meet the current threat, and they operate without political restriction on 70 percent of the earth's surface. This gives us airfields anywhere we need them, on any ocean, and along any coast on a few days' notice.

And we should not be lulled into thinking that we could do away with escort ships and destroyers if we did not have carriers. Those ships would still be necessary. The sea control, antiaircraft defense, assault bombardment and fire support which they provide is still vital today as a part of our overall deterrent posture.

Mr. Chairman, too many times in the past this Nation has neglected its carriers, and this has proved disastrous. I would hope that we have learned from the lessons of World War II and Korea that a strong carrier force is vital to preserving the peace. And I think we should forget the old wives' tales about their expense and vulnerability once and for all.

Mr. CASEY. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS) the chairman, and my distinguished colleagues on the Armed Services Committee for the diligence of their work in bringing this most important bill H.R. 14000 before us.

It is, certainly, a great amount of money we are being asked to authorize for defense procurement. But I doubt if any Member of this body would have the temerity to attempt to put a price tag upon the liberty and freedom of just one of his constituents—let alone the Nation, the Western World, or perhaps

even the very survival of civilization. And make no mistake about it, this is what we are talking about here today.

I can readily understand and even sympathize with those of my colleagues here, and some of our people across the Nation, who question certain of the programs contained in this bill. The very strength of our country is that we can have such soul-searching inquiries into the advisability of proposed expenditures for the public welfare and common defense, such as the Safeguard ABM system or the C–5A aircraft procurement. But I tell you, as I have told my own constituents who questioned the advisability of this program: If we err—I would rather have it be an error of safety in having a more than adequate defense, than to wake up and find we have too little, too late. And again I say, make no mistake about it—for that is a distinct possibility we face.

Mr. Chairman, I have listened with deep interest to the debate on this measure, and I have carefully examined the provisions contained in this bill. They have my full support. I think the time is long overdue when we should begin to rebuild our aging Navy, and replace the floating relics of another era with a modern fleet armed and equipped to meet the contingencies of the dangerous years ahead.

I think it is time we arm and equip our men in all our services with the finest arms and materiel available. I also think it is long past the time when we should give them the "go-ahead" to use it to bring the bitter struggle in Vietnam to a successful conclusion—but unfortunately, that is not within the scope of the legislation before us today.

Surely all of us here yearn as deeply for that golden age of peace on earth as anyone else within our country. But fortunately for our Nation, the Western World, and all civilization, the majority of us here are not blinded to the hard practicalities of 20th century international politics and the inherent dangers which face us. And until these dangers are resolved, and that great golden age dawns for all mankind when armaments are no longer needed, I am confident that this body will continue to see that our Armed Forces are provided with the best "big stick" available to preserve our freedom and liberty from encroachment by those whose stated goal is to destroy us.

Mr. HELSTOSKI. Mr. Chairman, as we debate the military procurement authorization bill, I find many areas of the bill which are objectionable to me, and I shall support any amendment which will lessen or remove the features to which I have objection.

First of all, the total authorization is excessive. It is only $47.1 million below the revised Laird budget of $21,394,960,000. Further, it is $1.346 billion greater than the Senate-approved version.

I cannot overlook the fact that one of the most menacing dangers to the country at this time is runaway inflation. This bill could contribute to that menace, and we can ill afford the continued rise in our spending policies.

I have consistently urged that we re-

evaluate our priorities in spending. We urgently need to reassess the need of our people here at home and the continuing erosion of the dollar makes it imperative that this Congress reduce spending wherever we can.

I would not object to the spending of over $21 billion if it were for peaceful purposes and for curing the ills of this Nation. If this money was used to rebuild our cities, fight crime, help our aged, educate our children, promote health programs, fight poverty, permit lower taxes for the average wage earners, I could see a valid reason for accepting such a bill. But to use this inflationary amount for military purposes, some of which have not yet been thoroughly proven, is something I cannot support. I do not wish to diminish the necessity of security of the Nation, but in President Nixon's own words uttered during his campaign for the Presidency, he pointed out the necessity of a complete reappraisal of the Federal budget.

President, then candidate, Nixon said:

> It requires a reappraisal of America's commitments abroad in all areas, foreign aid, military, and in other areas. It requires also an examination of the American military establishment at home, because the military shouldn't be a sacred cow.

Second, there are several items in this authorization bill which are unnecessary to the security of our Nation. Their need, according to several members of the Armed Forces Committee, has not been proved by the Department of Defense.

Mr. Chairman, I shall support any amendment which would delete funds for the C–5A aircraft. The history of this aircraft has been one of waste and inefficiency that can hardly be matched by any other defense program of the past decade. There have been cost overruns and the craft continues to be plagued with technical problems.

I shall support the deletion of funds for the procurement of the ABM. There is a great difference of opinion among the experts as to whether the ABM Safeguard system can be made to work. Deployment of this system could compel a Soviet response that could escalate the arms race without added security. Proponents of the ABM system claim this military component to be a deterrent to Soviet attack, but none of them wish the system to be deployed in their own backyard.

Mr. Chairman, there has been much controversy generated over the proposed MIRV—multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles—system. The Defense Department explains that the American MIRV is being developed for a specific purpose, namely that of being able to penetrate a heavy Soviet defense of cities and thus maintain the credibility of the American deterrent threat. If the need disappears then the MIRV could become the subject of proper negotiations.

Mr. Chairman, if we are to develop the MIRV system just for the sake of having something that we can negotiate from, this is altogether spending too much money for just plain talks. While the committee recommends the approval of the authority sought in this bill for the continuance of the MIRV system, I contend that the expenditures involved should be completely removed.

Looking at the overall picture of the budget for all defense or military allied projects, we have set a figure totaling $105.2 billion. This, Mr. Chairman, is 70 percent of the total administrative income of $152 billion for fiscal 1970.

My calculations say that this is too much for military emphasis. Military expenditures have increased $37 billion over the past decade. Today, virtually all income taxes paid by individuals are swallowed by the military. It is high time that we reallocate our efforts toward forces of construction rather than pursue forces of destruction.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the pending amendment on the subject of chemical and biological warfare.

For a long time I have been gravely concerned about the indiscriminate testing, transportation, and the development of chemical and biological weapons, commonly known as CBW.

It was not so long ago that our attention was directed to the secret world of the CBW which the Congress routinely financed as part of the military budget. In Dugway, Utah, some 6,400 sheep died when the wind shift carried a nerve gas away from the test range. Can you imagine what would have happened if the wind had blown this deadly gas toward Salt Lake City or any other nearby community?

To be sure, the Government reimbursed the farmers for the loss of their sheep, but what value of reimbursement could we have placed upon human life if it had been needlessly taken?

It has also been revealed that testing of CBW agents was being performed at Fort Detrick, the Army Biological Warfare Research Center in Maryland. This is just a short distance from the Nation's Capital.

CBW components have no such defense as that against conventional weapons, missiles, or nuclear weapons. Chemical and biological warfare is not a respecter of an enemy force against which it is directed. It does irreparable damage to all human and animal life exposed to this danger.

In a moral sense, I do not believe that the people of this Nation would ever sanction the use of deadly lethal gases and disease germs on defenseless civilian populations.

When we consider chemical and biological warfare, no release of this warfare agent is a minor one. A small particle of such a release could travel hundreds of miles and could start a devastating epidemic.

Clearly we should consider the fact that these agents can backfire and infect the forces using them.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment would let us know what is being done in the field of CBW. For too long, the Defense Department has been developing, testing, transporting, and disposing of these deadly agents without consulting Congress. We are responsible to our constituents and we want to know what the Defense Department is doing in this area. This amendment would furnish us with

the information we desire to have on this problem.

We are considering today a highly complex and unpopular part of our defense structure and we are making an effort to deal with it in such a way as to achieve some congressional control and national understanding which we feel is needed.

The amendment we are presently considering is a modest step in the right direction. It strips away some of the unnecessary secrecy which surrounds our CBW program. Providing Congress with basic information on the scope of our CBW program will make any other restrictions easier to enforce and will prevent a public fear which could turn into a mass emotional issue.

Mr. Chairman, we have heard many voices recently questioning the need for chemical warfare and biological research programs as part of this country's defense. We cannot obtain this information to give the American people because of the Army's obsession with secrecy. To give the American people the facts on this type of warfare we should adopt this amendment so that a public report which would include as much information as possible can be made.

Americans have a right to expect their Government to use great caution in maintaining such an awesome set of weapons. They have a right to expect their Government to take all diligent care in eliminating any danger which could be caused by careless handling of these weapons. This amendment will enable us to meet this responsibility to our people.

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Chairman, I propose to vote in favor of H.R. 14000, as reported by the House Armed Services Committee. In the normal course of events, I would consider that vote a sufficient recording of my strong support for an adequate defense posture for this country, generally, and for the specific recommendations of the committee. But these are not normal times, and I feel impelled to voice my unqualified endorsement of the committee's report and to commend the membership and staff of the committee for their diligent and penetrating examination of the crucial issues involved.

I want particularly to record my concurrence in the committee's judgment with respect to the proposed Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system. Little purpose would be served at this juncture by a further recital of the pros and cons of this proposal. But I would ask those who oppose even this modest initial step in deploying a ballistic missile defense system to ask themselves certain fundamental questions:

First. What if, as a consequence of our failure to initiate an ABM deployment at this time, we reach a point where the balance of strategic forces between the United States and the Soviet Union is altered in ways which produce a nuclear war which might otherwise have been averted?

Second. Or what if we lack a capacity to ward off a missile attack on some of our cities by the Chinese Communists? One need not answer the question whether the Chinese are likely to launch such an attack to welcome the kind of protection that the Safeguard system, if fully deployed, would provide. Because such a defense is feasible, we need not rest our security on assumed rationality.

Third. What if the absence of an ABM defense should so impair the credibility of our diplomacy that over the long run we find the balance of power in the world has shifted in ways which imperil our vital security interests? Then, if war should come, it might be a war risking the very survival of the Nation. Our whole purpose must be to avert such a possibility.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, the issue is not so much whether it can be demonstrably proven that a ballistic missile defense system will contribute meaningfully to our defense in the event of nuclear attack. Rather, the question is whether the absence of any defense might so alter perceptions of the strategic balance as to trigger an attack which otherwise might not have occurred, or so weaken our diplomatic posture in the world as to invite aggressions, damaging to our vital security interests, which might otherwise have been deterred.

While I know of no way to demonstrate that a failure to initiate deployment of the Safeguard missile defense system at this time would inescapably produce these consequences, the chance that they might argue conclusively for me that this is a chance we simply cannot take. Two successive Presidents—for all the differences in the specific systems proposed—have arrived at this same judgment. Considering the consequences of a misjudgment on this matter, I, for one, do not propose to withhold my support for any defensive measure that might conceivably represent the difference between the success or failure of deterrence.

Again I wish to congratulate the members of the committee for its penetrating analysis of this and other issues involved in the defense authorization bill. They deserve our unstinting gratitude, not only for their handling of the substantive questions involved but for demonstrating anew how the committee system, by which this body is able to perform its manifold tasks in a statesmanlike manner, and upon which we depend in performing our legislative duties, is still the best means of assuring that these major issues of public policy will receive the exhaustive consideration they merit.

In World War II we had enough time to arm and to defend ourselves against our enemies. Our time has run out, for today with sophisticated weapons we no longer have the opportunity to arm and to strike back. We must be in a position of retaliating now.

REVIEW OF THE TOW MISSILE

Mr. HANNA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call the attention of my colleagues to page 44 of the committee report on H.R. 14000. On page 44, under the title of "Tow Missile," we are treated in five short paragraphs to the committee explanation for doing away with one of the Army's most important weapon systems.

It seems rather remarkable to me that while our colleagues in the Senate, after 2½ months of careful debate and consideration included the authorization for the Tow missile system in their bill that our good friends on the House Armed Services Committee dismiss this rather vital system in five paragraphs.

Obviously the explanation in the committee report is unsatisfactory. And after a careful examination of the facts, I am convinced the decision of the committee in not authorizing the Tow system is incorrect.

At this point it would be helpful if I outlined the features of the Tow system and discuss some of the arguments offered in the committee report.

WHAT IS THE TOW MISSILE SYSTEM?

The Tow missile was developed for use by the infantry and air cavalry. It is designed as an antitank defense missile that can be easily, quickly, and efficiently launched from almost anywhere on the field, or from a helicopter, jeep, or other light ground vehicles.

WHAT ARE ITS ADVANTAGES?

Its main features are that it is lightweight, portable, capable of withstanding exposure to the elements, and requires little maintenance—more than 100 missiles can be launched without even a battery charge. It is wire guided and therefore will not expose the launching position, since no energy is radiated from its guidance system.

The actual Tow launcher costs one-fifth that of a General Sheridan tank, which serves as the launcher for the Shillelagh. The Army also estimates that in future procurement the actual cost of the Tow missile will be less expensive than Shillelagh.

Let us take up, one by one, the arguments against Tow. First, the committee report suggests Shillelagh can be "repackaged with lightweight guidance and control elements" making it as easily portable for field use or use by helicopter as Tow now is.

This argument is nothing more than wishful thinking. Shillelagh was developed for, and has only been used in conjunction with, the General Sheridan tank. Exhaustive Army studies have clearly demonstrated that to repackage Shillelagh in order to make it the all-purpose missile would take 3 years at a cost exceeding $50 million. Even after this, the Army expects that procurement unit costs for Shillelagh would be more than they are for Tow, while Shillelagh would still retain many undesirable features that could not be worked out.

Argument two tells us that the present unit cost for Tow is more than twice the cost of Shillelagh.

The facts suggest something entirely different. The Tow missile has just gone into production and the costs referred to in the committee report include the development costs. The Army reports that once production is fully underway the unit cost of the Tow missile will actually be less than the unit cost of the Shillelagh.

The committee report is certainly misleading in its comparison of the unit costs of Shillelagh and Tow. It compares a missile that has been in production since 1966 to one that is just getting into production. A much better basis of comparison would have been putting the two systems initial production costs side by side. Only then would we have a fair basis on which to judge the actual unit missile costs.

One other point needs to be made at this time. The committee in considering unit costs fails to take into account the life cycle cost of each unit. By this I mean the cost of the unit, not only in production, but also once it gets into operation. In this area the Tow missile is, by far, the more economically efficient.

Tow requires almost no maintenance in the field. On the other hand the Shillelagh requires periodic maintenance. The Tow missile is almost completely immune to environmental damage. The Shillelagh missile is particularly vulnerable to damage from the battlefield environment. Once out of the protective environment of the General Sheridan the Shillelagh easily falls victim to mud, sand, water, and fungus. This vulnerability also makes it prone to damage during shipment and field handling. Tow, because of its carefully developed container, has in repeated tests shown itself resistant to damage.

If we are to be careful managers of the taxpayers' money, we most certainly have the obligation to review the entire cost analysis of a weapons system. When we put the Tow system in this perspective, its economy becomes rather evident.

In argument three the committee report alleges that the Tow missile launcher costs "nearly half the cost of a General Sheridan."

Once again we are not given any indication as to what basis was used in arriving at this statistic. Are we once again talking about a development cost versus a production cost? Most probably we are, and if we are, the committee statistic is grossly misleading.

In fact, the best information available, both from the Army and the company producing the launcher shows that the unit cost of production is less than one-fifth of the General Sheridan.

The fourth and final argument offered in the committee report suggests the Army can manage on one missile, and offers us the "sage" advice that this could undoubtedly be done by a reasonable effort to develop the indicated alternatives for Shillelagh.

It seems to me we have heard this "all-purpose system" discussed before. As a matter of fact, the last fellow who suggested an all-purpose weapon found himself engaged in the most embarrassing controversy of his prominent career. Obviously I am talking about former Secretary McNamara and the "all-purpose" TFX.

The point is the Army cannot, nor should it be required to develop one "all-purpose" missile that would not perform any function with efficiency.

Granted there are similarities between the Tow and the Shillelagh. Certainly in terms of range, accuracies, and lethalities the missile systems are comparable. But there the comparison ends. The Tow missile system, contrary to what the committee report terms a "redundency," is in fact a different concept from Shillelagh.

Tow is a mobile, lightweight, recoilless, nondetectable, and easily maneuverable missile system. Shillelagh is exactly the opposite. Tow is designed to be used by the infantry; Shillelagh must be mounted on a tank.

In terms of performance the Tow is designed as an antitank defense or attack missile which can be launched from almost anywhere. The Tow missile launcher can be placed in situations for firing that would be impossible for any other comparable system. And because its guidance mechanism radiates no energy it is virtually undetectable to the enemy.

As I previously stated, to make the Shillelagh perform the functions for which the Tow was designed would be virtually impossible. Not only would costs skyrocket well beyond present outlays, the delay in producing the "repackaged" system would be most harmful to our national interest.

Just as one example, the Departments of State and Defense have already, because of the success of Tow, brought the system to the attention of NATO and arrangements for testing Tow in allied countries is in the negotiating stages.

The U.S. Government has offered Tow as a direct sale or as a coproduction program with one or more NATO countries to counter the Russian tank threat. Several countries have shown sincere interest and are currently negotiating with the Department of Defense for service tests in Europe.

The adoption of Tow as a standard antitank weapon for NATO will satisfy important military requirements, to say nothing of the economic benefits which will accrue to the United States.

For each missile produced under the terms of this coproduction program, the foreign nation would pay the U.S. Government over $350. This would help pay a pro rata share of development and nonrecurring costs of the weapon. There are few if any U.S. military weapons that can claim a cost-sharing provision and yet meet a critical military threat to the NATO Alliance.

To delay the Tow concept, just when it is beginning to go into production, would be false economy. Especially is this true in light of the pessimistic expert opinion of our ability to "repackage" the Shillelagh.

I urge the House to restore at least the $142 million for Tow authorized by the Senate.

If the explanations offered in the committee report are the only reasons for discontinuing this system then I suggest we are proceeding on the flimsiest tissues of argument.

It is neither economically sound nor militarily wise to discontinue production of Tow missiles. If we want to demonstrate responsibility on this important matter our only course is to restore the authorization.

Mr. PODELL. Mr. Chairman, this year has marked a watershed in how the Congress treats, considers, and debates adoption of military budgets.

In past years, constantly increasing sums of money representing taxes of millions upon millions of citizens, has been appropriated for military purposes with little, if any, debate.

Closed rules have been the rule, and sums exceeding $70 billion have passed this body with a minimum of discussion or questioning.

I do not call into doubt the sincerity or devotion to our country of those gentlemen among us, past and present, who have acted in such a manner.

Yet it has become increasingly and damningly obvious that many of these funds have been abused by contractors, small segments of our Armed Forces, and employees of Government charged with enforcement of these same contracts.

These evils and abuses have shaken the entire Nation, eroding confidence of millions of citizens who are paying the bill.

The list of failures, partial disasters, incomplete successes, and cost overruns is as sad as it is long.

They are all there: Planes which do not fly. Rifles which do not fire. Vehicles which are death traps. Outrageously expensive or never delivered systems. Our list is almost endless.

The abortions of the past are just as bad as the revealed failures of today.

We must prevent further disasters which will cost the Nation prohibitive sums.

Further, we must assert congressional control over spending of such massive sums.

This House possesses power of the purse, and it must not only carefully scrutinize expenditures when they are requested, but must also ascertain how money is being spent on an ongoing basis.

By doing so, we would ensure fiscal responsibility, tighten essential civilian control over the military, ensuring that dangerous as well as unsound projects are prevented or limited.

In such a manner we can begin to control what is obviously an entire secret world replete with poison gas, bacteriological warfare, and the deployment of such horrors abroad.

Only inattention, ineptitude, and irresponsibility has allowed us to arrive at our present pass. Now we stand aghast at what we have allowed to be created and perpetrated.

Our danger is immediate. Our duty is clear, control must be exercised.

But how?

The executive branch of Government has grown constantly in power at expense of the legislative branch.

Although this has been a recurrent phenomenon throughout American history, the imbalance existing today is too severe and fraught with permanent menace to the balance of our basic institutions.

The executive branch possesses a tool for scrutinizing and criticizing government fiscal matters.

This is the Bureau of the Budget.

It cannot serve two masters.

Rather than have Congress seek influence within this arm of Government, we must seek to make another branch serve the same purpose, securing and guaranteeing fiscal responsibility.

Such a branch of Government now exists ready for the hand of Congress. I refer to the General Accounting Office, headed by the Comptroller General of the United States. In effect, he is the chief accountant of Government.

When commanded to do so by Congress, GAO has audited and brought to account any given Government contract.

Written into each such contract is a reserved right for GAO to do exactly this.

It is well known that GAO, through no fault of its own, is somewhat underutilized for the function it is so admirably fitted to perform.

We have it in our power to rectify this situation, ensuring fiscal responsibility, without creating a new Government agency.

Any added cost Government would incur through expansion of GAO, pales before massive sums already wasted on weapons projects already revealed to Congress and public.

I sponsored a measure which would have automatically commanded GAO to audit all Government contracts of any kind involving overruns exceeding original contract cost by more than 10 percent.

One hundred eighty-four of my colleagues from both parties joined me in sponsoring that measure.

I thank them for their cooperation and efforts. A direct spinoff and slight modification of my measure was introduced and passed in the Senate.

This is the so-called Schweiker amendment, applying the GAO auditing principle to major weapons systems instead of all prime Government contracts.

This brings us to today and the amendment being offered by my distinguished colleague from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN).

His amendment would require that the Secretary of Defense submit to Congress quarterly status reports on major acquisition programs. It would also empower the Comptroller General of the General Accounting Office to audit this reporting system and make independent audits on major programs which deviate from the original plan in terms of cost, performance or schedules.

It would also give the Comptroller General power of subpena.

Although this amendment is a departure from my original measure and applies only to major military acquisition programs, I have decided to support Mr. WHALEN'S amendment wholeheartedly.

For it admirably fits all requirements recent events have shown must be institutionalized.

Fiscal responsibility would be a built-in guarantee on major acquisitions. An existing arm of Government immediately responsible to Congress would handle the task.

Constant scrutiny would be guaranteed.

Service personnel, contractors, and civil servants are put on immediate notice that nonperformance, nonenforcement of contracts, or deliberate evasion will be revealed almost instantly, and punished accordingly.

Above all, it is a full disclosure measure. Those who function effectively will aid the Nation's total defense effort. Those who do not, will be mercilessly exposed by the Secretary's report and the Comptroller General's auditors.

Finally, we shall, by creation of such a new check and balance, again rebalance what has become a potentially disastrous imbalance in respective powers of various branches of Government.

The legislative branch of Government shall cease to become a mere group of elected officials docilely appropriating whatever our military demands.

It shall be a body able to judge past performance before it once more becomes an appropriating instrument. With such reports sitting before us, we shall know whether or not a contract deserves further funding.

It is only elementary fiscal commonsense.

The executive branch of Government cannot do other than hold this body in far more respect than it has in the past.

If we do not guard our constitutionally guaranteed prerogatives jealously, we shall deserve to see them further eroded. The American people lose their prerogatives along with us. Therefore, enactment of the Whalen amendment to this bill rectifies constitutional imbalance, enforces fiscal responsibility, ensures full disclosure and guarantees the American taxpayer something more for his military dollar.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I had intended to offer an amendment to the military procurement bill similar to that passed by the Senate on the matter of social science and other research. This amendment was proposed by the junior Senator from Arkansas and was adopted in the other body by a vote of 49 to 44 on August 12.

I share a great deal of the concern Senator FULBRIGHT expressed about the direction and effect of military-sponsored research. The diversity of research projects presently funded by the Department of Defense, and the enormous complexity of these programs has not been clearly understood by the Congress or, I suspect, by the Defense Department.

The House Armed Services Committee did adopt the second part of the research amendment passed by the Senate, and the identical language may be found in section 203 of the House bill. This language specifically prohibits the funding of research projects unless they have a direct and apparent relationship to military requirements. Since part of the Fulbright amendment is included in the bill before the House, I have decided not to offer further changes. I will instead take a few minutes to share with the House a few points which my study of the amendment has revealed.

The Defense Department has been involved in programs which are clearly beyond their own direct research needs. There has been a serious lack of control over the military relatedness of these programs in the past. Recently too, defense involvement in research has become an issue in itself at the universities. It has caused problems for some dedicated and highly talented scientists who have been working under defense research contracts.

Because of the need to control military science research programs, I would strongly urge the Defense Department to follow the reduction guidelines offered by the Senate amendment. Its purpose is to make a modest cutback in funding of Federal contract research centers, other social and behavioral science research, and research in foreign institutions. More precise control must be asserted by the Department over social science studies related to foreign policy, the conduct of overseas research for Project Agile, and for basic research programs for universities participating in Project Themis. Congress is increasingly concerned about the scope of these programs, and a responsible effort to better define their direction and reduce unnecessary expenditures must be made.

The House Armed Services Committee indicated its concern over the course of the research and development program in approving section 402 of the bill which requires a full disclosure of the purposes, cost, and duration of a contract or grant made to a college or university. In a succinct statement about the lack of knowledge surrounding research and development contracts the House committee said on page 111 of its report, "for practical purposes, the Congress knows nothing about them." I fully agree with the reasoning of the committee that the requirement for prior reporting will provide the Congress with the information it needs to develop a better understanding of the utilization of research and development funds.

At the same time I am disturbed with other language at the end of this same section, 402, which indicates that such research projects should be placed in universities which are cooperating fully with the Department of Defense in national defense efforts. Support of research at a particular university and that university's position with respect to the ROTC and military recruiting are separate issues and must be dealt with separately. To link them will only exacerbate existing problems.

The Department of Defense should provide the Congress with a readable report on its current and projected research and development activities for military science research. My own study indicates that the Congress needs to continue its examination of these programs. For example, I am concerned that research directly relating to foreign policy issues may be self-serving, of dubious quality and of low utility. The report should describe in clear detail the reasons for Department of Defense supported foreign policy research at present levels, the costs and benefits of such research, an explanation as to why such research is not being sponsored primarily by the Department of State, and case studies of a substantial number of specific projects.

I would also suggest that scientists and professionals concerned with basic and social science research throughout the Government increase their efforts to broaden research undertaken by other departments. There is increasing national concern over all priorities, including research, and I feel that perhaps the Office of Science and Technology in the Executive offices could serve as the capping agency for discussion of research objectives in the Federal Government.

In relative terms the $400 million in the research, development, test, and evaluation budget is very small. It is the equivalent of one-half of 1 percent of the total defense research and development budget of $7 billion. Within that $400 million, something under $50 million is earmarked for social and behavioral

science research. However, the impact and importance of this $50 million is demonstrably greater than its monetary relation to the remainder of the research and development budget. It is precisely because of the interaction between our defense posture and policies and our research efforts that these military research programs play such an important role.

Thus, by continuing to absorb a disproportionate share of the research funds, the Department of Defense may influence the order of priorities in a manner which is not consistent with the overall national welfare. I continue to be concerned with the important and compelling need to fund research in other segments of our society for the enormous problems of housing, transportation, and pollution, to name but a few. It is my hope that the importance of imaginative, carefully considered requests for research funding by other agencies and professionals will be recognized, and that this effort to examine the military research programs will spark new interest and concern for the other areas that desperately need attention.

Mr. ROBISON. Mr. Chairman, the voting situation we will apparently face as debate on this, the 1970 military procurement authorization bill, draws to an end, has taken a sudden, unexpected—and, to my mind, unfortunate—turn.

In what is an ill-advised effort to fuzz up the only true issue involved in the longstanding national debate over our need, now, of an ABM system, I understand that the recommittal motion will be one striking out all ABM moneys as now contained in the bill—I repeat, all moneys, including not only those provided for advance deployment of the Safeguard system, but also the $400.9 million provided for further research and development into the Safeguard system or, hopefully, a better follow-on system against the day when there is clearer evidence than now of our need for the same.

My opposition to the deployment of the Safeguard system, now—or for deployment now, for that matter, of any ABM system—is a matter of longstanding record.

That opposition represents a position I have consistently held to since 1967. It is honest opposition, based on conviction and such commonsense as I can muster in the midst of all the ambiguities that have always surrounded this difficult question. And my reasons for such opposition to deploying any such system now were again fully set forth by me on yesterday, and are a part of the record on this measure.

However, I have never been opposed to further research and development in this field—and have never voted, specifically, against research and development moneys. As a matter of fact, I know of no one in this House who is opposed to research and development in this field, as against the day when, in this rapidly changing world, we might wish and need to shift to a defensive weapons system of this nature.

Accordingly, I cannot—and will not—vote for the anticipated motion to recommit.

But I believe it is crystal clear that the vote on the recommittal motion is not one on the only true issue involved in the ABM debate—which is not research and development, but deployment now of an unneeded, unreliable, counterproductive weapons system that, as I said on yesterday, will not buy us one dollar's worth more security than we now have.

If the recommittal motion fails—as it seems bound to do—under the circumstances thus forced upon me I shall have to vote against this bill on final passage.

Perhaps I would have anyway, since it contains far too much money—being $1.346 billion greater than the amount approved finally by the other body in the companion measure to which it gave such careful and detailed attention—but now, having lost all opportunity to cast a record vote against ABM's deployment, I do not believe I have any other alternative.

Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, much has been said within the past few months about the military-industrial complex which stokes the flames of chauvinism and aggression in this country. Certainly there is substantial basis for this view. Nevertheless, as I examined the bill now pending before the House, I was reminded of the comment recently made by Tom Wicker of the New York Times that the actual source of the abortive spending policies currently being pursued by our Nation was not a military-industrial complex, but rather a military-congressional complex. If this measure is passed in its present form, that comment will have become—or continued to be—a reality.

Some of the authorizations contained in the bill are necessary. Many others, however, are of marginal rationality—and a few defy credibility. Taken as a whole, the policy inherent in the proposal is that if the United States has several times as many troops, bombers, aircraft carriers, attack fighters, interceptor fighters, offensive missiles, defensive missiles, destroyers, tankers, radar installations, helicopters, and assorted other weapons as any possible enemy, we have a sound deterrent force and can sleep in the refreshing peace of security.

The easiest and most accurate answer to this mentality is, of course, that such buildups merely trigger similar responses by our potential enemies; thereby only exacerbating the weapons race and providing less, not more, security. Hopefully, the world will someday understand this principle. I recognize, however, that such a day is not yet upon us. In the interim, therefore, the answer to those who would protect us via potential overkill must be that while a meaningful deterrent force is necessary, multiple deterrents are neither necessary nor desirable.

Federal spending is obviously not unlimited. This fiscal year we will spend something very close to $193 billion. This means that every cent we waste on an inflated military budget means another American without adequate food, clothing, or housing.

I am not alone in these thoughts. Several of my colleagues, a majority of them from the Armed Services Committee, offered amendments today which would have removed much of the "water" from this bill. This measure as it stands now is often overly generous to the point of immorality.

Why, for example, does the committee feel we need a new nuclear attack carrier, when we already hold a 15 to 0 superiority in attack carriers over either the Soviet Union or Communist China?

What possessed them to add $1.024 billion to the Department of Defense's request for other naval vessels?

How can we rationally spend $275 million for procurement of the F–14 fighter-bomber without adequate research and demonstration to assure us that we are not making the identical mistake we made with the F–111B?

Why should we authorize a fourth squadron of the infamous C–5A's in light of evidence showing that the 59 already in the air fleet are an adequate number, that there are many less expensive alternatives to the C–5A—such as the vast number of C–141 currently being used for the same purposes—and that this would mean adding congressional blessing to Lockheed's egregious $2 billion overrun on the C–5A contract?

Finally, and most importantly, how can we blithely launch President Nixon's $8 to $20 billion Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system when an overwhelming majority of the scientific community questions its reliability and an equal percentage of our most respected foreign affairs advisers have grave doubts about the wisdom of adding the weapon to our nuclear arsenal? The amendment which was offered would in no way halt testing and development of the ABM. It would have, however, prevented immediate deployment.

This action was imperative. The scientific evidence against Safeguard is enough in itself to dictate extreme caution. The probability of failure of any given Spartan or Sprint missile is 34 to 59 percent. There is a 72-percent chance that one or more of the vital radar installations will be out of service at any particular time. Just yesterday, we all received a letter signed by over 400 members of the computer profession stating that the ABM's computer subsystem is not technically sound. And scientist after scientist has already stated that the Soviet Union could easily overwhelm the system with offensive missiles even if it were deployed at this very minute.

Nor does it appear that we will need the ABM to preserve a second-strike capability during the next decade. Our bomber deterrent, 40 percent of which is always on ground alert and thus invulnerable to missile attack, far outstrips that of the Soviets. Our extremely mobile Polaris—soon to be Poseidon—forces also is far greater than the almost nonexistent Soviet capability. Moreover, even assuming Soviet superiority in all weapons classes—a virtual impossibility—we would still have a second strike force which would destroy 70 percent of the industry and 30 percent of the population of the U.S.S.R. Surely that remains a deterrent by anyone's definition.

Very critical issues face the House today. Despite the desperate internal problems besetting our country, we continue to spend 70 percent of the U.S. adminis-

trative income for military and military-related items. 42 percent or $82 billion of the national budget goes directly for arms, manpower, and support. These expenditures have increased $37 billion over the past 10 years. Almost every dollar of individual income tax feeds this burgeoning appetite. Our per capita defense expenditure is 2½ times that of the Soviet Union, and 40 times that of Communist China.

The above statistics are not something to be proud of.

Yesterday afternoon I was called out of this Chamber to meet with a group of students from Eastern High School in Washington, D.C., who were protesting on the steps of the Capitol. These young people who are dependent upon Congress for school appropriations told us that they are attending school without books and paper because this Congress has not seen fit to release current funds appropriated for their school. It seems to me that we are going to be hard put to explain the necessity of this kind of expenditure in light of our desire to save the lives of the same children whom we do not see the necessity of properly educating.

A man recently stated, "America has become a militaristic and aggressive society." This man was not a "hippie," a "peacenik," a "one-worlder," a Black Panther, or even a "pointy-headed liberal." He was Gen. David M. Shoup, a hero of the battle of Tarawa, and former Commandant of the Marine Corps. He has perceived what we all must, that senseless spending for military might, and the congressionally sanctioned, chauvinistic thinking which nurtures it has to be curtailed. If not, we must then recognize that there is a great possibility that future generations of Americans will face the prospect of having less and less worth defending with their heritage of armaments.

Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Chairman, the vote on the authorization of $21.3 billion for military procurement is one of the most important authorizations to be before this Congress. I do not pretend to be a military expert. I have no desire to be a Monday morning armchair general.

I have spent many hours listening to the debate on the floor of the House. I have paid particular attention to those members of the House Armed Services Committee that have had a chance to question witnesses to review classified material. I have followed the Senate debate and read volumes of material from magazines, books, and newspapers discussing the merits and demerits of the various provisions of the measure.

After reviewing all the facts and reading all the material I have come to one conclusion. I shall support the authorization as reported out by the Armed Services Committee.

I would fervently hope that we would never have a need for these weapons. But my obligation to my country is to be sure that if in the event these weapons are ever needed that as a responsible Congressman I provided our Defense Establishment with what was needed.

I would like to commend Chairman RIVERS and the majority of the Armed Services Committee for placing the interest of America first when the Nation's safety is involved. How easy it would have been to play politics with this measure. I commend the majority of the members for the support they have given in behalf of America.

This bill proposes to authorize appropriations totaling $21,347,860,000. Of this total $13,926,460,000 is for the procurement of aircraft missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles; $7,421,400,000 is for research, development, and testing. It is only a part of the $77.5 billion which the Department of Defense has requested in new obligational authority for fiscal year 1970. Mr. Chairman, $77 billion is beyond the comprehension of any Member of this body. However, when one realizes that the Johnson budget, which was presented to this body in January, totaled $80.6 billion, that in April the new administration had revised this budget downward to $77.5 billion, and that Secretary of Defense Laird since April 15, 1969, has reduced this amount by another $3 billion to $74.5 billion, it must be admitted by all that the $6 billion reduction by this administration is evidence of its determination to remove the fat and the nonessential requests that were included in the Johnson budget.

The very fact that some of the additional reductions which Secretary Laird announced since April were taken from items other than those included in this authorization should cause each of us to stop and ponder before we rush forward and apply any further cuts.

Mr. Chairman, this bill authorizes $277.9 million less than was authorized for fiscal year 1969. I need not add that because of inflation, this in fact represents a cut of $300 million. I think the administration and the Democratic-controlled Armed Services Committee has done a good job.

Where savings can be made in the military budget, they should be made. But let us not gamble with the defense of this Nation. Let us cut where cuts can be justified—but if we err, let it be on the side of safety.

As Congressmen we would be derelict in our duties if we stood idly by, leaving undone those things that could easily be done, while a potentially hostile power acquired the future capability of destroying our Nation in one stroke.

Mr. Chairman, as I review the situation the two greatest problems facing this Congress are first: How do we keep this Nation safe from a military aggressor; and second, how do we keep our country economically sound. If our solution to either of these problems is wrong—you need not worry about the problems of better housing, hospitals, roads, cities, water and air pollution.

And of these two problems, national defense must always be given top priority. We can go through depressions and still survive—but God help us should this Nation ever become dominated by another force.

I have been a Member of this body since 1963. During that time we have spent billions upon billions of dollars for national defense—and why? Defense against the spread of international communism. If we have been in error—what a waste of the taxpayers money. I do not think we were wrong.

Many of us here have seen communism come into being, grow to maturity and now threaten the whole free world. Can any of us say that world conditions today justify a relaxation of our defense posture? The answer is no. Look at the takeover of Cuba or Czechoslovakia. Trouble in South America—Southeast Asia? Where are the countries that we can really count on to stand up and be counted?

Some speak of the cost—yet, while we spend $24 billion to place the first man on the moon, the Russians develop an orbital bombardment system which can orbit the earth and drop a bomb on any chosen target. We have no such comparable system. The Soviets have expanded their nuclear fleet—58 percent of the Soviet vessels are less than 10 years old while 58 percent of our vessels are more than 20 years old. The U.S.S.R. now has 350 submarines—including 65 nuclear subs while we have 140. We have 41 Polaris missile subs with no more being constructed at the present time. It is estimated that the Soviets will surpass us in this category by 1975. The Soviets have developed an ABM system while we have those who argue that our ABM system would cause an arms race, and others say it will not work. I do not know whether it will or not. There are plenty of experts that say it will. It seems to me that the question is not whether we should or should not act, but whether we can afford to stand still?

From President Eisenhower to the present date our defense strategy has been based on the development of a nuclear force that would deter any nation from making a surprise attack. We have relied on the development of a system that would provide us with a "second strike" capable of destroying any nation which dared attack us first. The ABM is a continuation of that strategy.

The Soviets acted first to deploy an ABM system. They have been testing that system ever since. Today there are over 60 ABM's deployed on Soviet launch pads.

The Soviets acted first to develop and test a 60-megaton bomb, and they are the only nation to possess anything like that size bomb.

The Soviets acted first to develop and deploy a fractional orbital bombardment system—FOBS—a first-strike oriented weapon, and they are the only nation to have developed such a system.

The Soviets are developing another terrifying weapon—the SS–9. The SS–9 has an advanced, very precise guidance system. For a city-buster, a missile of 1 megaton can virtually destroy the largest city in the world. Yet the SS–9 can boost up to 25 megatons. The only apparent purpose for the Soviet SS–9 therefore, would seem to be to destroy our Minutemen in their silos—in other words, a first strike weapon.

I have a responsibility as a congressman to vote for those programs which in the final analysis I believe are necessary to defend this Nation. If an ABM

system is built and it deters any nation from attacking us—it is worth every cent we spend on it. If we build a system and we are attacked and it does not work—we have lost everything anyway: money, property, and lives—but at least we tried. But if we do nothing in order to save money and by our failure to act, are attacked and are destroyed. Then we have failed those who relied upon our wisdom and judgment.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, ask yourself this question. Is $1 billion too much for a defense? Compare this expense with the $24 billion we spend to put a man on the moon: an average of $4 billion for each year of foreign aid ever since its inception.

Mr. UDALL. Mr. Chairman, I regret that the motion to recommit is framed to prevent any clear or undistorted registration of my position on ABM. I have publicly opposed deployment of a full or limited ABM system, but have publicly favored continued research and development of system components.

I intend to vote for the motion to recommit and make this statement so that my position will not be misunderstood.

When the military appropriation comes before us I shall vote, if given an opportunity, to appropriate research and development funds for ABM, but against funds for procurement.

Mr. VANIK. Mr. Chairman, the debate on the $21 billion military procurement bill which took place over the past 3 days was one of the most useful and constructive discussions of this Congress. For the first time in several decades, Congress is meeting a greater share of its responsibility to review defense spending and effect economies without impairing the national security.

The days of a blank check for defense are over—and that is to the credit of this Congress.

During the consideration of amendments to this bill, I supported amendments to strike out funds for the deployment of the ABM.

I also opposed the addition of over $1 billion for the construction of an additional carrier and cruiser. These funds were not requested by the President. The extra spending authorization is a wasteful and unnecessary extension of commitment unrelated to need.

It was also my hope that the House would defer the $481 million request for the procurement of the fourth C–5A Air Force squadron. Delay would provide an opportunity for improvement in the aircraft and a more accurate determination of the need for the additional squadron.

It was also my hope that this body would take appropriate action to control the growing arsenal of lethal chemical and biological agents and weapons.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the House would do well to recall today that article I, section 8 of the Constitution says that Congress shall have power to "provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States." It is more than symbolic that these two ideas were joined in the basic law of our land.

The war in Vietnam and the need to realize unfulfilled social goals have stimulated a spirited debate over defense spending and national priorities. As we consider the $21.3 billion military procurement bill, we should ask some fundamental questions:

What is the real nature of the external threat to this Nation?

What is and should be the extent of our commitments to intervene militarily around the world?

What are the urgent social tasks that we must accomplish?

How can the American people better contribute to informed decisions on this vital problem of national security?

Mr. Chairman, these are complex issues, but we must not shirk our constitutional obligation.

Turning to this bill, we are being asked to pass judgment on an incredibly complicated authorization in a few hours, when the other body examined it for 2 months.

We have the chance today to usher in a new era of legislative authority in the field of defense spending. I wish that we were willing to conduct an independent and searching analysis of these heretofore rubberstamped multimillion and multibillion dollar programs. I am confident that we are eminently capable of acting with wisdom in this area.

Mr. Chairman, I have made the effort to study this bill thoroughly, with a fair but critical attitude.

This bill, you will note, is $1.28 billion more than the version that passed the Senate.

Many of the programs for procurement and research and development contained in this bill deserve our earnest support.

Others raise serious questions of need, cost, duplication, waste, and inefficiency. Many of these questions can be resolved only in the context of an explicit review of the underlying strategic and foreign policy assumptions of the United States in the 1970's.

Some programs, however, are outrageously ill-conceived and should be rejected outright.

A number of amendments are being offered by my distinguished colleagues who share my concern that some of these programs ought to be cut or abandoned or continued only in the research and development stage before initiating production.

I call your attention to a few of the programs, the efforts to limit or eliminate which, I support: First, Safeguard antiballistic-missile system—delete $345.5 million for procurement, while continuing with research and development; second, C–5A—defer $481 million for fourth squadron; third, nuclear aircraft carrier—defer funds for fourth attack carrier; fourth, chemical and biological warfare—impose limitations on these weapons in all phases of use.

ABM: There is no authoritative evidence of a Soviet capability or intention for a first strike on our land-based missiles. Experts cannot agree that this revised system would even work. As I said in my March 1969 statement, "a modified missile system suggests an impossible compromise." No less an authority than Senator SYMINGTON, former Air Force Secretary, has estimated that the program could cost hundreds of billions of dollars. The Soviets have stopped deploying their Golash ABM, and the United States would force a Soviet response, thus speeding the arms race. The Safeguard ABM may be the beginning of a provocative thick system. In its presently conceived form it poses a hazard to the areas where it will be deployed.

Safeguard threatens to impair hope for progress at the upcoming strategic arms limitation talks, already long overdue, which offer our best hope for curbing the mad momentum of the arms race.

This amendment leaves intact $400.9 million for research and development. We should study this system and alternatives, while allowing meaningful negotiations with the Soviets for the limitation of all systems, offensive and defensive, to go forward.

C–5A: The C–5A cargo airplane is perhaps the biggest boondoggle in history, having cost the taxpayers almost $2 billion more than estimated. It typifies all the worst features of military procurement: Contractor withholding of overruns from the General Accounting Office; Air Force secrecy on costs from the Pentagon; Official protection of private company stock values; withholding of information from Congress.

On top of this phenomenal scandal, the plane has been beset by technical problems.

Cost aside, this plane is part of a strategic mobility plan that needs to be reconsidered in light of security needs and the policy of intreventionism in the 1970's.

This bill asks for funds for a fourth squadron of C–5A's—the Air Force already has contracted for 58 of the planes. There is no demonstrated need for these additional aircraft. Even if a giant transport plane is necessary, the Jumbo jets can supply this performance at a much lower cost.

In any event, there is no reason to act on the Air Force request at this moment. Because the program is already 6 months behind schedule—the 58th plane will not be delivered for almost 2 years—the Congress can decide later on additional authorization.

CVAN–70: The Navy already has two nuclear attack aircraft carriers. The United States is the only nation with a large carrier fleet. Carriers are becoming increasingly vulnerable to missiles and submarines, and they are at best a substitute, and a far more expensive one, for land bases, of which we have a tremendous number. Carriers cost $5 billion per year just to operate.

The need for a fleet of modern carriers must be patiently reexamined as part of the whole forward strategy which they help sustain. The carrier is the symbol of "America, the world policeman."

This bill adds over $1 billion for ship construction, not even requested by the Navy, to the $2.56 billion request already in the authorization. I am in favor of modernizing our Navy, but this unsolicited addition could upset the present Navy conversion and shipbuilding program, which does not require this money now.

Including funds for CVAN–69, the second *Nimitz*-type carrier, the bill authorizes $100 million—not requested—for

CVAN–70. This funding should be deferred, pending a study by the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees of the role and importance of the aircraft carrier in the future.

Chemical and biological warfare: It is shocking that this Nation in recent decades has deliberately and secretly constructed an awesome arsenal of offensive, as well as defensive, chemical and biological agents and weapons. A complete investigation of our Government's program of testing, developing, producing, and stockpiling of all forms of CBW items should be undertaken as an urgent priority.

The United States has declared, though it never ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925, that it would never be the first to use these instruments of doom. America must put its emphasis on the preservation of life and life-preserving environment.

This country has spent at least $1.7 billion since 1963 on CBW. These weapons are extremely hazardous and unreliable. Recent accidents and incidents involving transporting toxic materials have alarmed many Americans. Serious moral questions are raised by our involvement in CBW.

I support efforts to require periodic reports to the Congress, to halt the production of delivery vehicles, to limit the secret shipment and storage of these agents, and to limit open-air testing of lethal weapons.

These are reasonable steps that we can take, in anticipation of a full review of our policy regarding CBW.

Study amendments: I would also like to suggest two nonmoney amendments that merit our endorsement.

One requires that the Department of Defense submit quarterly reports, audited by the General Accounting Office, to Congress on major systems and projects.

The second directs the General Accounting Office to provide the Armed Services Committees by the end of 1970 with a study of defense contractors' profits.

Both measures are important in asserting Congressional oversight in this area.

Mr. Chairman, these are some of the major programs which we must deliberate in order to provide adequately and responsibly for our perceived security needs.

It is apparent that we must review our policy of worldwide intervention in order to gain a perspective on those security requirements.

We must insist that the Defense Department adopt the same critical attitude toward spending required of the average citizen, who must budget his income wisely and eliminate waste and inefficiency if he and his family are to survive.

Since World War II we have spent about $1 trillion for defense. We must stop offering blank checks to the military, for they have shown little inclination to go sparingly on the taxpayers' money.

Mr. Chairman, it is regrettable that in a bill of this magnitude we were denied an opportunity to deliberate and have a record vote on at least several of the items on which there was considerable difference of opinion.

In the course of these deliberations, I have placed my positions in the RECORD. When the Defense appropriation bill is submitted to the House, I expect to oppose those items which I consider wasteful and unnecessary to the proper defense of the Nation.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I am voting against H.R. 14000, the authorizing bill for military procurement and other purposes for fiscal year 1970. To say that this bill is inflated is, in my judgment, a gross understatement. I consider it to be obscenely fat and far out of line with national priorities. Practically all of the amendments that were offered and which were designed to cut some of the wasteful, dangerous, and unnecessarily expensive programs failed to pass although it must be noted that the margin of failure was not so great as it was last year.

I cannot recall voting against an authorization bill before. In voting "No" I am protesting what I consider to be overfunding of the authorization bill. As I pointed out in the ABM debate earlier, our cities are decaying and our recreation areas disappearing, education is in dire need of funds, and yet we have blithely voted to authorize enormous sums for arms that, in my opinion, are not consistent with the real needs of our national security.

As this bill goes to a House-Senate conference I fully expect it to be trimmed and brought into line with some kind of economic balance. When the bill returns from conference I hope that I will be able to support it. I also fully expect that when the Defense appropriation bill finally comes to the floor the funding for the military will be far less than this authorization. I have good reason to doubt that there will be much excess fat in the appropriation bill this year. In any case, in the days ahead I know I will have ample opportunity to record my support for a defense program sufficient to the needs of our national security.

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I have a great respect for the Armed Services Committee, particularly for its chairman, Hon. L. MENDEL RIVERS, and for these members who have worked diligently to see that our Nation directs its military research and development so as to protect and defend our country now and in the future.

Some of us know the distinguished chairman as a great lover of the poetry of Bobby Burns, who spoke so musically of the common man.

> I would some power the gift to gi us
> To see oursils as ithers see us—

And so forth. Mr. Chairman, it has been forcibly brought to my attention that we should develop more missile frigates and destroyers.

Many of our servicemen in the Mediterranean, who are in close contact with Russian vessels, are cognizant of the fact that Russia has 154 ships of the *Komar* and *Osa* classes. All are armed with Styx missiles.

This missile has a maximum trajectory of 22 miles. The optimum effective trajectory is between 12 and 4.5 miles. At a distance of 4.5 nautical miles from one of these ships, a Styx missile can be delivered on target in 30 seconds. The average reaction time of an unalerted American combat ship is 4 to 5 minutes. To shoot down or deflect such a missile, improved detection and deflection devices must be developed.

It takes many years to do this. Informed sources say that the reason for our deficiency in this area is a lack of funding. Most funds, I am told, have been diverted to carry on the war in Vietnam.

Since our Navy is deployed around the world and has a heavy concentration in the Mediterranean, it is imperative that funds be appropriated for a sufficient number of missile frigates and destroyers, equipped with detection devices and with missiles capable of shooting down the Styx.

A sudden confrontation with *Komar*- and *Osa*-type vessels would not only be hazardous, but possibly disastrous.

Further, Mr. Chairman, reports from many scientists, including Dr. Sternglass of the school of medicine at the University of Pittsburgh, indicated that large nuclear explosions are followed by an increased number of abortions, prenatal deaths and an increased death rate of younger children in proportion to the number and magnitude of preceding nuclear explosions.

In short, the conclusion reached by Dr. Ernest J. Sternglass and other scientists is that a large number of nuclear explosions may result in deaths of unborn children, with the result that in the future we may have a world devoid of life.

Mr. Chairman, I support all methods necessary for the protection of our country. However, all nuclear powers should be called together immediately to discuss and ban the use of nuclear devices. Otherwise, there will be no future for you or me, our children, or our children's children.

Mr. PETTIS. Mr. Chairman, section 408 of H.R. 14000 proposes to prohibit payment under contracts with Federal contract research centers if the annual compensation paid any officer or employee out of such funds exceeds $45,000, except with the approval of the Secretary of Defense under regulations prescribed by the President.

The corresponding section of the accompanying report—House Report 91–522—observes that the Federal contract research centers—FCRC's—are nonprofit organizations, that most if not all of their income is from their contracts with the Department of Defense, that they do not carry the business risk of normal private corporations, that their efforts are more similar to those performed within the Department of Defense, that their history indicates a fairly low risk with respect to their business activity, and that their salary levels should be more closely alined to that of the Government rather than that of private industry.

Mr. Chairman, partly from my work with the Committee on Science and Astronautics and partly because the largest of the FCRC's has a major facility

in the district I have the honor to represent, I have had an opportunity over the years that others may not have had to inform myself about these organizations and their work. I would like therefore to comment on certain of the observations in the report of the Committee on Armed Services.

That the FCRC's are nonprofit organizations is no accident. It has been a prime consideration in their establishment and utilization by the Department of Defense, intended to avoid the possibility that the profit motive might interfere with the complete objectivity demanded by their special roles for defense.

That most of their income is from contracts with the Department of Defense is likewise intentional. In the case of the Aerospace Corp., located in my district, this fact derives from the deliberate policy decision of the corporation's governing board of trustees to avoid the possibility that the lure of other business might detract from its dedication to the needs of the Department of Defense. Aerospace has declined numerous opportunities to work for others.

With respect to salary policies and procedures, let me comment concerning the FCRC I know best, the Aerospace Corp. Established salary approval mechanisms exist. In the first place, all salary structures and individual salaries above a certain level are established and approved only after careful study of responsibility, comparability, and qualification, by the governing boards of trustees. I have personally met the members of the Aerospace board of trustees. Among their more widely known members are Frederick R. Kappel, former chairman and chief executive of A.T. & T.; Cyrus R. Vance, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and Presidential troubleshooter; Dr. T. Keith Glennan, first Administrator of NASA, former AEC Commissioner, and new chairman of the Aerospace board, and former Air Force Gens. Earle E. Partridge and Edwin W. Rawlings, the latter more recently chairman and chief executive of General Mills, Inc. Just this month, S. E. Skinner, former executive vice president of General Motors, and Gen. Jimmy Doolittle retired from the board after long and dedicated service as board chairman and vice chairman respectively; both, incidentally, received the Air Force's highest civilian award for their work with Aerospace. The trustees, whose integrity and dedication to the public interest is beyond question, have assured me personally that the basic premise for approval of compensation at Aerospace has been and will continue to be that of reasonableness—namely, no higher than necessary to get the job done.

Moreover, all salaries to be reimbursed by the Government are submitted as required by the armed services procurement regulation—ASPR—to the procuring agency for review of their reasonableness and their allocability to the work called for by the contract. Higher salaries are given increasingly detailed and searching review, with the highest salaries reviewed individually both by the Air Force and by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, next in rank to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. Only those portions of such salaries considered by the Department of Defense to be both reasonable and allocable may then be charged to Government contracts whether the source of the funds is in the Department of Defense or elsewhere.

Federal contract research centers come in a variety of forms. Some do work very much like that done in universities. Some do work very much like that done in the Government. Others, like the Aerospace Corp., perform work very much like that done by industry. In fact, the work which TRW does for the Air Force in the Minuteman or which Lockheed does for the Navy in the Polaris/Poseidon programs or which Boeing does for NASA in the Apollo program is no different that the work which Aerospace does in such programs as the Titan III booster system and a great variety of military satellite systems. If there is any distinction, it lies not in the work performed by the Aerospace Corp., but rather in its nonprofit status which was deemed essential to provide for objectivity over the broad range of related programs. In fact, the Aerospace Corp. must compete with these same companies and with others such as Northrop, Hughes Aircraft, and General Dynamics for its technical manpower and management. Aerospace has on its payroll some 1,600 scientists and engineers of whom 304 were hired directly from TRW, 94 hired from Hughes Aircraft, 143 from North American, 90 from General Dynamics, and so forth. Substantially all of the employees of the corporation have come from industry; and of those that leave, nearly all are hired by industry.

I should like to comment also on the observation that the operation of the Federal contract research centers "do not carry all the business risks of a normal private corporation," and "the history of their operations indicates a fairly low risk with respect to their business activities." The term "business risk" of a normal private corporation presumably applies to a return on investment—namely, the return to its stockholders. Since nonprofits are by nature a public trust, this argument has in itself little meaning. If, on the other hand, it applies to the individual employees of the corporation, then the statement is not true. The people at the Aerospace Corp. have all the personal, professional job-related risk that any professional employee of a defense contractor has. The company's history demonstrates a series of contract cutbacks of major magnitude which have resulted in major reductions in force—involuntary terminations of personnel. The most recent example is the cancellation of the manned orbiting laboratory program—which caused a drastic realinement and cutback of hundreds of employees.

The personal risk is magnified too by the forefront position of the Aerospace systems personnel. An Aerospace project manager is right out in front, in the spotlight. A program such as Titan III involves hundreds of millions of dollars annually in engineering and development work. On the one hand, he must provide for the overall systems engineering and coordination of the associate contractors mostly operating on price-incentive or fixed-price contracts. On the other hand, he is responsible to the Air Force and to the Government that the program will succeed on schedule and within prescribed costs. The Aerospace system manager must walk a tightrope; and his personal professional success is entirely contingent on the success of the program for which he is responsible. When difficulties arise anywhere in a program, he becomes the prime target for criticism from both the associate contractors and from the Air Force.

The Federal contract research centers were created to meet major national needs. Without exception, they are today making major contributions to our defense effort. Some, like the Aerospace Corp., are involved in the most critical programs of the country.

I hope, therefore, Mr. Chairman, that these comments will serve to illuminate some of the reasons behind the observations made in House Report No. 91–552, at least in the case of one of the so-called FCRC's.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, tonight we come to the end of 3 long days of debate. Now the question is whether we support H.R. 14000. There was some complaint voiced that the allotted time was not adequate and loose language was used that the Senate spent "many months" on the military procurement bill. As a matter of fact the other body debated the bill only 29 days. Several days will show the debate on the procurement bill covered only one page of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. During the course of many of those days the debate in the other body extended into subjects for afield from the pending business.

On our side of the Congress there will probably be over 200 pages in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of debate on this measure. We have stayed strictly to the subject and I feel all of the important provisions of this bill have been thoroughly debated.

Most of the sponsors of amendments have been urged adoption of their particular changes in the bill in the name of economy. It is true the bill does authorize an appropriation of $21 billion. That would seem to be an enormous amount of money to buy aircraft, missiles, vessels, combat vehicles, and all the research, development, testing, and evaluation. However, this serves to tell the world that from our resources we are willing to spend what we believe to be necessary to defend our people and to retaliate to those who would try to destroy us. The price is high. I hate to have to authorize this much money. I wish we did not have to spend it. I am deeply concerned that world conditions require we divert so much of our resources to the purposes of H.R. 14000. But the information gained in months of hearings and briefings in executive session—to be more specific about 8 months—add up to the almost inescapable conclusion that our country needs procurement provided in this bill.

I will point out that the figure of $21.3 billion is $1.8 billion less than the authorization request of January 14, 1969, or that of Secretary Clifford. It is $615.8

million under the revised authorization request submitted on April 15 by Secretary Laird.

It is true the bill is more than that passed by the Senate. The difference is almost entirely to update our badly out of date seapower. As I pointed out in the debate yesterday the C–5A was an economy and would permit reduction of our overseas troop strength. The money in this bill to increase our seapower is in my opinion also economy. The reason is it will cost much less to modernize our Navy this year than next year. If we wait beyond next year to start to modernize our Navy it is possible it could not be accomplished at any price.

During much of the debate we have spoken of things that seem to have to do with war, missiles, fighter planes, assault vehicles, and all other categories of military hardware. I submit in all of this debate we have spoken really of peace. Yesterday I pointed out that I was convinced that if my fellow townsman, Mr. Truman had followed some of his advisers and refused to deploy the H-bomb we might today be a satellite of Russia. Worse, if we had not surrendered before now, we could find ourselves in the same occupied status as Czechoslovakia today. This kind of happening could take place in the future if we do not continue to prepare for our own defense.

The argument about priorities touches a responsive chord. The argument we should solve our problems at home and not worry about the problems of the world is appealing. The proposal to reduce military expenditures is most acceptable to our overburdened taxpayers. It would be easy for many Members to buy popularity by going along with these arguments. But in my opinion it would be disastrous for our Nation or I should say the future of our Nation.

The aggressors of this world are not going to give a period of grace in which to put our domestic house in order. I know many worthwhile domestic programs that need funding. I supported the Joelson amendment for education and I will support full funding for our water pollution program. But I think we should focus our attention upon the fact if we successfully solve all of our domestic problems all will be meaningless if we are not around to enjoy them.

A decision to vote for this bill must be made on the hard realities of the offensive capabilities of our adversaries and not on the fervent hope of their intentions. I have no choice in this decision but to vote on the side of security. To do otherwise would be to let our country fall behind in maintaining defenses necessary for the strength of this Nation.

Mr. HATHAWAY. Mr. Chairman, I am concerned, with the provision on this bill which calls for a three-way division of the proposed DD963 contract. It is my fear that this provision, if passed, will seriously jeopardize the long-term benefits which can be realized if the program is allowed to go ahead according to the present plan, calling for the award of as many as 30 destroyers to a single contractor with construction occurring between now and 1978.

A three-way division would certainly increase the costs to the Navy conceivably by as much as $200 million over the total program. I believe this is an unreasonable burden to impose upon the American taxpayers if it can be avoided.

Equally as important to the Navy is the fact that failure to maintain a single prime contractor could seriously impair the stated objective of standardizing ships within a class. It is my understanding that the referenced provision to the bill would still permit a prime contractor to lead the program but quite obviously as more builders participate in the program, it becomes more difficult to maintain a standardized ship.

Any act which alters the Navy's present plan could also delay the program from months to possibly a year. We simply cannot permit any delay in the construction of these ships, which are desperately needed to replace the World War II destroyer fleet. A three-way division could create contractual problems which might delay construction of the DD963 destroyers.

A major byproduct of the DD963 program is the possibility that a new and badly needed shipyard can result from the competition, if sufficient quantities of ships are awarded to one contractor. Our shipbuilding industry badly needs such modernization if the United States is to continue as a world leader in the shipbuilding business and compete on a worldwide basis. By dividing the contract, the distinct possibility arises that no single company will develop a sufficient backlog to justify substantial modernization of its facilities and the country then stands to lose a needed national asset.

As a member of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, I am well aware of the urgent requirement to modernize our merchant fleet. New vessels in large quantities will undoubtedly be constructed over the next few years and should provide a substantial workload for many shipbuilders. It will be most unfortunate if the DD963 program is altered to the extent that significant benefits are lost, ostensibly to maintain a broad base of shipbuilding capability, only to find that other programs such as that currently proposed by Marad accomplish this goal. Marad's requests for proposals dated September 2, 1969, calling for the construction of 10, 20, and 30 ships anually is just an example of the types of procurement which will achieve the objectives of those calling for a three-way division of the DD963 program.

Lastly, the question of fairness to those companies who have competed for the award of a large number of ships cannot be easily disregarded. The competitors have invested large sums on the assumption that the contract would be awarded to a single shipbuilder. Both the competing companies and the Navy have structured the program to permit such an award to the winner. A change at this time would be most unfair to the companies who have survived the competition and made such substantial investments. It is not fair to change the ground rules after competition has advanced so far.

It appears to me, Mr. Chairman, that the best approach to this program would be to continue the present procurement concept.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, I am opposing H.R. 14000, the fiscal year 1970 military procurement bill—as I opposed the second supplemental appropriation bill in May—because it carries forward what I believe to be utterly distorted priorities.

Since the end of the Second World War, we have spent $1,400,000,000,000 for defense. We are today spending at the rate of $1,000 per taxpayer per year and Government money poured into defense is greater than the profits of all American private enterprise put together.

Meanwhile, our cities are rat infested and in a state of decay, our youth are alienated by an unpopular war and the inequities they observe within our society, thousands are suffering from malnutrition, our air and rivers are polluted, inflation is rising, crime is rampant, and racial tensions are increasingly strained as we fail to fulfill our promises of equal opportunity to our minority citizens.

In 1968 the Pentagon's figures show that $72 billion was being spent for defense. However, if you include defense-related expenditures, this figure soars to almost $100 billion. At the same time, less than $500 million was appropriated for programs to feed our own undernourished children through food stamps, school lunches, and the special milk program, combined. All federally assisted housing programs in this same period, including the model cities program, received only $2 billion. Job Corps centers were closed in order to save $100 million. We are, in essence, spending more on defense than is allotted to all of the civilian programs—health, education, welfare, housing, agriculture, conservation, labor, commerce, foreign aid, law enforcement, and so on. This simple fact is bad enough alone but it becomes worse—almost criminal—when we realize that such a great proportion of the military budget is clearly wasted on defective weapons systems development—the Nike-Zeus system, the B–70 bomber and the Skybolt air-to-surface missile being just a few sterling examples.

The largest single item in the military budget is procurement—purchasing, renting, or leasing supplies and services. It is reported that the Defense Department signs agreements with some 22,000 prime contractors annually, which also involves more than 100,000 subcontractors. Since the end of the Second World War an entirely new subculture has developed in America—the military-industrial complex.

The imbalance in our budgetary allocations virtually defies description or belief and it seems clear that the priorities currently being pursued have little, if any, relation to reality. The fact that the bill before us today perpetuates these misdirected priorities, while at the same time feeding the military-industrial complex, is equally clear when we consider the procurement programs being included in it—the highly doubtful utility of additional C–5A aircraft, especially in the absence of further cost studies; the Cobra helicopter which very likely would soon be an obsolete weapon for which there would be no requirement; the con-

struction of a $483 million aircraft carrier for which there is no strategic military requirement; and a highly inflated overall authorization—over $1 billion more than approved by the other body.

For too many years, Mr. Chairman, the military budget has been considered sacrosanct. Anyone who challenged it was accused of being soft and fuzzy headed in the face of the great military dangers we faced. We must end this tendency. Military proposals, especially those involving basic policy decisions and billions in spending, deserve the most careful and thorough scrutiny from both the House and Senate. In this regard, I am greatly encouraged by the bipartisan efforts we have witnessed this week, and earlier in the Senate, to bring the military procurement program into line with reality.

No one disputes the need to finance the legitimate defense requirements of our Nation. I, nevertheless, remain deeply troubled by the magnitude of the military budget—the largest procurement or authorization bill ever to come before the Congress presently being considered—the relationship of this budget to the budget for urgent civilian needs and the imbalance in national priorities which it represents. We must question whether or not the crucial and urgent domestic needs of our Nation will continue to play a subservient role to that of the military, whether or not we will continue to pour billions of dollars into the tragic and unfortunate war in Vietnam or use these limited resources to combat poverty, disease, illiteracy, unemployment, urban blight and pollution. When we authorize billions for weapons research, development and deployment, we initiate an irreversible chain reaction which results in heightened world tensions, an accelerated arms race and a perpetuation of discredited policies.

If there is no more convincing argument that legislation such as is before us today continues and fosters our distorted priorities, simply consider the fact that last year two-thirds of all Federal tax receipts were spent for military and war-related costs. Add to this the amounts spent on the space program and interest on the national debt and one really begins to wonder how it was possible to eke out even the very little which was allotted to domestic programs. Is our inflated military budget simply a convenient, readymade excuse to avoid facing our failure to achieve justice and equality for all our citizens and working toward the resolution of our domestic ills?

Mr. Chairman, defense expenditures are so dominant that the total economy can hardly function normally without taking its direction from the Pentagon. The very structure and fiber of our society is involved and our national budget increasingly reflects a growing militarism. I feel strongly that this trend must be curtailed and that the bill before us should be defeated as distorting further our already horrendously distorted national priorities.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. Chairman, as we approach the final votes on this bill, I hope we will all pause to reflect for a moment on the debate, on the bill's provisions, and on the amendments proposed and defeated.

There is little choice for most of us other than to accept the bill as amended, but in doing so, we should recognize that we are exercising one of the most difficult responsibilities of this session, relating as it does to the entire present international stance and the future security of the Nation.

It relates indirectly as well to the other national priorities we set such as education, opportunity, and human welfare.

It is unfortunate then that we legislate inevitably in the shadow of the Vietnam war and the feelings of Members about the decisions and course of action that led us to our present predicament there. The emotions evoked here and throughout the Nation on the subjects before us have frequently shown this. Good examples would be the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. MIKVA) to reduce authorized military personnel, on the one hand, and the language of the bill attempting to penalize non-ROTC institutions on the other, both being equally unwise.

Thus, the emotions evoked by the present Vietnam problem, whether we have approved or disapproved of those decisions, do not necessarily point toward a responsible course on the votes upcoming. The scope of the latter is far broader and I would urge the Members so to consider them.

Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to speak on the question of defense and the implications of the legislation brought before this body by the House Committee on Armed Services.

In my presentation, I will present the case in defense, of the apprehensions I have about the Department of Defense and bring to the House some observations and suggestions that I think need pondering on as we look to the future and as we plan both for defense and for the preservation, the extension and influence of the American ideal of freedom in the family of nations.

On the question of defense, permit me to say it is my conviction that we must have a system of defense; that it must be both military and spiritual and moral. We, of all nations, need to have an adequate defense. The principal reason for this admonition is that we have more to defend than any other nation in all history. First of all, we have a system of freedom to defend. We, more than any other people, have, understand, and benefit more from the basic freedoms than any other nation. Those basic freedoms are freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and freedom of movement.

The embracing, cultivating, and extending of these freedoms within the United States has done more to bring the Biblical promise of a more abundant life to a people within a country than any other system has done for any other country, society and system.

Servan-Schriber, a writer and political scientist, in his book, "The American Challenge," written principally for Europeans, points out the material results that have come for our Nation by embracing the basic freedoms. I will point to only some highlights mentioned by him. They include the fact that all by ourselves, Americans consume one-third of the total world's production of energy and we have one-third of the world's highways. He reminds us one-half of the passenger miles flown each year are by American airlines. Two trucks out of every five on the road are American-made and American-based. Americans own three out of every five automobiles in the world, and in most instances, they are bigger and more luxurious than any others.

These few highlights point out the productive capacity of America—a nation representing only 6 percent of the world's population, making the kind of production and prosperity referred to above. All of this is made possible because, among other things, under our system of freedom, we promote and encourage education. Schriber refers to it as a grand partnership of business, government, and education.

Again, I reflect on two pertinent facts with regard to education. He points out one-third of all students in the world pursuing higher education are American students. He continues to remind us the number of students compared to total population is double that of any other country. The reading of Servan-Schriber's book, The American Challenge, will bring out more evidences of progress and prosperity that prevail in our country. So long as we support and maintain institutions that give us that prosperity, we will be the envy of the world and right now the great challenge is a system and way of life called communism.

The point I want to make and stress and have remembered is the fact that we have so much to preserve and defend. This makes what we are doing here today very important, but it is my hope that we will not put our entire reliance for the defense of the system on the military and without other supports. The other support deals with the attitude and spirit of our people. Without a feeling of purpose, a sense and feeling for the moral aspects of our position and policy, we will fail. The Army or the entire Defense Establishment with all its modern equipment and sophistication will be just another maginot line that is pregnable. Recent events in the Vietnam area where we have spent $100 billion of the taxpayer's money, where we have sacrificed the lives of over 40,000 young men have proven that the gun alone will not win the battle.

The great philosophers and political leaders in history, our own included, have reminded us in various ways that the military or material strength is not enough. England at one time would have gone under except for an indomitable spirit that would not admit defeat, a spirit led by Churchill, and the bastion of England held against the fury and power of Hitler. Lincoln spoke of it when he asked:

> What constitutes the bulwark of our own liberty and independence?

And he observed:

> It is not our frowning battlements, our bristling seacoasts, the guns of our war steamers or the strength of our gallant and disciplined army. These are not our reliance against a resumption of tyranny in our fair

land. All of them may be turned against our liberties without making us stronger or weaker for the struggle. Our reliance is in the love of liberty which God has planted in our bosoms. Our defense is in the preservation of the spirit which prizes liberty as the heritage of *all men, in all lands everywhere.* Destroy this spirit and you have planted the seeds of despotism around your own doors.

There is another reason that moves me. It is the revelation of the past several years of the great waste, great mistakes, the evidence of poor judgment on the part of the Pentagon. These could be detailed. Time will not permit, but the press, political writers, and others have called attention to this repeatedly over the past months and years. Poor judgment on the part of military leaders is a real thing and should be studied, investigated, and reported on.

Mr. Chairman, I have supported a number of the amendments that were presented not because I want to handicap the military for I, too, want to keep it strong. So long as the people of the world have not found ways to get along, so long as there is poverty and ignorance, lack of good judgment, lack of moral base in many parts of the world, we must have an army to defend ourselves and it must be as modern and sophisticated and as adequately manned as is possible. To assure these things I mentioned requires study, research, and then evaluation of the great goals and objectives outlined for short-range and long-range defense. What we want and need requires that we debate the question including some of the military decisions of the recent past that have proven to be wrong, wasteful, and inadequate. It is worthy to note also, that our forefathers were right in declaring and providing in the Constitution that the civilians should be and remain in charge of the military. History confirms their judgment and recent evidence on the national scene and international scene reveals military mismanagement, waste, and poor judgment. "We, the People," must regain and again assert our authority, which must be based on reason and good judgment on our part.

In my opinion, the ABM calls for more long-range judgments and more adequate basic research of what are long-range goals should be attained before we adopt an inefficient system; namely, because it affects the defense system rather than the concentration of people.

Another amendment dealing with cutting back the committee's recommendation on the cost for Navy replacement is in the public interest and national defense interest. The administration is asking for almost $1 billion less than the committee report asks for. Adoption of this amendment will balance our economy and do a better job of replacement and building of the Navy and that is important. The proposition to have the Bureau of the Budget make more careful inspection of expenditures is consistent with good government practice and should also prevail in the management of national defense.

The purpose of having the Bureau of the Budget make their judgments is consistent with practice now in all aspects of Government expenditures and that could be very helpful to the Defense Department and in the process save billions of dollars of the taxpayer's money.

In addition, Mr. Chairman, it is my conviction and evidence is clear again that the Congress ought to more adequately equip itself with the acquisition of talent and ability to make studies in depth before action is taken by the committees. In this case, while I have great personal confidence in the members of the House Committee on Armed Services, I am worried about what seems to be a precedent of taking the Defense Department's word about scrutiny, without evaluation, and without clear evidence that they are also using their better judgments.

Had this committee through the years had the kind of talent and technical ability that is available to them and made the studies and evaluations that should and could have been done, billions of dollars could have been saved in waste, in detecting the carelessness and finding other and better ways to accomplish goals. So, I make this point, Mr. Chairman, in this bill as is so often the case when we deal with defense matters, we are doing it with less-than-adequate information, studies, and research.

The evidence is quite clear that those of us that are taking this position may not prevail in every instance though we have had and will have suggestions and it is my belief we are serving the national interest in calling attention to what I believe have been mistakes and of a kind that could and should be corrected.

Finally, I want to make what I believe to be a very pertinent observation philosophically. It is one that has been spoken of throughout history and recently has been noted by some important leaders. History is full of human folly. Surely one of the most foolish features that man all through history is his incurable insistence on spending more energy and wealth on waging war than in preventing it. History reveals that most of our expenditures militarily through the years have not proved to be a bargain.

In paraphrasing and in part quoting something Servan-Schriber said in the conclusion of his book entitled "The American Challenge" earlier referred to, with men as with societies there can be no growth without challenge. Progress for mankind will always remain a battle just like life for people is a struggle. We must never forget this truth.

Because of war, human history has been nearly the same as military history, today the nations in the world most advanced industrially, the United States, Soviet Union, Europe and Japan, are bringing that era to a close. To some, this is a hope. To many, it is a belief and conviction.

Military confrontation between these powers can only be hypothetical or hypernuclear and it cannot exclude the possibility of annihilation. Hopefully, we are intelligent enough to recognize the awfulness of the kind of war in prospect with thermonuclear energy. So, I contend that the point of departure for thought and action must be a plan for atomic peace. So, let the war we face be an industrial one. President Nixon referred to this in his debate when he challenged the Russians to a contest of industrial production for people.

Schriber makes the observation and I quote:

The conflict in Vietnam, that absurd and barbarous residue of the Crusades, will inevitably come to an end. We are now beginning to discover what was concealed by 20 years of colonial wars, wars that dominated our thoughts and our behavior: the confrontation of civilizations will henceforth take place in the battlefield of technology, science and management.

It is my conviction that the American Army will leave Vietnam. It is my hope we will leave soon for there is nothing more to gain, everything to lose and we have lost too much already.

Let us then face the industrial challenge where we can both lead and win and we can make contributions while we prosper. The desire to build a more intelligent and bountiful postindustrial society is great. Let us join hands then in developing a program for everywhere that will hasten the day when "spears will be bent into pruning hooks and swords into plow shares" or in modern technology let us find peaceful uses for all our energy including atomic and thermonuclear powers. The world could be better and more peaceful if America will apply more of the intelligence in promoting peace than in promoting war.

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, we have debated this defense authorization bill for 2 long and tiring days. Sixteen amendments were offered by those of us who believe that the bill is loaded with wasteful projects. We sought in effect to reduce this monstrous defense authorization bill of $21½ billion by $2½ billion or about 10 percent. The proposed reductions were modest and only affect projects for which there was more than credible evidence indicating that they were not only unnecessary for our defense but were wasteful. Every attempt to reduce the huge budget was defeated. What is worse is that those in the majority refused even to hear the arguments of that small minority who wished to discuss these dubious projects. Almost every proposed amendment was one that had been passed by the other body when it debated the same defense authorization bill. However, rather than permit meaningful discussion, those in authority in this House shut off debate and imposed a gag rule which at times limited Members wishing to speak to a mere 45 seconds, barely enough time to cry out, "This is a hoax and not a debate." By proceeding this way we denigrate the democratic process and this House.

The Republican minority leader made it clear that he would not even permit a motion to recommit to be presented in a way which would reflect the opinion of the real minority—those who are trying to bring our military budget within reasonable bounds but instead would employ language in that motion to recommit which would make it difficult if not impossible for some Members to vote for it. The intent here is to intimidate—to prevent by threat, sometimes subtle and sometimes overt—those of us who

oppose the twisted national priorities of the Nixon administration and this Congress. I have sat in this House and seen those twisted priorities enacted into legislation; student loans have been cut; housing appropriations have been reduced by more than half; funds are made available for the SST; and mass transit takes a back seat; we shuttle to the moon and our cities strangle in traffic; we provide protection for silos and reduce our model city program by 42 percent and permit our cities to decay; we reward those of our States that do the least in terms of social welfare for its citizens and ignore those others who make the effort to provide a modest minimum income.

We are prepared to engage in 2½ wars on three fronts at the same time and to spend billions on destruction when our cities seethe with unrest because basic human needs are not being met.

I will not be cowed and intimidated; I will vote for the motion to recommit, as poor a motion as it is, and when that is defeated as we know it will be, I will vote nay on the defense authorization bill. Those of us who vote nay wish to protect this country and would vote for every item of defense required to do that but we will not be browbeaten into voting billions to appease the voracious appetite of the military-industrial complex.

Mr. DONOHUE. Mr. Chairman, an unhappy and unfortunate circumstance is apparently being projected here affecting the situation of many of us who have consistently favored the funding of research and development, in the missile weaponry area, but who have just as consistently opposed the funding of the ABM deployment system as I did again yesterday in supporting the Wilson amendment.

It was anticipated and hoped, of course, that the Members of the House would be privileged and permitted to exercise their final separate voting judgment on these two different items.

In my conscientious judgment, a continuation of missile research and development is imperative to the national security interests of the American people. Until and unless the Communist powers enter an iron clad agreement with us to abandon all projected missile research and development, it would be the height of practical foolishness for us to do so unilaterally. So long as they will not make such an agreement and continue their research testing, it is obvious that we must continue to do so.

On the other hand, it is my conscientious judgment that the deployment of the ABM missile system, on the evidence thus far developed and presented, would not insure any realistic safeguard shielding of our land-based missile stations and might well be the tragically unfortunate step to influence our enemies to further reaction and expansion of their own missile systems and thereby prolong the competitive arms race that must be stopped if there is to be any hope of attaining peace in this generation.

Under these circumstances, I intend to vote against any recommittal motion that will eliminate continuation of missile research and development essential to our national safety while we seek and hope for a further opportunity to eliminate funding for the ABM deployment system.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, to those of us who deplore the war in Vietnam, perhaps the most exciting development this year has been the growing public and congressional concern by both hawks and doves over the level and impact of defense expenditures.

Where once the word of the Chiefs of Staff was unquestionable, and defense needs were considered to be outside the sphere of the "nonexpert," we see an increasing desire by the public and its Representatives in Congress to examine the Defense budget and study strategic premises.

This questioning so far has uncovered the fact that the generals and admirals are not infallible. This year alone we have been made aware of a $3 billion cost overrun on the C–5A, that a system of manned orbiting laboratories has been developed for which there is apparently no utility, and that the M–551 tank which is destined for use in Vietnam has been improperly tested and may have to be abandoned entirely.

Begun as a skirmish over the most efficient and economic allocation of funds for programs conceded by both Congress and the DOD to be essential to the national security, this probing has escalated into a fundamental questioning of current and proposed weapons systems themselves.

For the first time in a long time Congress has insisted on answers to questions like: First, how likely or unlikely is the contingency against which the system is directed; second, how likely is it that the system will be capable of performing according to specifications; third, are there less costly means of achieving the same end; and fourth, how effective would the system be, given its cost.

The military procurement bill, H.R. 14000, before us today, unfortunately, is a throwback to the days of unquestioning acceptance of the Pentagon's word, and also of the premise that the more money we spend on defense, the safer we are.

The major justification given in the committee report for the level of expenditures contemplated by this bill is, essentially, "The committee believes that the least we can afford is that level of national defense that we cannot afford to be without."

This is hardly what I would call sufficient reason for allowing the completely free hand in defense spending that this bill permits.

The committee's handling of the bill reflects an attitude toward the Pentagon of "ask and ye shall receive." Maybe it is time we in Congress took a tip from that proverb and adopted an attitude of "seek and ye shall find" instead of standing at the doors of the Treasury and telling the Defense Department "knock and it shall be opened to you."

I am informed that members of the committee were not able to secure copies of the bill they were to vote on until 5 p.m. the night before they were to vote.

The remaining Members of the House have received the same treatment. The bill was reported out of committee on Friday, only became available on the following Monday, with the report on Tuesday and the hearings on Wednesday. Debate was set to begin on Wednesday. Thus, anyone wanting to read the hearings of the committee has had to do so on the floor or else put it off until after the bill is passed.

This country is being torn apart by a clash of opinions over the war in Vietnam and the possibility of U.S. involvement in future Vietnams. No one in Congress would question the right of this country to maintain its national security—nor begrudge it the money for doing so. The question which rises up to plague us right now is "Does more money always buy more security?" Not just more hardware and armaments, but does it actually contribute to a significant extent to our basic security?

The French spent millions on the maginot line after World War I in the firm belief that it made them secure. It took the Nazis no time at all in the next war to collapse that "security" like a dropped souffle.

We have heard the anti-ballistic-missile system touted as "the answer of answers" to the protection of American shores from nuclear attack. Brushed aside is the question that the fallout from these defensive missiles might possibly do more damage than the incoming enemy missiles themselves. And there has been testimony to the effect that this weapons system may not work altogether. Senator STENNIS, in justifying the system to the Senate, admitted this fact. His justification for supporting it? The President wanted it.

Another "system for security" is our attack aircraft carrier fleet. The justification for maintaining this fleet is that the carrier has great flexibility and has the advantage of being a moving rather than a stationary target in battle. Forgotten, or ignored, are other qualities which the carrier possess like its vulnerability to destruction by enemy PT boats 5 minutes after the start of any declared war and the open temptation its presence presents for U.S. intervention in another "small war" such as followed the Bay of Tonkin incident. If the United States is going to get involved in other Vietnams, the decision should be up to Congress and not come about because a carrier happened to be there to intervene.

If an aircraft carrier is capable of precipitating U.S. involvement in a small war, the development of MIRV can only be a temptation to major nuclear war. This country already sits on a stockpile of weapons sufficient to blow us all off the earth. Added to the materiel at the command of our fellow nuclear powers, we could manage very easily between us to blast ourselves into but a cosmic memory.

The chief justification for MIRV is that a single missile can destroy a large number of targets and such a system can insure the United States the ability to penetrate Russian missile defenses. But all that is going to do is encourage the Russians to follow suit. At the very least we will be escalating the arms race to an even higher level and really adding little to our national security.

Even more disastrous, though, is the

fact that the greater accuracy of MIRV will increase the possibility that one side or the other will be tempted to try a premature first strike.

I cannot see where these three systems: the ABM, the attack aircraft carriers, and MIRV will result in greater security. Authority and funding for these systems should be stricken from the bill.

The underlying implications for much of this debate is, however, not a clash of opinions over the defense needs of our country, but a clash of massive public constituencies over the post-Vietnam division of the national economic pie. On one side the poor, the environment, and the oppressed taxpayer plead for attention. On the other side, defense industries press for new weapons to avoid problems that economic conversion will cause whether they be unemployment or lower corporate earnings.

H.R. 14000 contains authorization for over $1 billion in new ships above that requested by the Department of Defense; a bonanza indeed for the shipbuilding industry.

The bill contains authorization for a fourth squad of C–5A's despite the $3 billion costovers which we have had, the availability of alternative systems to perform the same tasks, and the absence of any way of calculating what the ultimate cost of this additional squadron will be.

The military procurement bill contains authorization as well for a doubling of research and development funds for long obsolete—but if ever built, extremely lucrative—manned bombers.

At the same time the bill dropped the Senate requirements for first quarterly reports by the GAO on Defense contracts, and second, a study of excess profits derived by manufacturers of weapons systems. Particularly in view of the financial problems already cited, this is an outrageous slap at the public which has a right to know where its money is going.

There is something wrong with the priorities of a society which can spend so little to meet the domestic problems which are tearing this country apart internally at the same time it is appropriating huge amounts of money for weapons systems which will make us less secure externally.

It is time for a thorough reevaluation of our entire strategic and defense thinking. We need to go beyond the one-by-one muckraking exposure of excessive costs and flagrant abuses in procurement and contracting, beyond even the examination of the effectiveness and utility of individual weapons systems. We need to reexamine the fundamental premises upon which our defense policy is based: to look at the weapons systems we propose in their world context.

Such a review in 1961 behind closed doors produced the so-called 2½ war concept upon which American defense policy theoretically has been based since. The rethinking that takes place should be done more openly—involving Congress—and Congress should be brought into the original decisionmaking process to a much greater degree. It is difficult to assess the value or need for weapons when it is virtually impossible to find out the total cost of the weapons or even what it will cost to operate for the next 5 years.

Mr. GILBERT. Mr. Chairman, I am voting today against the military procurement authorization, but let those who favor this measure not argue that they are for a strong America and we are for a weak one.

I strongly favor making our country strong, not only to defend itself against aggression but to deter any potential aggressor from contemplating attack. But I believe we must have balance in our national expenditures and I am convinced that the authorization before us is far too large, and substantially in excess of what our national security requires.

I am a cosponsor of legislation to create a Joint Congressional Committee on National Priorities and to establish a Temporary National Security Commission, precisely to bring new perspective to the question of national priorities and to reassert congressional control over the Nation's military-industrial establishment. I feel that the Vietnam war, which I have long opposed, has provided the opening for a military budget which is no longer related to our military needs. I suspect that the Pentagon has, to put it in simple terms, acquired the bad habit of wanting to buy whatever suits its whimsy. We cannot afford such luxury, and I believe that a major study, by a commission such as I propose, will confirm this judgment.

Mr. Chairman, we are suffering at home from inflation. We are also suffering from a civilian sector of our national budget which I consider seriously deprived. We need more help for schools, for housing, for the fight against pollution, for transit and for our cities. We cannot accept the premise that our national security depends only upon the military expenditures we make. We need more understanding of what we, as a nation, are buying for our money. Therefore, I vote against this bill, in the interest of a more rational national budget—and as a warning that the military does not have the solution to our most pressing national problems.

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Chairman, no one can be sanguine about voting "no" on an authorization bill designed to provision our Armed Forces for the next 2 years. Unfortunately, the world is not yet ready to beat its sword into plowshares and no one can deny that there are external dangers to this country's security. I am opposed to the bill in its final form because it represents a painful distortion of our real national security requirements and robs us of the capacity to treat with equally frightening and urgent domestic problems.

The presence in this authorization bill of over $746 million for procurement and deployment on the safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system—the ABM—alone is enough to convince me to vote against it. The need for the ABM has not been demonstrated, there has been no convincing evidence that it will actually work, and it is outrageously expensive even if it does. It is, as someone has said, "too much to pay for a system we do not know will work against a threat we are not sure exists." Perhaps most important, the further fueling of the nuclear arms race is an inescapable consequence of the deployment of the ABM. We go back to the armaments bar for one more round when both we and our adversary instead should be seeking ways to sober up from the wildest arms binge in world history.

Another compelling reason for voting against this bill is its failure to limit sufficiently the bloated size of our armed forces by imposing meaningful ceilings on military manpower. For almost 20 years Congress has abdicated its clear constitutional responsibility to determine the size of the Armed Forces. Statutory limits on the armed services have been continuously suspended since 1950, leaving the Pentagon virtually free rein in setting the size of our military forces. The committee action lowers those ceilings only to reflect the manpower cuts which have already been decided upon and announced by the Department of Defense. This is no assertion of congressional prerogative or fulfillment of Congressional responsibility; most important it does nothing to prod the Department of Defense to worry about Parkinson's law and its effects on swelling the manpower in our Armed Forces.

During consideration of the bill I offered an amendment which would have lowered the committee's 3.285-million-man ceiling on military manpower by one man for every man withdrawn from Vietnam after the end of this year. This amendment would have brought the overall strength of the Armed Forces down to a level of 2.8 million by the time Vietnam withdrawals were completed. This itself is half a million more men than prescribed by the permanent statutory ceilings, which have been suspended since the Korean war. Without some meaningful assertion of congressional control over the size of the Armed Forces, this bill constitutes a continuing blankcheck to the Pentagon to set manpower levels far in excess of our real national security needs. I cannot endorse such a blankcheck.

Finally, I cannot vote for this bill because it represents—perhaps more clearly than any other piece of legislation which will come before this session of Congress—the ghastly distortion in our national priorities. The gentleman from California, Congressman ROBERT LEGGETT, a member of the Armed Services Committee, put the problem in perspective. He noted that defense expenditures now account for about 70 percent of the administrative budget of the Federal Government. When the $7.8 billion for Veterans' benefits and $16½ billion interest on previous war debts are added to the $82 billion defense budget, we are spending over $100 billion a year on defense and defense-related subjects. This is more in 1 year than we have spent on Federal aid to education or protection of our environment in all the years those programs have been in existence.

Somewhere this madness must stop. Somewhere we must begin to change our image of ourselves from that of worldwide warrior to that of teacher, healer and builder here at home. For me, the

place to begin is in voting against a bill which commits us to another $21.3 billion for military procurement in fiscal year 1970.

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. RIVERS

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move that all debate on the bill and all amendments thereto do now close.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from South Carolina.

The motion was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 14000) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the selected reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 561, he reported the bill back to the House with sundry amendments adopted by the Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Arrington, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed a bill of the following title, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 2917. An act to improve the health and safety conditions of persons working in the coal mining industry of the United States.

SWEARING IN OF MEMBER

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON, be permitted to take the oath of office today. His certificate of election has not arrived, but there is no contest, and no question has been raised with regard to his election.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

Mr. HARRINGTON appeared at the bar of the House and took the oath of office.

AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 1970, AND RESERVE STRENGTH

The SPEAKER. Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not, the Chair will put them en gros.

The amendments were agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time and was read the third time.

MOTION TO RECOMMIT OFFERED BY MR. O'KONSKI

Mr. O'KONSKI. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?

Mr. O'KONSKI. In its present form, emphatically yes.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Speaker, a point of order.

POINT OF ORDER

The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state his point of order.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Speaker, Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives, volume 8, section 2731, says:

Recognition to move recommitment is governed by the attitude of the Member toward the bill, and a Member opposed to the bill as a whole is entitled to prior recognition over a Member opposed to a portion of the bill.

Mr. Speaker, I submit that there were two gentlemen on their feet on the other side, one of whom has voted against the bill as a whole, both seeking recognition for the privilege of offering the motion to recommit. I would submit that under that rule of the House the gentleman who stated that he was opposed to it only in its present form should yield to the gentleman who has voted against the entire bill.

The SPEAKER. The Chair will state that the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. O'KONSKI) has stated he is opposed to the bill in its present form, and the only bill in its present form before the House is the bill H.R. 14000, as amended, and therefore the gentleman qualifies.

Therefore the point of order is overruled.

The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. O'KONSKI moves to recommit the bill H.R. 14000 to the Committee on Armed Services with instructions to report it back forthwith with the following amendments:

On page 2, line 6, delete the figure "$780,460,000" and substitute "$434,960,000";

On page 3, line 7, delete the figure "$1,664,500,000" and substitute "$1,263,600,000".

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, on that I move the previous question.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The SPEAKER. The Chair will state to the gentleman from Massachusetts that he should wait to demand the yeas and nays until the Chair puts the question.

The gentleman from South Carolina moves the previous question on the motion to recommit.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Minnesota will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, in order to be able to amend the pending motion to recommit, is it necessary that the previous question be voted down?

The SPEAKER. The Chair will state the answer to the question is "yes."

The question is on ordering the previous question, and on that the gentleman from Massachusetts demands the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 223, nays 141, not voting 67, as follows:

[Roll No. 198]

YEAS—223

Abbitt	Frelinghuysen	Natcher
Abernethy	Frey	Nelsen
Adair	Galifianakis	Nichols
Albert	Garmatz	O'Konski
Alexander	Gettys	O'Neal, Ga.
Anderson, Ill.	Goldwater	Passman
Anderson, Tenn.	Gonzalez	Patman
	Goodling	Perkins
Andrews, Ala.	Gray	Pettis
Andrews, N. Dak.	Griffin	Philbin
	Gross	Pirnie
Arends	Grover	Poff
Ayres	Gubser	Price, Ill.
Baring	Hagan	Price, Tex.
Beall, Md.	Haley	Pryor, Ark.
Belcher	Hall	Randall
Bennett	Hammer-schmidt	Rarick
Betts		Reid, Ill.
Bevill	Hansen, Idaho	Reifel
Blackburn	Harsha	Rivers
Blanton	Hébert	Roberts
Bow	Hogan	Rogers, Colo.
Bray	Hosmer	Rogers, Fla.
Brinkley	Hunt	Rooney, N.Y.
Broomfield	Hutchinson	Rostenkowski
Brotzman	Ichord	Roth
Brown, Ohio	Jarman	Roudebush
Broyhill, N.C.	Johnson, Pa.	Ruth
Broyhill, Va.	Jonas	Sandman
Buchanan	Jones, Ala.	Satterfield
Burke, Fla.	Jones, N.C.	Schadeberg
Burke, Mass.	Kazen	Scherle
Burleson, Tex.	Kee	Scott
Byrnes, Wis.	Keith	Shipley
Cabell	King	Shriver
Caffery	Kleppe	Sikes
Camp	Kluczynski	Sisk
Carter	Kuykendall	Skubitz
Cederberg	Kyl	Slack
Celler	Landgrebe	Smith, Calif.
Chamberlain	Landrum	Springer
Chappell	Langen	Stanton
Clancy	Latta	Steed
Clausen, Don H.	Lennon	Steiger, Ariz.
	Lloyd	Steiger, Wis.
Cleveland	Long, La.	Stratton
Collier	Lujan	Stubblefield
Collins	Lukens	Stuckey
Cramer	McClory	Taft
Cunningham	McCulloch	Taylor
Daniel, Va.	McEwen	Teague, Calif.
Davis, Ga.	McFall	Thompson, Ga.
de la Garza	McKneally	Thomson, Wis.
Denney	McMillan	Utt
Dennis	MacGregor	Waggonner
Derwinski	Mahon	Wampler
Devine	Mailliard	Watkins
Dickinson	Mann	Watson
Dorn	Marsh	Watts
Dowdy	Martin	Whalley
Downing	May	White
Dulski	Mayne	Whitehurst
Duncan	Meskill	Widnall
Dwyer	Michel	Wiggins
Edmondson	Miller, Calif.	Williams
Edwards, Ala.	Miller, Ohio	Wilson, Bob
Edwards, La.	Minshall	Wilson, Charles H.
Eshleman	Mize	
Evins, Tenn.	Mizell	Wold
Fascell	Mollohan	Wright
Fisher	Montgomery	Wyatt
Flood	Morgan	Wylie
Flynt	Morton	Wyman
Ford, Gerald R.	Murphy, Ill.	Zablocki
Foreman	Murphy, N.Y.	Zion
Fountain	Myers	Zwach

NAYS—141

Adams	Conte	Friedel
Addabbo	Conyers	Fulton, Pa.
Anderson, Calif.	Corbett	Fulton, Tenn.
	Corman	Gaydos
Ashley	Coughlin	Giaimo
Barrett	Culver	Gilbert
Biaggi	Daniels, N.J.	Green, Pa.
Biester	Dellenback	Gude
Bingham	Diggs	Halpern
Blatnik	Dingell	Hamilton
Boland	Donohue	Hanley
Bolling	Eckhardt	Hanna
Brademas	Edwards, Calif.	Hansen, Wash.
Brasco	Eilberg	Harrington
Brown, Mich.	Esch	Hathaway
Burlison, Mo.	Evans, Colo.	Hawkins
Burton, Calif.	Farbstein	Hechler, W. Va.
Button	Feighan	Heckler, Mass.
Byrne, Pa.	Findley	Helstoski
Cahill	Fish	Hicks
Carey	Foley	Horton
Chisholm	Ford, William D.	Howard
Clay		Jacobs
Cohelan	Fraser	Johnson, Calif.

Karth	Nedzi	St. Onge
Kastenmeier	Nix	Scheuer
Koch	Obey	Schneebeli
Kyros	O'Hara	Schwengel
Leggett	Olsen	Smith, Iowa
Long, Md.	O'Neill, Mass.	Stafford
Lowenstein	Ottinger	Stokes
McCarthy	Patten	Symington
McCloskey	Pepper	Thompson, N.J.
McDade	Pike	Tiernan
McDonald, Mich.	Podell	Udall
	Quie	Ullman
Macdonald, Mass.	Railsback	Van Deerlin
	Rees	Vander Jagt
Madden	Reid, N.Y.	Vanik
Matsunaga	Reuss	Vigorito
Meeds	Riegle	Waldie
Melcher	Robison	Weicker
Mikva	Rodino	Whalen
Minish	Rooney, Pa.	Wolff
Mink	Rosenthal	Wydler
Monagan	Roybal	Yates
Moorhead	Ruppe	Yatron
Morse	Ryan	
Moss	St Germain	

NOT VOTING—67

Annunzio	Fallon	Poage
Ashbrook	Flowers	Pollock
Aspinall	Fuqua	Powell
Bell, Calif.	Gallagher	Preyer, N.C.
Berry	Gibbons	Pucinski
Boggs	Green, Oreg.	Purcell
Brock	Griffiths	Quillen
Brooks	Harvey	Rhodes
Brown, Calif.	Hastings	Saylor
Burton, Utah	Hays	Sebelius
Bush	Henderson	Smith, N.Y.
Casey	Holifield	Snyder
Clark	Hull	Staggers
Clawson, Del	Hungate	Stephens
Colmer	Jones, Tenn.	Sullivan
Conable	Kirwan	Talcott
Cowger	Lipscomb	Teague, Tex.
Daddario	McClure	Tunney
Davis, Wis.	Mathias	Whitten
Dawson	Mills	Winn
Delaney	Mosher	Young
Dent	Pelly	
Erlenborn	Pickle	

So the previous question was ordered.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

Mr. Hays with Mr. Rhodes.
Mr. Annunzio with Mr. Mosher.
Mr. Dent with Mr. Lipscomb.
Mr. Delaney with Mr. Conable.
Mr. Teague of Texas with Mr. Ashbrook.
Mr. Holifield with Mr. Bell of California.
Mr. Aspinall with Mr. Berry.
Mr. Casey with Mr. Hastings.
Mr. Whitten with Mr. Davis of Wisconsin.
Mr. Staggers with Mr. Brock.
Mr. Fuqua with Mr. Harvey.
Mr. Fallon with Mr. Cowger.
Mr. Pickle with Mr. Bush.
Mr. Preyer of North Carolina with Mr. McClure.
Mr. Hungate with Mr. Burton of Utah.
Mr. Boggs with Mr. Del Clawson.
Mr. Pucinski with Mr. Erlenborn.
Mrs. Sullivan with Mr. Mathias.
Mr. Daddario with Mr. Pelly.
Mr. Hull with Mr. Winn.
Mr. Mills with Mr. Pollock.
Mr. Flowers with Mr. Sebelius.
Mr. Henderson with Mr. Quillen.
Mr. Purcell with Mr. Snyder.
Mr. Kirwan with Mr. Saylor.
Mr. Tunney with Mr. Talcott.
Mr. Gallagher with Mr. Smith of New York.
Mr. Brown of California with Mr. Dawson.
Mrs. Green of Oregon with Mr. Gibbons.
Mrs. Griffiths with Mr. Stephens.
Mr. Brooks with Mr. Colmer.
Mr. Clark with Mr. Powell.
Mr. Jones of Tennessee with Mr. Young.

Mr. CELLER and Mr. ABERNETHY changed their votes from "nay" to "yea."

Mr. DELLENBACK changed his vote from "yea" to "nay."

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion to recommit.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 92, nays 271, answered "present" 2, not voting 66, as follows:

[Roll No. 199]

YEAS—92

Adams	Fascell	Moorhead
Addabbo	Ford,	Morse
Anderson,	William D.	Moss
Calif.	Fraser	Nix
Ashley	Gaydos	Obey
Barrett	Gilbert	O'Konski
Bingham	Green, Pa.	O'Neill, Mass.
Blatnik	Gude	Ottinger
Boland	Halpern	Podell
Brademas	Hansen, Wash.	Rees
Brasco	Harrington	Reid, N.Y.
Burlison, Mo.	Hathaway	Reuss
Burton, Calif.	Hawkins	Riegle
Button	Hechler, W. Va.	Rodino
Byrne, Pa.	Heckler, Mass.	Rooney, Pa.
Carey	Helstoski	Rosenthal
Chisholm	Hicks	Roybal
Clay	Horton	Ryan
Cohelan	Howard	St Germain
Conte	Kastenmeier	St. Onge
Conyers	Koch	Scheuer
Corman	Lowenstein	Stokes
Coughlin	McCarthy	Thompson, N.J.
Culver	McCloskey	Tiernan
Daniels, N.J.	Macdonald,	Udall
Diggs	Mass.	Vanik
Dulski	Madden	Waldie
Eckhardt	Matsunaga	Weicker
Edwards, Calif.	Meeds	Whalen
Eilberg	Mikva	Yates
Evans, Colo.	Minish	Yatron
Farbstein	Mink	

NAYS—271

Abbitt	Denney	Jacobs
Abernethy	Dennis	Jarman
Adair	Derwinski	Johnson, Calif.
Albert	Devine	Johnson, Pa.
Alexander	Dickinson	Jonas
Anderson, Ill.	Dingell	Jones, Ala.
Anderson,	Donohue	Jones, N.C.
Tenn.	Dorn	Karth
Andrews, Ala.	Dowdy	Kazen
Andrews,	Downing	Kee
N. Dak.	Duncan	Keith
Arends	Dwyer	King
Ayres	Edmondson	Kleppe
Baring	Edwards, Ala.	Kluczynski
Beall, Md.	Edwards, La.	Kuykendall
Belcher	Esch	Kyl
Bennett	Eshleman	Kyros
Betts	Evins, Tenn.	Landgrebe
Bevill	Feighan	Landrum
Biaggi	Findley	Langen
Biester	Fish	Latta
Blackburn	Fisher	Lennon
Blanton	Flood	Lloyd
Bolling	Flynt	Long, La.
Bow	Foley	Long, Md.
Bray	Ford, Gerald R.	Lujan
Brinkley	Foreman	Lukens
Broomfield	Fountain	McClory
Brotzman	Frelinghuysen	McCulloch
Brown, Mich.	Frey	McDade
Brown, Ohio	Friedel	McDonald,
Broyhill, N.C.	Fulton, Pa.	Mich.
Broyhill, Va.	Fulton, Tenn.	McEwen
Buchanan	Galifianakis	McFall
Burke, Fla.	Garmatz	McKneally
Burke, Mass.	Gettys	McMillan
Burleson, Tex.	Giaimo	MacGregor
Burton, Utah	Goldwater	Mahon
Byrnes, Wis.	Gonzalez	Mailliard
Cabell	Goodling	Mann
Caffery	Gray	Marsh
Cahill	Griffin	Martin
Camp	Gross	May
Carter	Grover	Mayne
Cederberg	Gubser	Melcher
Celler	Hagan	Meskill
Chamberlain	Haley	Michel
Chappell	Hall	Miller, Calif.
Clancy	Hamilton	Miller, Ohio
Clausen,	Hammer-	Minshall
Don H.	schmidt	Mize
Cleveland	Hanley	Mizell
Collier	Hanna	Mollohan
Collins	Hansen, Idaho	Monagan
Corbett	Harsha	Montgomery
Cramer	Hébert	Morgan
Cunningham	Hogan	Morton
Daniel, Va.	Hosmer	Murphy, Ill.
Davis, Ga.	Hunt	Murphy, N.Y.
de la Garza	Hutchinson	Myers
Dellenback	Ichord	Natcher
Nedzi	Roth	Thompson, Ga.
Nelsen	Roudebush	Thomson, Wis.
Nichols	Ruppe	Ullman
O'Hara	Ruth	Utt
Olsen	Sandman	Van Deerlin
O'Neal, Ga.	Satterfield	Vander Jagt
Passman	Schadeberg	Vigorito
Patman	Scherle	Waggonner
Patten	Schneebeli	Wampler
Pepper	Schwengel	Watkins
Perkins	Scott	Watson
Pettis	Shipley	Watts
Philbin	Shriver	Whalley
Pike	Sikes	White
Pirnie	Sisk	Whitehurst
Poff	Skubitz	Widnall
Price, Ill.	Slack	Wiggins
Price, Tex.	Smith, Calif.	Williams
Pryor, Ark.	Smith, Iowa	Wilson, Bob
Quie	Springer	Wilson,
Railsback	Stafford	Charles H.
Randall	Stanton	Wold
Rarick	Steed	Wright
Reid, Ill.	Steiger, Ariz.	Wyatt
Reifel	Steiger, Wis.	Wydler
Rivers	Stratton	Wylie
Roberts	Stubblefield	Wyman
Robison	Stuckey	Zablocki
Rogers, Colo.	Symington	Zion
Rogers, Fla.	Taft	Zwach
Rooney, N.Y.	Taylor	
Rostenkowski	Teague, Calif.	

ANSWERED "PRESENT"—2

Leggett	Wolff

NOT VOTING—66

Annunzio	Fallon	Pickle
Ashbrook	Flowers	Poage
Aspinall	Fuqua	Pollock
Bell, Calif.	Gallagher	Powell
Berry	Gibbons	Preyer, N.C.
Boggs	Green, Oreg.	Pucinski
Brock	Griffiths	Purcell
Brooks	Harvey	Quillen
Brown, Calif.	Hastings	Rhodes
Bush	Hays	Saylor
Casey	Henderson	Sebelius
Clark	Holifield	Smith, N.Y.
Clawson, Del	Hull	Snyder
Colmer	Hungate	Staggers
Conable	Jones, Tenn.	Stephens
Cowger	Kirwan	Sullivan
Daddario	Lipscomb	Talcott
Davis, Wis.	McClure	Teague, Tex.
Dawson	Mathias	Tunney
Delaney	Mills	Whitten
Dent	Mosher	Winn
Erlenborn	Pelly	Young

So the motion to recommit was rejected.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Mosher for, with Mr. Erlenborn against.

Until further notice:

Mr. Hays with Mr. Ashbrook.
Mr. Annunzio with Mr. Pelly.
Mr. Dent with Mr. Harvey.
Mr. Delaney with Mr. Conable.
Mr. Teague of Texas with Mr. Saylor.
Mr. Holifield with Mr. Lipscomb.
Mr. Aspinall with Mr. Rhodes.
Mr. Casey with Mr. Talcott.
Mr. Whitten with Mr. Quillen.
Mr. Staggers with Mr. Pollock.
Mr. Fuqua with Mr. Snyder.
Mr. Pickle with Mr. McClure.
Mr. Preyer of North Carolina with Mr. Brock.
Mr. Hungate with Mr. Sebelius.
Mr. Boggs with Mr. Del Clawson.
Mr. Pucinski with Mr. Bell of California.
Mrs. Sullivan with Mr. Berry.
Mr. Daddario with Mr. Hastings.
Mr. Hull with Mr. Winn.
Mr. Mills with Mr. Mathias.
Mr. Fallon with Mr. Smith of New York.
Mr. Henderson with Mr. Cowger.
Mr. Purcell with Mr. Davis of Wisconsin.
Mr. Kirwan with Mr. Bush.
Mr. Brown of California with Mr. Stephens.
Mrs. Green of Oregon with Mr. Young.
Mr. Flowers with Mr. Tunney.
Mr. Gallagher with Mr. Powell.
Mr. Jones of Tennessee with Mrs. Griffiths.
Mr. Brooks with Mr. Gibbons.
Mr. Clark with Mr. Colmer.

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia and Mr. SCHWENGEL changed their votes from "yea" to "nay."

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 311, nays 44, answered "present" 1, not voting 75, as follows:

[Roll No. 200]

YEAS—311

Abbitt	Dulski	Leggett
Abernethy	Duncan	Lennon
Adair	Dwyer	Lloyd
Adams	Edmondson	Long, La.
Addabbo	Edwards, Ala.	Long, Md.
Albert	Edwards, La.	Lujan
Alexander	Eilberg	Lukens
Anderson, Calif.	Esch	McCarthy
	Eshleman	McClory
Anderson, Ill.	Evans, Colo.	McCloskey
Andrews, Ala.	Evins, Tenn.	McCulloch
Andrews, N. Dak.	Fascell	McDade
	Feighan	McDonald, Mich.
Arends	Findley	
Ashley	Fish	McEwen
Ayres	Fisher	McFall
Baring	Flood	McKneally
Barrett	Flynt	McMillan
Beall, Md.	Foley	Macdonald, Mass.
Belcher	Ford, Gerald R.	
Bennett	Ford, William D.	MacGregor
Betts		Madden
Bevill	Foreman	Mahon
Biaggi	Fountain	Mailliard
Biester	Frelinghuysen	Mann
Blackburn	Frey	Marsh
Blanton	Friedel	Martin
Blatnik	Fulton, Pa.	Matsunaga
Boland	Fulton, Tenn.	May
Bow	Galifianakis	Mayne
Brademas	Garmatz	Meeds
Bray	Gaydos	Melcher
Brinkley	Gettys	Meskill
Broomfield	Giaimo	Michel
Brotzman	Goldwater	Miller, Calif.
Brown, Mich.	Gonzalez	Miller, Ohio
Brown, Ohio	Goodling	Minish
Broyhill, N.C.	Gray	Mink
Broyhill, Va.	Griffin	Minshall
Buchanan	Gross	Mize
Burke, Fla.	Grover	Mizell
Burke, Mass.	Gubser	Mollohan
Burleson, Tex.	Gude	Monagan
Burlison, Mo.	Hagan	Montgomery
Burton, Utah	Haley	Moorhead
Button	Hall	Morgan
Byrne, Pa.	Halpern	Morse
Byrnes, Wis.	Hamilton	Morton
Cabell	Hammer-schmidt	Murphy, Ill.
Caffery		Murphy, N.Y.
Cahill	Hanley	Myers
Camp	Hanna	Natcher
Carey	Hansen, Idaho	Nelsen
Carter	Hansen, Wash.	Nichols
Cederberg	Harsha	Obey
Celler	Hathaway	Olsen
Chamberlain	Hébert	O'Neal, Ga.
Chappell	Heckler, Mass.	O'Neill, Mass.
Clancy	Hicks	Passman
Clausen, Don H.	Hogan	Patman
	Horton	Patten
Cleveland	Hosmer	Perkins
Collier	Howard	Pettis
Collins	Hunt	Philbin
Conte	Hutchinson	Pirnie
Corbett	Ichord	Poff
Corman	Jacobs	Price, Ill.
Coughlin	Jarman	Price, Tex.
Cramer	Johnson, Calif.	Pryor, Ark.
Culver	Johnson, Pa.	Quie
Daniel, Va.	Jonas	Railsback
Daniels, N.J.	Jones, Ala.	Randall
Davis, Ga.	Jones, N.C.	Rarick
de la Garza	Karth	Reid, Ill.
Dellenback	Kazen	Reifel
Denney	Kee	Riegle
Dennis	Keith	Rivers
Derwinski	King	Roberts
Devine	Kleppe	Rodino
Dickinson	Kyl	Rogers, Colo.
Donohue	Kyros	Rogers, Fla.
Dorn	Landgrebe	Rooney, N.Y.
Dowdy	Langen	Rooney, Pa.
Downing	Latta	Rostenkowski
Roth	Steed	Watts
Roudebush	Steiger, Ariz.	Weicker
Ruppe	Steiger, Wis.	Whalley
Ruth	Stratton	White
St Germain	Stubblefield	Whitehurst
St. Onge	Symington	Widnall
Sandman	Taft	Wiggins
Satterfield	Taylor	Williams
Schadeberg	Teague, Calif.	Wilson, Bob
Scherle	Thompson, Ga.	Wilson, Charles H.
Schwengel	Thomson, Wis.	
Scott	Tiernan	Wold
Shipley	Udall	Wright
Shriver	Ullman	Wyatt
Sikes	Utt	Wydler
Sisk	Van Deerlin	Wylie
Skubitz	Vanik	Wyman
Slack	Vigorito	Yatron
Smith, Calif.	Waggonner	Zablocki
Smith, Iowa	Waldie	Zion
Springer	Wampler	Zwach
Stafford	Watkins	
Stanton	Watson	

NAYS—44

Bingham	Green, Pa.	Rees
Bolling	Harrington	Reid, N.Y.
Brasco	Hawkins	Reuss
Burton, Calif.	Hechler, W. Va.	Robison
Chisholm	Helstoski	Rosenthal
Clay	Kastenmeier	Roybal
Cohelan	Koch	Ryan
Conyers	Lowenstein	Scheuer
Diggs	Nedzi	Schneebeli
Dingell	Nix	Stokes
Eckhardt	O'Hara	Thompson, N.J.
Edwards, Calif.	O'Konski	Whalen
Farbstein	Ottinger	Wolff
Fraser	Pike	Yates
Gilbert	Podell	

ANSWERED "PRESENT"—1

Mikva

NOT VOTING—75

Anderson, Tenn.	Flowers	Pickle
	Fuqua	Poage
Annunzio	Gallagher	Pollock
Ashbrook	Gibbons	Powell
Aspinall	Green, Oreg.	Preyer, N.C.
Bell, Calif.	Griffiths	Pucinski
Berry	Harvey	Purcell
Boggs	Hastings	Quillen
Brock	Hays	Rhodes
Brooks	Henderson	Saylor
Brown, Calif.	Holifield	Sebelius
Bush	Hull	Smith, N.Y.
Casey	Hungate	Snyder
Clark	Jones, Tenn.	Staggers
Clawson, Del	Kirwan	Stephens
Colmer	Kluczynski	Stuckey
Conable	Kuykendall	Sullivan
Cowger	Landrum	Talcott
Cunningham	Lipscomb	Teague, Tex.
Daddario	McClure	Tunney
Davis, Wis.	Mathias	Vander Jagt
Dawson	Mills	Whitten
Delaney	Mosher	Winn
Dent	Moss	Young
Erlenborn	Pelly	
Fallon	Pepper	

So the bill was passed.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Pucinski for, with Mr. Mikva against.

Mr. Delaney for, with Mr. Brown of California against.

Mr. Rhodes for, with Mr. Mosher against.

Until further notice:

Mr. Hays with Mr. Ashbrook.
Mr. Annunzio with Mr. Erlenborn.
Mr. Dent with Mr. Saylor.
Mr. Boggs with Mr. Conable.
Mr. Teague of Texas with Mr. Del Clawson.
Mr. Holifield with Mr. Mathias.
Mr. Aspinall with Mr. Berry.
Mr. Casey with Mr. Sebelius.
Mr. Whitten with Mr. Snyder.
Mr. Staggers with Mr. Bell of California.
Mr. Fuqua with Mr. Talcott.
Mr. Fallon with Mr. Harvey.
Mr. Pickle with Mr. Cowger.
Mr. Preyer of North Carolina with Mr. Vander Jagt.
Mr. Hungate with Mr. Brock.
Mr. Mills with Mr. Lipscomb.
Mr. Brooks with Mr. Kuykendall.
Mr. Kirwan with Mr. Cunningham.
Mr. Hull with Mr. McClure.
Mr. Henderson with Mr. Quillen.
Mr. Kluczynski with Mr. Winn.
Mr. Clark with Mr. Pollock.
Mr. Daddario with Mr. Hastings.
Mr. Gallagher with Mr. Powell.
Mrs. Sullivan with Mr. Davis of Wisconsin.
Mr. Purcell with Mr. Bush.
Mrs. Griffiths with Mr. Smith of New York.
Mr. Moss with Mr. Pelly.
Mr. Tunney with Mr. Pepper.
Mr. Jones of Tennessee with Mr. Flowers.
Mr. Colmer with Mr. Anderson of Tennessee.
Mrs. Green of Oregon with Mr. Stephens.
Mr. Landrum with Mr. Young.
Mr. Gibbons with Mr. Stuckey.

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Speaker, I have a live pair with the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. PUCINSKI. If he had been present he would have voted "yea." I voted "nay." I withdraw my vote and vote "present."

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the provisions of House Resolution 561, I call up from the Speaker's table for immediate consideration the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.

The Clerk read the Senate bill, as follows:

S. 2546

An act to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

SEC. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1970 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

AIRCRAFT

For aircraft: for the Army, $484,400,000; for the Navy and the Marine Corps, $2,287,200,000; for the Air Force, $3,965,700,000 of which $400,400,000 is authorized only for procurement of F–4 aircraft: *Provided*, That none of the funds herein authorized shall be used for the procurement of A–7 aircraft.

MISSILES

For missiles: for the Army, $922,500,000; for the Navy, $851,300,000; for the Marine Corps, $20,100,000; for the Air Force, $1,466,000,000.

NAVAL VESSELS

For naval vessels: for the Navy, $2,568,200,000.

TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES

For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, $276,900,000; for the Marine Corps, $37,700,000.

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

SEC. 201. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1970 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for research, development, test and evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

for the Army, $1,626,707,000;

for the Navy (including the Marine Corps), $1,911,343,000;

for the Air Force, $3,041,211,000; and

for the Defense Agencies, $454,625,000.

SEC. 202. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense during fiscal year 1970 for use as an emergency fund for research, development, test and evaluation or procurement or production related thereto, $75,000,000.

SEC. 203. Construction of research, development, and test facilities at the Kwajalein Missile Range is authorized in the amount of $12,700,000, and funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for this purpose.

SEC. 204. (a) After December 31, 1969, none of the funds authorized for appropriation by this or any other Act for the use of the Armed Forces shall be used for payments under a contract or agreement with any Federal Contract Research Center if the annual compensation of any officer or employee of such center exeeds $45,000, except with the approval of the President of the United States.

(b) The President shall notify the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives promptly of any approvals authorized under subsection (a), together with a detailed statement of the reasons therefor.

SEC. 205. None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used to carry out any research project or study unless such project or study has a direct and apparent relationship to a specific military function or operation.

TITLE III—RESERVE FORCES

SEC. 301. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1969, and ending June 30, 1970, the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the Armed Forces will be programmed to attain an average strength of not less than the following:

(1) The Army National Guard of the United States, 395,291.

(2) The Army Reserve, 256,264.

(3) The Naval Reserve, 129,000.

(4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 49,489.

(5) The Air National Guard of the United States, 86,999.

(6) The Air Force Reserve, 50,775.

(7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 17,500.

SEC. 302. The average strength prescribed by section 301 of this title for the Selected Reserve of any reserve component shall be proportionately reduced by (1) the total authorized strength of units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component which are ordered to active duty (other than for training) at any time during the fiscal year, and (2) the total number of individual members not in units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component who are ordered to active duty (other than for training or for unsatisfactory participation in training) without their consent at any time during the fiscal year. Whenever any such units or such individual members are released from active duty during any fiscal year, the average strength for such fiscal year for the Selected Reserve of such reserve component shall be proportionately increased by the total authorized strength of such units and by the total number of such individual members.

TITLE IV—GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 401. Subsection (a) of section 401 of Public Law 89-367 approved March 15, 1966 (80 Stat. 37), as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Not to exceed $2,500,000,000 of the funds authorized for appropriation for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes (1) to support Vietnamese and other free world forces in Vietnam, (2) to support local forces in Laos and Thailand, but support to such local forces shall be limited, except where protection of United States personnel is directly concerned, to the providing of supplies, materiel, equipment, and facilities, including maintenance thereof, and to the providing of training for such local forces, and (3) for related costs, during the fiscal year 1970 on such terms and conditions under Presidential regulations as the Secretary of Defense may determine."

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

SEC. 402. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall submit semiannual reports to the Congress on or before January 31 and on or before July 31 of each year setting forth the purposes of and the amounts spent during the preceding six-month period for research, development, test, evaluation, and procurement of lethal and nonlethal chemical and biological agents. The Secretary shall include in such reports an explanation of such expenditures including the necessary therefor.

(b) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other Act may be used for the procurement of delivery systems specifically designed to disseminate lethal chemical agents, or any disease-producing biological micro-organisms or biological toxins, or for the procurement of any part or component of such delivery system.

(c) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other Act may be used for future deployment and storage of any lethal chemical agent or any disease-producing biological micro-organisms or any biological toxin at any place outside the United States, or for the deployment at any place outside the United States of delivery systems designed to disseminate any such agent or micro-organism or toxin unless the country exercising jurisdiction over such place has prior notice of such action. In the case of any place outside the United States which is under the jurisdiction or control of the Government of the United States, no such action may be taken unless prior notice of such action has been given to the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations and, when appropriate, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations and, when appropriate, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the House of Representatives. As used in this section, the term "United States" means the several States and the District of Columbia.

(d)(1) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or any other Act shall be used for the transportation of any lethal chemical or biological agents to or from any military installation in the United States, its territories or possessions, unless the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service has determined that such transportation will not present a hazard to the public health.

(2) The Secretary of Defense, except during a war declared by Congress or during a national emergency declared by Congress or the President after the enactment of this legislation, shall provide written notification to the Congress, to the Secretary of Transportation, to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, and to the Interstate Commerce Commission at least thirty days in advance of any operation involving the transportation of lethal chemical or biological agents to or from any military installation in the United States, its territories or possessions. The Secretary of Defense shall provide appropriate notification to the Governor of any State through which such agents will be transported.

(3) The Department of Defense shall detoxify all lethal chemical or biological agents before their transportation for disposal as provided for in subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2) of this section whenever it is practical to do so.

(e) None of the funds authorized by this or any other Act shall be used for the testing, development, transportation, storage, or disposal of any chemical or biological weapon outside of the continental limits of the United States unless the Secretary of State determines that such testing, development, transportation, storage, or disposal will not violate international law and reports such determination to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and to the appropriate international organizations, or organs thereof, whenever required by treaty or other international agreement.

(f) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other Act shall be used for the open air testing of lethal chemical agents, or any disease-producing biological micro-organisms, or biological toxins except upon a determination by the Secretary of Defense, under guidelines provided by the President of the United States, that an open air test is necessary for the national security, and then only after a separate determination by the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, within thirty days of the determination of the Secretary of Defense, that the test proposed will not present a hazard to the public health. The Secretary of Defense shall report his determination and that of the Surgeon General, to the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and to the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives at least thirty days prior to any actual test. The Secretary of Defense shall set forth in his report the name of the agents, microorganisms, or toxins to be tested, the time and place of any test, and the reasons therefor.

(g)(1) Except as provided in subsection (g)(2) of this section, no funds authorized to be appropriated by this, or any other latter enacted Act may be expended for research, development, test, evaluation, or procurement of any chemical or biological weapon, including any such weapon used for incapacitation, defoliation, or other military operations.

(g)(2) The prohibition contained in subsection (g)(1) of this section shall not apply with respect to funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act.

SEC. 403. (a) As used in this section—

(1) The term "former military officer" means a former or retired commissioned officer of the Armed Forces of the United States who—

(A) served on active duty for any period of time as a member of a regular component of the Armed Forces in the grade of colonel (or equivalent) or above.

(B) served on active duty for a period of ten years or more and, at any time during the five-year period immediately preceding his last discharge or release from active duty, was directly engaged in the procurement of any weapon system or directly engaged in the negotiation, renegotiation, approval, or disapproval of any contract for the procurement of services or materials for or in connection with any weapon system, or

(C) served, for any period of time during

the five-year period immediately preceding his last discharge or release from active duty, as a representative of the Department of Defense at the factory or plant of a defense contractor in connection with work being performed by such contractor on any weapon system.

(2) The term "former civilian employee" means any former civilian officer or employee of the Department of Defense—

(A) whose annual salary at any time during the five-year period immediately preceding the termination of his last employment with the Department of Defense was equal to or greater than the minimum annual salary rate at such time for positions in GS–15,

(B) who was directly engaged, at any time during the five-year period immediately preceding the termination of his last employment with the Department of Defense, in the procurement of any weapon system or directly engaged in the negotiation, renegotiation, approval, or disapproval of any contract for the procurement of services or materials for or in connection with any weapon system, or

(C) who served, for any period of time during the five-year period immediately preceding the termination of his last employment with the Department of Defense as a representative of the Department of Defense at the factory or plant of a defense contractor in connection with work being performed by such contractor or any weapon system.

(3) The term "defense contractor" means any individual, firm, corporation, partnership, association, or other legal entity, which provides services and materials to or for the Department of Defense in connection with any weapon system.

(4) The term "services and materials" means either services or materials or services and materials which are provided as a part of or in connection with any weapon system.

(5) The term "weapon system" means any aircraft, vessel, tracked combat vehicle, or missile, or any part or component thereof.

(6) The term "Department of Defense" includes any military department thereof.

(b) Any former military officer or former civilian employee who—

(1) was employed for any period of time during any calendar year by a defense contractor,

(2) represented any defense contractor during any calendar year at any hearing, trial, appeal, or other action in which the United States was a party and which involved services and materials provided or to be provided to the United States by such contractor, or

(3) represented any such contractor in any transaction with the Department of Defense involving services or materials provided or to be provided by such contractor to the Department of Defense,

shall file with the Secretary of Defense, in such form and manner as the Secretary may prescribe, not later than March 1 of the next succeeding calendar year, a report containing the following information:

(1) His name and address.

(2) The name and address of the defense contractor by whom he was employed or whom he represented.

(3) The title of the position held by him with the defense contractor.

(4) A brief description of his duties with the defense contractor.

(5) His military grade while on active duty or his gross annual salary while employed by the Department of Defense, as the case may be.

(6) A brief description of his military duties while on active duty or while employed by the Department of Defense during the three-year period immediately preceding his release from active duty or the termination of his civilian employment, as the case may be.

(7) A description of any work performed by him in connection with any weapon system while serving on active duty or while employed by the Department of Defense, as the case may be, if the defense contractor by whom he is employed is providing substantial services or materials for such weapon system, or is negotiating or bidding to provide substantial services or materials for such weapon system.

(8) The date on which he was released from active duty or the termination of his civilian employment with the Department of Defense, as the case may be, and the date on which his employment with the defense contractor began and, if no longer employed by such defense contractor, the date on which his employment with such defense contractor terminated.

(9) Such other pertinent information as the Secretary of Defense may require.

(c) Any employee of the Department of Defense who was previously employed by a defense contractor in any calendar year and—

(1) whose annual salary in the Department of Defense is equal to or greater than the minimum annual salary rate for positions in GS–15,

(2) who is directly engaged in the procurement of any weapon system or is directly engaged in the negotiation, renegotiation, approval, or disapproval of any contract for the procurement of services or materials for or in connection with any weapon system, or

(3) who is serving or has served as a representative of the Department of Defense at the factory or plant of a defense contractor in connection with work being performed by such contractor on any weapon system, shall file with the Secretary of Defense, in such form and manner as the Secretary may prescribe, not later than March 1 of the next succeeding calendar year, a report containing the following information:

(1) His name and address.

(2) The title of his position with the Department of Defense.

(3) A brief description of his duties with the Department of Defense.

(4) The name and address of the defense contractors by whom he was employed.

(5) The title of his position with such defense contractor.

(6) A brief description of his duties at the time he was employed by such defense contractor.

(7) A description of any work performed by him in connection with any weapon system while he was employed by the defense contractor or while performing any legal services for such contractor, if such contractor is providing substantial services or materials for such weapon system or is negotiating or bidding to provide substantial services or materials for such weapon system.

(8) The date on which his employment with such contractor terminated and the date on which his employment with the Department of Defense began thereafter.

(9) Such other pertinent information as the Secretary of Defense may require.

(d) (1) No former military officer or former civilian employee shall be required to file a report under this section for any year in which he was employed by a defense contractor if the total cost to the United States of services and materials provided the United States by such contractor during such year was less than $10,000,000; and no employee of the Department of Defense shall be required to file a report under this section if the total cost to the United States of services and materials provided the United States by the defense contractor by whom such employee was employed was less than $10,000,000 in each of the applicable calendar years that he was employed by such contractor.

(2) No former or retired military officer or former civilian employee shall be required to file a report under this section for any calendar year on account of active duty performed or employment with the Department of Defense if such active duty or employment was terminated three years or more prior to the beginning of such calendar year; and no employee of the Department of Defense shall be required to file a report under this section for any calendar year on account of employment with or services performed for a defense contractor if such employment was terminated or such services were performed three years or more prior to the beginning of such calendar year.

(e) The Secretary of Defense shall, not later than May 1 of each year, file with the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a report containing a list of the names of persons who have filed reports with him for the preceding calendar year pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) of this section. The Secretary shall include after each name so much information as he deems appropriate, and shall list the names of such persons under the defense contractor for whom they worked or for whom they performed services.

(f) Any former military officer or former civilian employee whose employment with a defense contractor terminated during any calendar year shall be required to file a report pursuant to subsection (b) of this section for such year if he would otherwise be required to file under such subsection; and any person whose employment with the Department of Defense terminated during any calendar year shall be required to file a report pursuant to subsection (c) of this section for such year if he would otherwise be required to file under such subsection.

(g) The Secretary shall maintain a file containing the information filed with him pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) of this section and such file shall be open for public inspection at all times during the regular workday.

(h) Any person who fails to comply with the filing requirements of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by not more than six months in prison or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.

(i) No person shall be required to file a report pursuant to this section for any year prior to the calendar year 1970.

SEC. 404. (a) Prior to April 30, 1970, Congress shall complete a comprehensive study and investigation of the past and projected costs and effectiveness of attack aircraft carriers and their task forces and a thorough review of the considerations which went into the decision to maintain the present number of attack carriers. The results of this comprehensive study shall be considered prior to any authorization or appropriation for the production or procurement of the nuclear aircraft carrier designated as CVAN–70.

(b) The committee shall call on all Government agencies and such outside consultants as the committee may deem necessary.

SEC. 405. Funds authorized for appropriations under the provisions of this Act shall not be available for payment of independent research and development, bid and proposal, and other technical effort costs in a total amount in excess of $468,000,000. The foregoing limitation shall not apply in the case of formally advertised contracts or to other firmly fixed price contracts competitively awarded.

SEC. 406. (a) The Comptroller General of the United States (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Comptroller General") is authorized and directed, as soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this section, to conduct a study and review on a selective basis of the profits made by contractors and subcontractors on contracts on which there is no formally advertised competitive bidding entered into by the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force,

the Coast Guard, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration under the authority of chapter 137 of title 10, United States Code, and on contracts entered into by the Atomic Energy Commission to meet requirements of the Department of Defense. The results of such study and review shall be submitted to the Congress as soon as practicable, but in no event later than December 31, 1970. The Comptroller General is further authorized, upon request of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate or the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, to conduct a study and review regarding the amount of profit which has been or may be realized under any contract referred to in the first sentence of this subsection. The Comptroller General shall submit to the committee which requested such study and review a written report of the results of such study and review as soon as practicable.

(b) Any contractor or subcontractor referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall, upon the request of the Comptroller General, prepare and submit to the General Accounting Office such information as the Comptroller General determines necessary or appropriate in conducting any study and review authorized by subsection (a) of this section. Information required under this subsection shall be submitted by a contractor or subcontractor in response to a written request made by the Comptroller General and shall be submitted in such form and detail as the Comptroller General may prescribe and shall be submitted within a reasonable period of time.

(c) In order to determine the costs, including all types of direct and indirect costs, of performing any contract or subcontract referred to in subsection (a) of this section, and to determine the profit, if any, realized under any such contract or subcontract, either on a percentage of cost basis or a return on private capital employed basis, the Comptroller General and authorized representatives of the General Accounting Office are authorized to audit and inspect and to make copies of any books, accounts, or other records of any such contractor or subcontractor.

(d)(1) The Comptroller General, or any officer or employee designated by him for such purpose, may sign and issue subpenas requiring the production of such books, accounts, or other records as may be material to the study and review carried out by the Comptroller General under this section.

(2) Within five days after the service upon any person of any subpena issued under this subsection relating to any contract or subcontract, such person may file in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which such person transacts or has transacted business relating to that contract or subcontract, and serve upon the Comptroller General, a petition for an order of such court modifying or setting aside that subpena or demand. Such petition shall specify each ground upon which the petitioner relies in seeking such relief, and may be based upon any constitutional or other legal right or privilege of such person. Such court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter presented by such petition and to enter thereon such order or orders as it shall determine to be just and proper.

(e) In case of disobedience to subpena, the Comptroller General or his designee may invoke the aid of any district court of the United States in requiring the production of books, acounts, or other records. Any district court of the United States within the jurisdiction in which the contractor or subcontractor is found or resides or in which the contractor or subcontractor transact business may, in case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpena issued by the Comptroller General, issue an order requiring the contractor or subcontractor to produce books, accounts, and other records: and any failure to obey such order of the court shall be punished by the court as a contempt thereof.

(f) No book, account, or other record, or copy of any book, account, or record, of any contractor or subcontractor obtained by the Comptroller General under authority of this section which is not necessary for determining the profitability on any contract between such contractor or subcontractor and the Department of Defense shall be available for examination, without the consent of such contractor or subcontractor, by any individual other than a duly authorized officer or employee of the General Accounting Office; and no officer or employee of the General Accounting Office shall disclose, to any person not authorized by the Comptroller General to receive such information, any information obtained under authority of this section relating to cost, expense, or profitability on any nondefense business transaction of any contractor or subcontractor.

(g) The Comptroller General shall not disclose in any report made by him to the Congress or to either Committee on Armed Services under authority of this section any confidential information relating to the cost, expense, or profit of any contractor or subcontractor on any nondefense business transaction of such contractor or subcontractor.

SEC. 407. Notwithstanding the provisions of the Act entitled "An Act to suspend restrictions on the authorized personnel strength of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes", approved August 3, 1950 (64 Stat. 408), or any other provision of law, the total actual active duty personnel strength of the Armed Forces of the United States exclusive of personnel of the Coast Guard, personnel of reserve components on active duty for training purposes only and personnel of the Armed Forces employed in the Selective Service System shall not exceed 3,461,000 on the last day of the fiscal year 1970. In addition, whenever the total number of persons serving on active duty in Vietnam is reduced on or after July 1, 1969, this limitation of 3,461,000 shall be reduced by a like number. Nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring the reduction of the active duty personnel strength of any component of the Armed Forces below the level for such component prescribed by law. The foregoing provisions of this section shall not apply during any national emergency declared by the President or the Congress after the date of enactment of this section.

TITLE V—QUARTERLY CONTRACT REPORTING AND GAO AUDITS

SEC. 501. (a) The Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Comptroller General, shall develop a reporting system for major contracts entered into by the Department of Defense, any department or agency thereof, or any armed service of the United States, for the development or procurement of any weapons system or other need of the United States.

(b) The Secretary of Defense shall cause a review to be made of each major contract as specified in subsection (a) during each period of three calendar months and shall make a finding with respect to each such contract as to—

(1) the estimates at the time the contract was entered into of the contractor and the procuring agency as to the cost of the contract, with separate estimates for (a) research, development, testing, and engineering, and for (b) production;

(2) the contractor's and agency's subsequent estimates of cost for completion of the contract up to the time of the review;

(3) the reasons for any significant rise or decline from prior cost estimates;

(4) the options available for additional procurement, whether the agency intends to exercise such options, and the expected cost of exercising such options;

(5) the estimates of the contractor and the procuring agency, at the time the contract was entered into, of the time for completion of the contract, any subsequent estimates of both as to the time for completion, and the reasons for any significant increases therein;

(6) the estimates of the contractor and procuring agency as to performance capabilities of the subject matter of the contract, and the reasons for any significant actual or estimated shortcomings therein compared to the performance capabilities called for under the original contract or subsequent estimates; and

(7) such other information as the Secretary of Defense shall determine to be pertinent in the evaluation of costs incurred and expected to be incurred and the effectiveness of performance achieved and anticipated under the contract.

(c) The Secretary of Defense after consultation with the Comptroller General and with the chairman of the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall prescribe criteria for the determination of major contracts under subsection (a).

(d) The Secretary of Defense shall transmit quarterly to the Congress and to the Committees on Armed Services and to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives reports made pursuant to subsection (b), which shall include a full and complete statement of the findings made as a result of each contract review.

(e) The Comptroller General shall, through test checks, and other means, make an independent audit of the reporting system developed by the Secretary of Defense and shall furnish to the Congress and to the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations not less than once each year a report as to the adequacy of the reporting system, and any recommended improvements.

(f) The Comptroller General shall make independent audits of major contracts where in his opinion the costs incurred and to be incurred, the delivery schedules, and the effectiveness of performance achieved and anticipated are such as to warrant such audits and he shall report his findings to the Congress and to the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.

(g) Procuring agencies and contractors holding contracts selected by the Comptroller General for audit under subsection (f) shall file with the General Accounting Office such data, in such form and detail as may be prescribed by the Comptroller General, as the Comptroller General deems necessary or appropriate to assist him in carrying out his audits. The Comptroller General and any authorized representative of the General Accounting Office is entitled, until three years after final payment under the contract or subcontract, as the case may be, by subpena, inspection, authorization, or otherwise, to audit, obtain such information from, make such inspection and copies of, the books, records, and other writings of the procuring agency, the contractor, and subcontractors, and to take the sworn statement of any contractor or subcontractor or officer or employee of any contractor or subcontractor, as may be necessary or appropriate in the discretion of the Comptroller General, relating to contracts selected for audit.

(h) The United States district court for any district in which the contractor or subcontractor or his officer or employee is found or resides or in which the contractor or subcontractor transacts business shall have jurisdiction to issue an order requiring such contractor, subcontractor, officer, or employee to furnish such information, or to

permit the inspection and copying of such records, as may be requested by the Comptroller General under this section. Any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such courts as a contempt thereof.

(i) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be required to carry this section into effect.

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. RIVERS

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. RIVERS moves to strike out all after the enacting clause of S. 2546 and to insert in lieu thereof the provisions contained in H.R. 14000, as passed, as follows:

"TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

"SEC. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1970 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

"AIRCRAFT

"For aircraft: for the Army, $570,400,000; for the Navy and the Marine Corps, $2,391,-200,000; for the Air Force, $4,002,200,000.

"MISSILES

"For missiles: for the Army, $780,460,000; for the Navy, $851,300,000; for the Marine Corps, $20,100,000; for the Air Force, $1,486-400,000.

"NAVAL VESSELS

"For naval vessels: for the Navy, $3,591,-500,000: *Provided,* That no funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States shall be expended after January 1, 1970, for the contract procurement of DD 963 class destroyers unless the procurement planned for such vessels makes provision that the vessels in that plan shall be constructed at the facilities of at least three different United States shipbuilders.

"TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES

"For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, $195,200,000; for the Marine Corps, $37,700,000: *Provided,* That none of the funds authorized herein shall be utilized for the procurement of Sheridan assault vehicles (M-551) under any new or additional contract.

"TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

"SEC. 201. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1970 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for research, development, test, and evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

"For the Army, $1,664,500,000, of which (a) $10,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the Heavy Lift Helicopter and (b) $75,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the SAM-D system: *Provided,* That none of the funds herein authorized shall be expended for research, development, test, and evaluation of the Cheyenne helicopter;

"For the Navy (including the Marine Corps), $1,990,500,000, of which (a) $66,091,-000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the E-2C aircraft, (b) $165,400,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the S-3A aircraft, (c) $20,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the Undersea-Long-range Missile System, (d) $67,900,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the Advanced Surface Missile System, and (e) $517,300,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the research and development of Anti-Submarine Warfare Systems;

"For the Air Force, $3,241,200,000, of which (a) $15,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the RF-111D aircraft, (b) $1,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the Light Intratheater Transport aircraft, (c) $18,500,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the CONUS Air Defense Interceptor, (d) $84,700,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM), and (e) $40,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS): *Provided,* That none of the funds herein authorized shall be expended for research, development, test, and evaluation of the A-X aircraft; and

"For the Defense Agencies, $450,200,000.

"SEC. 202. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense during fiscal year 1970 for use as an emergency fund for research, development, test, and evaluation of procurement or production related thereto, $75,000,000.

"SEC. 203. None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used to carry out any research project or study unless such project or study has a direct and apparent relationship to a specific military function or operation.

TITLE III—RESERVE FORCES

"SEC. 301. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1969, and ending June 30, 1970, the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the Armed Forces will be programed to attain an average strength of not less than the following:

"(1) The Army National Guard of the United States, 393,298.

"(2) The Army Reserve, 255,591.

"(3) The Naval Reserve, 129,000.

"(4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 49,489.

"(5) The Air National Guard of the United States, 86,624.

"(6) The Air Force Reserve, 50,775.

"(7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 17,500.

"SEC. 302. The average strength prescribed by section 301 of this title for the Selected Reserve of any Reserve component shall be proportionately reduced by (1) the total authorized strength of units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component which are on active duty (other than for training) at any time during the fiscal year, and (2) the total number of individual members not in units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component who are on active duty (other than for training or for unsatisfactory participation in training) without their consent at any time during the fiscal year. Whenever any such units or such individual members are released from active duty during any fiscal year, the average strength for such fiscal year for the Selected Reserve of such Reserve component shall be proportionately increased by the total authorized strength of such units by the total number of such individual members.

"SEC. 303. Section 264 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by deleting subsection (b) and substituting the following in lieu thereof:

"'(b) The Secretary concerned is responsible for providing the personnel, equipment, facilities, and other general logistic support necessary to enable units and Reserves in the Selected Reserve of the Reserve components under this jurisdiction to satisfy the mobilization readiness requirements established for those units and Reserves in the contingency and war plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense, and as recommended by the Commandant of the Coast Guard and approved by the Secretary of Transportation when the Coast Guard is not operated as a service of the Navy. He shall, when a unit in the Selected Reserve is established and designated, expeditiously procure, issue, and maintain supplies and equipment of combat standard quality in amounts required for the training of each unit and shall store and maintain such additional supplies and equipment of that quality that are required by those units upon mobilization. However, if the Secretary concerned determines that compliance with the preceding provisions of this subsection will jeopardize the national security interests of the United States, he may temporarily waive compliance with these requirements after he has notified Congress in writing, setting forth the specific facts and circumstances upon which he made such a determination. Unless specifically authorized by law enacted after the effective date of this section, funds authorized for personnel, supplies, equipment and facilities for a Reserve component may not be transferred or expended for any other purpose.'

"SEC. 304. Subsection (c) of section 264 of title 10, United States Code, is amended as follows:

"In the last line of the last sentence of subsection (c) after the word 'within', change the figures '60' to '90'.

"TITLE IV—GENERAL PROVISIONS

"SEC. 401. Subsection (a) of section 401 of Public Law 89-367 approved March 15, 1966 (80 Stat. 37) as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"'Funds authorized for appropriation for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes to support: (1) Vietnamese and other Free World Forces in Vietnam, (2) local forces in Laos and Thailand; and for related costs, during the fiscal year 1970 on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine.'

"SEC. 402. After January 1, 1970, no contract or grant for Research and Development projects shall be awarded by the Department of Defense or any of the Armed Forces to any school, college or university or to any affiliated organization of such school, college or university, or to an individual in the employment of such school, college or university or its affiliated organization until sixty days after a full disclosure of the purposes, cost, and duration of such contract together with a statement setting forth in detail the number of research and development projects already awarded to that institution but not yet completed; the dollar amount of each said contract; the purpose of each of the contracts previously awarded; and for the contract or grant for which the notice is being given, a description of the facilities required to perform the research project, the cost of such facilities, a statement of whether such facilities are in existence and if so, a description of the ownership of such facilities, is made to the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives. In addition, such notification will include a statement summarizing the record of the school, college or university with regard to cooperation on military matters such as the Reserve Officer Training Corps and military recruiting on its campus.

"SEC. 403. Title 10, United States Code, is amended as follows:

"(1) Section 3015(c) is amended to read as follows:

"'(c) The Chief of the National Guard Bureau holds office for four years, but may be removed for cause at any time and may not hold that office after he becomes sixty-four years of age. He is eligible to succeed himself. An officer now or hereafter serving as Chief of the National Guard Bureau shall be appointed as a Reserve in his armed force in the grade of lieutenant general for service in the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States, as the case may be, while serving as the Chief of the National Guard

Bureau. The position of Chief of the National Guard Bureau is in addition to the number of lieutenant general positions authorized by section 3066, 3202, 8066, or 8202 of this title, or any other provision of law.'

"(2) Section 3962 is amended by adding the following new subsection:

"'(d) Upon retirment or being granted retired pay, a reserve commissioned officer of the Army who has served as Chief of the National Guard Bureau in the grade of lieutenant general may, in the discretion of the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, be retired in, and granted retired pay based on, that grade.'

"(3) Section 8962 is amended by adding the following new subsection:

"'(c) Upon retirement or being granted retired pay, a reserve commissioned officer of the Air Force who has served as Chief of the National Guard Bureau in the grade of lieutenant general may, in the discretion of the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, be retired in, and granted retired pay based on, that grade.'

"(4) The catchlines of sections 3962 and 8962 are each amended by deleting ': regular commissioned officers.'

"(5) The analysis of chapter 369 is amended by striking out 'regular commissioned officers' in item 3962.

"(6) The analysis of chapter 869 is amended by striking out 'regular commissioned officers' in item 8962.

"Section 3019, title 10, United States Code is amended to read as follows:

"'(c) The Chief, Office of Army Reserve, holds office for four years, but may be removed for cause at any time. He is eligible to succeed himself. An officer now or hereafter serving as Chief, Office of Army Reserve, shall be appointed in the grade of lieutenant general for service in the Army Reserve while serving as the Chief, Office of Army Reserve. The position of Chief, Office of Army Reserve is in addition to the number of lieutenant general positions authorized by section 3066 or 3202 of this title, or any other provision of law.'

"Section 8019, title 10, United States Code is amended to read as follows:

"'(c) The Chief, Office of Air Force Reserve, holds office for four years, but may be removed for cause at any time. He is eligible to succeed himself. An officer now or hereafter serving as Chief, Office of Air Force Reserve, shall be appointed in the grade of lieutenant general for service in the Air Force Reserve while serving as the Chief, Office of Air Force Reserve. The position of Chief, Office of Air Force Reserve is in addition to the number of lieutenant general positions authorized by section 8066 or 8202 of this title, or any other provision of law.'

"SEC. 404. (a) Section 136 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

"(1) by inserting after the first sentence in subsection (b) the following new sentences: 'One of the Assistant Secretaries shall be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. He shall have as his principal duty the overall supervision of health affairs of the Department of Defense.', and

"(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"'(g) Within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs there shall be a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Dental Affairs who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Subject to the supervision and control of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the Deputy Assistant Secretary shall be responsible for all matters relating to dental affairs within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.'

"(b) Until otherwise provided by operation of law, the individual holding office as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Medical) on the effective date of this section shall perform the duties of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs established by this section.

"SEC. 405. Section 412(b) of Public Law 86–149, as amended, is amended to read as follows:

"'(b) No funds may be appropriated afer December 31, 1960, to or for the use of any armed force of the United States for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, or naval vessels, or after December 31, 1962, to or for the use of any armed force of the United States for the research, development, test, or evaluation of aircraft, missiles, or naval vessels, or after December 31, 1963, to or for the use of any armed force of the United States for any research, development, test, or evaluation, or after December 31, 1965, to or for the use of any armed force of the United States for the procurement of tracked combat vehicles, or after December 31, 1969, to or for the use of any armed force of the United States for the procurement of other vehicles, weapons, and munitions, unless the appropriation of such funds has been authorized by legislation enacted after such dates.'

"SEC. 406. (1) Chapter 7 of title 37, United States Code is amended as follows:

"(a) The following new section is inserted after section 427:

"'§ 428. Travel and transportation allowances: dependents at permanent station outside United States

"'Under regulations prescribed by the Secretaries concerned, which shall be, as far as practicable, uniform for all of the uniformed services, a member of a uniformed service who is on duty outside the United States at a permanent station, and when such benefits are not made available in kind by the United States, is entitled to a travel and transportation allowance, to assist in providing transportation for his dependents who are authorized to accompany him, as follows:

"'(1) A travel and transportation allowance is authorized to meet the travel expenses of the dependents of a member to and from a school in the United States to obtain an undergraduate college education, not to exceed one round trip each school year for each dependent for the purpose of obtaining such type of education. All or any portion of the travel for which a transportation allowance is authorized by this section will be performed wherever possible by the Military Airlift Command on a space-required basis. Notwithstanding the area limitations in this section, a travel and transportation allowance for the purpose of obtaining undergraduate college education may be authorized under this clause for dependents of members stationed in the Canal Zone.

"'(2) The term "United States" shall, for the purpose of this section, mean the several States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Canal Zone.

"'(3) The words "permanent station" shall, for the purpose of this section, include home yard or home port of a vessel to which a member of a uniformed service may be assigned.

"'(4) Notwithstanding section 401(2)(A) of this title, "dependent" in this section may include an unmarried child over twenty-one years of age who is in fact dependent and is obtaining an undergraduate college education.'

"(b) The analysis is amended by inserting the following item:

"'Sec. 428. Travel and transportation allowances: dependents at permanent station outside the United States.'

"(2) Section 912 of title 26, United States Code, is amended by adding the following new paragraph at the end thereof:

"'(4) EDUCATION TRANSPORTATION ALLOWANCE.—In case of a member of a uniformed service, amounts received under section 428 of title 37, United States Code.'

"SEC. 407. Section 2 of the Act of August 3, 1950 (64 Stat. 408), as amended, is further amended to read as follows:

"'SEC. 2. After July 1, 1970, the active duty personnel strength of the Armed Forces, exclusive of personnel of the Coast Guard, personnel of the Reserve components on active duty for training purposes only, and personnel of the Armed Forces employed in the Selective Service System, shall not exceed a total of 3,285,000 persons at any time during the period of suspension prescribed in the first section of this Act except when the President of the United States determines that the application of this ceiling will seriously jeopardize the national security interests of the United States and informs the Congress of the basis of such determination.'

"SEC. 408. (a) After December 31, 1969, none of the funds authorized for appropriation by this or any other Act for the use of the Armed Forces shall be used for payments out of such funds under contracts or agreements with Federal contract research centers if the annual compensation of any officer or employee of such center paid out of such funds exceeds $45,000 except with the approval of the Secretary of Defense under regulations prescribed by the President.

"(b) The Secretary of Defense shall notify the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives promptly of any approvals authorized under subsection (a), together with a detailed statement of the reasons therefor.

"SEC. 409. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an officer of an armed force who—

"(1) served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

"(2) after he was retired, but before October 1, 1963, was ordered to active duty; and

"(3) was released from that active duty after July 31, 1969;

shall, effective as of the date he was released from that active duty, be entitled to retired pay computed under the formula set forth in the table in section 1402(a) of title 10, United States Code, but using the monthly basic pay prescribed at the time of his release from that active duty for an officer serving in pay grade O–10. The provisions of this paragraph do not affect or modify any prior commitment made by such officer in regard to participation in the Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan.

"(a) The Secretary of Defense shall submit semiannual reports to the Congress on or before January 31 and on or before July 31 of each year setting forth the amounts spent during the preceding six month period for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation and procurement of all lethal and nonlethal chemical and biological agents. The Secretary shall include in each report a full explanation of each expenditure, including the purpose and the necessity therefor.

"(b) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or any other Act may be used for (1) the transportation of any lethal chemical or biological warfare agent to or from any military installation in the United States, or (2) the open air testing of any such agent within the United States, unless—

"(A) the Secretary of Defense (hereafter referred to in this section as the 'Secretary') considers that the transportation or testing proposed to be made is necessary in the interests of national security;

"(B) the Secretary advises the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare of the particulars regarding the proposed transportation or testing,

"(C) the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare reviews such particulars with respect to any hazards to health and safety which such transportation or testing may pose, and reports his findings, together with any precautionary measures that he

recommends be taken to avoid or minimize such hazards, to the Secretary;

"(D) the Secretary considers the findings and recommendations made by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare under paragraph (C) and takes such action consenant therewith as he deems appropriate (including, where practical, the detoxification of any such agent, if such agent is to be transported to or from a military installation for disposal); and

"(E) The Secretary provides notification that such transportation or testing will be made to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives at least ten days before the date on which such transportation or testing will be commenced.

"(c)(1) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or any other Act may be used for the deployment, or storage, or both, at any place outside of the United States of—

"(A) any lethal chemical or biological warfare agent, or

"(B) any delivery system specifically designed to disseminate any such lethal agent, unless the Secretary gives prior notice of such deployment or storage to the country exercising jurisdiction over such place. In the case of any place outside the United States which is under the jurisdiction or control of the United States Government, no such action may be taken unless the Secretary gives prior notice of such action to the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. As used in this paragraph, the term 'United States' means the several States and the District of Columbia.

"(2) None of the funds authorized by this or any other Act shall be used for the testing, development, transportation, storage, or disposal of any lethal chemical or biological warfare agent outside the United States if the Secretary of State, after being notified by the Secretary that such action is contemplated, determines that such testing, development, transportation, storage, or disposal will violate international law. The Secretary of State shall report all determinations made by him under this paragraph to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, and to all appropriate international organizations, or organs thereof, whenever so required by treaty or other international agreement.

"(d) Unless otherwise indicated, as used in this section the term 'United States' means the several States, the District of Columbia, and the territories and possessions of the United States.

"(e) After the effective date of this bill, the operation of this section, or any portion thereof, may be suspended during the period of any war declared by Congress and during the period of any national emergency declared by Congress or by the President."

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from South Carolina.

The motion was agreed to.

The Senate bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed.

The title was amended so as to read: "To authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes."

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

A similar House bill (H.R. 14000) was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous matter on the bill just passed.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GRAY). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

PERSONAL ANNOUNCEMENT

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, a little while ago I referred to the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) in my remarks on the floor. I am removing all reference from the temporary and permanent RECORD to Mr. LEGGETT. I ask unanimous consent to do so.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

PERSONAL ANNOUNCEMENT

(Mr. LANDRUM asked and was given permission to address the house for 1 minute.)

Mr. LANDRUM. Mr. Speaker, at the time my name was called to vote on the motion to recommit, I voted. I thought there would be sufficient time to go to my office and attend to a matter that needed to be attended to before I go home. So I went to my office and came back here at the time the call for final passage was being made. It was faster than I could travel so I was not recorded on the vote for final passage.

Mr. Speaker, had I been here I would have voted for final passage unquestionably as my record in the debate on the bill under consideration today for military procurement would have shown.

I make this statement, Mr. Speaker, so the RECORD will show this.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

PERSONAL ANNOUNCEMENT

(Mr. PEPPER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, except for the first quorum call today, I was on the floor all of today voting on all of the amendments including the teller votes and as well as being on record as voting on the motion to recommit.

But I had some matters pressing in my office just before the final rollcall began and I thought I could get back before the rollcall was concluded. The announcement of the vote was being made as I rushed through the door. Unfortunately, the announcement had been made when I actually got on the floor and, therefore, I could not be recorded as voting.

Mr. Speaker, had I been here, of course, I would have voted "yea".

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that my statement will appear in the RECORD immediately following the announcement of the vote.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

PERSONAL ANNOUNCEMENT

(Mr. STUCKEY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. STUCKEY. Mr. Speaker, I would like to associate my remarks with the dean of our delegation, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. LANDRUM).

We were both in his office at the time on a pressing matter.

Mr. Speaker, I would like the RECORD to show that I did vote on the recommital and that I was in favor of the passage of the bill. I would like the permanent RECORD to show that if I had been present, I would have voted for it.

PERSONAL ANNOUNCEMENT

(Mr. VANDER JAGT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. VANDER JAGT. Mr. Speaker, I would like to associate my remarks with the remarks that have gone on earlier.

Mr. Speaker, I too missed the vote on final passage of the military procurement bill. I voted on all of the matters earlier in the day. Had I been present, I would have voted "yea" and I would like the RECORD to so indicate.

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

(Mr. ARENDS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I take this time to inquire of the distinguished majority leader the program for next week.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ARENDS. I yield to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. ALBERT. The program for next week is as follows:

Monday is Consent Calendar day, and there are seven suspensions, as follows:

H.R. 14127, to carry out the recommendations of the Joint Commission on the Coinage;

H.R. 13304, Gifted and Talented Children Educational Assistance Act;

H.R. 13310, to provide for special programs for children with special learning disabilities;

H.R. 13576, to increase the rates of dependency and indemnity compensation to widows of veterans;

H.R. 372, amendments to the non-service-connected pension program for veterans;

S. 1836, to amend the Federal Seed Act; and

H.R. 9857, to amend the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act.

Tuesday is Private Calendar day.

There is also scheduled for consideration H.R. 10878, to authorize appropriations for activities of the National Science Foundation under an open rule with 1 hour of debate.

For Wednesday and the balance of the week:

Calendar Wednesday:

H.R. 14159, public works for water, pollution control, and power development, and Atomic Energy Commission Appropriation Act, 1970;

H.R. 8449, Hours of Service Act amendments under an open rule, with 1 hour of debate; and

H.R. 7737, Educational Television and Radio Amendments of 1969 under an open rule with 1 hour of debate.

This announcement is made subject to the usual reservation that conference reports may be brought up at any time, and any further program will be announced later.

Mr. Speaker, it may well be we will have additions to the program before the end of next week and, if so, we will announce them at the time.

ADJOURNMENT TO MONDAY, OCTOBER 6

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet on Monday next.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, on the assumption that we will be here Thanksgiving and Christmas in Washington, would I be safe at this time in putting in an order for a turkey and a Christmas tree?

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I think the gentleman might take that up with the body across the Capitol.

Mr. GROSS. Which body? Oh, the gentleman means the other body?

Mr. ALBERT. The gentleman is right.

Mr. GROSS. I see. I thank the gentleman.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

REQUEST TO DISPENSE WITH CALENDAR WEDNESDAY BUSINESS ON WEDNESDAY NEXT

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the business in order under the Calendar Wednesday rule may be dispensed with on Wednesday next.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

Mr. UDALL. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I have never objected to the leadership's request of this kind, and I take the floor tonight with considerable reluctance. But for the last month the bill H.R. 13000, dealing with the paying of benefits and compensation of nearly 2 million Federal employees, has been languishing in the Committee on Rules.

I have believed that it was languishing there because of the backlog left over from our August recess and other business. I now discover, and I am led to believe, that the bill is being held there in part through efforts of those in the administration, and those who are anxious to hold it in ransom for the so-called postal corporation bill.

It is kind of ironic, because I am the principal sponsor of the proposal for the postal service corporation bill, and have been trying in the last several weeks with the administration to see if we can move this proposal along this year.

But if this is the way the game is to be played, and if I am to keep the commitments I have made in our committee, and that I have made to the Federal employees that we would give them some answers to the serious questions they have raised, and with the possibility of strikes, and that we would have disruptions if they do not receive some action on the Federal pay bills this year, then I can no longer sit back and wait.

Calendar Wednesday is one of the few devices by which a committee can get consideration of legislation that it has approved. This legislation is supported by a vast majority of the Members of the House, so I am constrained tonight, Mr. Speaker, to object, but if I do object—and I think I shall—I would ask the leadership to renew the request on Monday, and maybe we can get a little better indication as to the reasons that are holding this up.

So, Mr. Speaker, under the circumstances I do object.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.

(Mr. OLSEN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. OLSEN. Mr. Speaker, had I been present, I would have joined the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. UDALL) in objecting to the waiver of Calendar Wednesday.

I ask unanimous consent that I may have my remarks follow those of the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. UDALL) when he made that objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY TO HAVE UNTIL MIDNIGHT SATURDAY, OCTOBER 4, TO FILE REPORT ON H.R. 14127

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the House Committee on Banking and Currency have until midnight Saturday, October 4, to file its report on H.R. 14127, to carry out the recommendations of the Joint Commission on the Coinage, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, may I inquire if the committee has met, and if the action has been channeled in both the subcommittee and the full committee, and if the report has been completed, and is ready for filing?

Mr. PATMAN. I would say to the gentleman from Missouri that it will be filed by tomorrow night. That is the request that I have made.

The vote was unanimous. It is a bill on coinage, and it includes a dollar for the late General Eisenhower.

Mr. HALL. I am not sure that he would be honored with what you are going to put in it. But I want to be sure that this is not another one of those star chamber proceedings that have been reported in the various news media on the gentleman's committee.

Mr. PATMAN. We had 35 members there, and they all voted, and voted for it.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HALL. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Is it proposed to file a report on this bill on tomorrow night, and then to take it up under suspension on Monday?

Mr. PATMAN. That is correct.

Mr. GROSS. When are we supposed to get some information or be able to get some information on the bill?

Mr. PATMAN. You will have it Monday noon.

There again, President Nixon wrote the Speaker of the House and wrote to me, and to others, indicating that President Eisenhower's birthday is October 14, and that it would be very nice if this bill were to be passed before that time so that the President could make certain announcements that would be important.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I would say I have no particular objection to this, although I may reserve the right to vote against the coinage if it does not have any of the metal of the realm in it.

Be that as it may, perhaps we should have had the bill out on time, and ready to have been examined by the Members, instead of filing it over the weekend, if we had not had these star chamber proceedings going on.

Mr. PATMAN. May I say to the gentleman, there have been no star chamber proceedings at all.

Mr. HALL. The gentleman does not deny but what they have been going on, or that the reports as printed on the editorial page of the Wall Street Journal being an exact transcript, does he?

Mr. PATMAN. No; it was not an exact transcript and it was out of context and not all of it was correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. PATMAN)?

There was no objection.

TIME FOR A VICTORY IN VIETNAM DAY

(Mr. HALEY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HALEY. Mr. Speaker, when I visited my congressional district during the brief recess of the Congress, many of my constituents discussed with me the

war in Vietnam. Each expressed the desire that it soon be ended, although many had different theories about how this should be accomplished.

On September 30, 1969, one of my hometown newspapers, the Sarasota Journal, expressed an idea that deserves wide audience, when it published an editorial entitled, "Time for 'VV' Day." I hope all readers of the RECORD will consider the editorial writer's thoughts. It is time that we chart a specific course to lead us to an early "Victory in Vietnam Day." The editorial follows:

TIME FOR "VV" DAY

President Nixon says the time has come to end the Vietnam war. We agree. The nation agrees. So, let's end it.

Let's don't get hung upon details. Just proclaim VV Day (Victory in Vietnam) and bring our troops home.

The President, in such a proclamation, could point out that we have achieved all our stated objectives in South Vietnam. We have defeated and turned back invaders from the North. We have, at a high cost in American lives, bought time for the South Vietnamese to establish a viable government.

The proclamation need not go into the question of how that time has been used. But it should affirm that the United States has no desire to hold any Vietnamese territory, that we have never wanted to impose our will upon another people, that all we ever intended was to repeal aggression, to give the people of South Vietnam a chance to determine their own future, and that this we have done.

The proclamation should express the nation's gratitude to the million or more men who have followed the colors into America's least-understood and most unpopular war. It should accord special honor to the 40,000 who gave their last full measure of devotion because they were told that the cause was just.

VV Day should be declared, not a day for unrestrained rejoicing, but a day for prayer and reflection and for re-dedication to freedom and justice for all men and all nations.

Naturally, a Presidential proclamation would need a lot of "Whereases" and "Therefores" and more flourish and styles than we can put in these few word. But we have touched upon the essentials of the instrument.

There would remain the matter of picking a date for VV Day. We suggest only that it should be soon. Very soon.

FRESHMAN ECONOMICS LESSON NO. 6

(Mr. PODELL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PODELL. Mr. Speaker, the Nixon administration is riding piggyback on an economic buzz saw which it created and accelerated the pace of. This is inevitably resulting in the rupture of our hard-won prosperity in the name of ending inflation. Already the economy is careening wildly, yawing right and left under the influence of a commander and officers who do not know where we have been, have no idea of where we are, and are completely in the dark as to where we are heading. All we do know is that matters are worsening, people are losing their jobs, buying power decreases, and interest rates and prices are high and going higher. Further instruction in freshman elementary economics is therefore in order. Let us commence.

First there is the elementary choice facing the administration. Shall they halt corporate price hikes or destroy the average person's buying power? Obviously they have opted for the latter. As buying power is ordered, the various corporations which have raised prices blithely continue mass production on items workers can no longer afford or will now hesitate to purchase. Inventories pyramid, as recent news has informed us is the case. Disaster stands poised in the wings, delighted at the prospect of repeating its 1929 triumph.

If the President seeks to reduce the cause of inflation, I am more than happy to offer him a case in point which is the inflationary cycle in microcosm. For the second time in 3 weeks, the Maxwell House Division of General Foods Corp. is raising wholesale coffee prices. They are immediately going up 3 cents a pound, a 3.8-percent increase. On September 11, it announced increases of 5 percent.

General Electric's Hotpoint appliance prices are going up 3 percent. Standard Oil of New Jersey raises prices for polyethylene film. Riegle Paper Corp. announces a 4-percent increase in glassine and grease-proof products. International Paper Sales Co. raises newsprint prices $5 per ton. Pratt and Whitney Aircraft increases jet engine prices by 5 to 10 percent, and the administration cannot understand why there is inflation.

The auto industry is another case in point. We left these heroes of the corporate world after Ford had followed the General Motors price hike with one of its own. Chrysler followed with a price hike of $107 per car. Now that is what I call competition. Sugar prices then hit their highest point since 1964. In both cases, the Government maintained a bleak silence. Bowater Paper Corp., one of the majors, increased its newsprint prices to $152 per ton. If other companies follow their lead, it will be the third general rise in newsprint cost in 2 years. The other day General Motors added insult to injury by raising prices on auto accessories for cars and trucks. So when you and I need a battery or one of those thousand and one items which a car or truck requires, we shall pay more; 3.9 percent is the amount of the increase. Toyota and Nissan, the two major auto companies in Japan which sell significant numbers of cars in the United States, are contemplating a price hike. Sure. Why not get on the bandwagon.

Meanwhile, we must lift up our eyes to see what is transpiring in the background, where the massive forces of the economy are realining themselves as a result of these economic policies of the Government and the accompanying actions of various corporations.

In August there was no increase in savings, a month when there is usually a large inflow. Last year, savings gained $366 million in August. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board also reported that interest rates on conventional mortgages rose again in August to an average of 7.99 percent for new homes, compared with 7.91 percent in July. This simply means that the average prospective home purchaser will have to pay more for his mortgaged home. No problem to the average corporation president, but a major one to the average worker. Lending volume is plummeting, and the decline is accelerating. Industrial output in August declined for the first time in a year as the Federal Reserve Board production index showed a 0.2-percent drop. Housing construction declined in August for the seventh consecutive month. Corporate profits meanwhile, hit an alltime high. Durable goods orders declined $700 million, or 2.4 percent in August. Orders for machinery and equipment decreased by $200 million.

All over the Nation unemployment is spreading like a pox, as thousands and now tens of thousands of American workers are being laid off or released outright. Unemployment lines are beginning to lengthen and real deprivation is making its appearance in places where it had been merely a spectre of the bad old days. Cheer up folks, you have the President and his advisers to thank for all this largesse. How generous of them to bring us a recession, and perhaps a recession, all in the name of halting inflation.

Our leaders live in the clouds, navigating a balloon made of an immense and empty bologna skin. Down below we mere mortals groan in increasing economic agony. Recently it was announced that the President may use sweet reason, moral suasion, and an eloquent plea for price and wage restraint. Emptying out the ocean with a thimble makes more sense. Double doses of ipecac and field artillery will have to be employed on the Nation's major corporations to end their power and profit mad price-raising spree. The President must act rather than talk. This is not the campaign and oratory will fail. This is the crunch. This is what he was elected for. Now is when we shall find out whether there is granite and hard bone in his spine or whipped cream.

THE HOMETOWN ANGLE

(Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI. Mr. Speaker, I recently had the privilege of reading an article entitled "The Hometown Angle," which appeared in the publication Television Age, by Mr. Robert F. Foster, Washington news bureau chief for WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., located at 2501 W. Bradley Place in Chicago, Ill.

In this critique, Mr. Foster highlights his observations regarding the role of WGN in reporting the days' events. I found his remarks to be not only concisive, but of great personal interest because this report underscores the distinguished service that WGN has provided to the residents of my congressional district, the city of Chicago, and the entire Midwest.

I feel confident that this article will also be of great interest to my colleagues as well, and I am, therefore, enclosing a copy of the article, as follows:

THE HOMETOWN ANGLE

Finding the local angle to a Washington story is not as hard as it sounds. Perhaps one of the best examples of localizing Congressional news is the obvious one—the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. Defense spending will affect military installations throughout the country. And the public works appropriations bill touches on every state in the Union.

Another example: The President's Office of Emergency Preparedness recently gave our news bureau a chance to localize the tragedy of hurricane "Camille."

We set up an interview with the director, Brig. Gen. George A. Lincoln (ret.), who was in charge of coordinating federal and state evacuation and clean-up operations following the hurricane's assault on the Mississippi and Louisiana coasts.

Localizing the story for Chicago was relatively simple, as the plane-loads of medicines, clothing and shelter supplies were being sent from Illinois to the disaster sites. A two-minute interview wrapped up the Illinois and Chicago participation in a nutshell.

Localizing the story for KWGN–TV Denver, we thought, might pose a more difficult problem. But we learned the general had married a woman from Denver, has a ranch near there and has children in Colorado colleges. Our "localized" interview was complete when the general told us he was in the Denver area when he first learned of Camille's devastation and was called to mobilize his disaster units.

Ordinarily, in interviewing a Congressman, some kind of reaction is sought. What does a given Congressman think of a certain Congressional development? What does he think should have been done, and what does he propose should be done in the future regarding the topic?

The Midwest is fortunate in having five of the top Congressional leaders from its area. In the Senate, there was, until recently, Illinois' Everett Dirksen, minority leader. In the House, the Midwest has minority leader Gerald Ford of Michigan, minority whip Leslie Arends of Illinois, the Chairman of the House Republican Conference, John Anderson of Illinois and Daniel Rostenkowski, Chairman of the House Democratic Caucus. The Denver area has its leadership representative in Sen. Gordon Allott, Senate Republican policy chairman. And Duluth-Superior has national recognition in such members as Minnesota Sen. Eugene McCarthy and Wisconsin Sen. William Proxmire.

The first thing one has to understand when covering the Capitol is the committee assignment of members. For instance, if there is a dispute between this country and France one doesn't go to a member who, although from your regional area, serves on the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee. He looks for a member from the House Foreign Affairs Committee. With the Chicago area, it is not difficult to find members on all committees of both Houses.

Congressmen as a group are no different than lawyers, doctors or bricklayers. Each member is an individual and each has his own traits.

Some members are more than willing to be interviewed—some, in fact, are over-eager to be seen by the constituency back home.

Others are willing, but there is difficulty in setting up the time because of their heavy committee work. This is especially true of members with high seniority on committees. They certainly want to cooperate, but you have to do your share of cooperating, too.

For some members, it's a matter of their disposition on a given day. Congressmen have difficulties with their wives, for instance, just as much as men in other fields. You'll find a member one day throwing out his hand in greeting, and the next day he'll walk right by you with his mind miles away.

There is a group of members who want to talk only if the topic is relatively non-controversial. The example which always comes to mind on this subject, was the release of the Warren Report.

We asked one member if he would comment on it, immediately after its release. "Let's skip this one, Bob," he replied. "It's a little sticky." Granted, time proved him correct with the disputes that eventually came up on the Warren Report, but there was certainly nothing controversial at the time of its publication, nor any indication whatsoever that there would be.

And then there is a small group which under no circumstances wants to do an interview. One can only summarize this very, very small group as coming from the school that believes that if you don't say anything, you'll never have to regret saying the wrong thing.

But the great majority of members and those holding other high governmental positions are willing to talk if they have the time. If they don't want to be interviewed they will almost always tell you off the record why they want to pass it up. You will find in Washington, as in other cities, that it is one thing to have a person talk for newsmen from the wire services or newspapers, and it is another thing to have them talk for radio or television.

As a rule members are easy to contact, either directly or through their press aides. Committee work of the members makes it necessary to go through the press aides quite often. Senators have more committee assignments than do members of the House and as a result it is often more difficult to set a time for an interview with a member of the Senate.

The stations in Chicago, Denver and Duluth leave the day-to-day assignments to the Washington News Bureau—with exceptions, of course.

They certainly alert us if a mayor or governor is due in the Capitol or they will point out if there is high interest locally in an upcoming committee hearing.

TELEVISION COVERAGE

Speaking of committees, the Houses are divided on the subject of coverage by television. The Senate leaves the matter up to the individual committee chairman, and the subcommittee chairman, as to whether sound-on-film (SOF) shooting will be allowed during testimony and discussion. In most cases, where no SOF filming is allowed, the committee chairman will allow some silent footage until the gavel is brought into use.

The House, on the other hand, allows no SOF shooting of committee sessions. In these instances, silent film is shot prior to the committee going into session. However, in the event committee work is not shot SOF, permission is almost always granted to set-up in the hallway outside of the committee chamber for interviews with the parties interested in the proceedings, including, of course, those who testified.

If a member has a speech impediment, he is naturally going to be hesitant about doing an interview. If, in the rare event his grammar is bad, this usually will not stop him from doing an interview. Why? Because he's been talking that way for a long time and sees nothing wrong with his delivery.

If someone is camera-shy, or is afraid of becoming panic stricken or speechless, a little bit of encouragement will usually work. The best line I have heard in a case like this, and I have used it, is to explain that it's as if we were sitting in a living room at home and just casually talking. He has to be convinced that a camera has never bitten anyone and there is no reason why it will happen today. But realizing that a person is following the line of public life and politics makes you understand that there is a degree—no matter how small—of extrovert in that person.

If you are particularly concerned that an interview will go on too long—based upon experience—it doesn't hurt to say you've only got 100 feet left in the magazine, you are fighting a deadline, and the subject has to be wrapped up rather quickly.

There is no more a set formula for questioning people in Washington as there is elsewhere. The first reaction question is usually. "Why?" Somewhere along the line, another question is bound to be, "What do you think will happen next?"

Occasionally, you have to call a member off the floor to ask about a subject he is unaware of. An example of this would be to approach a member of the House Armed Services Committee, and inform him about a story which has just broken on fighting in South Viet Nam. You obviously have to fill him in on the report before he can analyze or comment.

The House of Representatives provides the best facilities for filming. In the House Radio-TV Gallery, located almost directly above the chamber, three studios are available for cameras. Two are small, but the third is quite large, and as many as twelve cameras were in use on at least one occasion for a news conference in this studio. While the small studios provide for only a curtain or wall background, at least five backgrounds can be used in the big studio, including a desk with books behind it, a large colored map of the world, and large doors. There is also a large, attractive studio available in the Sam Rayburn House Office Building.

The Senate Radio-TV Gallery, on the other hand, is very small, although efforts have been underway for some time to increase the size of this facility. If necessary, more than six crews can be jammed into this small space; but it's a very, very tight squeeze. Two backgrounds are available.

SHOOTING AT WHITE HOUSE

Cameras crews at the White House find things more confining, with one asphalt-paved center outside the West Wing set aside for interviews and "stand-up" work. The East Room and the Fish Room are used for Presidential news conferences. However, since almost all stations have network or UPI Films affiliations, the Presidential news conferences almost always are left to these organizations.

On occasion, there will be addresses by the President to groups in the Rose Garden, and ceremonies on the South Lawn. Here, of course, the space is not limited, and a good deal of silent coverage is given by regional bureaus.

Most Federal agencies are not equipped for film coverage of news conferences, but there are exceptions.

One executive agency geared for filming interviews is the Department of Defense. Pentagon coverage, usually, for obvious reasons, is confined to one area, and the subject involved in the news briefings is brought to the reporters. The Pentagon studio is large enough to accommodate a dozen cameras, and some 100 people. It is adequate now, but with the sudden influx of independent bureaus, it may be outmoded in the near future. Set-ups are permitted for feature interviews.

WGN-Continental, like the other regional bureaus, prefers to use the facilities of the House of Representatives. When in session, the House almost always convenes at Noon. As a consequence, it is more convenient for the members to be interivewed either just prior to the session, during the session—especially during a quorum call—immediately after an important vote is tallied, or when the House adjourns. With few exceptions, members of the Senate understand the reasons for our preferring to set-up in the House, and are willing to come over to the other side of the Capitol for an interview.

A regional bureau just doesn't have the staff to do investigative work, so the emphasis, after top priorities are given to Congress and the Executive branch, is directed at features.

Our list of photographic equipment is

short. For silent film coverage we use the Bell & Howell 70–DR 16 mm camera equipped with 10 mm, 25 mm and 50 mm lenses.

Our sound work is done with the Auricon pro-600, equipped with the Angenieux 12–120 zoom lens. We use both 400-foot and 1200-foot Auricon magazines, with either core or 100-foot reel takeups. Sound is handled by the standard Auricon amplifier, and magnetic sound heads.

Our film stock is Kodak-EF-B Ektachrome color film, with magnetic stripping. All film shot by the bureau is shot raw and processed in Chicago, Denver and Duluth.

One problem you don't have with a Washington News Bureau is makeup. With one, or possibly two, exceptions over a five and a half year period, no member of either House has requested to use makeup.

The ever-present problem of the regional bureau is shipment of film. You are forever at the mercy of the weather, as the regional bureau must rely on air shipment to the station. Film must be at the airport well ahead of flight time, and then there is a delay at the destination until the film has been taken to and sorted out by air express.

The following on how Washington coverage looks from the local station point of view was written by Robert D. Manewith, director of news of WGN–TV–AM *Chicago.*

There are many fast breaking local stories where we need comment from Washington authorities. Frequently Mayor Daley and Governor Ogilvie take newsmaking trips to Washington. We always tip off the Washington Bureau, and a WGN Bureau man is usually the first to greet these officials at the airport.

The Bureau also gets local requests from Wayne Vriesman of KWGN–TV Denver and Bill Krueger of KDAL–TV Duluth.

THE TIME ELEMENT

The basic problem for our home office, in dealing with its own Washington material, is getting the material to Chicago in a timely manner. We are at the mercy of traffic jams around two of the five most congested airport areas in the country. We are also at the mercy of the airline schedules, which in their turn, are at the mercy of the air congestion around these two airports, and the weather.

A courier must *get* from Capitol Hill to National Airport and place our package in the hands of an Air Express agent before lockout, one hour prior to flight time. Another courier must be waiting at the Air-Ex office in Chicago when the plane lands, at which time an agent, hopefully cajoled or rewarded, will actually go to the plane for our package, rather than forcing us to wait for routine unloading. Then, the courier has to get away from O'Hara Field and get into the city with the film.

The distance between the two cities is almost insignificant, in comparison with the time it takes for the couriers and express agents to complete their tasks.

Oh, for the days of the picture-phone and the miniature TV, when we can get *sound* and picture from Washington as easily as we do sound alone for WGN Radio. With a combined news operation, our Washington Bureau covers for radio as well as television, phone-feeding its tape. And, therein lies a story.

It was a rainy day in Washington. Bob Foster had walked out of the office and crossed the street, to cut through the lobby of the Mayflower Hotel, a rainy-day, sheltered route to the cab stand and a taxi to Capitol Hill. Like many another reporter, Bob got his start in sports. He worked with the WGN–TV crew handling White Sox games when Paul Richards was with our South Side heroes in the early '50s.

Now, it's maybe 15 years later. Bob Foster has left sports reporting, spent a few years covering Springfield, the state capital, for WGN, and has been assigned to open and operate our Washington Bureau.

A BASEBALL SCOOP

Paul Richards is long gone from the White Sox. In fact, he was just gone from Baltimore Orioles. Foster spotted Richards as he came out of a phone booth in the lobby. Old friends . . . a chance meeting. "Sorry to hear you're out of work, Paul," Bob says. "Got anything in mind yet?" Just so happens Richards was talking to Judge Roy Hofheinz down Houston way, and had just agreed to take over the Astros. Foster reached down for the switch on his tape recorder. "Could you tell me that again, Paul? Your friends and fans in Chicago would be interested."

A rainy day, a short-cut to keep dry, and a chance meeting in a hotel lobby. Perhaps it wasn't the sports story of the year, but it was a scoop—and for a Washington correspondent. That is, a "Washington reporter" who was a reporter first, merely assigned to cover Washington instead of Waukegan or the World Series . . . always a reporter.

CHIEF OF THE BUREAU FAHY RETIRES: LONG LIVE KING SONENSHEIN

(Mr. LEGGETT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Speaker, a few weeks ago, it was my pleasure to be present in the Main Navy Building here in Washington when Adm. I. J. Pete Galantin presided over the change of command of the Chief of Navy Ship Systems.

My good friend, Adm. Ed Fahy, retired after serving the past 3 years with outstanding distinction as the first Chief of the new Department of Naval Ship Systems Command. He perhaps had been Chief of the Bureau of Ships—the predecessor organization—shorter than any officer in history.

Ed and his successor, Adm. Nathen Sonenshein, were both properly eulogized at the ceremony and the admirals made appropriate remarks. I include at this point in the RECORD a portion of a copy of the transcript of the change of command. I wish them both success in their further efforts to redevelop the U.S. Navy:

Adm. I. J. GALANTIN, Chief of Naval Material. Those of us who take part in these Change of Command Ceremonies at sea, of course, are used to quite a bit of pomp and circumstance. We realize the significance when one man hauls down his flag and another breaks his. And although that event generally attracts more attention, this one is no less significant. In many ways this is more significant because here we are seeing and taking part in the culmination of a highly successful career of one distinguished officer and helping push on to his next step another distinguished officer.

But really the significance is deeper than just personal. It is a very significant event for the Navy because the work that Admiral Fahy has done, and which Admiral Sonenshein will do, supported by the many people I see here and the people you represent, is of very great importance to me. It is of tremendous importance to our nation. We know we are trying to revitalize our sea power, shipbuilding in general, and although the work of those in this business is often undramatic it goes without question that I think we are influencing the Navy of the future more than we could in equivalent positions elsewhere. . . .

Admiral Fahy's career has been marked by leadership. I think from his earliest days up in New York City in high school he marked himself as a man who would take charge. . . . But really, to indicate what I say about his leadership, he was the Regimental Commander at the Naval Academy. Those of us who came through that school know what that means.

After graduation he went to sea and served on the Cruiser *Tuscaloosa*. A few years later he went to Submarine School. . . . He commanded the *Plunger* with great distinction and then found that this bent of his of being distinguished in academies as well as in leadership could be applied to the Navy's benefit in another field. He transferred to the restricted line, the Engineering Duty Officer community. He took post-graduate training in electronics both at the Naval Academy and at M.I.T.

So, with that background, it was only natural that in 1965 when I was looking for leadership of the 1400 community, Engineer Duty Officers, it was completely natural that I should turn to Admiral Fahy.

. . . Let me run down some of the accomplishments and some of the problems that Eddy has faced with us. We all know that the affair in Southeast Asia has put tremendous burdens on the Navy, particularly in its shipbuilding effort and ship repair effort. He took that as well in stride as we all did. There were numerous emergencies at sea that we had to respond to, and again very largely in the shipbuilding area. We have only to remind ourselves that wars are difficult and dangerous and that intense operations at sea lead to problems. We can tick those off, all of which had an impact on us: the *Oriskany*, the *Forrestal*, the *Enterprise*, the *Scorpion*, the *Frank Knox*, the *Bache*. A number of these resulted in unplanned, unbudgeted efforts, and Eddy Fahy had the job of directing his resources and personnel to take those aboard as well as the routine work.

This routine work itself amounted to about a $10 billion effort during his four years, made up of new construction and conversion of some $6½ billion; over a billion dollars went into the alteration of ships; the overhaul of the ships ran about $1½ billion; restricted availabilities another $700 million. So, in anybody's language, this is truly big business.

He pioneered certain other efforts which will long be remembered after many of us are forgotten. Among them are such things as the Shipbuilding Industry Advisory Committee. This was a new effort which Eddy initiated to get better understanding between the civilian shipbuilding community and the Navy. They have contributed good ideas. They have gotten better understanding of our problems. We understand theirs better. Each knows what we can expect from the other. This was a fruitful bit of innovation that is just beginning to pay dividends. . . .

Many of his accomplishments have been unpublicized. I am aware of them. I think others will be increasingly as time goes on.

We should also, of course, mention the improvement in the planning and accomplishment of complex ship overhauls, typified by *Saratoga*—and what a successful job that has been. Later, the *FDR* under Rear Admiral "Moose" Brown was even more successful by building on that concept, and the PERA concept, the Planning for Engineering Repairs and Alterations, which Eddy has instituted in our shipyards. These will pay continuing dividends as time goes on. . . .

To wrap this up I can simply say that Eddy's contribution is going to outlast every one of us. There is recognition that as time marches on the Navy is increasingly dependent on advanced technology. The only way you can cope with that in the Navy is recruit good people, hold good people, train good people, use good people. Knowing that, he has succeeded in selling the need for more engineering duty officers and more top civil-

ians. . . . This is, in my judgment, the very great contribution that Admiral Fahy has made, and I know that it will be a lasting contribution.

CLEAN WATER NOW

(Mr. FEIGHAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, debate on the funding of the Clean Water Restoration Act is scheduled to begin next Tuesday. It is imperative that we appropriate the full $1 billion for pollution control as authorized by the Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966. We can no longer afford to compromise as the condition of our Nation's waterways continues to deteriorate.

The following editorial which appeared in the Cleveland Plain Dealer of September 30, 1969, echoes the sentiment of concerned citizens throughout our country:

CLEAN WATER MONEY

There is good news from Washington in the fight against water pollution.

A majority of Congressmen—219 so far—have pledged to fight for an appropriation of $1 billion in fiscal 1970 to help cities and states build wastewater treatment plants.

The pledges were lined up by Rep. John D. Dingell, D.-Mich., Rep. Michael A. Feighan, D.-Ohio, of Cleveland and five colleagues in the House who formed an ad hoc committee to attain a higher priority for the long-neglected battle for pollution control.

Like other domestic programs, the cleanup effort initiated by the Clean Water Act of 1966 was pushed into the background because of spending on the Vietnam war. From the beginning, appropriations fell short of the authorizations. Both the Johnson and Nixon administrations, for example, budgeted only $214 million for sewage plant grants in fiscal 1970, although Congress had authorized $1 billion.

Now Congress is saying that regardless of the war and in spite of a general desire to reduce federal spending, water pollution must be attacked. The battle can be put off no longer.

We like that sentiment. We have argued for it a good many months. We believe Congress should appropriate the full $1 billion. It will be the best $1 billion ever spent, helping hundreds of communities across the country to build treatment plants that simply must be built to protect a precious resource from ruin.

FAMILY ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1969

(Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced H.R. 14173—the Family Assistance Act of 1969—which incorporates the administration's recommendations for comprehensive reform of our welfare laws. I will include at the end of my remarks an analysis of the bill.

Our present welfare system is a failure—marked by inequities and abuses, encouraging family breakups, and perpetuating dependence on welfare payments. The President's proposal constitutes the first major attempt to overhaul our Federal-State welfare system during the 30-year history of the program. The need to find workable solutions to the problems we face in this field must be given a high priority.

The growing costs of this welfare system to our society—both human and financial—require that new initiatives be developed to insure that all citizens have both the opportunity and responsibility to participate in our economy. The President's proposal provides new initiatives that are intended to break the cyclical heritage of poverty and dependency that has become an all too prevalent characteristic of our Federal-State-local welfare system.

The new approach incorporated in this bill is deserving of the most careful consideration by the Ways and Means Committee in connection with the hearings on welfare that will begin in the latter part of October.

The analysis of the bill follows:

SUMMARY OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1969; TITLE I—FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN

ESTABLISHMENT OF PLAN

Section 101 of the bill adds new parts D, E, and F to title IV of the Social Security Act, establishing a new Family Assistance Plan providing for payment of family assistance benefits by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and supplementary payments by the States.

Eligibility and amount

The new part D of title IV of the Social Security Act authorizes benefits to families with children payable at the rate of $500 per year for each of the first two members of a family plus $300 for each additional member.

The family assistance benefit would be reduced by non-excluded income, so that families with more non-excludable income than these benefits ($1600 for a family of four) would not be eligible for any benefits.

A family with more than $1500 in resources, other than the home, household goods, personal effects, and other property essential to the family's capacity for self-support, would also not be eligible.

Countable income would include both earned income (remuneration for employment and net earnings from self-employment) and unearned income.

In determining income the following would be excluded (subject, in some cases, to limitations by the Secretary):

(1) All income of a student;

(2) Inconsequential or infrequent or irregular income;

(3) Income needed to offset necessary child care costs while in training or working;

(4) Earned income of the family at the rate of $720 per year plus ½ the remainder;

(5) Food stamps and other public assistance or private charity;

(6) Special training incentives and allowances;

(7) The tuition portion of scholarships and fellowships;

(8) Home produced and consumed produce;

(9) One half of other unearned income.

Veterans pensions, farm price supports, and soil bank payments would not be excludable income to any extent and would, therefore, result in reduction of benefits on a dollar for dollar basis.

Eligibility for and amount of benefits would be determined quarterly on the basis of estimates of income for the quarter, made in the light of the preceding period's income as modified in the light of changes in circumstances and conditions.

Definition of family and child

To qualify for Family Assistance Plan benefits a family must consist of two or more related individuals living in their own home and residing in the United States and one must be an unmarried child (i.e., under the age of 18, or under the age of 21 and regularly attending school).

Payment of benefits

Payment may be made to any one or more members of the qualified family. The Secretary would prescribe regulations regarding the filing of applications and supplying of data to determine eligibility of a family and the amounts for which the family is eligible. Beneficiaries would be required to report events or changes of circumstances affecting eligibility or the amount of benefits.

When reports by beneficiaries are delayed too long or are too inaccurate, part or all of the resulting benefit payments could be treated as recoverable overpayments.

Registration for work and referral for training

Eligible adult family members would be required to register with public employment officers for manpower services and training or employment unless they belong to specified excepted groups. However, a person in an excepted group may register if he wishes.

The exceptions are: (1) ill, incapacitated, or aged persons; (2) the caretaker relative (usually the mother) of a child under 6; (3) the mother or other female caretaker of the child if an adult male (usually the father) who have to register is there; (4) the caretaker for an ill household member; and (5) full-time workers.

Where the individual is disabled, referral for rehabilitation services would be made. Provision is also made for child care services to the extent the Secretary finds necessary in case of participation in manpower services, training, or employment.

Denial of benefits

Family Assistance benefits would be denied with respect to any member of a family who refuses without good cause to register or to participate in suitable manpower services, training, or employment. If the member is the only adult, he would be included as a family member but only for purposes of determining eligibility of the family. Also, in appropriate cases, the remaining portion of the Family Assistance benefit would be paid to an interested person outside the family.

On-the-job training

The Secretary would transfer to the Department of Labor funds which would otherwise be paid to families participating in employer-compensated on-the-job training if they were not participating. These funds would be available to pay the training costs involved.

STATE SUPPLEMENTATION OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE BENEFITS

Required supplementation

The individual States would have to agree to supplement the family assistance benefits under a new part E of title IV of the Social Security Act wherever the family assistance benefit level is below the previously existing Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) payment level. This supplementation is a condition which the State must meet in order to continue to receive Federal payments with respect to maternal and child health and crippled children's services (title V) and with respect to their State plans for aid to the aged, blind, and disabled (title XVI), medical assistance (title XIX), and services to needy families with children (part A of title IV). Such "supplementation" would be required to families eligible for family assistance benefits other than families where parents are present, neither is incapacitated, or the father is not unemployed. The States would thus be required to supplement in the case of individuals eligible under the old AFDC and AFDC–UF provisions; they would not have to supplement in case of the working poor.

Amount of supplementation

Except as indicated below and, except for use of the State standard of need and payment maximums, eligibility for and amount of supplementary payments would be determined by use of the rules applicable for Family Assistance Benefits.

In applying the family assistance rules to the disregarding of income under the supplementary payment program—

(1) In the case of earned income of the family, the State would first disregard income at the rate of $720 per year, and would then be permitted to reduce its supplementary payment by 16⅔ cents for every dollar of earnings over the range of earnings between $720 per year and the cutoff point for family assistance (i.e., $3920 for a family of four), and could further reduce its supplementary payments by an amount equal to not more than 80 cents for every dollar of earnings beyond that family assistance cutoff point.

(2) In the case of unearned income, these same percentage reductions would apply, although the initial $720 exclusion would not apply.

Requirements for agreements

Some of the State plan requirements now applicable in the case of Aid and Services to Needy Families with Children would be made applicable to the agreement. These include the requirements relating to:

(1) Statewideness;

(2) Administration by a single State agency;

(3) Fair hearing to dissatisfied claimants;

(4) Methods of administration needed for proper and efficient operation, including personnel standards, training, and effective use of subprofessional staff;

(5) Reporting to Secretary as required;

(6) Confidentiality of information relating to applicants and recipients;

(7) Opportunity to apply for and prompt furnishing of supplementary payments.

Payments to States

A State agreeing to make the supplementary payments would be guaranteed that its expenditures for the first five full fiscal years after enactment would be no more than 90 per cent of the amount they would have been if the Family Assistance Plan amendments not been enacted. This would be accompanied by Federal payment to each State, for each year, of the excess of—

(1) The total of its supplementary payments for the year plus the State share of its expenditures called for under its existing State plan approved under title XVI plus the additional expenditures required by the new title XVI, over

(2) Ninety percent of the State share of what its expenditures would have been in the form of maintenance payments for such year if the State's approved plans under titles I, IV(A), X, XIV, and XVI had continued in effect (assuming in the case of the part A of title IV plan, payments for dependent children of unemployed fathers).

On the other hand, any State spending less than 50 per cent of the State share, referred to in clause (2) above, for supplementary payments and its title XVI plan would be required to pay the amount of the deficiency to the Federal treasury.

A State would also receive ½ of its cost of administration under its agreement.

ADMINISTRATION

Agreements with States

Sufficient latitude is provided to deal with the individual administrative characteristics of the States. Provision is made under which the Secretary can agree to administer and disburse the supplementary payments on behalf of the States. Similarly the States can agree to administer portions of the family assistance plan on behalf of the Secretary, with respect to all or specified families in the States.

Evaluation, research, training

The Secretary would make an annual report to Congress on the new Family Assistance Plan, including an evaluation of its operation. He would also have authority to make periodic evaluations of its operation and to use part of the program funds for this purpose.

Research into and demonstrations of better ways of carrying out the purposes of the new Plan, as well as technical assistance to the States and training of their personnel who are involved in making supplementary payments, would also be authorized.

Special provisions for Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam

There are special provisions for these areas under which the amount of family assistance benefits, the $720 of earned income to be disregarded, and several other amounts under the Family Assistance Plan and the new title XVI of the Social Security Act (aid to the aged, blind, and disabled) would be reduced to the extent that the per capita income of these areas is below that of that one of the 50 States which had the lowest per capita income.

TRAINING, EMPLOYMENT, AND DAY CARE PROGRAMS

Section 102 of the Administration bill would replace part C of title IV of the Social Security Act in its entirety.

Purpose

The purpose of the revised part C is to provide manpower services, training, and employment, and child care and related services for individuals eligible for the new Family Assistance Plan benefits (new part D) or State supplementary payments (new part E) to help them secure or retain employment or advancement in employment. The intent is to do this in a manner which will restore families with dependent children to self-supporting, independent, and useful roles in the community.

Operation

The Secretary of Labor is required to develop an employability plan for each individual required to register under the new part D or receiving supplementary payments pursuant to the new part E. The plan would describe the manpower services, training, and employment to be provided and needed to enable the individual to become self-supporting or attain advancement in employment.

Allowances

The Secretary of Labor would pay an incentive training allowance of $30 per month to each member of a family participating in manpower training. Where training allowances for a family under another program would be larger than their benefits under the Family Assistance Plan and supplementary State payments, the incentive allowances for the family would be equal to the difference, or $30 per member, whichever is larger.

Allowances for transportation and other expenses would also be authorized.

These incentive and other allowances would be in lieu of allowances under other manpower training programs.

Allowances would not be payable to individuals praticipating in employer compensated on-the-job training.

Denial of allowances

Allowances would not be payable to an individual who refuses to accept manpower training without good cause. The individual would receive reasonable notice and have an opportunity for a hearing if dissatisfied with the denial.

Utilization of other programs

In order to avoid the creation of duplicative programs, maximum use of authorities under other acts would be made by the Secretary of Labor in providing the manpower training and related services under the revised part C, but subject to all duties and responsibilities under such other programs. Part C appropriations could be used to pay the cost of services provided by other programs and to reimburse other public agencies for services they provided to persons under part C. The emphasis is on an integrated and comprehensive manpower training program involving all sectors of the economy and all levels of government to make maximum use of existing manpower and manpower related programs.

Appropriations and administration

Appropriations to the Secretary of Labor would be authorized for carrying out the revised part C, including payment of up to 90 percent of the cost of training and employment services provided individuals registered under the Family Assistance Plan. The Secretary would seek to achieve equitable geographical distribution of these funds.

In developing policies and programs for manpower services, training and employment for individuals registered under the Family Assistance Plan, the Secretary of Labor would have to first obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare with regard to all programs under the usual and traditional authority of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Child care and support services

Appropriations to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare would be authorized for grants and contracts for up to 90 per cent of the cost of projects for child care and related services for persons registered under the Family Assistance Plan and in manpower training or employment. The grants would go to any public or non-profit private agency or organization, and the contracts could be with any public or private agency or organization. The cost of these services could include alteration, remodeling, and renovation of facilities, but no provision is made for wholly new construction. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare could allow the non-federal share of the cost to be provided in the form of services or facilities.

These provisions (unlike other provisions of the bill) would become effective on enactment of the bill.

Advance funding

To afford adequate notice of available funds, appropriations for one year to pay the cost of the program during the next year would be authorized.

Evaluation and research

A continuing evaluation of the program under part C and research for improving it are authorized.

Annual report and advisory council

The Secretary of Labor is required to report annually to Congress on the manpower training and related services.

ELIMINATION OF PRESENT PROVISIONS ON CASH ASSISTANCE FOR FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN

Section 103 of the bill revises part A of title IV of the Social Security Act which relates to cash assistance and services for needy families with children. The new part A is called Services to Needy Families with Children, reflecting the elimination of the provisions on cash assistance. The cash assistance part is no longer necessary because of the Family Assistance Plan in the new part D of title IV.

The revised part A provides for continuation of the present program of services for these families. Foster care for children and emergency assistance, as included under existing law, are also continued.

Requirements for State plans

Section 402 of the Social Security Act which sets forth the requirements to be met

by State plans before they are approved and qualify the State for federal financial participation in expenditures, would be revised as appropriate in the light of the elimination of the cash assistance provisions.

Payments to States

The provisions on payments to States for expenditures under approved State plans remain the same as existing law with respect to services, emergency assistance, and foster care. The matching formulas continue to vary, as in existing law, according to the kinds of services involved.

Definitions

The definitions of "family services" and "emergency assistance to needy families with children" have not been substantially changed.

The definitions of "dependent child," "aid to families with dependent children," and "relative with whom any dependent child is living" have been replaced (as no longer applicable) by definitions of

(1) "child"—which refers to the definition in the new part D, establishing the Family Assistance Plan; this in effect substitutes a requirement that the child be a member of a "family" (as defined in the new part D) instead of having to live with particularly designated relatives;

(2) "needy families with children" (and "assistance to such families")—this being defined as families receiving family assistance benefits under the new part D, if they are also receiving supplementary State payments pursuant to the new part E or would have been eligible for aid under the existing State plan for aid to needy families with children if it had continued in effect.

Foster care and emergency assistance

The provisions on payments for foster care of children and emergency assistance remain virtually the same as under existing law.

Assistance by Internal Revenue Service in locating parents

The provision on this subject remains the same and allows use of the master files of the Internal Revenue Service to locate missing parents in certain cases.

TITLE II—AID TO THE AGED, BLIND, AND DISABLED

This title revises the current title XVI of the Social Security Act and sets forth the revised title XVI in its entirety. One of the major changes is the removal of the provisions relating to medical assistance for the aged which, under existing law, would terminate at the end of calendar 1969. All medical assistance for which the Federal government shares costs will now be provided under approved title XIX State plans.

Requirements for State plans

Few changes are made in this section (sec. 1602), aside from deleting the provisions relating to medical assistance for the aged. The section retains, without substantial change, the requirements relating to:

(1) Administration by a single State agency (except where a separate agency is permitted for the blind as under existing law);

(2) Financial participation by the State;

(3) Statewideness;

(4) Opportunity for fair hearing;

(5) Methods of administration, including personnel standards, training, and effective use of subprofessional staff;

(6) Reporting to the Secretary as required;

(7) Confidentiality of information relating to recipients;

(8) Opportunity for application and furnishing of assistance with reasonable promptness;

(9) Establishment and maintenance by the State of standards for institutions in which there are individuals receiving aid;

(10) Description of services provided for self-support or self-care; and

(11) Determination of blindness by an ophthalmologist or an optometrist.

The present prohibition against payment to persons in receipt of assistance under title I, IV, X, or XIV would be applicable instead to cases of receipt of family security benefits under the new part D of title IV.

The provision on inclusion of reasonable standards for determining eligibility and amount of aid would be replaced by one requiring a minimum benefit of $90 per month, less any other income, and by another requiring that the standard of need not be lower than the standard applied under the State plan approved under the existing title XVI or (in case the State had not had such a plan) the appropriate one of the standards of need applied under the plans approved under titles I, X, and XIV.

While the requirement relating to the determination of need and disregarding of certain income in connection therewith has been continued (although without the authorization to disregard $7.50 per month of any income, in addition to other income which may or must be disregarded), it has been expanded in a manner parallel to family assistance benefits to include disregarding as resources the home, household goods, personal effects, other property which might help to increase the family's ability for self-support, and, finally, any other personal or real property the total value of which does not exceed $1500. There would also be a new requirement for not considering the financial responsibility of any other individual for the applicant or recipient unless the applicant is the individual's spouse or child under the age of 21 or blind or severely disabled, and a prohibition against imposition of liens on account of benefits correctly paid to recipients.

Other new requirements relate to provision for the training and effective use of social service personnel, provision of technical assistance to State agencies and local subdivisions furnishing assistance or services, and provision for the development, through research or demonstrations, of new or improved methods of furnishing assistance or services. Also added is a requirement for use of a simplified statement for establishing eligibility and for adequate and effective methods of verification thereof. Finally, there are new requirements for periodic evaluation of the State plan at least annually, with reports thereof being submitted to the Secretary together with any necessary modifications of the State plan; for establishment of advisory committees, including recipients as members; and for observing priorities and performance standards set by the Secretary in the administration of the State plan and in providing services thereunder.

The present prohibitions against any age requirement of more than 65 years and against any citizenship requirement excluding U.S. citizens would be continued.

In place of the present provision on residency, there is a new one which prohibits any residency requirement excluding any resident of the State. Also there would be new prohibitions against any disability or age requirement which excludes a severely disabled individual aged 18 or older, and any blindness or age requirement which excludes any person who is blind (determined under criteria by the Secretary).

PAYMENTS

In place of the present provision on the Federal share of expenditures under the approved State plan there is a new formula which provides for payment as follows with respect to expenditures under State plans for aid to the aged, blind, and disabled approved under the net title XVI:

With respect to cash assistance, the Federal Government will pay (1) 100 per cent of the first $50 per recipient, plus (2) 50 per cent of the next $15 per recipient, plus (3) 25 per cent of the balance of the payment per recipient which does not exceed the maximum permissible level of assistance per person by the Secretary (which may be lower in the case of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam than for other jurisdictions).

With respect to services for which expenditures are made under the approved State plan, the Federal Government would pay the same percentages as are provided under existing law, that is, 75 per cent in the case of certain specified services and training of personnel and 50 per cent in the case of the remainder of the cost of administration of the State plan.

Payment by Federal Government to individuals

The revised title XVI includes authority for the Secretary to enter into agreements with any State under which the Secretary will make the payments of aid to the aged, blind, and disabled directly to individuals in the State who are eligible therefor. In that case, the State would reimburse the Federal Government for the State's share of those payments and for ½ the additional cost to the Secretary of carrying out the agreement, other than the cost of making the payments themselves.

Definition

The new title XVI defines aid to the aged, blind, and disabled as money payments to needy individuals who are 65 or older or are blind or are severely disabled.

Transitional and related provisions

Titles I, X, and XIV of the Social Security Act would be repealed.

Provision is made for making adjustments under the new title XVI on account of overpayments and underpayments under the existing public assistance titles.

Provision is also made for according States a grace period during which they can be eligible to participate in the new title XVI without changing their tests of disability or blindness. The grace period would end for any State with the June 30 following the close of the first regular session of its State legislature beginning after enactment of the bill.

Conforming amendments

The bill also contains a number of conforming amendments in other provisions of the Social Security Act in order to take account of the substantive changes made by the bill. Thus, the changes in the medicaid program (title XIX of the Social Security Act) would require the States to cover individuals eligible for supplementary State payments pursuant to the new part E of title IV or who would be eligible for cash assistance under an existing State plan for aid to families with dependent children if it continued in effect and included dependent children of unemployed fathers.

Effective date

The amendments made by the bill would become effective on the first January 1 following the fiscal year in which the bill is enacted. However, if a State is prevented by statute from making the supplementary payments provided for under the new part E of title IV of the Social Security Act, the amendments would not apply to individuals in that State until the first July 1 which follows the end of the State's first regular session of its legislature beginning after the enactment of the bill—unless the State certified before this date that it is no longer prevented by State statute from making the payments. In the latter case the amendments would become effective at the beginning of the first calendar quarter following the certification.

Also, in the case of a State which is prevented by statute from meeting the requirements in the revised section 1602 of the Social Security Act, the amendments made in that title would not apply until the first July 1 following the close of the State's first regular session of its legislature beginning

after the enactment of the bill—unless the State submitted before this date a State plan meeting these requirements. In the latter case the amendments would become effective on the date of submission of the plan.

Another exception to this effective date provision is made in the case of the new authorization, in the revised part C of title IV of the Social Security Act, for provision of child care services for persons undergoing training or employment—which would be effective on enactment of the bill.

JAPANESE TEXTILE DELEGATION FRAUD

(Mr. DORN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, the recent Japanese textile delegation's "factfinding" visit to the United States was a fraud and a humbug. I was shocked and amazed that this delegation refused to even see and talk to those who are best acquainted with the textile situation.

It is incredible that the Japanese Government would permit such an arrogant and insulting approach to a very real threat to the American textile industry, an unfavorable trade balance with Japan, and our entire future relationship with the second largest industrial power in the free world.

Since 1961, the House of Representatives has had an informal textile committee which has dealt exclusively with the growing threat of foreign low-wage textile imports. This Japanese delegation boycotted the Members of Congress on this committee and refused to visit those plants and areas affected by textile imports. It made no attempt to visit the American mills closed. It made no attempt to visit those mills that have been curtailed with only partial employment. It made no attempt to inform itself of the real problem.

The Members of Congress have been extremely patient in their hope that Japan would enter into a discussion which would lead to voluntary controls of imports. We urge the Japanese Government to show good faith and enter into negotiations in earnest. Time is running out. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi will soon visit the United States. They should bring with them assurance that negotiations will begin for voluntary controls of textile imports. If not, we will definitely proceed with legislation and will have even more support than before.

Mr. Speaker, I include in my remarks the following story from the Daily News Record:

[From the Daily News Record, Sept. 29, 1969]

STANS SAYS JAPAN TALKS "INADEQUATE"

WASHINGTON.—The United States will ask Japan for another meeting soon on the wool and synthetic textile import problem, if the Japanese delay their response "to any significant extent."

That word comes from Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans who considers the recent meeting between United States and Japanese representatives on the subject "generally inadequate."

Stans, who submitted to an interview with Tokyo reporters, said the Japanese on their recent mission "refused to discuss our ideas for a solution of this problem at this time."

The Commerce Department released a transcript of the interview.

Stans also said the Japanese refused to give American textile industry an opportunity for a full-scale presentation of the problem from its point of view.

In addition, Stans said the Japanese refused to give United States labor organizations in the textile industry an opportunity for a full-scale discussion of the subject.

The Japanese also refused to meet with more than one representative of Congress.

Stans said that if the Japanese think the United States presentation was "unreasonable," as some reports have it, "it is regrettable."

Such a conclusion, Stans said, "can only be based upon a preconceived conclusion before the analysis was made, or an utterly inadequate evaluation of the evidence that was presented."

Stans estimated that the imbalance in United States textile trade with Japan this year would be $1.1 billion, a $300 million increase over 1968.

"It is utterly inconceivable that anyone would come to the conclusion that this rate of growth could not do harm to American industry and to American labor, or that this evidence is not a reasonable basis for negotiations for some kind of voluntary adjustment," Stans said.

He said it is not the Nixon Administration's intention at this time to seek restraints for any other commodity than textiles.

A DAY OF PRAYER

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GRAY). Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. EDWARDS) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, every day several columns of the front pages of our daily papers are filled with news from Vietnam. Every day our radio and television broadcasts spend many minutes with reports of the war's progress. Every day on the floor of this Chamber some Member rises to speak about the war or a related topic. And every day the news is what I call bad news, because more American boys have been killed or wounded.

This topic, which is on everybody's lips regardless of what they do, has buried itself deep in the minds and hearts of the people of this country. Whether it is at the lunch counter or from the minister's podium or on the placard of the peace demonstrator, the subject is the same: How do we best find peace in Vietnam?

But it does nobody any good—not Members of Congress, not the President, nor the American people—to continually berate each other about what should and should not be done about the war.

But, what should we do? Say nothing and wait to see what happens? Or should we take to the streets and march on the White House? These seem to be two alternatives toward which the people are gravitating. But are they the only alternatives? I think not. There is a more rational approach to our present predicament—an approach that will help bring together the entire American people and unite them behind the President in the face of a common foe. Yet, it will not stifle dissent or discussion.

All people—both protestor and military general alike—want to bring the war to a swift conclusion. All of us want to see the Vietnamese people free to determine their own proper form of government.

All of us want to see our boys returned home and to put an end to the death and the destruction. But if you read the papers or watch television, we appear to be a country divided and the appearance of this division is feeding the morale of the enemy. There seems to be those among us who hold the view that they want peace more than anyone else; that those in authority are not really interested in an early peace; that the President is dragging his feet in trying to find peace. Their easy answer is to just walk away from the war. That is it—just pick up and leave and somehow this is supposed to bring instant peace.

On October 15, students across the country have been called upon to join in a moratorium to demonstrate their desire for an end to the war. They are to stop their normal routine of attending classes to dramatize their collective hopes for peace. Why will a great number of people join in? Because they genuinely want peace. But the leaders of this movement have not called for this demonstration in support of our President and our national effort to find a just peace. Rather, as is the case with many protests of this type, the effort will end up giving more support to Hanoi than to Washington. Somehow it just seems easier for them to cast all the blame on our own people rather than on the enemy.

Unfortunately, many who crave peace just as much as we do will join in and lend support to the peace-at-any-cost boys and swell their ranks to the point that the world will misunderstand what is being said. Even in the high schools and junior high schools pamphlets are being passed around urging the younger people to leave school on October 15 to demonstrate for peace. My God, who does not want peace? But short of just picking up our troops and walking away—a solution which is completely unacceptable—the only answer is to rally behind the first President who has really done something about trying to get our boys home.

Individual Americans may have different opinions—and thank God that we are able to vocally express these differences—but we simply must stand united behind our President in the national goal of peace. There is not one American who wants war at any cost, just as there should not be one American who wants peace at any cost. An unjust peace is just as bad as—if not worse than—an unjust war.

Yes, our young people in the colleges and universities—and even in the junior and senior high schools—want an outlet to express their sincere desires for an end to the Vietnamese war and for a continued and lasting peace in the world. Let us give them a proper outlet. Let us join with them in this search for peace. Let us declare October 15 a National Day of Prayer for Peace. A day to rededicate ourselves in support of the President in his effort to find an honor-

able peace so that our boys can come home. Let us not leave them in the hands of the peaceniks. Let us show them that the entire Nation wants peace—a lasting peace.

I urge the President to call for such a National Day of Prayer and I urge the people of this Nation to support it. We need a day where the true American spirit can be made manifest to the world. Everyone of us—students, politicians, and President—can let the world know that the American people want an end to war in Vietnam; that the American people are ready to stop the continued battles and loss of lives. These things the President has so often said in his own statements and through the American peace negotiators in Paris. We all share this singular desire and unity of purpose. Let us get the message through to the rest of the world that America wants peace. America is and has been ready to negotiate a settlement. Let us make this one thing clear to the leaders of North Vietnam: No amount of waiting for America to become divided will give them victory. This just will not happen. The enemy has misread the healthy discussion of differing viewpoints as being a sign of division.

Let us set aside the day of October 15 with special services in our houses of prayer. Let the civic leaders join with their people in a demonstration of American solidarity for peace in the world. Let the national leaders here in Washington stage their own demonstration—a demonstration to the whole world that the American people want a just and speedy peace in Vietnam.

All Americans on October 15 should let the world know that they are behind their President 100 percent in the common quest for peace. Let us have a National Day of Prayer and quit following these false prophets.

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOGAN) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. HOGAN. Mr. Speaker, the President in his message on January 31, 1969, on crime in the District of Columbia once again exhibited those qualities of statesmanship and leadership which are characteristic of him. In that message he outlined for us some of the basic problems which plague the Nation's Capital and hinder effective law enforcement. He sketched in broad terms the approach he planned to take in solving these problems.

The Attorney General of the United States submitted for our consideration various legislative proposals which will have the effect of converting the President's overall approach into a concrete and coordinated plan of action. The Attorney General and his assistants are to be commended for their conscientious effort in this matter. These bills, which I was pleased to cosponsor, comprise a carefully thought out and effective legislative attack on the District of Columbia's crime problem and deserve our wholehearted support. There is probably no one in this Chamber who does not agree that crime in Washington is an appalling problem.

These bills, which were introduced July 15, 1969, are now the subject of hearings before Subcommittee No. 1, under the chairmanship of our distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. ABERNETHY), on which I am privileged to serve. I am hopeful that they will be promptly approved by the subcommittee, full committee, and the House.

Certainly one of the most complicated problems facing our legal system today in the District of Columbia is the problem presented by the multiplicity of courts with overlapping jurisdictions. This results in considerable case backlogs and frequent collisions in the judicial process. To many people, the roles played by the various Federal and District of Columbia courts are vague and unclear at best. The Federal courts are forced to deal with many cases of a strictly local nature—cases which normally do not come within the cognizance of a Federal court but rather are handled in the several States by local courts. At the same time, the local courts here in the District—the court of general sessions and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals—are unnaturally limited in the types of cases they can deal with, limited in a manner not true of their sister courts in the various States. The decisions reached in these courts also lack the finality which is characteristic of State court decisions, because of the appellate role played here by the U.S. Court of Appeals.

H.R. 12854 would eliminate the present jurisdictional problems and other difficulties which frequently make the courts in the District of Columbia the object of misunderstanding and distrust, and would ensure greater fairness in the handling of each case. The importance of this measure cannot be stressed too greatly.

H.R. 10083, which I introduced on April 15, would provide some much needed strengthening in the area of bail and pretrial release. It complements the constructive provisions set forth in the Bail Reform Act of 1966 by permitting the courts to take cognizance of a particular individual's dangerousness to the community before releasing him on bail, by refusing to allow bail at all in certain cases, and by providing sanctions in the event that bail conditions are violated. These new provisions will be extremely valuable in dealing with the increasingly more serious problem presented by those who commit crimes while on bail, while preserving the beneficial purposes behind the original Bail Reform Act. This proposal should be supported strongly by all of us who are concerned about crime in Washington.

At the same time, H.R. 12855 recognizes the need to provide for accurate analysis of bail applicants and effective supervision of persons on bail. By providing more funds for adequate salaries for personnel and by giving the bail agency more complete authority to recommend in all cases and achieve more thorough control of the bail system, we can enable the system to operate much more efficiently.

Another aspect of Washington crime demands attention: Legal defense of the accused. It is clear that a more effective system for assisting in the defense of those accused of crimes must be provided. This need is met in the administration's proposal, H.R. 12856. There is no question that the Legal Aid Agency, together with many private attorneys, have rendered outstanding service in the past. However, the Agency has been prevented from doing the best job it can because of financial and organizational limitations. H.R. 12856 will convert the Agency into a full-fledged public defender service, allowing it to handle a great many more cases more effectively. This will ease the burden on the private bar brought about by the dramatic rise in the number of criminal cases in recent years, and will provide capable, specialized help to many more accused persons than has been possible previously. This proposal also deserves our wholehearted support.

Now today, Mr. Speaker, a number of us are introducing another bill related to those I have just discussed. It is the President's proposal for a new code of juvenile procedure for the District of Columbia. I am very pleased to enthusiastically sponsor this bill with my esteemed colleague, the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. NELSEN), and others.

This bill is another part of the President's program to reorganize and modernize the court system in the District of Columbia. It is an important step toward the goal, shared by all of us, to make the administration of justice in the District of Columbia a model for the rest of the Nation and to curtail our staggering crime problem.

In recent years, juveniles have been committing a substantial number of serious and violent crimes. Available statistics on juvenile crime in the District of Columbia indicate frightening increases. For example, in the last 6 years, the number of juveniles referred to juvenile court for rape has increased from seven in fiscal 1963 to 37 in fiscal 1969, and the number of juveniles referred to juvenile court for armed robbery has increased from 18 in fiscal 1963 to 261 in fiscal 1969. Thus, there were 298 juveniles referred to juvenile court for rape and armed robbery in fiscal 1969; of these 298 juveniles, 209 were 16- and 17-year-olds.

In my view, these alarming increases in juvenile crime can in substantial part be explained by the attitude of our modern, sophisticated juvenile that, if he commits a crime, nothing will happen to him because he is under 18 years of age. This attitude has been encouraged by the ineffectiveness of the present District of Columbia juvenile court system, and the restrictions placed on the juvenile court by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Only 10 juveniles were transferred for adult prosecution in the District of Columbia in fiscal 1969.

Something must be done to make it clear to the sophisticated 16- and 17-

year-olds in the District of Columbia that they will not be permitted to pick up a pistol to rob a liquor store or participate in a gang rape of an innocent woman walking home from work. The proposed new juvenile code for the District would remove from the juvenile court system 16- and 17-year-olds who commit serious and violent crimes such as murder, rape, robbery, burglary, and kidnapping. These individuals would be treated as adult offenders, thus, removing from the juvenile system the most hardened youths who frequently interfere with the potential rehabilitation of other, less mature juveniles. However, if convicted in adult court, these individuals may receive, in the discretion of the sentencing judge, the treatment and supervision afforded by the Federal Youth Corrections Act, including the potential expungement of the record of conviction.

The proposed new juvenile code for the District of Columbia would replace outdated and incomplete methods for processing juvenile cases with modern and detailed procedures. These provisions will substantially enhance the juvenile court's ability to provide the District with expeditious and efficient handling of juvenile cases. The legislation provides for a factfinding hearing in delinquent cases, after prompt and clear notice. The District of Columbia Corporation Counsel will be the representative of the community at these hearings and will be required to establish the case by clear and convincing evidence to the court. Jury trials will be eliminated; thus, materially aiding the reduction of the present overwhelming backlog in the juvenile court.

At the same time, the proposed new juvenile code provides numerous safeguards for the child. The right to counsel is provided for at all critical stages of the proceedings. All children taken into custody receive a prompt detention hearing not later than the close of business of the next day. And prior to an adjudication at a factfinding hearing, a consent decree may be ordered which would provide the child with a method of avoiding an adjudication of involvement yet allow him to receive necessary supervision. In addition, necessary safeguards are provided for to protect the identity of the child.

The drafting of this legislation by the administration represents an expert effort to provide the District with a juvenile system that can effectively deal with the problems of the city's children. I support the enactment of the administration's code of juvenile procedure for the District of Columbia as an important part of an overall plan to improve the administration of justice in the District.

I was pleased to cosponsor with the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. GUDE) and the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. BROYHILL), a bill, H.R. 8868, which authorizes the District of Columbia to enter into the interstate compact on juveniles. The promptness with which the House passed this bill is indeed gratifying and I hope the other anticrime bills I have discussed today will also receive expeditious attention.

These proposals which I have discussed today, taken together, will greatly streamline the legal system in the District of Columbia and will permit the great number of cases passing through our courts to be handled more quickly, easily, and most important, more competently and fairly. They also represent a tangible, positive way for the House of Representatives to express its concern over the mounting crime problem in our Nation's Capital.

I hope the House will move to bring these laudable proposals into law.

WATSON DEFENDS JUDGE HAYNSWORTH IN SPEECH ON HOUSE FLOOR

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. WATSON) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Speaker, a number of people were all aglow yesterday when rumors began to dance about like Daphnis and Chloe in the forest to the effect that Judge Clement Haynsworth had requested the President to withdraw his nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court. Of course, subsequent events proved these deliberately planted rumors to be absolutely false much to the annoyance of those who delighted in perpetrating them.

But, Mr. Speaker, these malicious and totally unfounded rumors served to point up the shocking depths that some people will go to malign the character of an extremely able, conscientious, dedicated, patriotic and honest American, who happens to espouse a philosophy of government consistent with the most noble principles our democracy can offer.

Let us make no mistake about this whole sordid business. I will not mince words, not in my remarks here or later. The opposition to Judge Haynsworth is the most vitriolic, the most obstreperous, the most ill intentioned, and the most diabolic that I have ever encountered in my career of public service.

The chief perpetrators of this smear campaign are the same liberals and other assortment of malefactors who got caught with their pants down in the Fortas affair. There is no doubt in my mind that they will stop at nothing to assassinate the character of an honorable jurist to compensate for the terrible embarrassment that Fortas cost them. Let us bring it out in the open—the fact that Judge Haynsworth happens to be a southerner makes him the ideal scapegoat for their revenge. With the able assistance of a generally hostile press, they seem to be succeeding. A case in point is the infamous Huntley-Brinkley report last evening. These disciples of the innuendo and half truth as usual gave only one side of the story. They pointed out the so-called mounting opposition to Judge Haynsworth as well as all the rumors, but was there just one interview, just one comment from those outstanding Americans who support the President's nomination? Why, of course not. Huntley and Brinkley would not present both sides of a matter if they were teaching a course in equity.

Mr. Speaker, Judge Haynsworth has the unequivocal support of the American Bar Association's Judiciary Committee. He is enthusiastically patronized by prominent judges and attorneys throughout the country. He is one of the greatest legal minds in this Nation, a man who will take his rightful place beside names like Marshall, Holmes, Brandeis, Hughes, and Frankfurter. He is a man of the highest moral character and integrity.

Mr. Speaker, I sympathize deeply with Judge Haynsworth and his family as they undergo this trying ordeal, but additionally, I am concerned for the American people, the great silent majority, who want a change in the Supreme Court and who support this eminently qualified jurist. I hope they are not going to be dissuaded by some of the hostile and cynical press and a handful of revengeful fringe groups and politicians. Either in or out of the courtroom, he is eminently qualified to serve as a Justice of the Supreme Court.

Finally, I do not support him because we are both South Carolinians, although of that I am profoundly proud, but I speak out for him because he is the man for the job.

DEATH OF JOHN P. WHITE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. BOLAND) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, I was stunned and saddened to learn of the sudden death of my dear and long-time friend, John P. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

"Skip" White, as he was affectionately known by his many friends in Massachusetts and in Washington, was an affable, astute, knowledgeable, and practical practitioner of government at all levels, whose integrity was beyond question and whose word was his bond.

I first met him in the statehouse on Beacon Hill, Boston, after my election to the Massachusetts General Court in 1934. "Skip" White was then serving as legislative attaché in the Massachusetts house to the majority leader, and late Speaker, Christian A. Herter. He graduated from the New Preparatory School, Cambridge, in 1934, and continued his education at Boston College through 1940 while working in the legislature.

A World War II veteran, he served for 5 years in the Army, enlisting as a private in the field artillery in 1940, going on to pilot training and was discharged as a captain from the Army Air Corps in 1945.

Returning to the Massachusetts Legislature after wartime service, "Skip" White served as legislative counsel until 1953, when he was named legislative secretary to the newly-elected Governor of Massachusetts, Christian A. Herter. He remained in this key post as liaison man with the Massachusetts Legislature during Governor Herter's two terms as chief executive, from 1953 to 1957, and then came to Washington and the State Department as Special Assistant for Congressional Relations when

Governor Herter was appointed Under Secretary of State by President Eisenhower in 1957.

He continued his State Department service with Mr. Herter as Secretary of State following the death of Secretary John Foster Dulles; with Secretary Dean Rusk under our late beloved President, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, and President Lyndon B. Johnson; and with Secretary William P. Rogers under President Richard Nixon.

Mr. White had been named to the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations in 1964.

He was liked and admired and respected by the Members of Congress and Government officials throughout Washington, and in the American Embassies and missions throughout the world, for his loyalty and dedication and zest in the performance of his job. He has rendered a lifetime of useful and meaningful service to his State, his Nation and his fellow man.

Mr. Speaker, I know I speak for other Members of this House when I say that the warm personality and smiling countenance of "Skip" White will long be missed in the corridors of this Capitol. I wish to join with my colleagues in expressing my sincere condolences to his wife, Elaine, and his son, Scott, now a student at Princeton University, on this sad occasion.

WILLY BRANDT—ANOTHER ILLEGITIMATE GERMAN CHANCELLOR

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. RARICK) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, yesterday I pointed out to our colleagues the ludicrous posture of those who loudly bewailed the so-called constitutional crisis created by the effective candidacy of George Wallace in the United States, but can see only a commendable change in the impending Willy Brandt minority government of free Germany.

In Germany, the Christian Democrats who placed first in the election are forced out of the Government by a coalition between the second-place Social Democrats and the party who suffered the biggest loss in the election, the splinter Free Democrats.

Mr. Speaker, I include the editorial comments in today's Evening Star at this point in my remarks:

GERMAN ELECTION

Americans would be ill-advised to take too lofty a view of the brief chaos that followed the recent national election in West Germany. Our own system of electing a President has built into it a potential for confusion and danger that would make the German result seem like a model of orderly succession by comparison. We had better defuse our own electoral bomb before pointing with too much derision at the German firecracker.

Still and all, the outcome of Sunday's election was remarkable. The only immediate result was the eclipse of the ultra-right-wing National Democratic Party, which failed to muster the 5 percent of the vote needed to qualify for seats in the Bundestag and is out, for the moment at least, on its neo-Nazi ear.

The positive results were harder to pin down. The big loser in the popular vote, the Free Democratic Party, emerged as the big winner in the world of realpolitik. Winning only 5.7 percent of the vote, the FDP found itself in the role of chancellor-maker. Neither of the major parties—Willy Brandt's Social Democrats or Kurt Kiesinger's Christian Democrats—won a majority. But either party, in coalition with the Free Democrats, could make the grade.

Now, after a brief but intense courtship by the two powerful suitors, Free Democrat leader Walter Scheel has apparently made his choice. He has said yes to Brandt. As of October 19—barring an estrangement during the engagement period—Chancellor Kiesinger, whose party received a clear plurality of the votes, will be out of a job.

So West Germany is in for a change. There will be a shift to the left as the Socialist-FDP coalition takes over. But there is no reason to suppose that the shift will be marked by an abrupt change or internal or external policy. Brandt is, after all, no wild-eyed newcomer to the scene. His years of service as mayor of West Berlin have made him keenly aware of the threat posed by the sullenly aggressive leadership of East Germany. During his present service as foreign minister, Brandt has demonstrated no inclination to alter any of Germany's postwar alliances.

The makeup of the new government is still a matter of speculation. The probability is, however, that Scheel, as leader of the mini-opposition, will be rewarded with the foreign ministry in return for the 12-vote majority he can offer. This, too, should not result in any major change. The liberal leader is a pragmatist. And he will be operating under the watchful eye of the man who has held that post for the past three years.

The massive effort of the German national election has, then, counted for almost nothing. The new Chancellor has been named not by the voters but by Walter Scheel. And the result, it seems, will be a new alliance, a new government and no major change of policy.

FLOATING THE MARK

The Kiesinger government's last major decision, which permits the mark to float upward from its fixed exchange rate of four to the dollar, was a good one. For one thing, this upward adjustment was clearly needed as a way of reducing Germany's large surplus of exports over imports that has been such a destabilizing factor in the world money markets. The pound and then the franc were devalued to give Britain and France a competitive edge in international trade; the German move completes that picture.

Also, the method of adjustment employed—permitting the mark to seek its natural level rather than upvaluing it straightway—represents a useful, tentative step in the direction of building more flexibility into the fixed exchange rate system. Presumably, the mark will shortly be revalued upward by the new German government. But its interim fluctuations should tell us much about the major currencies' real values. Should this modest experiment with a floating exchange rate prove successful, the central banking fraternity would be well-advised to consider seriously the adoption of such abstruse formulas for greater exchange-rate flexibility as the "wider band" and "crawling peg."

Further reference to the Star editorial calls to our attention the editor's conclusion that—

Brandt is, after all, no wild-eyed newcomer to the scene. His years of service as mayor of West Berlin have made him keenly aware of the threat posed by the sullenly aggressive leadership of East Germany. During his present service as foreign minister, Brandt has demonstrated no inclination to alter any of Germany's postwar alliances.

On the front page of the same paper, however, is the plain report from his foreign correspondent in Bonn, stating:

The coalition members favor overtures to normalize West Germany's relations with the Communist world in general and East Germany and Poland in particular. However, no formal recognition of East Germany is expected.

It is appropriate, Mr. Speaker, to suggest a fruitful line of inquiry for those who wish to ascertain what is really going on in Europe, and particularly in Germany, and the developing shifts important to us as Americans.

How did Herbert Karl Frahm, the illegitimate son of a shopgirl in the Baltic German Port of Lubeck, a member of the Red falcons and functionary of the far left Socialist Workers' Party, said by an old acquaintance to be "as close to Red as you can get without actually being Red" become in less than 5 years Willy Brandt, a "correspondent" with the Communist forces in the Spanish Civil War, under a forged Norwegian passport?

How did Willy Brandt, a German hiding out the war in Sweden, become a naturalized Norwegian while the government of Norway was in exile in London?

How did Brandt next surface as a Norwegian reporter at the Nuremburg trials "acting as go-between and translator for half of the foreign press corps?"

How did Brandt next appear at Allied headquarters in Berlin, not as a German, but as a Norwegian major in 1946?

Who were the "Norwegian relatives" to whom Herbert Frahm fled to become Willy Brandt, and what part does Trygve Lie play in the Norwegian, Spanish, Swedish episode?

Finally, who, and more importantly what, is Herbert Wehner?

The peace of the world may depend on early and accurate answers to these questions.

Mr. Speaker, a local news article follows:

[From the Evening Star, Oct. 3, 1969]

BONN LIBERALS BACK BRANDT IN COALITION

(By Andrew Borowiec)

BONN.—Foreign Minister Willy Brandt today stood on the threshold of power after a coalition agreement between his Socialist Democrats and the liberal Free Democratic party (FDP).

A tense post-midnight announcement ended four days of intense talks between Brandt's party (SPD) and the FDP, headed by Walter Scheel.

"We have agreed on the basic lines of a joint government policy," spokesmen for the two parties said.

NEW ERA BOWS

The announcement virtually ushered a new era in Germany's post war history, dominated by the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the spirit of the late Konrad Adenauer.

It dealt a crushing blow to the stubborn hope of Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger of the outgoing government to swing the FDP into forming a coalition with the Christian Democrats after Sunday's elections that gave no clear-cut majority to any of the major parties.

The SPD-FDP coalition today received the stamp of approval from parliament members of both parties.

The Social Democratic deputies voted unanimously for the new coalition; a Free Democratic party spokesman said there were

no opposing votes in its caucus, but two abstentions among the 30 deputies.

Following approval the two party heads were to report to President Gustav Heinemann to announce formal intention of forming the country's next government.

FEWER MINISTERS LIKELY

According to information available at this stage, the new government with Brandt as chancellor would cut the number of ministers by four to 15. Scheel would be foreign minister and presumably vice chancellor. The bulk of ministerial posts would go to the SPD.

The two parties have agreed on the need to lower the voting age from 21 to 18 years. The plan reflects concern about increasing their support, which lies mainly among West Germany's postwar generation.

The coalition members favor overtures to normalize West Germany's relations with the Communist world in general and East Germany and Poland in particular. However, no formal recognition of East Germany is expected.

There were reports of compromise on the part of the SPD on the issue of workers' "codetermination" in industrial enterprises. The liberal party, which is backed by a number of industrialists, opposes any drastic changes in this field.

There was a broad agreement on a tax reform that would favor the lower and middle income groups.

The present government remains in power until Oct. 20.

The SPD–FDP coalition has a 12-seat edge in the Bundestag (parliament) over the CDU, which will represent a formidable opposition force with 242 seats among the 496 voting members.

A number of observers believe that Brandt's task will be extremely difficult. There are some fears that West Germany's postwar political stability may be seriously threatened.

For the time being, however, Brandt's Social Democrats were jubilant. They promised to lead the country along a new path marked by imaginative ideas and the search for new formulas.

But the new government is not likely to introduce immediately any sweeping changes.

Its first concern is the fate of the West German mark which, freed from government controls on Monday, has shot up 6 percent since.

The measure permitting the mark to float amounted to a de facto revaluation and caused a number of problems for West Germany's partners in the European Common Market.

The West German bankers now are generally agreed that formal revaluation is a necessity. The SPD favors it too. The revaluation will most likely be equal to the amount at which the deutschemark will stabilize the days to come on the free market.

The promised reforms in internal matters are not likely to be worked out before spring at the earliest. And Brandt's planned initiatives toward the Communist world are not about to bear immediate fruit, being limited by the nature of Soviet response.

The new regime will be marked, above all, by participation of younger, generally more dynamic and progressive elements. But no radical changes are expected in staid, prosperous West Germany.

NIXON DISEMBOWELS MODEL CITIES

(Mr. PODELL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PODELL. Mr. Speaker, it has been an ill-concealed secret that the Nixon administration has no understanding of or sympathy for the cities of our land. Particularly is this true of the cities of the Northeast, Midwest, and Middle Atlantic States. At last the mask has been completely dropped, for yesterday the President signaled a slowdown and stretchout for the entire model cities program of urban aid. He did it by cutting $215 million from planned expenditures this year. This is a 42-percent reduction in spending estimates for the fiscal year ending next June 30, and it signals utter disaster for the very segments of our urban areas requiring the most help the fastest.

In 45 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, 150 cities are now participating in this program, originated and passed during the last administration. They are told that Presidential required budget cuts and slow starts are responsible. Forty-one of these communities have already signed contracts moving their model cities programs from planning to implementation. As the Nixon administration sinks this particular fiscal knife to the hilt in the stomachs of these cities, it smilingly insists none of them will lose any of their promised money. Logical? Believable? When you can drive nails in a snowbank and steam shovels fly like butterflies.

Mr. Speaker, this program has moved along rapidly until President Nixon laid heavy hands on it. This was the first year for implementing plans to attack all causes of poverty and blight within a slum through one integrated plan. The concept is to funnel all the renewal Federal-local money can buy into target slum neighborhoods. It was our brightest urban renewal concept about to reach fruition. It had roused many bright hopes. Now all has been destroyed by a heartless administration with no compassion for the weak, no desire to help the downtrodden, and no understanding of the malaise and ills gripping America.

All plans left by the preceding administration, which called for funding model cities programs of 65 cities, have been canceled by the Republicans. The slowdown is expected to have its heaviest impact on the 34 first-round model cities locales that have yet to sign grant contracts, and on 75 second-round choices still in the planning phase.

Yesterday the reaction of every big-city mayor was universally negative and complete with condemnation of the President's action. Yet the worst reaction is yet to come.

What has been done in the past pales before the accumulated negative actions of this Government. President Nixon is using his executive power to wipe out almost all gains we have so painfully made in solving our urban problems. The Office of Economic Opportunity has been ruined. Job Corps, VISTA, and the Peace Corps have been effectively stifled or altered. Efforts by Government to fight water and air pollution have been muted or derailed by the President. Consumerism on the part of Government is now a delusion. Medical research has been crippled and research centers are already beginning to close. Now model cities joins cuts made in education and aid to libraries. It is more than disgusting, saddening, and depressing. It is self-defeating, and no phrase better describes the policy now being followed by the Nixon administration.

If we shortchange our children, allow pollution to continue unhindered, adjourn all efforts to end poverty, or aid the consumer, cripple medical research and conservation efforts and anihilate the average worker's buying power through disastrous economic polices, what will happen to our Nation? After Nixon, we shall be left with a hamstrung economy, devastating unemployment, and a series of social problems which will be worse and far more severe because they have been ignored. Cancers do not wither when unattended. They grow larger and more dangerous.

Mr. Speaker, I am very much saddened and apprehensive over these actions. Especially because they are the death knell for the hopes of so many poorer, humble people—citizens who were counting on this help. Now the dream of millions has vanished at the hands of a leader who spoke of compassion and who now exercises the cruelest of national options. Let us remember this well.

There has not been a single compassionate act or word from this administration. Everything is harsh, with edges and surrounded by "No." It is somehow reminiscent of Herbert Hoover, who stood stolidly while America crashed in ruins around him and people starved, mouthing the economic catchwords of another era. Somehow, they did not replace food or work to the American people. The President ought to look at yesterday's Massachusetts election if he wants to find out how well he is fooling the people of this country.

TROUBLED LAOS NEEDS FRIENDS NOW

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, not long ago I visited much of Southeast Asia. There, much more is at stake than the struggle in South Vietnam which has so preoccupied the American people during the past 4 years. And regardless of the importance of that struggle, we cannot ignore other troubled areas of Southeast Asia. For instance, the American people are not as well aware, nor was I, until my recent trip, that another Southeast Asian nation is seriously threatened by Hanoi's invading troops. This nation is the small Kingdom of Laos which lies alongside of North and South Vietnam to the west.

Laos is truly ancient among the nations of the modern world. Its written history dates back, long before ours, to the mid-14th century. Yet in another sense, Laos is a young nation, having regained its independence in 1953 after several generations of French colonial rule.

Today, the freedom of Laos is menaced by a new and much harsher form of colonialism. This time the threat comes from neighboring North Vietnam, which for many years has sought to impose its domination over Laos by a clandestine

campaign of military aggression. Lao Prime Minister Prince Souvanna Phouma has often called this conflict "the forgotten war" in his appeals for international support for his embattled nation. But Laos should not be forgotten. Its security is vitally important to a lasting settlement of the war in Vietnam and to the broader question of freedom and stability in Southeast Asia.

To understand the extent of North Vietnamese interference in Laos, we must go back to 1950, when a Lao Communist front group, the Pathet Lao, was formed in the mountains of Northeast Laos under North Vietnamese auspices. The ostensible leader of the Pathet Lao was, and remains Prince Souphanouvong, the half brother of Lao Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. From the very beginning, Hanoi has controlled the Pathet Lao with an iron hand, using it as a faithful servant in its quest for hegemony in Laos. But in spite of generous North Vietnamese training, advice and supplies, the Pathet Lao have never succeeded in arousing a broad following among the Lao people. Indeed, as a tool of a hostile foreign power, they are anathema to genuine Lao nationalists. Thus, Hanoi learned, at an early date, that it would have to do much of its own dirty work in Laos to fulfill its ambitions for control there.

This meant the introduction of regular North Vietnamese troops to fight in Laos. They came for the first time in 1953 and 1954, during the first Indochinese war. And at the Geneva Conference in 1954, they used the presence of their troops in Laos to assure Pathet Lao control of two northern Lao provinces. In this way they established a military and political base in Laos from which they could launch later campaigns on Lao soil.

For the next 5 years, Hanoi postponed its efforts in Laos while it rebuilt at home. But in 1959, it was ready again to commit major forces in Laos and new North Vietnamese battalions swept into Laos that year. The Communists made major gains, and a crisis of international dimensions devloped as the United States rushed to support the Lao Government with material and advisors, while the Soviet Union did the same for the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao.

By 1961, it became clear to the United States and the Russians that only a neutral status for Laos would permit it to survive as a nation and help insure stability in Southeast Asia. Many other nations agreed and the result was the 1962 Geneva Conference and the 1962 Geneva accords in which 14 nations, including the United States, Red China, the Soviet Union, and North Vietnam, pledged themselves to the independence and neutrality of Laos, and its freedom from all foreign military interference. A neutral coalition government was then formed under Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma in which all Laos factions, including the Pathet Lao, were represented.

The 1962 Geneva accords neutralizing Laos appeared to be a workable solution for Laos at that time. And indeed, they would have been, if the North Vietnamese had not betrayed their signature of the agreements. Instead of withdrawing their legions from Laos, as they solemnly promised to do, they withdrew only a token force of 40 men. Cynically violating their international commitment, the North Vietnamese kept an estimated 10,000 troops in north Laos. There they waited to resume their military campaign against the Lao Government when the time was ripe.

With North Vietnamese battalions backing them up, but with little domestic political support, the Pathet Lao were afraid of open competition in the Lao political arena. In 1963 they abandoned their seats in the coalition government and returned to open rebellion against the government, with heightened North Vietnamese assistance.

The escalation of the war in Vietnam then brought new North Vietnamese depredations in Laos. In order to wage war in South Vietnam, Hanoi needed a safe transport route to carry men and material southward. So it built the Ho Chi Minh trail, a vast complex of roads and trails that winds through the mountains and jungles of south Laos toward South Vietnam.

With ever-increasing momentum, North Vietnamese troops have continued to flow into Laos both in the Ho Chi Minh trail area in the south and in the north. Despite North Vietnam's involvement in the fighting with South Vietnam, it has been estimated that by 1968 there were as many as 40,000 North Vietnamese troops committed to the Laotian conflict. Today, it is known that there has been a substantial increase in this troop strength and with the introduction of these new troops, Hanoi has stepped up its timetable for aggression in Laos. During the past 2 years, its invading armies have hurled offensives against Lao Government positions and pushed deeper and deeper into Lao territory.

Interestingly, the North Vietnamese have been scarcely aided at all, during recent campaigns, by the Pathet Lao whose ranks have grown progressively weaker and ineffectual. The conflict in Laos has thus become, quite clearly, a war between the Royal Lao Government and the forces of North Vietnam. One cannot help but be appalled by the inequality of this conflict, even though North Vietnam is heavily committed in the war in South Vietnam. Laos has a population of less than 3 million, and probably 1 million of these live in Communist-occupied and controlled areas. Yet with few people and little in the way of supplies and weapons, the Laotians maintain an army of 100,000. This is the equivalent to forces of 10 million in the United States.

Hanoi's goal in this cruel war of aggression has remained constant: to destroy the neutral, independent Government of Laos and to replace it with a puppet regime of Pathet Lao Communists, reinforced, of course, with North Vietnamese military might and political cadres.

The cost of the war to the Lao people has been truly staggering. Tens of thousands of Lao have been killed or wounded. Hundreds of thousands have fled their homes as refugees from the brutal yoke of North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao control. The war has devastated the Lao economy and frustrated the Government's hopes for economic and social development. Already a poor and underdeveloped nation, Laos has been forced to devote a vast portion of its meager resources and able-bodied manpower to defend its very existence.

The fact that Laos continues to resist North Vietnam's campaign of aggression is a tribute to the courage of this small nation and the leadership of its leader, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. Holding steadfast to the principle of neutrality under the 1962 Geneva Accords, Prime Minister Souvanna has never asked for foreign troops to defend his nation against Hanoi's invading troops. The Royal Lao Army and loyal irregular forces have given valiant account of themselves and the enemy has had to pay dearly for his aggression. The Royal Lao Air Force is truly one of the wonders of the modern military world. Its young pilots regularly fly three sorities a day and have been doing so day in and day out for years, some for as many as 1,000 missions. The propeller-driven aircraft—T–28's—they fly, which were provided under U.S. military assistance, are ideally suited to conditions in Laos. The enemy fears them justifiably, for without them, it is doubtful whether the loyalist forces could have successfully continued their resistance to the North Vietnamese aggressions.

Souvanna has, however, called repeatedly for diplomatic and financial support from the signatories of the 1962 Geneva Accords who are pledged to protect the sovereignty and neutrality of Laos.

I am proud to say that the United States as a signatory of the 1962 Geneva Accords, has responded to these appeals with economic aid, military supplies, and strong diplomatic support. Presidents and Secretaries of State of three successive American administrations have spoken out strongly in favor of a sovereign and neutral Laos and have condemned Hanoi's predatory war of war against the Lao people.

Our delegation at the Paris talks has emphasized time and again that a peaceful settlement in Vietnam must include new guarantees for the inviolability of Laos and the removal of all North Vietnamese troops there. One needs only to glance at a map to realize that a withdrawal of North Vietnam troops from South Vietnam would be meaningless, if they are allowed to lurk nearby in neighboring Laos, waiting to strike once again into South Vietnam.

In the larger context of Southeast Asia, it is clear that no country there will be safe if little Laos is swallowed up by an imperialist North Vietnam, nor will the cause of international law and justice be strengthened, if this small nation is abandoned to its lawless neighbor.

Let us then take notice that there is indeed a war in Laos, which is a very serious matter to the United States and to the world. And let us serve notice on the new leaders in Hanoi, whoever they may be, that the world does not intend to forget the brave people of Laos as the victims of just another "forgotten war."

CHANGE OF HOUSE RULES REGARDING APPROPRIATIONS LEGISLATION

(Mr. CEDERBERG asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CEDERBERG. Mr. Speaker, earlier this week I supported my good friend and colleague from New Hampshire (Mr. WYMAN) by cosponsoring a resolution—House Resolution 558—calling for a change in the rules of the House regarding appropriations legislation. While I believe that this is a good first step toward a resolution of our present difficulties in the area of funding legislation, it is only a first step.

In order to promote a more realistic approach to the problem of appropriations for the future, I introduced a bill yesterday which would change the fiscal year to conform to the calendar year. I believe that this is the only sure way to provide for a continuing solution to our problem. Each year we find that the Congress is in session later and later, and the appropriations bills are acted upon last. The legislation which I am introducing will greatly reduce the uncertainty which presently plagues Government agencies and will allow for a more adequate review of spending policies and needs.

It is time that we recognize that we cannot expect our Government to operate efficiently or effectively when moneys for programs are not accurately programed in advance. We are faced this year with the necessity of passing continuing resolutions in nearly all areas. This places a great burden on the various Government agencies which must plan their expenditures. We here in the Congress have complained bitterly about waste in Government and yet we do not provide one of the most necessary vehicles for the elimination of much of the waste which occurs.

A number of my colleagues have introduced legislation similar to mine. I feel that the bill which I have submitted recognizes several problems which are overlooked in other proposals. Section 2 of my bill would provide a vehicle for the orderly transition from the present system to the new one by directing that the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, in consultation with the Comptroller General, make provisions for the change so as not to adversely affect either the agencies of the Government or the collection of revenues.

Further, the bill reflects the need for conforming legislation in areas where reports and estimates are required from instrumentalities of the Government. This would bring accounting procedures into line with the new fiscal year.

I sincerely hope that the experiences of the last few years have not been lost on my colleagues and that we will be able to take some action on my proposal in the near future. It is my honest belief that the smooth functioning of government programs on both the Federal and local level is at stake.

SCHENECTADY GAZETTE CELEBRATES ITS 75TH ANNIVERSARY

(Mr. STRATTON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, one of the leading newspapers in upstate New York, the Schenectady Gazette of Schenectady, N.Y., celebrated its 75th anniversary on Wednesday, October 1. I have been acquainted with the Gazette since I was a boy. It has made a great contribution to effective journalism in Schenectady and the surrounding areas.

I am proud on this occasion to join in saluting Mr. John E. N. Hume, Jr., the editor of the Gazette, its fine staff, and its Washington correspondent, Alan S. Emory, for the great job they have done, and to wish them many more years of continued community service in the years ahead.

Under leave to extend my remarks I include a letter from President Nixon and an anniversary editorial, both of which appeared on the front page of the anniversary edition on October 1:

FROM THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, September 17, 1969.

Mr. JOHN HUME,
Editor, Schenectady Gazette,
Schenectady, N.Y.

DEAR MR. HUME: My warmest congratulations go out to The Schenectady Gazette on its 75th anniversary.

Your publication has been a vital factor in the progress and growth of your community. You have enriched a tradition that is among the most cherished possessions of our democracy: the freedom of the press.

As I salute your past accomplishments, I look forward with you, your staff and readers to continued success in the years ahead.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON.

AN EDITORIAL

The Schenectady Gazette takes pride in announcing its 75th anniversary as a daily newspaper.

In the Daily Gazette of Oct. 1, 1894, the proprietors greeted the public as follows, in part:

"We today present to the people of our city the first issue of the Daily Gazette. We do not claim for it perfection but simply present it as the first evidence of an earnest desire on our part to give the City of Schenectady a newspaper that will seek to gather and print all the news while it is news and that it will be representative of the progressive and enterprising spirit which has so rapidly developed here . . .

"We appreciate the fact that to attain success we must deserve it. It shall be our labor to deserve it and in our efforts to that end we bespeak the hearty cooperation and kindly support of the people, whom we come to serve . . ."

The intentions of the Gazette thus were clearly outlined, and we are appreciative of the support from readers and advertisers alike that has made it possible for us to keep the faith that we expressed 75 years ago today.

The Gazette, as its first editorial in 1894 pointed out, was not launched as an "organ" and it has not been such. Its aim was to present the news from day to day as fairly and completely as it could. Our belief that it has done so is strengthened by the fact that in spite of the handicaps of various kinds faced by newspapers during the past 75 years the Gazette has risen to a position of prominence in the state. It is the only daily newspaper published in Schenectady.

Basically a news story or an advertisement is the same as it was three quarters of a century ago, but the difference between today's Gazette and the paper of 1894 is that of day and night. The four-page issues of the Gazette in the early days contained some 435 column-inches of news and roughly 110 column-inches of advertising. These days our editions carry 10 to 20 times as much. Not only the volume of news but the diversity of material has increased by leaps and bounds. Such fields as sports, women's activities, financial affairs, stage and screen, science, music, church and lodge affairs are covered far more efficiently than in former years and in addition the Gazette regularly carries a wide variety of columns of comment, analysis and instruction along with many other features of interest to young and old.

The Gazette is proud to have been in the front in the matter of physical improvements. In its early decades the Gazette was the first paper in the city to have the rotary press that made the flatbed press obsolete, the first to install linotypes that replaced most of the hand typesetting, the first to obtain stereotyping equipment, the first in the city to have the teletype machine by which the news is received from throughout the nation and the world. With each new advance, such as enlargement of our plant to include a separate building for the presses, the use of color in printing, improved picture reproduction processes, improved typography and makeup, the Gazette has been enabled to provide a more satisfying paper. Each improvement has reflected a confidence on the part of the Gazette not only in itself but in the community and the area. Time has shown that confidence to be justified.

The Gazette has endeavored not only to present the news but to offer what it believes are intelligent channels for thought on the part of the readers. It has encouraged and cooperated with organizations whose programs appear conducive to the public's welfare and advancement. We believe we have contributed significantly to the growth and advancement of Schenectady and the steadily widening area which this newspaper serves.

Twenty-five years ago today we said, on our 50th anniversary:

"We have no more idea than the next person what the next 50 years will bring, either to the Gazette, our community or the world. But on looking back over our half-century of service as a daily newspaper we cannot escape the conclusion that despite discouragements, handicaps, differences of opinion, depressions, wars, catastrophes and all the other heartbreaking events that have taken place, many forward steps have been achieved . . ."

We can say the same thing today, well aware of the fact that this area, like other parts of the nation, faces many problems, some of which did not exist 50 or 75 years ago.

We welcome the continuing challenge. We are determined to serve the people of this area to even greater degree as we head for our next big milestone, the 100-year mark.

CARROLL A. "PINK" GARDNER, A GREAT ATHLETE AND A GREAT PUBLIC SERVANT IN SCHENECTADY

(Mr. STRATTON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, last Sunday very suddenly one of the really great citizens of my former home city passed away, in the midst of a long and very brilliant career of public service,

Carroll A. "Pink" Gardner, Schenectady County clerk since 1936.

Although we ran against each other in a primary election in 1958 which preceded my election to the House for the first time, we had been friends for a long time before that, and he remained my friend and counsellor. I knew him when I was just a boy and he was the new world's light-heavyweight wrestling champion, in the days before wrestling became more of an entertainment than a sport. He helped me get into political life for the first time in Schenectady and I have always tried to emulate his courage, his independence, and his consistent ability to put service to the community ahead of mere partisianship.

"Pink" Gardner was the greatest vote getter on either party in Schenectady. It is typical of this great and generous and energetic individual that at the time of his death he was, at the age of 75, running vigorously for reelection to his 12th consecutive term as county clerk. He did not believe in retirement; he was still young and vigorous at 75.

Carroll Gardner was the son-in-law of a former Member of this House, the late Congressman George R. Lunn, of Schenectady, and was himself three times a candidate for Congress. He would have been a credit and a great addition to this House.

Schenectady and the people of the New York State have lost a devoted and dedicated public servant whose match will not be seen for many a year to come. And I have lost a friend.

Under leave to extend by remarks, I include an article on Carroll Gardner from the Schenectady Gazette of September 29, and an editorial from the same paper of the following day:

"PINK" GARDNER DIES AT FALL OUTING AT 75

Carroll A. "Pink" Gardner, 75, running for his 12th consecutive term as Schenectady County Clerk, collapsed and died about 5 p.m. yesterday at his summer home, Fieldstone Lodge, Newfane, Vt.

Mr. Gardner and his wife, the former Eleanor Lunn, were hosting the annual fall outing of the Schenectady Old Time Football Players Inc. when he was stricken.

He reportedly entered the kitchen of the summer home and in the words of one guest, "just toppled over." A physician was summoned and pronounced the long-time county officer dead.

A medical examiner's report will be issued later, it was reported.

Survivors include his wife, and three children, Carroll A. Gardner, Jr., Ann Arbor, Mich.; George R. L. Gardner, Titusville, Fla.; and Mrs. James H. Jewell, Sinking Springs, Pa.

When Mr. Gardner, a one-time champion professional wrestler, announced his candidacy earlier this year, the Schenectady GOP was getting some bad news since the Democratic county clerk had proved the most successful vote-getter in local elections in the past three decades.

There had been speculation prior to his announcement that he would not run, but after consultations with Democratic officials, his candidacy was announced.

George V. Palmer, County Democratic chairman, called Mr. Gardner yesterday "a man of exceptional capability in many fields of endeavor. He will be deeply missed by the community as a whole and by the Democratic Party, both of which held him in such high esteem."

Mr. Gardner's first political office was attained in 1931 when he became the first Democratic sheriff in 20 years in what was described as an easy victory.

He took office as county clerk in November of 1936 (his first year was by gubernatorial appointment) and some of the staff who came with him then are still in their posts today.

Born in Poughkeepsie, he came here with his family in March, 1908, at he age of 13. His father, the late Charles N. Gardner, established a monument business which he later took over.

He went through the Schenectady Public Schools and began wrestling here as an amateur in 1911 for the Schenectady YMCA.

His amateur career led to the professional ranks two years later and he won the middleweight wrestling crown in 1922 at Boston, Mass., and the lightweight title in 1932 at Camden, N.J.

The son-in-law of the late Lt. Gov. George R. Lunn, who was also a Schenectady mayor and congressman, Mr. Gardner at times even had the support of the Republicans when he ran for the post, due to his virtual "shoo-in" vote getting.

Mr. Gardner ran unsuccessfully for Congress in 1934 and although losing in the predominantly Republican district in which he ran, managed to take the county.

He made two more unsuccessful Congressional bids, running in 1946 when he again took Schenectady County. In 1958, he was the organization nominee but lost in the primary to Representative Samuel S. Stratton.

Considered by many "the great neutral" in the local Democratic Party he had been given credit on numerous occasions for holding the party's many factions together.

Despite outstanding loyalty to the party organization, his independence had been displayed on occasion, most obviously in 1950 when he opened fire on the city Democratic administration for failure to crack down on gambling.

His statement led to a grand jury investigation, police department shakeup and collapse of the administration in the 1951 campaign.

Mr. Gardner was a difficult target for his political opponents to attack, since his office duties were so efficiently handled that the department was once chosen as a model for training of state motor vehicle district supervisors.

Besides his former career of operating the family monument business, he also operated the Gardner School of Physical Education and did public relations management for a brewery.

He unveiled his own grave mounment in 1951, which included two beaches and a reproduction of a 300 B.C. statue, "The Wrestlers."

Arrangements for funeral services for Mr. Gardner, who was active in a variety of civic, professional and political organizations, are incomplete.

"PINK" GARDNER

Schenectady County probably will never have another public office holder like Carroll A. "Pink" Gardner, county clerk who died Sunday at the age of 75 at his summer home at Newfane, Vt.

Every time Mr. Gardner ran for re-election some people said "he may have gone to the well once too often," but his popularity did not wane and he had little demolishing his Republican opponents one by one regardless of what the rest of the respective tickets accomplished.

As with any public office with which the voter-taxpayer has direct contact there were complaints about the operation of the motor vehicle bureau, which is part of the county clerk's responsibilities, yet Mr. Gardner's bureau was once chosen as a model for training of state motor vehicle district supervisors. In most cases the camplaints came from people who waited too long before applying for licenses.

Mr. Gardner was remarkable not only for his longevity in office but because of his ability to take an independent, or neutral, stance while remaining Democrat. He was, in a sense, a one-man third party, so popular that if the Democrats had wanted to reject him because of his independent attitude they would not have dared. Usually his Republican opponent was running largely to get his name before the public, knowing he had little chance of beating "Pink."

"Pink" Gardner was widely known in his younger days not as a politician but athlete. He held wrestling championships in the days before wrestling became a trumped-up show. On the side, he was a successful businessman with a monument company and a physical education school.

"Pink" Gardner continued to "go to the well" because he knew most of the voters were still with him. He died, undefeated as county clerk, after a full life, with many friends and many satisfactions.

PERSONAL ANNOUNCEMENT

(Mr. KAZEN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KAZEN. Mr. Speaker, my colleague, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. PICKLE) has asked that I tell the House today of the reason for his absence. Due to a commitment made a number of months ago, he is home in his district today to attend a special ceremony in which the University of Texas at Austin is honoring the Clerk of the House, the Honorable Pat Jennings, and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. PICKLE).

FAVORABLE COMMENTS ON PRESIDENT'S RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, the President's recent press conference drew much favorable comment—as well it might have. Typical is the following editoral from the New York Daily News of September 27:

NIXON LAYS IT ON THE LINE

President Richard M. Nixon—calmly, candidly and we think brilliantly—covered a lot of important ground in his televised White House news conference yesterday.

We particularly admired his booting into the middle of next week the current dove demands that a definite date be set for a complete U.S. troop pullout from Vietnam.

That, said the President with obvious truth, would only encourage the enemy to hang on until the stated day. He called such talk defeatist, and observed acidly that with less of such dove prattle in this country we could get on faster toward winding up the war.

He again refused to consider selling the South Vietnamese out to any government unwanted by them.

In the war against inflation, Mr. Nixon pointed out that the federal government now is tightening its own belt. It is not merely trying to jawbone industry and labor into keeping prices and wages down while government spending goes on unchecked. If industry and labor will cooperate, we'll get inflation under control that much sooner.

These were the highlights of the conference.

Our reaction: With every news conference, this President looks greater and greater. Let's be thankful for that.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted as follows to:

Mrs. GREEN of Oregon, for Friday, October 3, 1969, on account of illness.

Mr. FALLON (at the request of Mr. GARMATZ), for today, on account of official business.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. DELLENBACK), to revise and extend their remarks, and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama, for 30 minutes, today.

Mr. BUSH, for 15 minutes, on October 6.

Mr. HOGAN, for 30 minutes, today.

Mr. WATSON, for 10 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. MIKVA), to revise and extend their remarks, and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. GONZALEZ, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. BOLAND, for 15 minutes, today.

Mr. RARICK, for 15 minutes, today.

Mr. GONZALEZ, for 30 minutes, on October 6.

Mr. CONYERS, for 30 minutes, on October 6.

Mr. CONYERS, for 30 minutes, on October 7.

Mr. MIKVA, for 60 minutes, on October 14.

Mr. OLSEN, for 1 hour, on October 14.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. ALBERT, to include with his remarks a copy of the report of the Twentieth Century Fund Commission on Campaign Costs in the Electronic Era.

Mr. COUGHLIN, to follow the remarks of Mr. RYAN on the Leggett amendment.

Mr. STUBBLEFIELD, to revise and extend his remarks immediately following those of Mr. BRAY this morning.

Mr. PODELL, to revise and extend his remarks.

Mr. RYAN, to revise and extend his remarks prior to the vote on the Jacobs amendment.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON, to extend his remarks in Committee of the Whole following the introduction of an amendment by the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) on the freedom fighter.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. DELLENBACK), to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. ROUDEBUSH.

Mr. GUDE in two instances.

Mr. SCHERLE.

Mr. KYL.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin.

Mr. PETTIS.

Mr. WYMAN in two instances.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM in five instances.

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania in five instances.

Mr. FOREMAN in two instances.

Mr. LUKENS in two instances.

Mr. DERWINSKI.

Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT.

Mr. NELSEN.

Mr. HOSMER in two instances.

Mr. KEITH.

Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia.

Mr. RUTH in five instances.

Mr. COLLINS in five instances.

Mr. CARTER.

Mr. SCHWENGEL.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. MIKVA), and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. O'HARA.

Mr. MATSUNAGA in three instances.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS.

Mr. HELSTOSKI in four instances.

Mr. EDWARDS of California.

Mr. DIGGS.

Mr. ANNUNZIO in two instances.

Mr. GONZALEZ in two instances.

Mr. ROONEY of New York.

Mr. HOWARD.

Mr. KLUCZYNSKI.

Mr. DOWNING.

Mr. RARICK in three instances.

Mr. VIGORITO.

Mr. CONYERS in five instances.

Mr. POWELL in two instances.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON.

Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts.

Mr. MOORHEAD in two instances.

Mr. BOLAND.

Mr. VANIK in two instances.

Mr. PATTEN in two instances.

Mr. CLAY in six instances.

Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey in two instances.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois in two instances.

Mr. HAGAN in three instances.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 8 o'clock and 23 minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until Monday, October 6, 1969, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1213. A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting documents classifying the St. Croix River, establishing boundaries, and setting forth development plans, pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 90–542, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (H. Doc. No. 91–165); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and ordered to be printed with illustrations.

1214. A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting documents classifying the Wolf River, establishing boundaries, and setting forth development plans, pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 90–542, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (H. Doc. No. 91–166); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and ordered to be printed with illustrations.

1215. A letter from the Chief, Forest Service, Department of Agriculture, transmitting documents for the classification, boundaries, and development of the Eleven Point River, Mo., pursuant to the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (H. Doc. No. 91–167); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and ordered to be printed with illustrations.

1216. A letter from the Chairman, Indian Claims Commission, transmitting a report that proceedings have been concluded with respect to Docket No. 171, William L. Paul, Sr., on the relation of *Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, a tribe, band or group, petitioner,* v. *The United States of America,* defendant, pursuant to the provisions of section 21 of the Indian Claims Commission Act, as amended (60 Stat. 1055; 25 U.S.C. 70t); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin (for himself, Mr. GERALD R. FORD, Mr. ARENDS, Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois, Mr. CRAMER, Mr. POFF, Mr. RHODES, Mr. TAFT, Mr. BOB WILSON, Mr. SMITH of California, Mr. UTT, Mr. SCHNEEBELI, Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia, Mr. BUSH, Mr. MORTON, and Mr. CHAMBERLAIN):

H.R. 14173. A bill to authorize a family assistance plan providing basic benefits to low-income families with children, to provide incentives for employment and training to improve the capacity for employment of members of such families, to achieve greater uniformity of treatment of recipients under the Federal-State public assistance programs and to otherwise improve such programs, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. GERALD R. FORD (for himself, Mr. BEALL of Maryland, Mr. BIESTER, Mr. BOW, Mr. BROWN of Ohio, Mr. BROWN of Michigan, Mr. CARTER, Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN, Mr. COUGHLIN, Mr. COWGER, Mr. CUNNINGHAM, Mr. ESCH, Mr. ESHLEMAN, Mr. FISH, Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN, Mr. GROVER, Mr. GUBSER, Mr. HALPERN, Mr. HANSEN of Idaho, Mr. HORTON, Mr. KUYKENDALL, Mr. LUJAN, Mr. MCCLORY, Mr. MCCLOSKEY, and Mr. MCKNEALLY):

H.R. 14174. A bill to authorize a family assistance plan providing basic benefits to low-income families with children, to provide incentives for employment and training to improve the capacity for employment of members of such families, to achieve greater uniformity of treatment of recipients under the Federal-State public assistance programs and to otherwise improve such programs, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. GERALD R. FORD (for himself, Mrs. MAY, Mr. MESKILL, Mr. MORSE, Mr. MOSHER, Mr. RAILSBACK, Mr. ROBISON, Mr. RUPPE, Mr. SCHADEBERG, Mr. SCOTT, Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin, Mr. WEICKER, Mr. WHALLEY, Mr. WHITEHURST, Mr. WIDNALL, Mr. WYDLER, Mr. WYLIE, Mr. ZWACH, Mr. HOSMER, and Mr. BROCK):

H.R. 14175. A bill to authorize a family assistance plan providing basic benefits to low-income families with children, to provide incentives for employment and training to improve the capacity for employment of members of such families, to achieve greater uniformity of treatment of recipients under the Federal-State public assistance programs and to otherwise improve such programs, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. ABERNETHY:

H.R. 14176. A bill to provide for a Delegate from the District of Columbia to the Senate; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. BINGHAM:

H.R. 14177. A bill, The Trade Quality and Consumer Information Act of 1969; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts (for himself and Mr. WYMAN):

H.R. 14178. A bill to establish an orderly trade in textiles and in leather footwear; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. DINGELL (for himself and Mr. Moss):

H.R. 14179. A bill to provide that the fiscal year of the United States shall coincide with the calendar year; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. FRASER (for himself, Mr. KARTH, Mr. ROSENTHAL, Mr. BROWN of California, and Mr. CONYERS):

H.R. 14180. A bill to prohibit hiring professional strikebreakers in interstate labor disputes; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. GROSS:

H.R. 14181. A bill to encourage the growth of international trade on a fair and equitable basis; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. HELSTOSKI:

H.R. 14182. A bill to establish a national program of assistance to the States with the goal of achieving equalized excellence in schools throughout the Nation over a 10-year period; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

H.R. 14183. A bill to provide for special programs for children with specific learning disabilities; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

H.R. 14184. A bill to designate the third Sunday in October of each year, as "Foster Parents Day," and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania:

H.R. 14185. A bill to amend the Social Security Act to provide an increase in benefits under the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance program, provide for automatic benefit increases thereafter in the event of future increases in the cost of living, provide for future automatic increases in the earnings and contribution base, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. KEITH:

H.R. 14186. A bill to provide for the licensing of personnel on certain vessels; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MELCHER:

H.R. 14187. A bill to amend the act of March 29, 1956, chapter 107, 70 Stat. 62 (25 U.S.C. 483a) entitled "An act to authorize the execution of mortgages and deeds of trust on individual Indian trust or restricted land"; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. MILLS:

H.R. 14188. A bill to amend the Tariff Schedules of the United States to repeal the special tariff treatment accorded to articles assembled abroad with components produced in the United States; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. NELSEN (for himself, Mr. GERALD R. FORD, Mr. SPRINGER, Mr. O'KONSKI, Mr. HARSHA, Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia, Mr. WINN, Mr. STEIGER of Arizona, Mrs. MAY, Mr. HOGAN, Mr. CRAMER, Mr. POFF, and Mr. MCCLORY):

H.R. 14189. A bill to amend chapter 23 of title 16 of the District of Columbia Code to revise proceedings regarding juvenile delinquency and related matters, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. O'KONSKI:

H.R. 14190. A bill to improve farm income and insure adequate supplies of agricultural commodities by extending and improving certain commodity programs; to the Committee on Agriculture.

H.R. 14191. A bill to provide additional benefits for optometry officers of the uniformed services; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. RUPPE:

H.R. 14192. A bill to amend the act of August 1, 1958, to authorize restrictions and prohibitions on the use of insecticides, herbicides, fungicides, and pesticides which pollute the navigable waters of the United States; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. WHITEHURST:

H.R. 14193. A bill to amend title II of the Social Security Act so as to liberalize the conditions governing eligibility of blind persons to receive disability insurance benefits thereunder; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. WYLIE:

H.R. 14194. A bill to strengthen the penalty provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ABBITT:

H.R. 14195. A bill to revise the law governing contests of elections of Members of the House of Representatives, and for other purposes; to the Committee on House Administration.

By Mr. MICHEL:

H.J. Res. 921. Joint resolution to provide for the issuance of a special postage stamp in commemoration of Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. PEPPER (for himself, Mrs. GRIFFITHS, Mr. NIX, Mr. WALDIE, Mr. WATSON, Mr. WIGGINS, and Mr. DENNEY):

H. Con. Res. 397. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress with respect to the Surgeon General conducting a study of the social, behavioral, medical, and pharmacological questions relating to the use of marihuana; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. KEITH:

H.R. 14196. A bill for the relief of Carlota Gujmares; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MESKILL:

H.R. 14197. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Aprus Eshoo; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ROYBAL:

H.R. 14198. A bill for the relief of Ali Samimi; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

HOUSE PASSAGE OF H.R. 14000

HON. MARIO BIAGGI

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, October 3, 1969

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 14000, the fiscal year 1970 military procurement authorization bill, has been passed by the House. I felt compelled, out of concern for national defenses and the national interest, to support final passage, despite the fact there are many expenditures in the bill I opposed and expressed my opposition by voting on a number of amendments offered. It grieves me, and my colleagues who feel as I do, that the bill appeared in this final form. Notwithstanding the objectionable portions, my position was motivated by a sense of responsibility and concern for my country and for the hundreds of thousands of American boys who are currently serving in the military services, who require continued support until the end of the war when they can once again return to their homes.

Nonetheless, Mr. Speaker, it is incumbent upon me to etch into history a brief but vitally important footnote relating to the manner in which this bill was considered by the House of Representatives.

As reported out of the Committee on Armed Services H.R. 14000 authorized appropriations totaling $21,347,860,000. This report—No. 91–522—ran to 176 pages, and was dated September 26, 1969. The report followed extensive hearings on military procurement authorization which total thousands of pages of testimony. Yet the bill was first taken up on the House floor on October 1, 1969, which hardly gave time for due consideration of either the hearings or the report, and was passed shortly thereafter.

When all is said and done, probably the key vote in House consideration of H.R. 14000 was on House Resolution 561, by which only 4 hours of general debate were to be devoted to evaluation of the bill. This resolution passed in a rollcall vote on October 1, by 342–61. I joined 60 of my colleagues in voting "nay."

This particular vote, Mr. Speaker, raises grave questions about the propriety of the approach to basic national defense issues that this body has taken. As my colleague, Representative JOHN E. Moss of California stated on the floor just before passage of House Resolution 561:

We ought to know what we are doing. We ought to have adequate time to engage in meaningful debate and not be forced to compact it all into four hours. I know what is going to happen. We are going to try to get the four hours out of the way probably today and then under the pressure of avoiding a Friday session try to limit debate tomorrow. If we debated this thing for a week we would be giving it inadequate attention.

I believe that sufficient time be provided to consider every aspect of this authorization bill—to weigh all of the varied viewpoints that could well have provided substantial savings in military expenditures without endangering national security. These savings could have been designated to promote a healthier domestic economy and society. Further, such savings would assist in removing some of the inflationary pressures which are presently threatening the economy and affecting the wage-earner by reducing the value of his earnings. As a practical man, I believe it is logical to assume that it would be in the best interest of all concerned if spending more time resulted in spending less money in the area of military priorities.

What is done is done, Mr. Speaker. What is important is what will be done in the future. Never again, I submit to